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It has become generally accepted among public policy stakeholders, practitioners and scholars
that street – level bureaucrats play a vital role in policy implementation. Because of that, street –
level bureaucrats are attracting considerable interest due to their ability to influence policy
outcomes through the exercise of their professional discretion and autonomy. On the other hand,
there is an immense body of literature covering different techniques public managers can use to
hold street – level bureaucrats accountable. Although many studies have been done to investigate
the role of management in holding street – level bureaucrats accountable, there are very few such
studies in done in South Africa.
Our knowledge of the role of management in holding street – level bureaucrats accountable to
organisational goals in the education sector of South Africa is largely based on very limited data.
The aim of the research was therefore to analyse accountability mechanisms used in managing
the implementation of National Curriculum Statements in the education street - level
bureaucracy of South Africa. The specific geographical unit of the study was uMgungundlovu
District in KwaZulu-Natal Province. The study had five key objectives, each of which is
suggestive of a type of accountability:  political accountability, performance accountability,
hierarchical accountability, legal accountability and professional accountability.
In order to understand the different types of accountability used in the implementation of
National Curriculum Statements, a comprehensive review of documents was done. This was
followed by interviews with six high school principals and surveys with 100 high school
educators. The data were analysed quantitatively and qualitatively.
The results from documentary review show that the government was exercising political
accountability in education through various policies as well as financing education. However,
not many respondents were satisfied with its level of political accountability. The results further
show that in line with performance accountability, the government was using performance
measures to in order to hold educators accountable among other reasons. With various levels of
effectiveness, the government is using different forms of hierarchical, legal and professional
accountability mechanisms to hold educators accountable.
The findings of this study have shown that there are various forms of accountability used in the
implementation of National Curriculum Statements. Each type of accountability has its strengths
and weaknesses; therefore, they are not mutually exclusive. The present findings have important
implications for our understanding of the role played by management in managing policy
implementation in street – level bureaucracies.
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A question that has been of a source of public debate in public administration, public
management, and public policy literatures is whether management makes a difference to the
operations and performance of government organisations (Riccucci, 2005:1). On the one hand,
there is an immense body of literature which highlights the importance of management
techniques and leadership in the efficient operation of public organisations. On the other hand,
there is considerable academic research which suggests that the influence of management and
management techniques on the behaviours of the street-level bureaucrats is minimal (Lipsky,
1980:159). By definition, street-level bureaucrats are “public service workers who interact
directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the
execution of their work” (Lipsky, 1980:3). In this sense, teachers are viewed as street-level
bureaucrats. Some scholars portray a very pessimistic view of the ability of public managers to
secure accountability among street-level bureaucrats and improve the efficiency of public
organisations. They argue that “bureaucratic systems make it extraordinarily difficult for
management to change the direction, nature, or culture of their organisations” (Riccucci,
2005:1).  These scholars contend that street-level workers are difficult to control because they
possess a great deal of discretionary powers especially where their jobs involve qualitative
aspects (Riccucci, 2005:1; Lipsky, 1980:159).
A further area of research shows that mechanisms of accountability can hinder managers from
attaining their organisational objectives. Ebrahim (2005:57) notes that certain accountability
requirements can hinder organisational learning, and it is thus important to differentiate among
factors that enable and impede efficiency. A number of the studies show the existence of side
effects such as ‘window dressing’ and other types of ‘gaming’ (Wolf and Janssens, 2007:2).
Notwithstanding this, public managers are pressured to secure or improve workers’
accountability through manipulation of incentives and other aspects of the job structure available
to them (Lipsky, 1980:159). The need for accountability in policy implementation is heightened
by the principles of democracy. Lipsky (1980:160) argues that there is a strong link between
bureaucracy and democracy. Lipsky explains that modern democracy depends on the
accountability of bureaucracies to carry out declared policies. In this respect, accountability
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means more than answering to a superior or to account for one’s action; the issue here is the
relationship between what superiors seek and what subordinates do (Lipsky, 1980:160).
Because street-level bureaucracies are major recipients of public expenditure and represent a
significant portion of public activities at local level (Lipsky, 1980: xvi), they are expected to be
accountable. For example, the education and health sectors in South Africa receive a total of
30% of government expenditure (The Presidency, 2009:5). Some 60% of this money is spent on
salaries (The Presidency, 2009:7).
For this reason and others, education is the most ‘public’ of all public policies. As a result there
is great deal of literature on accountability pertaining to education policy, but there very little on
South African education.
1.2 The context of the study
The context of this thesis is the implementation of educational policy in South Africa. It
examines mechanisms employed by government, public managers and other organisations in
trying to achieve accountability in the implementation the National Curriculum Statement
(NCS). The main aims of the NCS policy are, among other things, to:
 Equip learners, irrespective of their socio-economic background, race, gender, physical
ability or intellectual ability, with the knowledge, skills and values necessary for self-
fulfilment, and meaningful participation in society as citizens of a free country;
 Provide access to higher education;
 Facilitate the transition of learners from education institutions to the workplace; and
 Provide employers with a sufficient profile of a learner’s competences. (Department of
Education, 2002b:1)
The demands of the NCS on both educators and learners have been debated by scholars,
practitioners, and policy makers. Because of this, the policy has been amended several times. It
has a number of features which seek a radical change in the behaviour of educators in order to be
relevant in the democratic dispensation. For instance, the NSC envisions teachers who are
qualified, competent, dedicated and caring and who will be able to fulfil the various roles
outlined in the Norms and Standards for Educators of 2000 (Department of Education, 2002a:9).
Some of the norms and standards view teachers as mediators of learning, interpreters and
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designers of learning programmes and materials, leaders, administrators and managers, scholars,
researchers and lifelong learners, community members, citizens and pastors, assessors and
learning area/phase specialists (Government Gazette No 20844). This places a huge
responsibility on education managers at all levels to make sure that that behaviour of educators is
in accordance with policy expectations.
The role of management in street-level bureaucrats’ implementation of NSC policy and teachers’
perceptions of the effect of different accountability mechanisms on educators are the focal point
of my thesis. The term ‘street-level bureaucrats’ in this study refers to teachers (educators) who
work at the frontline in the actual implementation of curricula, while management denotes heads
of departments (HoDs), deputy school principals, school principals, subject advisers as well
other management personnel at district as well provincial offices in South Africa.
The implementation of the NCS has not been smooth. Due to several challenges faced during its
implementation successive ministers of education in South Africa instituted commissions to
investigate such challenges. President Jacob Zuma, in his 2009 State of the Nation Address as
well as in his 2010 Freedom Day celebration address, seemed to apportion part of the problem to
the teachers. He pointed out that:
Our plan is to improve the output and the pass rates through increasing efficiency and
accountability in our schools. That is why we say our teachers should be in school, in
class, on time, teaching for at least six and half hours a day. If they do that, the results
will speak for themselves (The Presidency, 2010).
It is implicit in this assertion that once the educators do implement the NCS policy as it intended
poor educational outcomes will become a thing of the past. The question is why do teachers
apparently behave in ways that are contrary to their expected roles?  What can be done to make
them accountable in delivering NCS policy?
While the factors that hinder policy implementation are varied and may include the nature of the
NCS policy, the focus of this study is on how to make schools and teachers accountable. The
government at different levels has a number of mechanisms that are meant to keep the teachers’
level of accountability at optimum levels. In 2009 The Presidency produced a discussion
document entitled Improving Government Performance: Our Approach. This document, among
other things, emphasises the need for institutional mechanisms for outcomes performance
management. “The purpose of the outcome performance system is not limited to measuring
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outcomes and outputs. It serves as a mechanism to guide the direction of policy implementation
– to ensure that we are doing what matters most” (The Presidency, 2009:8).
While all these control mechanisms and many others are in place at provincial, district and
school level, the problem of poor performance seems to persist. The teachers still have a
considerable level of discretion in the course of their duties (Mutereko, 2009: iii). The individual
decisions made by each teacher (street-level bureaucrat), the routines they establish, and the
devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the
education policy they carry out (Lipsky, 1980: xii).
Nevertheless, if the educational outcomes are to improve there is a need to find ways of
controlling the teachers’ discretion and enhancing accountability. The central theme of this study
is to explore ways and means by which street-level workers can be held accountable to their
organisation objectives. For various reasons, the methods used by the Department of Education
have not been effective as evidenced by “widespread learner underperformance in both
international and local assessment” (DBE, 2009:1). Some of these mechanisms include
performance evaluation, training and recruitment (professional development), sanctions, time
limits, the use of authority and centralizing certain functions (Lipsky, 1980, Riccucci, 2005).
Despite the unsatisfactory educational outcomes in South Africa, there has been very little
research on educational accountability. Most studies on National Curriculum Statements (NCS)
simply mention educational outcomes in OBE as a mechanism for accountability (Jansen,
2001:242, Chisholm, 2004:1). One study is Mapesela and Strydom’s (2003) research on
performance management and accountability in South African higher education. Most of the
studies on educational accountability and performance management have been carried out in
North America (Horsley, 2009; Frink and Klimoski, 2004; Frink and Ferris, 1998; Webb, 2005;
Bush, 2007) and Europe (Taylor, 2007; Huse, 2005; Epstein, 1993; Maupin, 1993).
1.3 Research problems and objectives
In policy implementation there is an increasing need to understand why policies do not achieve
the desired results. Studies have shown that street-level bureaucrats, who are the final
implementers of policy, have discretion, autonomy and coping mechanisms which they
exercise to produce the final policy which might not resemble the written policy (Mutereko,
2009:4). On one hand, Lipsky (2010) boldly asserts that “bureaucratic accountability is
virtually impossible to achieve among street-level bureaucrats who exercise a high degree of
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discretion at least where qualitative aspects of the work is involved”.  On the other he observes
the high expectation placed on public managers to secure or at least improve accountability
through manipulation of incentives and other aspects of job structure available to them (Lipsky,
2010:159). Broadly speaking, this study explores the different strategies employed by
departments, organisations and government at large to secure accountability among street-level
bureaucrats in South Africa in the implementation of government policies on education in
schools.
In view of the poor performance by government departments which was reported by The
Presidency (2009:3), the question is, what are the government departments doing to enforce
accountability among the street-level bureaucrats?  What kind of accountability mechanisms
are they using? How do these accountability mechanisms affect the behaviour of street-level
bureaucrats? Answering these questions is significant in a number of ways if government
performance is to be improved through enhanced accountability. Understanding the effect of
accountability mechanisms on street-level workers in policy implementation is important for
public managers, policy makers and scholars alike.
The purpose of this study was to investigate how government and management responsible for
secondary schools in uMgungundlovu District in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, attempts to
secure and improve accountability in the implementation of the National Curriculum Statements.
Furthermore, the study seeks to understand how the educators perceive the different
accountability mechanisms the government and the secondary schools employ to hold them
accountable.
In order to explore the research problem, this study has five key objectives, each of which is
indicative of a type of accountability. The perceptions of teachers and principals are investigated
in order to understand: firstly, government’s responsiveness to the educational needs of South
Africa (political accountability); secondly, the implementation of performance evaluation by the
Department of Basic Education (DBE) (performance accountability); thirdly, the bureaucratic
processes which are used to make teachers accountable (hierarchical accountability); fourthly,
the legal framework for the work of teachers (legal accountability); and fifthly’ professional
accountability of teachers in relation to implementing NCS.
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In the next sections that follow, how these key objectives will be investigated will be explained
by outlining the theoretical framework of the study and then indicating the context of the
research itself, and the methods used.
1.4 Theoretical framework
This study seeks to bridge the gap between the literature on public policy implementation and on
organisational management, which are informed by different theoretical frameworks. This
investigation is underpinned by two main theories: (1) street-level bureaucracy as propounded by
Lipsky (1980) in his celebrated book titled Street-Level Bureaucrats: dilemmas of individuals in
public serves, and (2) organisational influences on workers as postulated by Simon in his works,
starting with his seminal article in 1944, titled Decision-Making and Administrative
Organisation, and his classical book, Administrative Organisation (second and fourth editions in
1952 and 1997 respectively).
Organisations use different mechanisms to influence the behaviour of their workers in making
them accountable to their organisation or clients (Lipsky, 1980:162-171; Simon, 1944:21;
1952:102; 1997:277). In order to achieve accountability, organisations can use authority,
performance evaluation, advice and information, training and the criterion of efficiency (Simon,
1944:21-25). Lipsky’s (1980:164-166) main performance prescriptions for accountability are
goal clarification and performance measures. Lipsky also includes training and professional
development as solutions to public service dilemmas (1980:202). In many respects, these writers
agree on the need to hold street-level workers accountable to realising organisational objectives,
although they differ in terms of their approaches. For instance, Simon (1944:24; 1952:103;
1997:13) emphasizes the importance of pre-training and in-service training as a means of
achieving accountability from the inside out. Lipsky’s (1980) position is not known since he is
silent about the training issue. On the other hand, Simon (1944; 1952; 1997) does not discuss the
need for performance evaluation as a means of influencing the street-level worker’s behaviour. It
is, however, important to note that although these authors may not be explicit about certain
accountability mechanisms, a review of their works shows that by implication they all believe in
the importance of training (Simon, 1944:24; Simon, 1997:13; Lipsky, 1980:200-201).
Lipsky proposes accountability mechanisms that are related to what he perceives to be the cause
of the lack of accountability (Lipsky, 1980:164). For instance, Lipsky notes that lack of
accountability among street-level workers is caused by the ambiguity and multiplicity of
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organisational objectives. It is easier to manage a department if you are sure of what is supposed
to be done. In the United States of America, public service areas such education in recent years
have all been subject to efforts to increase accountability through goal clarification (Lipsky,
1980:165).  Lipsky explains that:
Schools attempt to instruct, but they also inculcate social behaviour and citizenship.
They do this not because educators are fuzzy but because both these objectives are
favoured by parents (and because there is no convincing case that they are mutually
incompatible) (Lipsky, 1980:165).
The problem of goal ambiguity has contributed to discrediting institutions that provide social
services. For example, educators may not be sure of their aim: providing citizenship education or
teaching to produce high pass rates? Observers can discredit an education system if there is such
uncertainty.
Another important accountability mechanism presented by Lipsky is performance evaluation.
The development of performance measures is critical to a bureaucratic accountability policy
(Lipsky, 1980:165). He notes that the purpose of these measures is to control employees’
behaviour. Lipsky explains the purpose of performance evaluation as follows:
There is no doubt that public services can be enhanced through the development of
valid performance measures.  In such cases, public service workers can be held
accountable for producing results in the same way machine operators can be charged
with producing a certain volume of output in a given time (Lipsky, 1980:166).
This may imply the Taylorist scientific management style of 1911 which was deemed effective
in increasing the productivity of pig-iron handlers at Bethlehem Steel Company. The application
of these strategies in human service organisations dealing with professionals might be
questionable. Furthermore, Lipsky notes that public service workers must also be assessed for
quality control since producing a volume of items may be meaningless (Lipsky, 1980:166). To
Lipsky these are some mechanisms that can be executed in order make street-level bureaucracies
and bureaucrats accountable.
Simon proposes several modes of organisational influences on the behaviour of street-level
workers (operatives) (1944:21-25; 1997:9-14). Some of the modes are similar to Lipsky’s ones
(1980). First, the use of authority as a mode of influence on street-level workers’ behaviour is
discussed by Simon. The importance of authority as an accountability mechanism is that it can
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permit a decision to be made and carried out even when agreement cannot be reached (Simon,
1997:10). However, it is important to note that subordinates can only carry out authoritative
orders if they are within their `zone of acceptance’, which is the limit beyond which workers are
unwilling to take orders (Simon, 1997:10). The zone of acceptance depends on the sanctions
which the authority has to enforce its commands. Simon notes that these sanctions could be
physical or economic sanctions (1997:10). The critical question is how can authority be used to
secure accountability in educational bureaucrats?
The second accountability mechanism which Simon (1997:10; 1944:21) proposes is
organisational loyalty. It is a prevalent characteristic of human behaviour that members of an
organised group tend to identify with that group (Simon, 1997:10). In making decisions,
individual members are influenced by their organisational loyalty.  There are a number of
psychological elements on which an organisational loyalty mechanism is based. First, personal
success often depends on organisational success – the administrator who builds up his or her unit
expects (with good reason) promotion and salary increases. Second, loyalty seems partly to
transfer to the field of public management the spirit of competition which characterizes private
enterprise (Simon, 1997:11). Third, Simon avers that advice and information can be used to
influence the behaviour of street-level workers (Simon, 1997:12; 1944: 23). Unlike the overt and
formal accountability mechanisms already discussed, Simon says that advice and information
may be viewed as internal public relations for there is no guarantee that advice rendered will be
used (1997:12). He adds that information and advice may be used as alternatives to the exercise
of authority (Simon, 1944:23).
Fourth, Simon believes that training, like institutional loyalties and other overt accountability
mechanisms, influences decisions “from the inside out” (Simon, 1997:13; Simon, 1944:24).
Because of this, many bureaucracies require people to undergo some form of training. Training
can be pre-service or in-service. Lipsky (1980:200) concurs with Simon (1997:13) and adds that
“on the job training is likely to be more effective than classroom learning experiences because
the training is provided in the context of actual problem solving situations”.  New members to an
organisation are trained in what is appropriate and acceptable in a way that will guide their future
decisions in their organisations.
In summary, the accountability mechanisms which are employed in educational policy
implementation include the elements which are listed in Table 1.1. They can be grouped into
internal and external mechanisms.
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Table 1.1 Street-level accountability mechanisms in schools
External mechanisms Internal mechanisms
 Authority
 Performance evaluation
 Assessment and mandated
curriculum







Internal mechanisms of accountability are those which teachers as street – level bureaucrats
experience at school, whereas external mechanisms emanate from outside sources, for instance,
government department or a professional association. This typology is taken a step further in the
conceptual framework below.
The conceptual framework in Figure 1.1 depicts the impact of public authorities in education and
school principals on street-level bureaucrats. In this model, managers in government
bureaucracies affect the front-line management in local offices as well as schools and thereby
influence the final organisational outputs.  The model also illustrates the importance of street-
level bureaucrats’ beliefs about the policy goals and the needs of individual learners. It also
shows that the day-to-day activities of teachers, such as the time of coming to work, lesson
planning and lesson delivery influence the educational outputs of the schools. The arrows
indicate that the impacts of elements of front-line management on the behaviour of street-level
bureaucrats are expected to be tenuous due to coping mechanisms employed by teachers.
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Figure 1.1 A conceptual model of accountability and performance of street-level bureaucrats
Explicit goals supporting work





Employment and training staff-
development
Performance evaluation
Clients’ expectations (parents, learners)
Institutional roles (uMalusi, South




Assessments and mandated curricular
Publication of results
Local statement of policy (district and
school)
Human resources practices
(implementation of state policy,
staffing, training staff development,
reward structure, monitoring and
evaluation: class and school visits,
book inspection)
Management practices
(Communication and leadership styles
and oversight)
Street-level behaviour and practices
(Observable characteristics of service
delivery, delivery including day
today activities of frontline workers
(educators)
Organisational outputs
Ensured specific organisational qualities
considered to be critical to effectiveness
are reflected in their schools or district
Meeting standards of professional
knowledge and skill
Meeting standards of moral behaviour
Performance of best professional
practices or specified duties
Organisational efficiency
Access to higher education,
Transition from high school to work
place
Sufficient profile of learner competence
Unwanted outcomes
Teachers leaving due to excessive need
for accountability
Window dressing
Creaming (preventing weaker learners
from progressing to matric)
Falsification of information
Entry tests of new students to screen
weak students
Elements of state management









beliefs about the NCS mission and
goals, worker roles, and learner
obligation
(Adapted from Riccucci, 2005:8)
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This theoretical framework is appropriate in providing answers to the research questions
raised in this thesis in two significant ways. First, it will be used to identify and explain the
different mechanisms (formal and informal) that are used to achieve accountability in the
street-level workers (teachers). Simon, for example, in all his writings in the 1940s until the
late 1990s believed that it is possible to control the street-level bureaucrats through the
prescriptions that he outlines. The DBE has, in a number of ways, used some of these
mechanisms. Second, the theoretical framework shows how the attainment of accountability
among the street-level workers may be an elusive pursuit. For instance, Lipsky’s (1980)
theory presents a very pessimistic picture about the ability of the mechanisms to attain
accountability among street-level bureaucrats. Proper application of this framework should
enable the research questions to be addressed comprehensively.
1.5 Research: context and methods
The research focuses on secondary schools in uMgungundlovu District in KwaZulu-Natal.
This is a District with poor and rich schools. It also has a mix of public and private schools.
Above all, it has both schools which have enjoyed successive outstanding Matriculation pass
rates (Grade 12) as well as those that continue be far less successful. This makes this District
a suitable case study.
This study took a mixed methodology approach which focused on qualitative as well as
quantitative methods.
Qualitative methodology
Qualitative research methodology is relevant for this study for three major reasons. First,
qualitative research is deemed to be much more fluid and flexible than quantitative research
in that it emphasizes discovering novel or unanticipated findings and the possibility of
altering research plans in response to such serendipitous occurrences (Bryman, 1984:78).
This is very important since there have been very few studies on accountability in basic
education in South Africa. Second, qualitative research generates results and theories that are
understandable and experientially credible, both to educators, principals and other people
(Bickman and Rog, 1998:76). Third, Bickman and Rog (1998:76) argue that qualitative
research is appropriate for studies that intended to improve existing practice rather than to
determine the outcomes of the programme.
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Quantitative methodology
Quantitative techniques were used in coding interview data with a view to constructing a
dataset which can be analysed using appropriate statistical programme (Burton, 2000:217).
To this end, questions in the interview schedule were designed in a way that made responses
easier to code (See the Appendices). Quantitative data were linked to qualitative data in order
to: (a) enable confirmation and corroboration of each other via triangulation; (b) to elaborate
and develop analysis, providing richer detail; and (c) to initiate new lines of thinking through
attention to surprises or paradoxes (Miles and Huberman, 1994:41).
Sample
For the purpose of this study, non-probability sampling was used, both the convenient and
purposive forms. Based on the researcher’s previous findings (Mutereko, 2009), the sample
comprised six school principals and 100 teachers. The sample size for this study was
determined by three different factors. First, the size was determined by the techniques of
analysis to be used which are mainly qualitative. Secondly, the number of units of analysis
from which usable data were collected was anticipated to be smaller than the number
originally drawn since some people might have refused to participate in the research
(Welman et al, 2007:72). Thirdly, the size was also influenced by the resources that were
available for undertaking this study.
Data collection and analysis
Apart from the data collected from interviews, extensive use was made of reviewing official
documents, from government and other educational organisations. This covered the laws and
policies that have been promulgated to guide the management of schools. For example:
 Draft Policy on the Minimum Requirements in Education 2009
 Human Resources Management Guideline for Schools 2010
 Human Resources Management Guideline for Districts and Provinces
 An Integrated Performance Management and Development System for Use in the
Public Service (Department of Public Service and Administration, 2009).
 National Education Policy (1996)
 The National Policy Framework for Teacher Education and Development in
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South Africa (2007)
 The National Policy on Whole-School Evaluation (2001b).
These documents allowed the researcher to track what happened, when it happened and who
was involved (Bickman and Rog, 1998:19). These documents were also important in
corroborating and augmenting evidence from other sources (Bickman and Rog, 1998:19).
The review of documents before fieldwork also provided the basis for interviews.
The main form of data analysis was content analysis. Data recorded and coded from
interviews were transcribed before analysis. Thematic content analysis was then used to
analyse responses to the open ended comments in the interview schedule. The analyses of the
transcribed data were based on pattern matching logic, which “compares an empirically-
based pattern with a predicted one” (Yin, 2003:116). The ‘predicted pattern’ comprised
findings from the previous studies, together with the theoretical framework (Bergen and
While, 2005:4). Put another way, findings from other studies at times were used to compare
results.
The responses from the closed questions in the interview schedule for the educators were
analyzed quantitatively, using IBM SPSS Statistics 21. Frequency tables and bar graphs were
developed to present summary statistics. The Chi-Square tests were deployed to test the effect
of accountability mechanisms and the level of accountability. Cross tabulation was used to
explore relationships in the data.
To ensure validity the researcher used multiple sources of evidence (triangulation) during the
data collection stage. The researcher gave some participants draft reports for verification
(Bickman and Rog, 1998:243). The study did pattern and explanation building during the
data analysis stage to ensure internal validity. External validity was enhanced through the use
of theories outlined in the theoretical framework (Bickman and Rog, 1998: xiii)
The researcher made sure that the findings of the study are reliable. Reliability is concerned
with the findings of the research as it relates to credibility of the findings (Welman,
2007:145). To achieve this, the researcher used the case study protocol and by ensuring that
the data collection instruments yielded consistent information.
Ethical consideration
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In order “to protect the welfare and rights of research participants” (Terre-Blanche and
Durrheim, 2002:65) the researcher had to follow research ethics protocols. The researcher
observed the ethics that pertain to the conduct of research under the auspices of the UKZN.
To that end, the study was carried out in accordance with UKZN policy on ethical issues
relating to research activities. Right at the proposal stage the researcher sought clearance
from the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee which was granted.
The researcher got permission to conduct the study in the uMgungundlovu District (See
Appendix Four). Before conducting interviews and giving questionnaires to respondents the
researcher obtained informed consent from the participants. The researcher explained
everything the participants needed in order to make informed decisions before participation.
The researcher identified himself as well as the institution that he was affiliated to. He gave
the participants his supervisor’s contact details in case there was a problem. He explained the
aims of the study as well as the methods to be used. Furthermore, the researcher assured the
participants of anonymity, privacy and confidentiality. The right to privacy can be viewed as
“the right to decide when, where, to whom, and to what extent his or her attitudes, beliefs and
behaviour will be revealed” (Singleton et al., 1988:454). The researcher explained to the
participants that no one in their schools or the Department of Basic Education would know
how they would have answered. They did not give their names or any person’s name in their
answers. He assured them that their responses were going to remain confidential. All
information the participants provided was considered confidential and grouped with
responses from other participants.  Furthermore, no participant was identified by name in this
thesis or in any report or publication resulting from this study.  Pseudonyms were used in
pace of respondents names (e.g. Tr. 1 for teacher 1, Pl. 1 for principal 1 and SA 1for subject
advisor 1). It was also important for the researcher to emphasise to the participants that their
participation was voluntary. He explained to them that they were not going to be penalised
they chose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time.  Lastly, the researcher
assured the participants that this study had been reviewed and received ethics clearance
through the Office of Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee at UKZN
and, both their schools and the Department of Basic Education had approved this study but
the final decision about participation was theirs.
1.6 Structure of the thesis
The argument of the thesis will be structured as follows:
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Chapter Two considers the subject of policy implementation by focusing attention on the
three generations of implementation research, followed by a presentation of models and
approaches to policy implementaion. The chapter ends with an analysis of the role of street –
level bureaucrats in policy implementaion. The third chapter characterises accountability and
then examines five types of accountability, namely, political accountability, performance
accountability, hierarchical accountability, legal accountability and professional
accountability. The chapter closes by offering an analytic framework for educational
accountability. Chapter Four arrives at an analytic framework for ensuring accountability in
schools and among teachers by drawing on various types of accountability.
In order to place the whole thesis in context, Chapter Five chronicles the evolution of the
South African education policy from the period before the dawn of democracy in 1994 until
2012. Chapter Six will concentrate on a comprehensive review of documents pertaining to the
implementation of NCS in terms of different types of accountability.
The seventh chapter describes the study site and gives a profile of uMgungundlovu District.
This will include data about educators and information on schools.The next several chapters
will consist of findings from surveys and interviews in accordance with types of
accountability developed in the theoretical framework. Chapter Eight will examine political
accountability; Chapter Nine will examine performance accountability; Chapter Ten will
consider hierarchical accountability; and Chapter Eleven will analyse professional
accountability.
The final chapter will be divided into two: conclusions and implications. First, conclusions
will be derived from qualitative and quantitative findings on the research problems. The




Many bureaucracies and other organisations have formulated superb policies that are aimed at
delivering services and improving the quality of life of their people. There are many
approaches that governments use to implement policies. Depending on various factors, top-
down, and bottom-up approaches can be used. Policy networks are increasingly becoming
common where public and private partnerships are forged in implementing public policies.
However, although many of these policies are premised on sound theoretical foundations, in
many cases they fail to achieve the desired outcomes. The reasons for policy failure are
many. They include but are not limited to non-implementation or partial implementation,
inadequate political commitment at the top, lack of capacity by street-level bureaucrats and
poor oversight at local level. Whatever the reason for policy failure, it may lead to a change
of government through electoral processes while in others, especially in authoritarian states,
this may lead to public protest and despondency. In areas where it is assumed that the
problem of policy implementation lies in the street-level bureaucrats, governments and their
departments have used different accountability mechanisms.
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the history of policy implementation in the context of
this study. This will focus on the three generations of policy implementation. These are:
Generation 1: a cog in the administrative machine; Generation 2: implementation is complex,
‘nothing works’; and Generation 3: the search for a fully-fledged theory. Then the chapter
will outline the top-down and the bottom-up models of implementation. After that the chapter
will explain the principal theory upon which the study is based. Then the chapter will end
with a section on the role of street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation. In analysing
the complex process of policy implementation, this chapter attempts to unravel the
complexity of policy and ultimately understand the managerial mechanisms of securing
accountability.
2.1 Policy implementation
The systematic study of public policy implementation started in the 1970s (Hill and Hupe,
2002:41). As such, most influential definitions of policy implementation used in policy
analysis are those developed at that time. Drawing on these definitions and others developed
later, this section attempts to define policy implementation. Implementation is viewed as “the
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ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired result”
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: xv). For Rein and Rabinovitz (1978: 308), implementation
is “the point at which intent gets translated into action”. Some conceive implementation as
“those events and activities that occur after the issuing of authoritative public policy
directives, which include both the effort to administer and the substantive impacts on people
and events” (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983:4). To Goggin, Bowman, Lester, and O’Toole
(1990:34) implementation is a “process, a series of ... decisions and actions directed toward
putting an already decided ... mandate into effect”. All these definitions have implicit points
of convergence. Common among these definitions is the desire to produce change or desired
outcomes through directed actions by groups of people or individuals.
The last definition to be considered in this section is that of Bardach (1977). Bardach
(1977:56) defines implementation as “the playing out of a number of loosely interrelated
games.” Bardarch defends his games metaphor of implementation by arguing that:
It [implementation] directs us to look at the players, what they regard as the stakes,
their strategies and tactics, their resources for playing, the rules of play (which
stipulate the conditions for winning), the rules of ‘fair’ play (which stipulate the
boundaries beyond which lie fraud or illegitimacy), the nature of the
communications (or lack of them) among the players, and the degree of uncertainty
surrounding possible outcomes. The game metaphor also directs our attention to who
is not willing to play and for what reasons, and to who insists on changes in some of
the game’s parameters as a condition for playing. (Bardach, 1977:56)
This definition is of great interest to policy implementation scholarship due to its unique
approach to implementation and, by extension, to accountability. It highlights the
unwillingness of some players to play, the rules of play and the conditions for winning or
how the success of implementation can be measured. In figurative language, this definition
contains most of the ideas in all other definitions of policy implementation. Furthermore, it
also goes on to show how the outputs of the process are to be measured. This is very close to
Jenkins’s (1978) view of implementation. Jenkins argues that:
A study of implementation is a study of change: how change occurs, possibly how it
may be induced. It is a study of the micro-structure of political life; outside and
inside of political system how actors conduct their affairs and interact with one
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another; what motivates them to act the way they do, what motivates them to act
differently. (Jenkins, 1978:203)
Implicitly, Jenkins’s (1978:203) and Bardach’s (1977:56) definitions of implementation agree
on the role of different players in the organisations and their motivations. In Bardach’s
language it could be asked, what motivates players to ‘win their games?’ Importantly, Jenkins
raised the importance of different levels of implementation to include micro-structures and
organisations which could be termed micro-implementation.
2.2 The three generations of implementation research
The problem of trying to match public policies and outcomes in the form of improved public
services is not new. Many scholars and analysts have devoted a lot of time and effort to learn
and understand the dynamics of policy implementation. “The first generation of
implementation analysts discovered the problem of policy implementation – the uncertain
relationship between policies and implemented programs- and sketched its broad parameters”
(McLaughlin, 1989:9). The second generation began to unpack implementation processes and
to zero in on relations between policy and practice of implementers at local level (1989:9).
The third generation focused on understanding policy implementation through organising
frameworks and theories. These generations can be summarised as follows:
 Generation 1: A cog in the administrative machine
 Generation 2:  Implementation is complex and “nothing works”
 Generation 3: The search for fully-fledged implementation theory (Najam, 1995:8-11;
Cloete and Wissink, 2000:166-169).
These three generations of scholarly thinking on implementation are very critical for this
study since they also imply different accountability mechanisms used in policy
implementation. The next three subsections will briefly explore each generation.
2.2.1 Generation 1: A cog in the administrative machine
“The first (‘classical’) generation of thinking on the subject of implementation began with the
assumption that implementation will happen automatically once the policies are
authoritatively proclaimed” (Cloete and Wissink, 2000:166). The antecedents of the
“classical” view of administration can be traced to early constitutionalists (Najam, 1995:8).
The political methodology of this phase could be “labelled [a] single-authority, top-down’
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approach to political organisation and, thereby, to policy implementation (Cloete and
Wissink, 2000:166). Cloete and Wissink (2000:166) point out that the law was dominant in
policy implementation. They argue that:
So great is the force of laws and of particular forms of government, and so little
dependence have they on the humours and tempers of men, that consequences almost
as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them as any which the
mathematical sciences afford us” (Cloete and Wissink, 2000:167).
It is because of this that administration was conceived as being “scientific”, “rational”,
“predictable” and, ultimately, “machine-like” (Najam, 1995:8). The classical model of
administration (implementation) is based on three basic concepts which helped to foster the
view that implementation was an automatic cog within a rationalised administrative machine
(Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980:8). The three concepts are based on the work of Max
Weber, Woodrow Wilson and Fredrick Taylor. First, the Weberian framework of the ideal
bureaucracy is a firmly ordered “system” with highly rationalized, legalistic, authoritarian,
and hierarchical structures, where a small group of decision makers at the top create policy
and subordinates at the bottom dutifully carry it out (Najam, 1995:9; Cloete and Wissink,
2000:167).
The second concept upon which the classical view is based is Woodrow Wilson’s work. In an
influential 1887 paper on the subject, Woodrow forwarded the thesis that policy formulation
and policy implementation are - and should be - two separate and distinct activities; with the
later being neutral, professionalized, and non-political (Najam, 1995:9; Cloete and Wissink,
2000:167). The third and last basic concept upon which the classical model of
implementation is based is Frederick Taylor’s influential work, The Principle of Scientific
Management in 1912. This theory provided the rationale for adopting efficiency as the basic
criterion for evaluating administrative performance (Najam, 1995:9; Cloete and Wissink,
2000:167). It is precisely for these reasons that the significance of implementation was
minimised. Although these theories might seem antiquated, their influence on accountability
mechanisms in the contemporary world is still very significant. As Smith (1973) [cited in
Najam, 1995:9] points out the assumption was that “once [an ‘efficient’] policy has been
‘made’ by a government, the policy will be implemented and the desired results of the policy
will be near those expected by the policymakers”. In that sense, the implementation process is
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assumed to be a series of decisions and interactions which did not attract the attention of
scholars and politicians (Najam, 1995:9).
2.2.2 Generation 2:  Implementation is complex and “nothing works”
Many scholars agree that the limitations of the classical model of implementation began to
emerge after World War II (Najam, 1995:9; Cloete and Wissink, 2000:167) as it became
apparent that public policy worked less as an efficient and orderly machine and more as a
process of “muddling through” (Najam, 1995:9). A number of case studies in the 1970s
showed that “the grand policies of the 1960s were not working the way they were ‘supposed’
to under the classical model” (Najam, 1995:10). At the same time, scholarship in public
administration and organisational behaviour revealed that administration and implementation
were far more complex and political than the classical assumptions had suggested them to be
(Cloete and Wissink, 2000:168).
The second generation of scholars set out to record the magnitude of the complexity of
implementation through detailed empirical studies. Scholars of this generation meticulously
documented specific case studies and showed how complex implementation really was and
why it was folly to assume that just because a policy had been proclaimed it would be
implemented (Najam, 1995:10). In short, the second generation of scholars set out to
challenge the classical model and to demonstrate that was a complex process which requires
due attention. Bardach (1977:3) highlights the importance of implementation and concludes
that:
It is hard enough to design public policies and programs that look good on paper. It
is harder still to formulate them in words and slogans that resonate pleasingly in the
ears of political leaders and the constituencies to which they are responsive. And it is
excruciatingly hard to implement them in a way that pleases anyone at all, including
the supposed beneficiaries or clients.
Although the second generation of scholars is criticized for being overly pessimistic, Goggin
et al (1990:13-14) list the major contributions of this generation of scholars. These include:
a) it shifted the focus from how a bill becomes a law to how a law becomes a
program;
b) it demonstrated the complex and dynamic nature of implementation;
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c) it emphasized the importance of policy subsystems;
d) it identified a number of factors that seemed to account for programmatic
results, especially failure;
e) it diagnosed several treatable pathologies that periodically plague implementing
actors (Goggin et al, 1990:13-14).
2.2.3 Generation 3: The search for fully-fledged implementation theory
The third (“analytic”) generation, by contrast, has been less specific with implementation
failure and focuses more on understanding how implementation works in general and how its
prospects may be improved (Cloete and Wissink, 2000:167). This generation of scholars
realises that the battle for implementation to be recognised had been won but there was no
organising framework to allow comparisons of studies (Najam, 1995:11). It was the absence
of sound conceptual models of policy implementation that led to the development of the third
generation of thinking on implementation (Najam, 1995:11). Most importantly, researchers
on implementation do not agree on the outlines of a theory of implementation or even on the
variables crucial to successful implementation (Cloete and Wissink, 2000:168).
2.3 Models and approaches to implementation
The third generation of implementation research mourn the lack of an analytic framework
and explanatory ‘models’ of implementation. The contribution of the third generation
scholars “yielded a number of increasingly more refined analytic models of the
implementation process, an extended list of potential  explanatory variables, and at least two
major theoretical streams of thought” (Najam, 1995:11). The prominent models produced by
these scholars are the top-down approach as well as the bottom-up approach which will be
discussed in the next two subsections.
2.3.1 Top-down rational system approaches
The earliest model on the scene was the top-down approach. The classical top-down writers
are Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky who are believed to be the founding fathers (Hill
and Hupe, 2002:44; Parsons, 1995:463). Other scholars associated with this model are
Donald Van Meter, Carl Van Horn and Eugene Bardarch (Hill and Hupe, 2002:44). The top-
down approach begins with the central decision - maker and the authoritative policy
statement and proceeds downwards through the hierarchical administrative structure to
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examine the extent to which a policy’s legally mandated objectives were achieved and
procedures followed (Najam, 1995:12).
In their book, Implementation: How Great Expectations Are Dashed in Oakland, Pressman
and Wildavsky became interested in the efforts by Oakland Economic Development
Administration (EDA) in California to implement a programme for city development. As
they explored the programme they became aware that implementation problems were rarely
analysed (Parsons, 1995:464). They observed that implementation involves efforts to forge
links in a causal chain so as to put policy into effect.  They argue that for successful
implementation to occur “the goals have to be clearly defined and understood, resources
made available, the chain of command be capable of assembling and controlling resources,
and the system be able to communicate effectively and control the individuals and
organisations involved in the performance tasks” (Parsons, 1995:464).
After an analysis of the EDA and experiences of Oakland, Pressman and Wildavsky
prescribed that “implementation requires a top-down system control and communications,
and resources for the job” (Parsons, 1995:464). Pressman and Wildavsky note that capacity to
co-ordinate and control was sadly lacking in the Oakland case study (Parsons, 1995:465). An
illustration of a classical top-down model is depicted in Figure 2.1. The idea of top-down
model has much in common with Weber’s construction of an ideal type of bureaucracy.






Hood (1976) [cited in Parsons, 1995:465] cited the five conditions that are needed for perfect
policy implementation. Hood argues that:
 ideal implementation is a product of a unitary ‘army like’ organisation, with clear
lines of authority;
 norms will be enforced and objectives given;
 people would do what they are told and asked;
 there should be perfect communication in and between units of organisation;
 there will be no pressure of time (Parsons, 1995:465).
It is important to note that the top-down model is a prescriptive theory which may be found in
Taylorism and scientific management theory (Parsons, 1995:467) and in that sense it may be
subjected to similar criticisms. Furthermore, Parsons (1995: 467) criticises the top-down
model for “too much emphasis on the definition of goals at the top”. Another criticism is its
perception of policy implementation as “a process in which x follows y in a chain of
causation” (Parsons, 1995:467). Public programmes are not well defined and cannot be
subjected to quantitative evaluation.
2.3.2 The bottom-up models
The top-down model has been criticised for not taking into account the role played by other
actors and levels in the implementation process (Parsons, 1995:467). Parsons notes that a
major source of this criticism pre-dates the top-down model. In an article published in 1971,
Michael Lipsky argued that “students of public policy had to take into account the
interactions of bureaucrats with their clients at ‘street-level’” (Parsons, 1995:467).
Because of his work (1971; 1977; 1978; 1980), Michael Lipsky is the founding father of the
bottom-up perspective (Hill and Hupe, 2002:51).  Lipsky’s analysis of the behaviour of front-
line staff in policy delivery agencies, whom he calls ‘street-level bureaucrats’, has had a
profound effect upon implementation studies. “The decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the
routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work
pressure become the public policies they implement” (Lipsky, 1980:12). After Lipsky’s 1977
study of institutional innovation in implementing special education reform, it was discovered
how the rational top-down model was not effective in practice although it is convincing in
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theory (Parsons, 1995:468).  It was clear that the implementation of public policy depended
on changing the attitudes and practices of micro-implementers (Hill and Hupe, 2002:53).
Lipsky (1978) [cited in Najam, 1995:20] called for “standing the study of public policy
implementation on its head”. Lipsky questioned the assumption of hierarchy and proposed
that in many cases “the latitude of those charged with carrying out policy is so substantial that
...  policy is effectively ‘made’ by the people who implement it” (Najam, 1995:20).
In essence, Lipsky’s (1980) study shows that control over people was not the best way
forward for effective policy implementation. People cannot be regarded as chains in the line
of command; policy makers should realise that policy is implemented by “backward
mapping” (Elmore, 1979) [cited in Parsons, 1995:469]. Street-level workers may develop
ways of implementing government policy which actually result in outcomes which are quite
different from those intended or desired by policy makers (Parsons, 1995:469).
Other scholars of bottom-up implementation, such Porter (1981) and Hjern and Hull (1982),
argue that a more realistic understanding of policy implementation can be gained by looking
at policy from the perspective of the target population and service deliverers (Matland,
1995:148). What is peculiar to this view is the inclusion of the target population in policy
implementation. At macro-implementation level, policy makers design government
programmes which are implemented at micro-implementation level by local organisations
and individuals (Matland, 1995:148). At this level “contextual factors within an
implementing environment completely dominate rules created at the top implementing
pyramid, and policy designers will be unable to control the process” (Matland, 1995:148).
In sum, the “bottom-up approach was, largely, a reaction to this model: based on identifying
weaknesses in it and suggesting alternatives to address those weaknesses” (Najam, 1995:13).
Workers will always have a degree of discretion in the process of policy implementation.
Kaufman (1973) [cited in Najam 1995:13] declares that:
Subordinate compliance does not automatically follow upon the issuance of orders
and instructions... when managers die and go to heaven, they may find themselves in
charge of organisations in which subordinates invariably, cheerfully, and fully do as
they are bid. Not here on earth. (Najam 1995:13)
It is important to note that both approaches to the study of policy implementation are
powerful heuristic as well as analytic tools in policy implementation scholarship. It is not the
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aim of this study to join the debate between bottom-up and top-down scholars of
implementation.  It suffices here note Matland’s conclusion that:
Under certain conditions it is most appropriate to hold either a top-down or bottom-
up perspective ... [and] to recognize that both schools contain kernels of truth
relevant to policy implementation situations. For example, central authorities
inevitably influence policy implementation through decisions on funding and
jurisdiction, even when policies are vague and conflict is low. It is also clear that
policies are not self-executing. (Matland, 1995:171)
This understanding is very important since different policies require different approaches to
implementation.  Central implementation is important in order to provide a monitoring and
evaluation framework. Without such structures it is disastrous to wait until the end of the
programme. Some authors prefer to apply the different models at different stages of the
policy cycle (Matland, 1995:152). For instance, Dunsire (1978) [cited in Matland (1995:152)]
argues that the two perspectives should apply at different times in the implementation
process. The top-down approach is more appropriate in the early planning stages; the bottom-
up view is more appropriate in later evaluation stages.
In sum, the role of street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation has been accentuated by
most scholars of bottom-up approaches. It is generally agreed that policy is made during
implementation. The original policy may, for some reason, be ignored by implementers at the
front line. This scenario raises serious issues about public accountability. To this end, the
concept of street-level bureaucrats is explored in greater detail in the next section.
So far the analysis of scholarly literature reveals the contentious nature of policy discourses at
theoretical level. In reality, policy processes such as those in education are not linear. The
processes are iterative in nature. Education policies processes have no clear stages such
depicted in the frameworks analysed here. The fluid character of policy dynamics in
education and elsewhere makes them difficult to implement and monitor which raise the
issues of accountability.   The next section explores the role of front line workers in the
policy processes.
2.4 The role of street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation
The concept of street-level bureaucracy as propounded by Michael Lipsky (1980) stresses the
relative autonomy of professionals working in public service. The autonomy of street-level
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workers poses a problem of control for those at the ‘top’ and justifies the need for more direct
forms of accountability to the ‘street’ (Hupe and Hill, 2007:279). In this section the concept
of street-level bureaucracy is explored. The discussion will cover issues which give street-
level bureaucrats autonomy and discretion in their work.
By definition, street-level bureaucrats are “public service workers who interact directly with
citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of
their work” (Lipsky, 1980:3). This definition includes people like teachers, social workers,
lawyers, judges, health workers and police officers. Street-level bureaucracies are
organisations that “employ a significant number of street-level bureaucrats in proportion to
their workforce” (Lipsky, 1980:3). Organisations like schools, police and welfare
departments, lower courts, legal services offices and hospitals are, in Lipsky’s language,
street-level bureaucracies.
This theory of Lipsky is a total departure from the classical model of public policy
implementation process which suggests a top-down, hierarchical approach (Riccucci,
2005:4). Riccucci argues that this “somewhat static view of policy implementation may
illustrate the broad elements of the policy process, but it does not account for the important
role of street-level bureaucrats” (Riccucci, 2005:4). “Although they are normally regarded as
low-level employees, the actions of most public service employees constitute the services
delivered by government” (Riccucci, 2005:3). Such a view rejects the notion of policy
implementation depicted in Figure 2.1. Thus public policy is not best understood as made in
legislatures or top floor suits of high ranking administrators, “because in important ways it is
actually made in crowded offices and daily encounters with street-level workers” (Lipsky,
1980: xii). Lipsky argues that “the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they
establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures
effectively become the public policy they carry out (Lipsky, 1980: xii).
This theory makes the efforts to link policy demands and the actions at street-level elusive
due to a number of practical as well as abstract assumptions. In a comprehensive article on
‘Street-Level Bureaucracy and Public Accountability’ Hupe and Hill (2007:280-286) present
a number of statements as grounding axioms for the theoretical and empirical study of the
scholarly theme of street-level bureaucracy. The statements are presented here and will be
discussed in relation to other literature on street-level bureaucracy and policy
implementation.
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Statement 1: street-level bureaucrats have discretion and are forced to use it (Hupe and
Hill, 2007:280; Lipsky, 1980:13). Unlike other lower-level workers in most organisations,
street-level bureaucrats have considerable discretion in determining the nature, amount, and
quality of benefits and sanctions provided by their organisation (Lipsky, 1980:13). However,
Lipsky warns that “this is not to say street-level bureaucrats are not unrestrained by rules,
regulations, and directives from above or by norms and practices of their occupational group”
(1980:14). In reality, discretion and rules are interrelated: as rules specify the duties of
officials, discretion allows freedom of action (Hupe and Hill, 2007:281). Hupe and Hill argue
that, for example, a public officer has discretion wherever effective limits on his or her
power leave him or her free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction
(2007:281).
Discretion is not always desirable. Lipsky acknowledges that many problems associated with
street-level bureaucrats in implementation would theoretically disappear if workers’
discretion is eliminated (1980:15). The elimination of such discretion is difficult to severely
reduce for three main reasons. First, “street-level bureaucrats often work in situations too
complicated to reduce to programmatic formats” (Lipsky, 1980:15). It would be difficult to
give instructions to police on how they should apprehend suspects in all situations. Likewise,
contemporary educational philosophies militate against giving detailed instructions to
teachers since they are expected to cater for individual differences among students.
The second reason pertains to the work situations of street-level bureaucrats. They work in
situations that often require responses to human dimensions (Lipsky, 1980:15). In these
situations sensitive observation and judgement are required and cannot be reduced to
programmatic formats. Teachers should be sensitive to individual learners and respond
appropriately. Similarly, judges are not expected by society and superiors to give similar
judgements for all cases that look similar before their context is considered.  The third reason
discretion is not likely to be eliminated bears more on the function of the lower-level workers
who interact with citizens than with the nature of the tasks (Lipsky, 1980:15). Discretion
promotes workers’ self - regard and encourages clients to believe that workers hold the key to
their well-being. This is, arguably, illustrated by the faith the students have in their teachers
and patients in their nurses and doctors.
Statement 2: street-level bureaucrats seek ways to manage their work (Hupe and Hill,
2007:282). Managers seek to restrict workers’ discretion in order to secure certain results, but
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street-level bureaucrats often regard such efforts as illegitimate and to some degree resist
them successfully (Lipsky, 1980:19). This is because public officials engaged in street-level
work have specific characteristics and certain situations are handled in a way similar to how
corresponding situations have been handled regardless of rule from the ‘top’. In other words,
there are standard operating procedures at street-level.
Statement 3: street-level bureaucrats see themselves as professionals (Hupe and Hill, 2007;
Lipsky, 1980:147). As such, they are regularly deferred to in their specialized area of work
and are relatively free from supervision by superiors or from scrutiny by clients.  Their
professional ideology provides a framework in terms of which disparate information is
stored, comprehended, and retrieved (Lipsky, 1980:147). However, the problem is
compounded by the fact that “public service employees who do not have claim to
professional status exercise considerable discretion” (Lipsky, 1980:14). These include
workers such as clerks in welfare and public housing departments. In defining professions, a
distinction is made between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a specific kind of
occupation and, on the other hand, the way in which society approaches the persons
exercising that occupation (Hupe and Hill, 2007:282). In this context, teachers, police officers
and medical doctors are viewed as professionals. Schools as street-level bureaucracies and
teachers as street-level bureaucrats clearly reflect Lipsky’s perspective. Teachers, like other
professionals, have their own self-policing processes and are subject to relatively little
managerial control (Taylor, 2007:558). The school system limits its controls on teachers “for
fear of generating opposition to management policies and diminishing accountability still
further” (Lipsky, 1980: 168).
Statement 4: in their interaction with individual citizens in different roles, street-level
bureaucrats are public officials (Hupe and Hill, 2007:283). “The essence of street-level
bureaucracies is that they require people to make decisions about other people. Street-level
bureaucrats have discretion because the nature of service provision calls for human
judgement that cannot be programmed and for which machines cannot substitute” (Lipsky
1980:161). Furthermore, street-level bureaucrats must be accountable to the client and must
give an appropriate response to a client’s situation and circumstances. These considerations
cannot be translated into authoritative agency guidelines, although it is on behalf of their
agencies that these street-level bureaucrats are accountable to the clients (Lipsky, 1980:162).
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Statement 5: street-level bureaucrats have relative autonomy from organisational authority
(Lipsky, 1980:16). It is misleading to take for granted that the work of lower-level workers is
to conform to what is expected of them. In agreement with this, Brinkerhoff (2001:3) posits
that “in all of these realms, public officials, by virtue of the authority accorded the roles and
positions they occupy, exercise varying degrees of power as they carry out their functions”.
Furthermore, organisational theorists recognise that there will always be some slippage
between orders and the carrying out of orders (Lipsky, 1980:16). This may be as a result of
workers who do not share the objectives, or the means of attaining such objectives, with their
superiors. At times this may happen due to the recruitment of workers who do not have an
affinity with an organisation’s goals. This can be prevalent due to unemployment. Workers
can withhold co-operation from their organisations through absenteeism, quitting, aggression
towards the organisation (cheating, deliberate wasting) and negative attitudes with
implications for work (alienation and apathy) (Lipsky, 1980:17). Furthermore, workers can
collectively resist the authority of their organisation. Lipsky states that:
Workers may take advantage of collective resources to act non-cooperatively by
forming trade unions or by exercising rights under collective bargaining or civil
service regulations. These collective strategies for noncooperation contribute to
workers’ willingness to display a lack of motivation and to perform at minimal
levels (Lipsky, 1980:17).
These acts of noncooperation reduce the capacity of an organisation to achieve its objectives.
Management is left with a challenge of how to balance an organisation’s goals and meet the
personal, material as well as psychological gratification of workers (Lipsky, 1980:17).
Statement 6: “lower level workers always possess relatively resources with which they can
resist management” (Lipsky, 1980:23). Some of these resources include the costs of firing
and demoting workers which are high under civil service regulations. This results in mediocre
standards of public service performance. This does not mean that management does not
control workers (a subject to be dealt with in greater detail in the later chapters). Lipsky
points out that management can manipulate perquisites they control such as recommendations
for advancement or transfer (1980:24).
The arguments in the preceding section led Lipsky to conclude that “accountability is
virtually impossible to achieve among street-level bureaucrats who exercise high degrees of
discretion, where qualitative aspects of their work are involved” (Lipsky, 1980:159).
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Regarding educational accountability, Winkler, (2004:1) declares that creating accountability
in public education is extraordinarily complex. Nonetheless, public managers are pressured to
secure and improve accountability since lack of it may lead to poor service delivery. To this
end, public administration and public policy scholars have devoted an enormous amount of
attention to the importance of public management in public bureaucracies (Riccucci, 2005:
xiii). Although a large volume of literature demonstrates that management impacts directly
on the efficacy of organisations, there is very little research focusing on the effects of public
management on street-level behaviour (Riccucci, 2005: xiii). This study analyses the types of
accountability available to public managers to make street-level bureaucrats (in this case,
teachers) accountable for their implementation of public policies (in this case, the National
Curriculum Statements).  Accountability, which Lipsky argues, is inherently difficult to
enforce among street-level bureaucrats because of the six statements discussed above.
Contributing to such research is the core of this thesis.
Conclusion
In order to put accountability into perspective in relation to public policy implementation, this
chapter has reviewed academic research on public policy implementation itself. In the light of
persistent failure in policy implementation, the chapter has traced the history of policy
implementation as a field of study. The three generations of policy implementation were
discussed. The first generation assumed that implementation would happen automatically
once policies are formulated. The second generation, which came after World War 2,
responded to the realisation that policy implementation worked less efficiently and less
orderly as postulated by the first generation. The chapter pointed out that the first two
generations did not yield conceptual models or organising frameworks, which then ushered in
the third generation which focused more on how policy implementation works.
The chapter went on to discuss the models of policy implementation starting with the top-
down model which is considered classical and then the bottom-up approach. Regardless of
efforts to understand policy implementation, the process remains a big challenge for
bureaucracies seeking to deliver services. Many reasons for policy implementation failure
have been put forward. To that end, the chapter has outlined the theory of street-level
bureaucracy. The chapter ended with the role of street-level bureaucrats in policy
implementation.  It was highlighted that because of the nature of their work, it can be difficult
to hold street-level bureaucrats accountable to organisational goals. The role of street-level
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bureaucracy managers is critical for the success of policy implementation. The issue of street-
level bureaucrats’ accountability is a key to the success of policy implementation.




Accountability is the hallmark of modern democratic governance (Bovens, 2005:1). In
agreement with this, Lipsky argues that modern democracy depends on the accountability of
bureaucracies to carry out declared policy (1980:160). For democracy to be a reality those in
power should be held accountable by the public for their acts and omissions, for their
decisions, their policies, and their expenditures (Bovens, 2005:1). The need for accountability
in the public sector has been necessitated by two main reasons. Firstly, “the size and scope of
the administrative state in modern economies is large, according governments’ broad and
significant power to intervene in people’s lives” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:3).  Secondly,
“democracy has emerged as the pre-eminent and most aspired-to form of governance system”
(Brinkerhoff, 2001:3). Furthermore, politicians and other activists have used accountability to
patch up a rambling argument, to evoke an image of transparency, responsiveness,
trustworthiness, fidelity, and justice, or to hold critics at bay because of its attractiveness
(Bovens, 2005:1; Brinkerhoff, 2001:3). Because of this, it is apparent that the term
accountability is evocative and can be likened to ‘transparency’, ‘responsibility’, ‘learning’,
‘integrity’ and ‘solidarity’:  nobody can be against it. However, the term accountability is too
complex to be construed comprehensively.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss accountability. Using different views of academic
scholars, this chapter will commence by defining accountability. After considering various
views of accountability the chapter will devise different types of accountability that are
considered important for this study; namely professional accountability, political
accountability, legal accountability, hierarchical accountability and performance
accountability. This will then form the basis for an analytical framework for educational
accountability, which will be discussed in the final section of the chapter.
3.1 Defining accountability
Accountability is a difficult term to define. Citing Schedler (1999), Brinkerhoff (2001:3;
2003:4) notes that “accountability represents an underexplored concept whose meaning
remains evasive, whose boundaries are fuzzy, and whose internal structure is confusing.” He
then concludes that “accountability is a complex and chameleon-like term” (Brinkerhoff
(2001:3).
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The need for accountability in public bureaucracies has drawn the attention of scholars. In the
process, the term accountability is construed and used differently by different people. The
general insistence on increased accountability is plagued by the fact that it is not always clear
precisely what is being advocated. The term ‘accountability’ has come to mean different
things to different people. For example, in education it has ranged from improving the quality
of education to ‘scape-goating the teachers’ (Smithson, 1987:4). Because of this some
researchers have tried to distinguish different types of accountability. Since accountability is
one of the pillars of the thesis, a range of literature on accountability is discussed here.
Although the definitions of accountability presented here are generic, the analysis will focus
on educational accountability since this thesis focuses on street-level bureaucrats in the
context of educational policy implementation.
Accountability is a relational term. It means that “A is accountable to B” and also implies
that A is held accountable and that B is holding A accountable (Fenstermacher, 1979:330).
Brinkerhoff (2001:16) asks the question “who is accountable?” This implies: which actors in
the street-level bureaucracy are held accountable for their actions? Brinkerhoff (2001:16)
introduces the notion of power relations by observing that to whom street-level bureaucrats
are accountable lie power, authority and the right to ask for answers and explanations.
Generally, there are three broad categories of actors that are “held accountable for policy and
program decisions, actions, and outcomes: politicians and politically appointed leaders,
public officials, and non-governmental actors” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:16).  One important
attempt to synthesise different views on accountability was made by Brinkerhoff (2001:6).
Although these dimensions and definitions may not exhaustively cover the concept of
accountability several critical elements are indicated in Table 3.1.
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Definition Links to other dimensions of accountability
Democratic/political Oversight of public officials and
agencies in terms of their
responsiveness to political leaders
and to citizens, and of fulfilment of
the public trust.
To financial: officials and agencies budget
and spend resources to discharge their public
mandates, dialogue and deliberation on
budgets are a core feature of democratic
discourse and policy-making.
To performance: delivering services and
results is a concrete manifestation of
responsiveness to citizens’ interests and
societal needs. Judgments about performance
influence voter behaviour.
Financial [ Legal] Examination of compliance of
officials and agencies with laws,
regulations, and procedures for the
transparent allocation, expenditure,
and reporting of financial
resources.
To democratic/political: financial
accountability assures that resources are used
for agreed upon public purposes.
Transparency in financial accountability
enhances citizens’ ability to participate in
oversight.
To performance: goods and services cannot
be produced without financial resources.
Many accountability systems join financial
and performance accountability.
Performance Scrutiny of the actions of officials
and agencies related to the
production of outputs, delivery of
services, accomplishment of
objectives, and/or achievement of
results and impacts.
To democratic/political: politicians and
citizens look at performance to determine
whether government is responsive,
trustworthy, effective, and democratic. These
determinations can affect citizen satisfaction
with government and the outcome of
elections. To financial: performance links
allocation and spending of financial resources
to achieving desired results.
Source: Brinkerhoff (2001:6)
Firstly, “in a democracy, politicians are accountable first and foremost to the citizens who
elect them, though often the links are tenuous” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:14). This is because
“accountability is the link between bureaucracy and democracy” (Lipsky, 1980:160). Lipsky
notes that “modern democracy depends on the accountability of bureaucracies to carry out
declared policy” (1980:160). The mechanism for this accountability is an election. However,
“elections can be a rather distant and limited accountability mechanism” (Brinkerhoff,
2001:14). Secondly, Brinkerhoff points out that “politicians elected under systems where
citizens vote for party lists rather than individual representatives [for example, the South
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African system] tend to be accountable first to their party leadership, and only secondarily to
citizens. Furthermore, most senior bureaucrats are appointed by political leadership.
Brinkerhoff posits that “officials appointed to [such] leadership positions by the government
in power may feel they owe their allegiance to political decision-makers, with only a distant
or diffuse sense of accountability to citizens” (2001:14).
The second group of actors is composed of public officials and agencies or departments. This
large group of players is the major object of public accountability (Brinkerhoff, 2001:14).
Street-level bureaucrats are caught up in a dichotomous accountability situation. Brinkerhoff
notes that “[t]hey [are] ultimately upwardly accountable to politically appointed leaders and
downwardly accountable to citizens via responsive and transparent policy implementation
and service delivery” (2001:15). The main problem in this situation is that “some
constituencies are more powerful than others in influencing officials and their agencies to
respond to their needs and desires; this reduces accountability to disadvantaged and
marginalized groups, with negative impacts on equity” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:14). Powerful
politicians and senior bureaucrats are almost always at an advantage.
Another feature of the concept of accountability is that the relation holds with regard to some
standard of performance. “Person B does not hold A accountable. Rather, A is held
accountable for specific performances that meet stated or implicit standards” (Fenstermacher,
1979:330). Like Fenstermacher (1979:330), Bardach and Lesser (1996:201) note that street-
level bureaucrats are “accountable for results”. Bardach and Lesser posit that “‘holding
Agency X accountable for results generally appears to mean that the agency should take pains
to measure and report its results and that its managers should expect to be berated, if not
dismissed, if they fall short” (1996:201). For instance, taxpayers hold public officials
accountable for the proper and judicious expenditure of tax revenues on quality public
services. The issue of punishment gives ‘teeth’ to accountability (Brinkerhoff, 2001:2).
Brinkerhoff notes that “answerability without sanctions is generally regarded to be weak
accountability” (2001:2). This may include requirements, standards, and penalties embodied
in laws, statutes, and regulations. However, “the main value of an accountability system is
not to produce punishment; it is to motivate better performance than would otherwise occur”
(Bardach and Lesser, 1996:201).
The third feature of accountability pointed by Fenstermacher (1979) is that of information
sharing. Brinkerhoff (2001:2) says accountability implies answerability; “being accountable
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means having the obligation to answer questions regarding decisions and/or actions”. In
agreement with this, Fenstermacher says that:
The parties to an accountability relation are obliged to provide or receive
information. The obligation to provide is incurred by A, the person held accountable;
the obligation to receive is incurred by B. This obligation operates somewhat
ambiguously, as is shown by the difference between the expressions, A gave an
account to B, and A was called to account by B. (Fenstermacher, 1979:331)
However, a critical feature of the information regarding accountability is that it is
asymmetrical: a manager simply informs street-level workers, usually in a manner that is
regular and routine, while street-level workers are expected to justify their performance.
Similar to this definition is Kappan’s (1972:636) view of the relationship in accountability.
Kappan notes that “an accountable relationship between seller and buyer involves three
elements [contractual – implicit and explicit]: 1) disclosure concerning the product or service
being sold; 2) product or performances testing; 3) redress in the event of false disclosure or
poor performance” (1972:636).
Levin’s concept of information in accountability is common to many authors. Levin points
out that “the most straightforward interpretation of the accountability concept appears to be
that of performance reporting, a periodic report of the attainments of schools and other
educational units” (Levin, 1974:364).  Under Levin’s interpretation accountability usually
includes the development of state-wide testing programs in the United States as well as the
provision of other information such as the racial and socioeconomic distributions of pupils
which is useful in interpreting test results among school districts (1974:364). The
presumption underlying the performance reporting interpretation is that information on policy
outcomes is necessary in order to enable constituents to appraise the public service workers.
Accountability can also be seen as the extent to which one must answer to a higher authority,
legal or organisational, for one’s actions in society at large or within one’s organisation
(Kearns, 1998:145). Kearns views accountability as an “obligation for keeping accurate
records of property, documents, or funds” which will help the agents to provide answers to
questions from principals (Kearns, 1998:145).  Furthermore, Starling (1986:123) asserts that
a good synonym for accountability is answerability. To Kogan (1986:26), accountability is a
synonym of responsibility. Hunt summarizes accountability as:
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…the capacity and the willingness to give explanations for conduct, stating how one
has discharged one’s responsibilities. Accountability, therefore, involves both an
explanation of conduct in a credible story of what happened, and a calculation and
balancing of competitive obligations. (Hunt, 2006:45)
Scholars of accountability generally agree with the concepts of “answerability for
performance” (Romzek 2000:22) and “the obligation to report to others, to explain, to justify,
to answer questions about how resources have been used, and to what effect” (Trow,
1996:310).  However, the underlying principle is that those whose capital is used to finance
an undertaking should be able to judge the performance of those who act on their behalf and
should be able to exercise sanctions when necessary (Smith, 1990:54).
A common feature among these definitions, though not explicit, is a hierarchical form of
accountability where street-level workers are expected to be answerable, responsible and
keep organisational information for some higher authority. Implicit in these definitions is the
view that workers (agents) should account for all their actions in the organisation. They must
collect information and document their activities for their principals.
Some authors, although they agree with most of definitions mentioned, believe that
accountability is a form of performance evaluation. One such writer is Paul (1991:2) who
maintains that accountability is “holding individuals and organisations responsible for
performance measured as objectively as possible”. Although the inclusion of some
performance measurement (evaluation) as an element of accountability is echoed by some
writers (Huisman and Currie, 2004:530; Levin, 1974:363), other authors believe that this is a
misconception of accountability.  For instance, Kogan (1986:32-33) believes that many
people mistakenly think that accountability and evaluation are identical. The notion of
accountability carries with it the overtones of sanctions while responsibility simply refers to
the feeling that the workers may have towards those who are affected by their work.
These definitions are clear, simple to understand and embody the core elements of
accountability, but they are narrow. Kearns (1998:144) identifies the core elements of
narrow definitions of accountability. They include “(a) a higher authority vested with the
power of oversight, (b) an explicit reporting mechanism for conveying information to the
higher authority, and (c) a measure or criterion used by the higher authority to assess
compliance by subordinate institutions” (Kearns, 1998:144). Kearns argues that
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accountability includes much more than following rules and formal reporting upward through
a chain of command (1998:145).
In explaining the broader meaning of accountability, Kearns (1998:145) notes that
accountability is achieved when organisations assume responsibility for responding to the
needs of society. For instance, if the education system does not respond to the needs of the
society its accountability becomes questionable. In the same vein, Kearns further argues that
accountability can be extended to include the desire by stakeholders to have street-level
bureaucracies and bureaucrats be held accountable to their wishes, their personal definitions
of a problem and the best way to solve it (1998:145).
Another author who views accountability in broader terms is Mansfield (1982).  Mansfield
declares that the notion of  “accountability reaches beyond obeying instructions faithfully to
include a responsibility for behaviour and actions that are judged by standards (national and
international examinations) of competency, integrity, judgment, prudence, vision, courage,
and other like qualities” (Mansfield, 1982:61). These broader definitions extend far beyond
bureaucratic control and “blur some important semantic and conceptual distinctions between
the related, but distinct, notions of accountability, responsibility, obligation, and ethics”
(Cooper, 1990:60). Although it may be technically correct to differentiate between these
concepts, there are only rare cases in the literature on accountability where these distinctions
are made. However, the focus of this study is limited to accountability within the
bureaucracy.
Bovens views accountability as a social relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to
explain and to justify his or her conduct to some significant other (Bovens, 2005:4). In this
relatively simply definition of a relationship there are a number of variables. The actor, or
accountor, can be either an individual or an organisation. The significant other, which
Bovens (2005:4) calls the accountability forum or the accountee, can be a specific person or
organisation. For public managers this could be the general public. The accounting
relationship usually consists of three stages. The first stage is that “the actor must feel obliged
to inform the forum about his or her conduct, by providing various sorts of data about the
performance of tasks, about outcomes, or about procedures. This usually happens in the case
of failures or incidents; this also involves the provision of justifications” (Bovens, 2005:4).
The obligation that is felt by the accountor can be formal and informal. Bovens argues that
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“public managers often will be under a formal obligation to give accounts on a regular basis
to specific forums, such as their superiors, supervisory agencies, or auditors (2005:4).
Secondly, such information can prompt the forum to interrogate the actor and to question the
adequacy of the information or the legitimacy of the conduct (Bovens, 2005:5).  This reveals
the connection between ‘accountability’ and ‘answerability’. The third and final stage of the
accounting relationship is that the forum usually passes judgement on the conduct of the
actor. This may include implicit sanctions on the actor such as the very fact of having to give
an account in front of television cameras, or of having one’s public image or career severely
damaged by the negative publicity that results from the process (Bovens, 2005:5). Here
accountability involves a reactive response to the outcome of an organisation in relation to
the expected outputs.
3.2 Forms and types of accountability
The different views of the concept of accountability can yield different forms of
accountability.  Brinkerhoff suggests that “these definitional elements of accountability can
be combined into a matrix that helps to bring some order to the concept and adds clarity in
terms of where various kinds of accountability mechanisms fit within the schema” (2001:4).
Illustrations of these matrixes are shown in Table 3.2 (Brinkerhoff, 2001:5) and Table 3.3
(Romzek, B., & Dubnick, 1987:229).
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 Blue ribbon panels
 Citizens’ charters
 ‘Sunshine laws’
 Freedom of information laws
 Citizen oversight committees
 Service delivery surveys
 Civil society watchdog
organisations
 Policy research (e.g., by




Table 3.3 Types of accountability.
Source: Romzek and Dubnick (1987:229)
Although these matrixes are not exhaustive, a close look at them reveals remarkable features.
Firstly it is clear that accountability has both internal and external orientations. Both matrixes
show that legal and bureaucratic forms of accountability have a high degree of control over
agency actions. However the scholars seem to disagree on the level of enforcement or degree
of control of political and professional accountability. Brinkerhoff seems to suggest that
political accountability [denoted by elections] has a high level of enforcement (2001:5) while
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Romzek and Dubnick (1987:229) rate political accountability as having a low degree of
control over agency action. It is, however, not necessary for this study to resolve these
differences.
Some authors group accountability into several types depending on the purposes of their
analyses. Some of the groups are professional accountability, political accountability
(Huisman and Currie, 2004:530), upward and downward accountability, inward or outward
accountability (Burke, 2005:3), legal and hierarchical accountability (Radin and Romzek,
1996:61), public accountability, public-administrative accountability, participatory
accountability (Hupe and Hill, 2007:288-290). Some scholars state that “in the daily life of
modern public managers operating in a democratic system, there are at least five different
sorts of forums that they may have to face up to, and therefore also at least five major types
of potential accountability relationships” (Bovens, 2005:7). These are: organisational
accountability – superiors; political accountability - elected representatives and political
parties; legal accountability – courts; administrative - auditors, inspectors; and controllers and
professional accountability - professional peers (Bovens, 2005:5-9). Table 3.4 shows some of
the types of accountability as classified by Hupe and Hill (2007:289). The next sections will
focus on five common types of accountability which have been chosen due to their relevance
to this study; that is political, performance, hierarchical, legal and professional.
Table 3.4 Forms of accountability
** Note: peers within both the profession in question and related professions.
(Source: Hupe and Hill, 2007:289).
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3.2.1 Political accountability
Political accountability “relates to building trust among citizens that government acts in
accordance with agreed-upon standards of probity, ethics, integrity, and professional
responsibility” (Brinkerhoff, 2003:8). In terms of the accountability matrix (Table 3.1),
political accountability is an external mechanism. Many scholars believe that political
accountability is an important type of accountability for street-level bureaucrats (Timar,
2003:178; Boven, 2005:7). Also referred to as democratic accountability (Brinkerhoff,
2001:8), “political accountability relationships afford managers the discretion or choice to be
responsive to the concerns of key interest groups, such as elected officials, clientele groups,
and the general public (Huisman and Currie, 2004:531; Bovens, 2005:7). These stakeholders
may come from formal institutions (such as chief executives or legislative bodies) or
constituent groups. These relationships derive from external sources but involve low degrees
of direct control. They are manifested in a high degree of discretion for the individual
organisation or individual to choose whether to respond to the expectations of some key
external stakeholder and to face the consequences of a decision made (Radin and Romzek,
1996:62). This is because the relationship is based on an expectation of responsiveness to
these stakeholders. Hupe and Hill assert that political accountability implies an orientation
towards a top, demanding that functionaries are accountable to it (Hupe and Hill, 2007:286).
However, the political model of accountability can lead to intrusive regulations and it
requires consensus or at least majority consent (Burke, 2005:10).
Political accountability usually causes conflicts between politicians and professionals due to
their different perspectives. Public managers, especially “those with a professional or legal
background, often find political accountability difficult to handle, if not threatening, because
of the fluid, contingent, and ambiguous character of political agendas and political norms”
(Bovens, 2005:7). This is because the criteria for political judgment are often contestable and
contested and may depend on media coverage, blaming, coalition building, and political
opportunity to get into power or stay in power.
The main avenues for political accountability are the political process and elections
(Brinkerhoff, 2001:9). While this form of accountability is decisive in determining the
government’s continuation in power, in reality, and especially in developing countries,
political accountability is weak and blunt. Brinkerhoff (2001) gives three major reasons for
this. Firstly, “elections are periodic, thus attenuating the link between government’s actions
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and the expression of citizen approval or dissatisfaction” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:9). Secondly, it
seems that most voters choose their leaders based on the election manifestos.  Brinkerhoff
notes that “it can be unclear to those in power whether votes are taken on the basis of
retrospective voter assessment of past government performance or of prospective
appreciation of promises made for the future” (2001:9). Thirdly, the “political process in
developing and transitioning countries constrains democratic/political accountability”
(Brinkerhoff, 2001:9). In most developing countries elections are rarely free and fair, or even
if they are, their outcomes are rarely respected by those in power. Because of this Brinkerhoff
argues that “the effectiveness of electoral accountability tends to further diminish” (2001:9).
This is in stark contrast with the purpose of political accountability which Brinkerhoff says
“has to do with the institutions, procedures, and mechanisms that seek to ensure that
government delivers on electoral promises, fulfils the public trust, aggregates and represents
citizens’ interests, and responds to ongoing and emerging societal needs and concerns”
(2003:7).
3.2.2 Performance accountability
Also termed managerial accountability, performance accountability refers to demonstrating
and accounting for performance in light of agreed-upon performance targets (Brinkerhoff,
2001:10; 2003:21). Performance is both internal and external in this form of accountability:
internal to internal supervisors and external to the public. The main focus of performance
accountability is on outputs of public bureaucracies. Performance accountability also denotes
the notions of efficiency, effectiveness, productivity, quality (‘hard accountability’) and
satisfaction, trust and equity (‘soft accountability’) (Fard and Rostamy, 2007:342). It has a
strong link with political accountability in that the decisive factors “for performance are
responsiveness to citizens and achievement of service delivery targets that meet their needs
and demands” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:10). Furthermore, performance accountability is related to
financial accountability in as far as financial resources intended to produce goods, services,
and benefits for citizens are to be accounted for (Lipsky, 1980:16; Brinkerhoff, 2003:7).
However, performance accountability involves complex processes of setting credible goals
and objectives against which performance is judged. The main problem with this is the
measurability of public bureaucracies’ goods. By definition, street-level bureaucracies are
large organisations whose outputs are difficult to measure objectively (Lipsky, 1980).  In
agreement with this assertion, Brinkerhoff points out that:
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On the surface, performance accountability appears deceptively simple: public
officials should be accountable for outputs, results, and impacts. However, a number
of methodological issues arise in thinking about performance accountability and
governance reform. (Brinkerhoff, 2001:11)
Moreover, critical questions concerning the link between performance and other types of
accountability emerge. Because of this, some analysts believe that the emphasis on
performance accountability has led to the introduction of business management concepts and
market based accountability in public sector administration and management (Brinkerhoff,
2001:11). The main problem with this is that “treating citizens as consumers downplays the
democratic aspects of accountability; the risk is that governments become accountable only to
those citizen-consumers who ‘vote’ with their dollars” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:12). Brinkerhoff
laments the issues of equity if citizens without resources do not have a voice and compliance
with standards and regulations if accountability favours responsiveness to citizen-consumers
(2001:12).
All the accountability forums discussed here can fall into two broad groups: internal and
external accountability. Internal accountability relationships are based on the assumptions
that organisations have conceptions of accountability embedded in their patterns of day-to-
day operations, and that an organisation’s conception of accountability significantly
influences how it delivers its services (Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin, 2003:3). For street-level
bureaucracies to function they need to solve problems of accountability. In specific reference
to schools, Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin posit that “the way they solve these problems is
reflected in the ways teachers, administrators, students and parents talk about fundamental
issues of schooling” (2003:3).  Some analysts view capacity building (to be discussed later)
as an effort to strengthen internal accountability (Gunzenhauser and Hyde, 2007:501).
However, it is important to note that internal accountability exists in the context of external
accountability pressures (from parents, media and the public at large) which seek to promote
improved student learning. Because of the strengths of internal accountability mechanisms, a
number of countries, for example, Scotland, emphasise systems of self-evaluation (internal
accountability) as a means of quality control (Swift 2008:4). Using a sense-making
perspective, Karen, Febey and Schroeder (2005) examined teachers’ responses to
accountability and report that teachers “viewed their long-term emphasis on school
improvement planning and internal accountability as having contributed to their success, and
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they were angry that their path-breaking work on quality improvement had not been
acknowledged” (2005:185).
With specific reference to education, external accountability can be viewed as “the
constraints and demands placed upon schools and school districts” (Gunzenhauser and Hyde,
2007:501). These can include state - mandated assessments, performance evaluation and time
limits. There are mixed views on the effectiveness of external forms of accountability on
street-level behaviour. There is some evidence that better performing schools have greater
capacity to respond to external accountability pressures (Carnoy and Loeb, 2002:320).
However, as will be discussed in later sections, external  accountability alone will not ensure
that a school will have adequate organisational capacity to improve, and that highly
prescriptive consequences mandated by external authorities deny school staff the necessary
ownership of the change process to make it effective (Ahearn, 2000:10).
Securing compliance through any or all of the forms of accountability discussed to date in
this chapter is important if street-level bureaucracies and bureaucrats are to deliver quality
public goods. Public managers can attempt to increase accountability through administrative
controls to increase the congruence between worker behaviour and the policies of their
organisations (Lipsky, 1980:160). Lipsky notes that recent efforts have also focused on
improving accountability to public consumers by creating market conditions and by
decentralising (1980:160). Depending on the approach to policy implementation discussed
earlier, accountability mechanisms can be either top-down or bottom-up, and have internal or
external forms of accountability.
3.2.3 Hierarchical accountability.
Also termed bureaucratic accountability (Smithson, 1987:6), hierarchical accountability is an
internal mechanism with a high enforcement capacity (see accountability matrix: Table 3.1).
The principle of hierarchical accountability is characteristic of Weber’s ideal-type of
bureaucracy (Pesch, 2008:338) Pesch notes that, in order to deal with the complexities of
bureaucracies, Weber calls on both political leaders and civil servants to behave according to
their ascribed roles (2008:8). As with legal accountability, in hierarchical accountability
relationships are defined internally and exhibit a high degree of control (Radin and Romzek,
1996:62). In both legal and hierarchical accountability relationships, there is little choice
about whether to respond to the relevant expectations. “The high degree of control and
scrutiny leaves little room for discretion; in contrast, both professional and political
46
accountability relationships allow a high degree of discretion as to how to respond to
expectations for performance” (Radin and Romzek, 1996:62). In hierarchical accountability,
relationships are manifested in organisational roles, supervisory relationships, rules, standard
operating procedures, and close, detailed scrutiny of employee or agency performance and
are based on an expectation of obedience to organisational directives (Radin and Romzek,
1996:62). Heinrich adds that hierarchical accountability includes inputs such as
administrative rules which guide routine tasks and budgetary allocations (2002:712). Some
authors substitute the term “hierarchical” accountability for “bureaucratic” accountability
(Radin and Romzek, 1996:62).
Hierarchical accountability is similar in many respects to what Bovens (2005:7) calls
organisational accountability. He notes that public managers will regularly, sometimes on a
formal basis, such as with annual performance reviews, but more often in daily informal
meetings, ask street-level bureaucrats to account for their assignments. This involves a strong
hierarchical relationship and such accounting may be based on strict directives and standard
operating procedures, but this is not a constitutive element (Bovens, 2005:7).
3.2.4 Legal accountability
Legal accountability is an external mechanism which entails a high degree of control over
agency actions (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). Legal accountability is based on specific
responsibilities which are formally or legally awarded to authorities (Boven, 2005:8).
Relationships in legal accountability derive from external sources that exercise a high degree
of control and scrutiny (Radin and Romzek, 1996:62). They are manifested in oversight and
monitoring activities (for example, audits, site visits, and other monitoring tasks). This also
involves appraisals of government performance and adapting techniques from the larger field
of management science (Heinrich, 2002:712). These accountability relationships have an
orientation to the ‘top’.  Radin and Romzek point out that “some actor (individual or
organisation) external to the office or agency has an independent basis for scrutinizing
performance, such as an auditor, a legislative oversight hearing, or a court review of
administrative practices” (1996:61). Hupe and Hill (2007:286) add that public- administrative
and legal forms of accountability have in common a vertical orientation. They argue that
political and legal accountability may be in conflict even for street-level bureaucrats who
may see themselves as, first, bound by law and, secondly, are restrained hierarchically (Hupe
and Hill, 2007:286). However, a study by Fard and Rostamy (2007:340) in Iran shows that
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legal accountability was ranked as the most effective form of accountability in terms of
degree of control over workers. This is because “legal accountability is the most
unambiguous type of accountability as the legal scrutiny will be based on detailed legal
standards, prescribed by civil, penal, or administrative statutes, or precedent” (Boven,
2005:8).
3.2.5 Professional accountability
Street-level bureaucrats are often held accountable by their peers (Hupe and Hill, 2007:289;
Smithson, 1987:6; Huisman and Currie, 2004:530). “Professional accountability systems are
reflected in work arrangements that afford high degrees of autonomy to individuals who base
their decision-making on internalized norms of appropriate practice” (Romzek, 2000:26).
According to Tables 3.2 and Table 3.3 (accountability matrixes) professional accountability
falls in both the internal and external accountability mechanisms. It is external in as far as
professional bodies are concerned and internal when considered in relation to internal peers.
Professional accountability relationships derive from internal sources but involve low degrees
of control and high degrees of discretion to the individual or agency being held to answer for
performance (Radin and Romzek, 1996:62). Radin and Romzek argue that peers practice
collective self-management on various scales (1996:62). It seems as though this approach
preserves the traditional domination of certain professions such as medicine and law. The
relationships in professional accountability are based on a high opinion of the expertise of
workers. In terms of professional accountability street-level bureaucrats are expected to
exercise discretion in a manner consistent with the norms of professional practice relevant to
the area of expertise as stipulated by their code of ethics. This source of control emanates
from within the organisation as internalized professional norms and standards (Radin and
Romzek, 1996:62). The implicit bargain between professions and society is that in exchange
for self-regulation professions will act in a client’s interest without regard for personal gain
and without compromising their advocacy (Lipsky, 1980:189). Jaafar and Anderson share
the same view and state that the standards of practice set benchmarks that in principle serve
as a point of reference by which educators can self-reflect and measure their own thinking
and practice (2007:211). In explaining the importance of professional accountability from
public management perspectives, Bovens says that:
Professional bodies lay down codes with standards for acceptable practice which are
binding for all members. These standards are monitored and enforced by
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professional bodies of oversight on the basis of peer review. This type of
accountability relation will be particularly relevant for public managers that work in
professional organisations, such as hospitals, schools, psychiatric clinics, police
departments, or fire brigades. (Bovens, 2005:9)
However, Lipsky points out that “this is not to say street-level bureaucrats do not also
confront organisational demands” (1980:190).  Furthermore, professions are not necessarily
unified groups. There may be divisions within them (for example, within medicine, between
primary and secondary care practitioners, between physicians and surgeons, between medical
specialities, and so on) (Hupe and Hill, 2007:289). Moreover, street-level bureaucrats of a
given profession may often cooperate, externally induced or not, with other professionals
(doctors with social workers; teachers with educational psychologists, and so on). Hupe and
Hill thus distinguish between ‘inter’ and ‘intra’ dimensions of professional accountability
(2007:290).
3.3 Analytic framework for educational accountability
Using the five types of accountability discussed in the preceding subsection as analytic
lenses, this section attempts to devise a framework for educational accountability. It can be
discerned that the five classes of accountability outlined here are dependent on the purpose of
accountability. For instance, some purposes of accountability can include adherence to
professional ethics, legal requirements, bureaucratic procedures and processes,
responsiveness to societal needs and making sure that schools are performing at the highest
level so as to attain the agreed upon outcomes or results. In light of this, different views on
educational accountability will be discussed based on the types of accountability presented
above. Like the notion of accountability, educational accountability is a difficult term to
define. With specific reference to Australia, Smithson (1987:4) states that “today’s general
insistence on increased educational accountability is plagued by the fact that it is not always
clear precisely what is being advocated, for there is little doubt that in Australia, as
elsewhere, ‘the term ‘accountability’ has come to mean different things to different people”.
Political accountability
Political accountability manifests itself in educational institutions’ responsiveness to
expectations that emerge from external stakeholders such as legislative bodies, parents and
society at large (Radin and Romzek, 1998:77). However, it is generally agreed that
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accountability in education involves not only reactive responses to the requirements of
different constituencies, but also requires efforts by different stakeholders to meet the needs
of the public and to make sure that the public trust is served. This view matches the political
form of accountability. Accountability in educational policy implementation also entails “the
guarantee that all students, without respect to race, income, or social class, will acquire the
minimum school skills necessary to take full advantage of the choices that accrue upon
successful completion of public schooling” (Fenstermacher, 1979:333). In agreement with
this, Elmore (1996) [cited in Linn, 2000:12] states that educational accountability should
focus schools’ attention less on compliance with rules [legal accountability] and more on
increasing learning for students. However, this does not eliminate the need to comply with
regulations. Political accountability relies on periodic elections as political actors promise
their supporters better and effective educational systems. Furthermore, Smithson argues that
if:
publicly funded state schools should be under some form of democratic control, ...
presumably we could expect citizens in a democracy to hold those responsible for
making curriculum policy decision, democratically accountable for their policies - to
the extent that should citizens disapprove of policies and policy-makers, they could
rid themselves of both, and the electoral system is the traditional means of
accomplishing this. (1987:7)
A study carried out by Fard and Rostamy reveals that political accountability, public trust and
citizens’ are interrelated (2007:331). Political accountability allows government to
demonstrate, at least symbolically, that it is being attentive and responsive to all constituent
interests in education (Jaafar and Anderson, 2007:220). In the event of problems in areas of
jurisdiction, public managers or senior bureaucrats in the education sector may be required to
appear before parliamentary committees on education (Bovens, 2005:8).  Furthermore,
Bovens notes that public managers can find themselves in the United States in “informal and
discrete, but not to be disregarded accountability relationships with party bosses” to protect
their jobs (2007:8). Bovens also argues that street-level bureaucrats and public managers in
education alike have to be constantly alert to the media, because the agenda of the media
determines in large part the agenda of their political principals (2007:25). This is because
political accountability implies an orientation towards a top, demanding that street-level
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bureaucrats and public managers and educational institutions are accountable to it (Hupe and
Hill, 2007:286).
Performance accountability
In using performance accountability as an analytic tool, Leithwood, Edge and Jantzi’s (1999)
conception of educational accountability is relevant here. They assert that an educational
system must account for the welfare of individual students (1999:18). By ‘welfare’, these
scholars imply the pre-eminence of academic achievement. They argue that “such
achievement is a necessary if not sufficient part of the meaning of student welfare in the
context of schooling” (Leithwood et al, 1999:18). A distinguishing feature of this view is
‘academic achievement’ without which an educational institution may not be said to be
accountable. In current policy and practice, argue Leithwood et al (1999:18), educators are
often held accountable, as well, for the nature of the organisation and the practices of those
who it is believed contribute more or less directly to students’ welfare. Under this regime the
most straightforward way of understanding educational accountability seems to be that of
“performance reporting, a periodic report of attainments of schools and other educational
units” (Levin, 1974:364). To attain this, in the United States, state-wide mandated curricular
and testing procedures which provide information and ways of analysing the information on
the basis of other variables such as geography and other socio-economic variables have been
used.
There are different purposes of performance reporting in education. For instance, in
Singapore performance reporting coupled with rewards is used for the following reasons:
 as a tool of accountability tool for Ministry of Education to identify good practices
that can be used to improve an education system.
 as a benchmarking tool for schools to measure their performance against that of other
schools as a part of continual improvement.
 as a source of information to allow parents and students to make informed choices
when choosing schools. (Ministry of Education, 2006:2)
It is clear that educational accountability is consonant with the variety of accountability types
outlined earlier. In as far as teachers are accountable to “their employers, their school
principals, their staff colleagues, the parents of their pupils, their pupils, the teaching
profession, and they are also responsible to themselves” (Smithson, 1987:4), the notions of
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bureaucratic accountability (to the principals), and professional accountability (to staff and
colleagues) are evident. However, educational accountability has been regarded as very poor
in developing countries. Winkler (2004:3) points out that “in traditional public education,
accountability is weak, especially in most developing countries because of weak voice, poor
management, insufficient information, confusing roles, and weak incentives”. These
challenges can be grouped into external and internal factors. Some external challenges to
educational accountability listed by Winkler are:
 Citizens lack experience with popular democracy. Their resultant passive behaviour
reduces the voice of parents and citizens in education.
 Weak management practices pervade the public sector, making it difficult for the
management of the education sector to improve.
 Poor public budgeting and spending practices produce unpredictable education
funding. (Winkler, 2004:6)
The internal challenges are:
 Public schools rarely welcome parental involvement, except for their financial
contributions.
 Reliable information on academic performance at the school level is almost never
available.
 Schools lack an evaluation culture: neither teachers nor schools are evaluated.
(Winkler, 2004:6)
Thus, although educational accountability has reached advanced stages in the developed
world, in Africa, as in many developing countries, educational accountability remains a
daunting challenge. This is compounded by the dearth of scholarship on educational
accountability in the developing world.
Hierarchical accountability
In the education sector the hierarchical form of accountability is defined by the dimensions of
the subordinate/supervisor relationships within a hierarchical organisation (Radin and
Romzek, 1996:74). These can include relationships, as in South Africa, between teachers,
heads of department, principals, circuit managers, district education managers, provincial
education directors, the director generals and political masters (for instance, the Minister of
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Basic Education). Hierarchical accountability denotes the answerability of street-level
bureaucrats to superiors. As Kearns (1998:145) points out, “accountability is the obligation of
educational institutions to acknowledge a higher authority, the public trust, which ultimately
is the source of their mandate, their authority, and their credibility”. Kerns’ view of
educational accountability is that bureaucratic accountability and hierarchical accountability
are synonymous. Depending on the accountability actors in question, educators are obliged to
acknowledge their principals as higher authorities while at the same time senior bureaucrats
in education are also obliged to acknowledge their political masters as the source of their
credibility and mandate.
Legal accountability
Legal accountability is another important aspect of educational accountability. Many
standards of accountability are codified in laws and regulations. Educational institutions are
expected to comply with explicit standards of performance, operational procedures, output
measures, or reporting requirements (Kerns, 1998:147). The compliance requirements are
often formally codified and carry the force of law (Kerns, 1998:147). In another way, schools
are legally accountable to parents of pupils stemming from the in loco parentis principle
(Smithson, 1987:6). Furthermore, legal accountability provides for processes such as audits,
school visits, and other monitoring tasks (Heinrich, 2002:712). However, effective legal
accountability requires proper execution of law and regulations, and providing citizens with
required information about laws and regulations at the expected time. (Fard and Rostamy,
2007:336). An example of legal accountability in education is the ‘No Child is Left Behind’
law in the United States which stipulates that states adopt a comprehensive accountability
system for identifying and improving underperforming schools. This law aims to have all
students performing at proficient levels in selected learning areas by 2014. Furthermore, it
prohibits any national testing or federally controlled curriculum. In England the ‘Every Child
Matters’ (2003) law provides for inspecting children’s services which include schools.
Within a legal accountability framework laws and regulations can be passed to constrain the
screws on teachers and educational institutions. For example, California created an
‘accountability law’ through the passage of the Stull Act (Lenin, 1974:366). One section of
that Act calls for the assessment of teacher competence. It stipulates that the governing board
of school districts should develop and adopt evaluation and assessment guidelines which
include the following elements:
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 The establishment of standards of expected student progress in each area of study
and of techniques for the assessment of that progress.
 Assessment of certificated personnel competence as it relates to the established
standards.
 Assessment of other duties normally required to be performed by certificated
employees as an adjunct to their regular assignments.
 The establishment of procedures and techniques for ascertaining that the
certificated employee is maintaining proper control and is preserving a suitable
learning environment. (Levin, 1974:366)
Fenstermacher argues that the Stull Act involves the continuous willingness to evaluate
education, to explain and interpret the results with all candour and to divulge the results to the
public or constituencies that need to know them (1979:333). Martin [cited in Fenstermacher
(1979:333)] views accountability as “a system for rewarding teachers according to their
pupils’ performance on some standardized measures of learning”.
Professional accountability
In terms of professional accountability, schools and educators are held accountable by their
peers (by professional bodies like the South African Council for Educators). Professional
accountability relies on a distinction between experts and laypeople. Teachers regard
themselves as professionals whose work can be understood better by their peers. That is, in
addition to being held accountable for organisational features that enhance student welfare
(performance accountability), teachers are held accountable for student welfare directly by
their peers. Educators in some contexts are held accountable for:
– ensuring that specific organisational qualities considered to be critical to
effectiveness are reflected in their schools or districts;
– organisational efficiency;
– meeting standards of professional knowledge and skill;
– meeting standards of moral behaviour;
– performance of best professional practices or specified duties;
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–skilfully using organisational processes believed to contribute to the successful
introduction of change (such as strategic planning, school improvement planning
and the carrying out of quality reviews). (Leithwood et al, 1999:19)
Conclusion
In this chapter a definition of accountability was offered. It was shown that although
accountability is important for all organisations and is a hallmark of democracy, the term is
not easy to define. It was noted that accountability may be interpreted as transparency,
responsiveness, trustworthiness, and fidelity and justice. The need for accountability in
bureaucracies has attracted the attention of scholars. As result, there have been concerted
efforts to understand the term. This has given rise to different types of accountability that
were discussed in this chapter, particularly political accountability, performance
accountability, hierarchical accountability, legal accountability and professional
accountability.
Political accountability is based on public trust in elected officials (when they are elected) in
terms of their responsiveness to fulfilling their promises. It is usually judged on the ability of
governments to deliver services which can influence voter behaviour. Then performance
accountability, which is also known as managerial accountability, was discussed. This type of
accountability refers to the demonstration of performance in view of agreed-upon outcomes.
The third type of accountability presented was hierarchical accountability which is also
known as bureaucratic accountability. This type of accountability requires high degrees of
control and leaves very little room for discretion. A further type of accountability which was
discussed is legal accountability which is reflected in the compliance of public officials with
regulations and laws. This form of accountability is related to political accountability.
Finally, professional accountability takes place when street-level bureaucrats hold each other
accountable in terms of norms and standards as well as according to a code of ethics of the
profession. Professional accountability has low degrees of control as well as high degrees of
discretion and professional autonomy. It is important to note that all these forms of
accountability are related to one another and that most of them emanate from legislative
requirements in many contexts.
The chapter ended by examining educational accountability in terms of the above types of
accountability. Academic research which deals with the application of different forms of
accountability to education was reviewed. In both the United States and Western Europe
55
different forms of accountability have been used to make education bureaucracies
accountable. There is a dearth of academic scholarship on educational accountability in South




A FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EDUCATION
SECTOR
Managing public policy invariably requires the ability to hold role payers accountable at all
the echelons of government bureaucracy and every stage of policy cycle.  Despite the
challenges to educational accountability in the developing world, the demand for
accountability the management of educational policy is increasing. Furthermore, tax payers
the donor community as well as bilateral and multilateral organisations have made
accountability an indispensable virtue. The need for accountability in the public sector cannot
be over emphasised. To do this, public managers who are involved in managing public policy
in government departments have to find ways of making their organisations and street-level
workers more accountable. Lipsky posits that:
Despite the dual focus of accountability inherent in street-level bureaucrats’ roles,
public managers are drawn to make street-level bureaucrats more accountable by
reducing their discretion and constraining their alternatives. They write manuals to
cover contingencies. They audit performance of workers to provide retrospective
sanctions in anticipation of which it is hoped future behaviour will be modified
(Lipsky, 1980:162).
There is a large volume of scholarly literature on different modes of achieving accountability
and their effects among street-level bureaucrats. Some include performance management and
legal and bureaucratic accountability. Other methods that are used to improve accountability
in education entail mandated curricular and external examinations. This study will focus on
both internal (bureaucratic and professional) and external (legal and political) modes.  This
chapter will explore different accountability mechanisms employed in managing the
implementation of educational policy. Methods such as performance evaluation, student
assessment, school inspection or whole school evaluation, accreditation and professional
development will be discussed.  As noted in the previous chapter, the different types of
generic accountability are somewhat arbitrary. The boundaries of each mode of
accountability are not crystal clear. Semantic confusion has resulted in an unending list of
accountability types which are often applied to education. It is, however, apparent that no
single type of accountability stands on its own. For instance professional accountability in
education is supported by legal accountability through the promulgation of legislations such
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as the South African Council of Educators Act of 2000 in South Africa. The purpose of this
chapter, therefore, is to further develop and apply the accountability framework developed in
Chapter 3 to the management of educational policy implementation.
Accordingly, the chapter will be organised in line with the accountability framework
developed in the previous chapters. It will commence with political accountability followed
by performance accountability, third will be bureaucratic/hierarchical accountability which
will be followed by legal accountability, and then professional accountability. As far as
possible these connections will be highlighted. Even within each type of accountability, the
methods used are interrelated. For example, sanctions and rewards as a strategy which may
be used may also be based on the results of student assessments. The type of accountability
which is applied may have a bearing on the strategy which is used to increase accountability.
4.1 Political accountability
The faith and hope that families, communities and society have on education makes
education one the ‘most public’ of all the public policies. Managing the implementation of
education becomes one of the most controversial tasks for public managers. Examples of
such controversial policies include the ‘No Child left Behind’ in United States and the
Curriculum, 2005 (outcomes based education) in South Africa. Using the hierarchy presented
earlier, each level at the top places pressure at the levels beneath it to perform and produce
outcomes. As conceptualised in Chapter 3, among other relationships, political accountability
represents the relationship between elected officials and the voters. This relationship can exist
at least at two levels, school level and national level. At school level it is manifested in school
governing bodies (SGBs) that are elected to oversee the running of the school (Manchanda,
2013). At national level it is revealed in national politics where elected officials are expected
to formulate sound educational policies and enact them in the most prudent ways. Although
these two dimensions of political accountability do not pose any meaningful direct contact
with street-level bureaucrats in classes, their position in management of educational policy
merits a brief analysis.
At school level in South Africa composition and functions of SGBs are sanctioned by the
South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 [a clear link with legal accountability]. DBE (2009:6)
notes that SGBGs are democratically elected to:
 improve quality of education;
 ensure good governance;
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 ensure that schools serve the interests of the community and meet expectations of
parents;
 assist in spreading the cost of education across users and society as a whole and to
 combat racism, sexism and all other forms of unfair discrimination and intolerance.
The electoral process of SGB members is comprehensive systematic. These processes are
guided by Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; National Education Policy Act,
1996 (Act 27 of 1996); South African Schools Act, 1996 (Act 84 of 1996); and failure to
deliver on their mandates would result in members losing their position in the SGBs.
However, the extent to which these governing bodies are accountable is unclear. Considering
the number of schools in the rural communities, with huge number of parents who are
illiterate, it may be difficult to ascertain the capacity of such bodies to be accountable.
Although an analysis of their mandated duties seems to show that holding street-level
bureaucrats accountable is not within their jurisdiction, they are still held accountable for the
functioning of the school ((Manchanda, 2013). It may, however, be inferred that the attitudes
of parents towards the schools may have an effect on how teachers perceive their duties and
accountability devices that are placed on them to secure accountability among them in the
schools.
At national level, formulation and implementation of education by governing parties is often
a critical issue of accountability. Both ruling and opposition political parties place attractive
and at times radical education policies in their election manifesto in order to attract voters in
electoral processes. Often, these policies are purportedly informed by their constitution.
In 2007 Britain’s Labour Party demonstrated its willingness to exercise political
accountability in education and set out the following objectives:
 Secure the wellbeing and health of children and young people
 Safeguard the young and vulnerable
 Achieve world class standards in education
 Close the gap in educational achievement for children from disadvantaged
backgrounds
 Ensure young people are participating and achieving their potential to 18 and beyond
 Keep children and young people on the path to success (Lupton and Obolenskaya,
2013:7).
59
In New Zealand the Labour Party promises its people “a world-class education for all” (New
Zealand Labour Party, 2013: 32).
These promises often remain wish lists if the implementation of such polices is not well
managed. If the political accountability devices are not effective ruling parties may do as they
wish. In the Western countries electoral processes are an effective means to make
governments account for their action or inaction. For instance, the Conservative Party of
Canada state that the principles of its education policy are guided by the Constitution of
Canada (Conservative Party of Canada, 2011). This policy document emphasises the
importance of government accountability. It states:
A fundamental component of parliamentary government is ministerial accountability
to Parliament. The Conservative Party is determined to enforce parliamentary
principles of government [political] accountability. We believe that ministers should
continue to have authority and be accountable for the policies [including education
policy] they implement and the administrative actions of their departments.
(Conservative Party of Canada, 2011:9)
The ANC, the governing party, aims to strength its position and exercise political
accountability in education improving through:
 Strengthening the culture of performance management within the
education system;
 Simplifying and aligning the evaluation instruments that measure
performance standards for educators;
 Strengthening monitoring and support for educators; and
 Strengthening reporting at all levels. (ANC, 2012:13)
What has been made clear in this is that governing parties exercise political accountability in
education to maintain the trust and significance before the voters while opposition parties
present alternatives as they attempt to gain the win voters to their side. While it has been
shown that in the Western World political accountability is an effective means of  keeping
government accountable evidence reveal that this is not so in Africa and other developing
countries (Brinkerhoff, 2001). Although political accountability may not have a direct link to
what takes in in classrooms, it foregrounds the different mechanisms that are employed to




As discussed previously, performance accountability is based on the demonstration of
performance in the light of agreed upon performance targets. The method that is used to
secure and improve accountability in performance accountability is performance evaluation.
This method can be either an internal or an external mode of accountability.  Performance
accountability can have links with political accountability as politicians seek to determine
whether their educational policies are being effective or not, as this could influence the
behaviour of voters.
Performance accountability involves complex processes of setting credible educational goals
and objectives against which performance is judged. The main problem with the use of
performance accountability for street-level bureaucrats is the measurability of educational
bureaucracies’ goods.
Measures of performance evaluation are premised on performance as a type of accountability,
as was discussed earlier. Educational institutions and their workers are expected to perform
according to acceptable performance targets. The operational framework for performance
evaluation is guided by work plans and objectives of the entire educational bureaucracy at
regional level as well as at district and institutional level (depending on the organisation of
the education system). At national level a government may have targets such as improving
access to education through increased enrolment, improving student retention and reducing
dropout rates. These may cascade downwards to form targets for schools. Here, the
development of performance measures is critical to a performance accountability policy
(Lipsky, 1980:165).
To this end, administrators make great efforts to develop performance measures in order to
control employees’ behaviour. Lipsky believes that “if appropriate performance measures
were available street-level bureaucrats could be made accountable for their behaviour”
(1980:199). Performance measures can be viewed as a method of evaluating an organisation
or a street-level bureaucrat’s performance, which involves tracking, evaluating and giving
feedback on actual performance based on key behaviours or competencies which are
established in terms of the goals that support the achievement of the overall organisational
mission (Davi Ngo, hrvinet.com).  Student performance can be a measure of how effective
school districts are in improving the academic performance of its students by relying on
standardized exams. The federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 in the United States of
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America explicitly requires that all states develop accountability systems based on
assessment tests (Imazeki and Reschovsky, 2004:5). The “most straightforward interpretation
of the accountability concept appears to be that of performance reporting, a periodic report of
the attainments of schools and other educational units” (Levin, 1974:363).
Smith (1990:53) notes that performance indicators have become ubiquitous in the public
sector. Street-level bureaucracies do this for many reasons and in the same way they use
different measures for each purpose. For example, some believe that “the current focus on
performance measurement at all levels of government and in non-profit organisations reflects
citizen demands for evidence of program effectiveness that have been made around the
world” (Behn, 2003:586). Wholey and Newcomer  add that “performance measurement may
be done annually to improve public accountability and policy decision-making or done more
frequently to improve management and program effectiveness” (1997:98). As an
accountability system, managers use performance for various purposes.
While performance evaluation is seen by many scholars (Behn, 2003:586-606; Smith,
1995:189-205) as a means of reducing the discretion of street-level bureaucrats and
improvising performance in public bureaucracy, Lipsky (1980) is pessimistic about the
efficacy of these mechanisms because “bureaucracy itself may be defined in part as a large
organisation whose output cannot be evaluated through market transactions” (Lipsky,
1980:48). One of the reasons for this is that there are too many variables to take into account
to make the evaluation realistic. As explained earlier, educational outcomes are not
determined by what happens in class alone. For instance, one of the examples of educational
outcomes given by the South African Presidency (2009:7) is to “improve the quality of basic
education”. A realistic evaluation of such an outcome is complicated by several factors.
Educational outcomes are the product of a multiplicity of stakeholders. Furthermore, street-
level bureaucrats tend to work in jobs that are freer from supervisory scrutiny than most
organisational jobs (Lipsky, 1980:50). In this regard, teachers work in their classes with
minimal supervision since they are regarded as professionals.  Some of the purposes of
performance evaluation in general, as well as in education are discussed below.
To evaluate
Arguably, the main purpose of performance measurement in education is to evaluate. As an
accountability mechanism bureaucracies usually want to know how they are performing or
how well they are meeting societal needs and receiving public trust. Behn notes that people
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rarely state that their dominant rationale for measuring performance is to evaluate
performance, let alone acknowledge there may be other purposes (Behn, 2003:588).
Performance measurement of programme outputs and outcomes provides important, if not
vital, information on current programme status and how much progress is being made toward
important programme goals (NAPA, 1994:2). This assertion implicitly invokes the
importance of performance evaluation. Performance measures are usually centred on
programme outcomes (for example, the pass rates) rather than on inputs (for example, the
number of students taught). In order to evaluate, a public manager needs to know what a
department or ministry needs to accomplish. To evaluate the performance of a public
organisation, a public manager needs to know what is supposed to be accomplished and
should then formulate a clear, coherent mission, strategy, and then objectives, and structure
the programme as a prelude to measurement (Behn, 2003:588). To this end, Lipsky lists four
conditions that are necessary for accountability:
1. Agencies must know what they want their workers to do. Where the objectives are
multiple and conflicting, agencies must be able to rank their preferences.
2. Agencies must know how to measure workers’ outputs.
3. Agencies must be able to compare workers to one another to establish standards of
judgement.
4. Agencies must have incentives and sanctions which would serve to discipline
workers. (Lipsky, 1980:161)
To control
Public managers also use performance measures as a proactive accountability mechanism. In
order to ensure that schools and teachers are implementing a policy as it is intended, public
managers measure their outputs and processes. Behn points out that in measuring
performance, systems try to control the behaviour of street-level bureaucrats (Behn,
2003:390). However, Behn is not optimistic about the effectiveness of these measures. He
notes that:
Yes. Frederick Winslow Taylor is dead. Today, no manager believes the best way
to influence the behaviour of subordinates is to establish the one best way for
them to do their prescribed tasks and then measure their compliance with this
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particular way. In the twenty-first century, all managers are into empowerment.
(Behn, 2003:589)
Behn further says that it is disingenuous to assert (or believe) that people no longer seek to
control the behaviour of public agencies and street-level bureaucrats, let alone seek to use
performance measurement to help them do so (2003:589).
Executive branch superiors do establish performance standards, for instance, specific
curriculum standards for teachers, and then measure performance to see whether individuals
have complied with these mandates. In terms of the general principal-agent model, the
principals seek to control the behaviour of agents.  However, the introduction of multi-
principals in the model can create problems for agents (teachers). Some principals of schools
measure outcomes through pass rates while others measure the same outcomes through the
quality of those passes. As already said, Lipsky (1980:162) agrees that “they (managers)
audit the performance of workers to provide retrospective sanctions in anticipation of which
it is hoped future behaviour will be modified”. In fact, management control depends on
measurement (Behn, 2003:589). That is, if the measured performance indicators are
associated with sanctions, workers maintain or modify their behaviour. For example,
Kentucky’s accountability system in the United States focuses on rewarding and sanctioning
schools for compliance with state standards and goals (Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin, 2003:65).
Specifically, Carnoy et al report that principals of non-performing schools can be replaced by
distinguished educators who are given administrative authority over the schools (2003:65).
For example, in England, schools are judged on a four point scale. If the school’s overall
effectiveness is judged as causing concern, the school can be placed on special measures or
issued with a notice to improve (Matters, 2003)
To motivate
In addition, performance measures are used to motivate schools and teachers. In order to
motivate workers to work harder or smarter, almost real time measures of outputs are needed
in order to compare with production targets (Behn, 2003:594). Following good results a
school may receive awards while poor performers may face sanctions. For example, in
Singapore, awards were introduced in 1998 in order to recognise success and sustained
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achievement in both educational processes and educational outcomes (based on
examinations). Furthermore, schools were rewarded with increased funding and flexibility.
On the other hand, sanctions are used to discourage poor performance. In the United States,
schools which fail to meet Adequate Yearly Progress face sanctions (Gunzenhauser,
2007:493). Sanctions and rewards are common features of the accountability processes in
countries such as the United States, England and Scotland. California’s Public Schools
Accountability Act 1999 provides for award programmes, both monetary and non-monetary,
for schools that meet the Academic Performance Index (Timar, 2003:180).
However, it is important to note that organisations like schools do not produce outcomes but
outputs (Behn, 2003:594). It will be difficult, if not impossible, to measure educational
outcomes such “to develop responsible and respectful citizens”.  School outputs such as an
improvement of a pass rate from 30% to 60% can be measured. In that sense, in order to
motivate an organisation to improve its performance, managers have to motivate street-level
bureaucrats accordingly (Behn, 2003:594).  Moreover, to motivate street-level bureaucrats,
managers have to collect and distribute the output data quickly enough to provide useable
feedback so that they can continue productive behaviour or discontinue and change
ineffective strategies. This also explains why society attempts to motivate schools and
teachers with test scores (outputs). The real outcome that citizens want from public schools is
children who would grow up to become productive employees and responsible citizens. This
is because of the lengthy time lag between teaching and the observable outcomes of learners.
Concerning that, Behn states that:
The lag between when the schools and teachers do their work and when these
outcomes can be measured is not just months or years, but decades. Thus, we never
could feed these outcome measures back to the schools and teachers in time for them
to make any adjustments. Consequently, as a society we must resort to motivating
schools and teachers with outputs - with test scores that (presumably) measure how
much a child has learned. (Behn, 2003:595)
The issues discussed here may have implications for the use of performance accountability as
a means of holding street-level bureaucrats accountable to their organisational objectives. The
next section will examine some of the issues that pertain to the issue of measuring the
performance of street-level bureaucrats.
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4.3 Issues in measuring the performance of street-level bureaucrats
Academic research suggests that the development of valid performance measures can lead to
more accountable street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980:166). In such cases, Lipsky argues
that street-level bureaucrats can be held accountable for producing results in the same way
that machine operators can be charged with producing a certain volume of output in a given
period (1980:166). He, however, laments that such calls on street-level bureaucrats can
interfere with the quality of public services.  This is due to a number of reasons, including the
fact that quantitative measures of performance in street-level bureaucracies are usually
unreliable and controversial.
One of main reasons why performance measures cannot be perfect is that street-level
bureaucrats will concentrate on activities that are measured (Lipsky, 1980:166). Lipsky
argues that, “by virtue of simply putting attention on some tasks over others street-level
bureaucrats can improve their performance on most quantitative measures that managers
introduce” (1980:166). For example, if street-level bureaucrats are assessed according to the
proportion of their students who pass end of year examinations, more teachers will “teach the
test” (Lipsky, 1980:166). This is what Behn calls “what gets measured gets done, and people
responding to the explicit or implicit incentives of the measurement will do what people are
measuring, not what these people actually want done” (Behn, 2003:599). One might say ‘if
performance measures improve the performance then what it is the problem?’ The problem is
that what people measure often is not precisely what they want done (Behn, 2003:599).
Another problem is that a measured aspect of the job can induce workers to reduce attention
on other aspects where there are no controls on the quality of work produced. Because of the
multi-purpose nature of performance appraisals discussed earlier, no optimal performance
measure can be used for all of the purposes.
If only certain areas of their work are measured, the problem is that street-level bureaucrats
will make choices and exercise discretion by directing their activities in ways that will
improve their performance scores (Lipsky, 1980:166). Workers will select into their
programmes clients who are likely to do well in them, in order to improve appearance of
success, a situation which Lipsky calls “creaming” (1980:166). This can result in interviews
(test) to determine entry to some ‘elite’ government schools and minimum points being
required for admission to university education. This can be in direct conflict with the goal of
‘education for all’.
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Another problem with performance measures in street-level bureaucracies is resistance by
workers. For example, teachers resist being measured by the progress of their pupils unless
adequate provision is made to control for their students’ previous levels of achievement and
their capacity to learn (Lipsky, 1980:169). This also can be controversial.
Recent attention has also focused on using surveys of client satisfaction to obtain information
on workers’ performance (Lipsky, 1980:169). This has also faced resistance by some due to
professional scepticism that performance that pleases clients may not be related to high class
practice: the popular teacher may not be the best instructor (Lipsky, 1980:169). This problem
is compounded by the fact that street-level bureaucrats’ work tends to take place in private or
beyond the scrutiny of supervisors. Teaching is done in classrooms where principals and
supervisors do not normally enter; if they do, they often provide advance notice so that the
teaching, like a performance, may be prepared accordingly (Lipsky, 1980:169).
The issues discussed here provide a formidable barrier to effective performance
measurement. In most cases, public managers in the education sector do not observe the
street-level bureaucrats at work but rely on reports. The reliability of these reports, which are
written by street-level bureaucrats themselves, can be questionable (Lipsky, 1980:169). It
seems the only form of accountability that Lipsky is optimistic about in the United States is
professional accountability. He notes that “it might be possible for street-level bureaucrats to
scrutinise each other’s’ work and provide assessment of quality” (Lipsky, 1980:169).
4.4 Hierarchical accountability
Hierarchical accountability is related to the other forms of accountability discussed earlier. It
is related to legal accountability in the sense that the roles and relationships of stakeholders in
education can be codified in policy documents and laws. It is also related to performance
accountability in terms of who measures performance and to whom an account of
performance is reported. The use of hierarchical or bureaucratic accountability in holding
street-level bureaucrats accountable seems to be the most important mechanism.  In
education, hierarchical accountability ensures a high degree of control with very little room
for discretion as there are always rules and regulations that guide routine tasks. As discussed
earlier, senior bureaucrats in central offices usually seek answers from provinces, districts,
schools and teachers (street-level bureaucrats). The purpose of hierarchical or bureaucratic
accountability is to remove autonomy and discretion from street-level bureaucrats.
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The significance of hierarchical accountability in education is the view that teachers are not
expected to be experts in making judgements about their clients but rather implement an
externally mandated curriculum in conjunction with prescribed text books. Crucial to
hierarchical accountability is the use of universal mandated assessments.
This section will discuss, in depth, the use of assessments as a form of an hierarchical
accountability mechanism. Somewhat related to performance measures, student assessment
has been used widely as an accountability mechanism in education. The use of student
assessment meets the requirements of political as well as performance accountability.
Usually, examination results are the only way that all stakeholders can measure what is
happening in schools and be able to seek answers from the street-level bureaucrats. In that
light, political and democratic accountability are exercised by society at large.
Linn notes that assessment and accountability have played prominent roles in many of the
educational reform efforts in the United States (2000:4). In identifying the role of tests in
hierarchical accountability, Linn (2000:4) remarks that tests and assessments come in many
different forms and may be used in a variety of ways in accountability systems which intend
to improve education. Angelo (1999:30) notes that “most of us think assessment should be
first and foremost about improving student learning and secondarily about determining
accountability for the quality of learning produced”. The purpose of assessment is to improve
accountability. Accountability for students’ performance, coupled with standards and
assessment, directed at students, teachers, or schools is growing not only in the United States,
but the world over (Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin, 2003:129). Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin argue
that in most cases assessments are critically important for students, where promotion and
graduation from high school are tied to students passing measures set by public authorities
(2003:129). Elmore, et al conclude that the presumption is that “educational accountability
should focus schools’ attention less on compliance with rules and more on increasing
learning for students” (1996:65). However, in the end, assessment as an accountability
mechanism depends on the co-operation of the students, a feature which causes resentment
among teachers and schools, an issue which will be discussed further in later sections. Other
issues pertain to the validity and reliability of such tests.
There is no agreement among scholars on the purpose of assessments. At a general level, the
main purpose is to improve instruction and student learning (Linn, 2003:2). Linn argues that
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tests and assessments are designed to provide information about student achievement which
will be helpful to teachers, schools and parents, although it is seldom specified how this is so
(2003:2).  However, it might be obvious that teachers have a great deal of information about
students’ performance through their day-to-day interactions as well as from assessing tests
which are devised by teachers. State tests in a public system provide an important
accountability mechanism as well as an external check against which teacher judgements can
be compared (Linn, 2003:3). Britain’s National Curriculum aimed at introducing a system of
measuring and reporting on the achievement of children, and by implication their teachers,
through a combination of Teacher Assessment (TA) and Standard Assessment Tasks (SATs)
(Abbott et al, 1994:155). Some analysts argue that if assessments are used as an
accountability mechanism in order to measure teacher performance, the teachers’
professionalism will be reduced and “teaching to the test” would also occur (Seashore, Febey
and Schroeder, 2005:177).
Assessments “throughout most of the United States today are designed to rank-order schools
and students for the purposes of accountability” (Guskey, 2003:6). In addition to providing
information to educators, parents, and students, most state mandated assessments have some
type of stakes attached to the results (Linn, 2001:6). Even though the stakes may not be
formally specified, the consequence of reporting results to the school boards and the public
can be very high. Newspaper reports of results by schools create pressure on principals and
teachers to improve scores (Linn, 2001:4).
Assessment results may have other consequences as well. Linn reports that at school level
these may involve requirements for accreditation or the assignments of rewards and sanctions
(2001:4). Linn notes that:
For teachers they may involve monetary rewards in the form of bonuses or, in some
instances, be the bases for pay-for-performance schemes. Negative consequences for
teachers most commonly are informal ones, such as pressure from principals, but
may include more formal actions such as being singled out for some kind of
assistance programme. For individual students, accountability may involve
placement in remedial programmes, mandatory attendance of summer school, grade
to grade promotion, or requirements for certificates of mastery, high school
graduation, or level of endorsement on high school diploma (Linn, 2001:4).
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Although student accountability (where students are responsible and answerable for their
outcomes) is not the focus of this thesis, it is of great importance since it illustrates the
environment in which the street-level bureaucrats operate and the expectations of their
clients. In their study, Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin (2003:13) found that the number of states
that mandated student accountability has increased dramatically and also discovered that
twenty-four states in the United States (almost 50%) attached stakes to their tests in the form
of student recognition, or graduation; forty states (80%) used test scores for accountability
(Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin, 2003:13-14).
Furthermore, feedback provided to parents and students based on assessments will, by
extension, make teachers more accountable. Linn points out that results from external
assessments are a useful benchmark against which reports of teacher performance can be
compared (2001:3). The argument is that parents and students could use such information to
demand improved education from the school and teachers if the results are not as expected.
Additionally, Linn suggests that in the same way tests can serve to motivate students to
greater efforts to learn, they can also motivate teachers to put more effort into their work
(Linn, 2001:3). Most “accountability programs took a variety of forms, but shared the
common characteristic that they increased real or perceived stakes of results for teachers and
educational administrators” (Linn, 2000:6). However, as already mentioned earlier, this may
lead to cheating, teaching the test and teaching to test (Linn, 2001:3).
It is clear from this discussion that forms of assessment have a long history in educational
accountability.  The motivations for assessment vary and depend on different perspectives of
the education stakeholders. Angelo concludes that when academics ‘do assessment’, personal
and professional values motivate them and the strongest of intrinsic motivators is the desire to
improve student learning (1999:30).
It is apparent that assessment is a mechanism of binding street-level bureaucrats to
organisational goals; it can also be argued that the use of government mandated assessment
may result in unwanted consequences. The next section discusses the effects of using
assessments as an hierarchical accountability mechanism.
4.5 Issues with the use of assessments as an accountability mechanism
“A fundamental premise of high-stakes accountability systems is that instruction and student
learning will be improved by holding teachers and/or learners accountable for results” (Linn,
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2001:4). However, a number of empirical studies have produced mixed results (Linn, 2001:4;
Angelo, 1999:30). Angelo is pessimistic about the improvement of learning through
assessment and he states that “we still don’t have much solid evidence of learning
improvement” (1999:30). On the other hand, Linn (2001:4) indicates that there is “a good
deal of evidence that test scores generally increase during the first few years after a new
assessment and accountability system is introduced”, a phenomenon he calls the “Lake
Wobegon effect” (Linn, 2000:7).  Furthermore, it is generally agreed that high-stakes
assessments result in a number of unintended consequences (Linn, 2001:4; Linn, 2000:12;
Stiggins, 2004:24). This section examines some questions raised in the use of assessments as
accountability mechanisms for street-level bureaucrats in the education sector.
The first issue to consider when using state mandated assessments as an accountability
mechanism for street-level bureaucrats is whether a student’s socioeconomic background
should be taken into account. “It is well known that socioeconomic background is
substantially related to student achievement” (Linn, 2001:12). In his later work, Linn
observes that “when teacher or school value-added results are reported it is assumed that it is
the teacher or the school that is having an effect rather than some other factor such as
students’ families, student background, or student peers in the school” (2006:19). However,
Linn believes that “schools can fairly be held accountable only for factors that they can
control, and therefore performance accountability systems should control for or equalize
student socioeconomic status before they dispense rewards or penalties”, a factor which he
believes might a cause for lower expectations from low-achieving schools (2001:12). It is
well-established that academic achievement is influenced “by two main factors: quality of
educational services provided and socioeconomic backgrounds of students themselves”
(Linn, 2001: 12). Most accountability and incentive schemes prejudge or ignore this
fundamental issue (Hanushek and Raymond, 2001:14).
Because of the obvious effect of a student’s background, some states in the United States take
socioeconomic factors into account when comparing assessment results from different
schools. Linn (2001:12) reports that “Pennsylvania uses a number of community type
socioeconomic status variables to identify similar schools and then reports the inter quartile
range for reading and mathematics scores for the set of similar schools called ‘Similar
Schools Band’”.  However, as already mentioned earlier, the use of the socioeconomic status
of students as the primary basis for accountability can lead “to institutionalisation of different
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expectations for different groups of students (and by implication, different groups of
teachers)” (Linn, 2001:13).
Another issue pertains to the use of students’ prior achievement in assessment and
accountability systems. “Accountability systems that emphasise change in performance over
time rather than current status provide a means of taking into account characteristics of
students attending the school without resorting to measures of socioeconomic status of
students” (Linn, 2001:13). Echoing Myers’s (2000) sentiments, Linn says that the current
educational accountability systems “are contaminated by factors other than school
performance, in particular, the average level of achievement prior to entering first grade, [and
the] effects of student, family, and community characteristics on student achievement growth
from first grade through the grade in which students are tested” (Linn, 2006:18). Linn
discovered that accountability systems in states like California and Kentucky compare
achievement of students at selected grades in a given year or biennium with that of cohorts
from previous years at the same grade in the same school which provides a means of
recognising that schools serve students who start at different places (2001:13). Linn questions
this comparison since it is based on the implicit assumption that students’ initial achievement
levels are relatively stable from year to year (2001:13). Linn went on to recommend that a
better way of tracking students’ prior achievement should “track changes in student
achievement from one grade to the next” (2001:13).
The use of prior achievement of students as a predictive factor in an accountability system
has many advantages over systems that rely on socioeconomic status (SES) as factors to
adjust scores or to produce comparative bands of schools (Linn, 2001:15). The use of prior
achievement as a predictor of subsequent achievement does not establish different gains for
students from different backgrounds (Linn, 2001:15-16) since the only basis for comparison
is academic background of students. The assumption is that teachers will be held accountable
for any deterioration in students’ achievement compared to what was expected of them.
Another problem that arises from the use of assessment results as an accountability
mechanism relates to “focusing only on the percentage of students who score at the proficient
level or above” (Linn, 2006:15). Linn went show how the mechanism “does not give credit
for moving students from the lowest performance levels to higher levels of achievement that
fall short of the minimum score required to be categorized as proficient” (2006:15). Akin to
what Lipsky calls “creaming” (1980:166) some analysts fear that:
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this encourages teachers to focus their attention on ‘bubble students,’ that is,
students who are performing near the proficient level, at the expense of more needy
students who are performing so far below the proficient cut that there is little hope of
raising their achievement enough to surpass the proficient cut score and at the
expense of high achieving students for whom there is little doubt that they will score
at the proficient level or above (Linn, 2006:15).
Many scholars agree with this assertion. For example, Shepard points out that “because of the
pressure to achieve high test scores, more hard-to-teach children are rejected by the system”
(1991:234).  He went on to say that “there is a direct correspondence between the extent of
pressures regarding accountability and the number of children who are denied entry to
kindergarten, who are assigned to two-year kindergarten programs, who are referred to
special education, who are made to repeat a grade, or who drop out of school” (1991:234). It
is, therefore, important to recognise any improvement in the results of learners regardless of
whether they have reached the minimum score required to be categorized as proficient. In the
United States, “Massachusetts defined six levels of performance called advanced, proficient,
needs improvement-high, needs improvement-low, warning/failing-high, and warning/failing
low (Linn, 2006:17). This was intended to motivate teachers in low performing schools by
then knowing that the impact they make would be recognised. In the same way teachers in
performing schools would be discouraged from aiming at the minimum score required to be
categorized as proficient.
The use of nationwide assessments as an accountability mechanism in education can also lead
to narrowing the curriculum. One of the major criticisms of this mechanism is that “high-
stakes tests narrow the curriculum: tested content tends to be taught to the exclusion of non-
tested content” (Shepard, 1991:232). Another analyst who agrees with this assertion is Ladd
who contends “that the emphasis on test scores will narrow the curriculum, induce teachers to
teach narrowly to the test, and promote a shallow approach to learning” (Ladd, 2002:385).
Even within subjects that are favoured such as mathematics and reading, and language
mechanics, instruction is focused only on skills covered by the test (Shepard, 1991:232).
Shepard also reports that studies have shown that “because of external tests, elementary
teachers had given up on reading real books, writing, and undertaking long-term projects and
were filling all available time with word recognition; recognition of errors in spelling,
language usage, and punctuation; and arithmetic operations” (Shepard, 1991:232). Shepard
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also lists two disturbing patterns in the use of state mandated assessments as accountability
mechanism. He explains that:
The degree to which testing distorts curriculum can be predicted from 1) the extent
of political pressure (that is, the higher the perceived stakes of test results, the
greater the narrowing of curriculum) and 2) the socioeconomic level of the school or
district (that is, the poorer the school or district, the more time devoted to teaching to
tests) (Shepard, 1991:232).
In some cases the nature of sanctions and rewards can lead to cheating and falsification by
both street-level bureaucrats and students. This depends on the level of stakes and the
severity of sanctions. In relation to the narrowing of curricula, the use of state mandated
assessments “misdirects instruction even for the basic skills” (Shepard, 1991:233). Sheppard
points out that a test-driven curriculum encourages the teaching of skills in isolation, and
different cognitive processes are elicited when a teacher concentrates on materials with a test-
like format instead of addressing intended learning goals directly (1991:233). Furthermore,
“the kind of drill-and-practice instruction that tests reinforce is based on outmoded learning
theory” (Shepard, 1991:234). While the primary focus of accountability mechanisms is
improving teaching and learning, “this approach actually denies students opportunities to
develop thinking and problem-solving skills” (Shepard, 1991:234).
Another criticism in the use of state mandated assessment as an accountability mechanism is
that it reduces professionalism in teachers. The dictates of externally mandated tests reduce
both the professional knowledge and the status of teachers (Shepard, 1991:234). Reporting on
the results of a study conducted by Amos Hatch and Evelyn Freeman, Shepard says that
“teachers were themselves victims of instructional decisions dictated by accountability
pressures” (Shepard, 1991:234). State mandated assessment is a typical example of
bureaucratic accountability as these assessments emphasise administrative hierarchy. Echoing
Linda Darling-Hammond’s sentiments, Shepard observes that:
The very conception of bureaucratic accountability is intended to remove control
from the judgments of individual teachers - hence such notions as ‘teacher-proof
curricula’. Teachers are not expected to be experts in pedagogy or child
development; rather, they are supposed to implement externally mandated curricula,
text books, tests, and promotional standards as specified. Bureaucratic accountability
begets exactly what it assumes - less skilled professionals (1991:235).
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Runté adds that the “centralized testing threatens teachers’ professional control in four ways:
(1) by deskilling the ‘testing’ portion of the evaluation function, (2) by enforcing a
centralized curriculum, (3) by removing the teachers’ right to evaluate the outcome of their
own activity, and (4) by introducing new (and possibly inappropriate) measures of teacher
productivity” (1998:166). Runté explains that teachers lose the responsibility of evaluating
the product of their labour and managers could “enforce labour discipline by linking salary
negotiations to achievement results, threatening dismissal for those whose graduates fail to
meet provincial norms, and so on” (1998:166). Consequently, Runté concludes that “the
external accountability provided by centralized testing indirectly undermines teachers’
professional autonomy and status, because professionalism assumes the absence of direct
managerial oversight” (1998:168).
The form and purpose of state mandated assessment may differ from context to context but
the primary goal is often the same: to improve student learning. In terms of types of
accountability, as already explained, it can be argued that nationwide assessment can serve as
bureaucratic accountability, which is associated with administrative hierarchy as well as
public and political accountability, given that the results tend to be published for all to see. In
terms of implementation, hierarchical accountability conforms to the top-down model.
Another prominent feature of the mechanism discussed here is that assessments are imposed
from the top and are mostly external forms of accountability.  This discussion, although not
exhaustive, has explored some of the effects of using state mandated assessment as an
accountability mechanism for teachers.
4.6 Legal accountability
Legal accountability is a critical element of increasing accountability in educational
bureaucracies and by street-level bureaucrats. As indicated previously, legal accountability is
an external mechanism. Legal accountability requires officials and government departments
to comply with laws, regulations and procedures for delivering services. In many ways it is
related to other types of accountability. It is related to political accountability in that it
requires politician to deliver and to give an account of issues that fall within their government
departments. In some situations, citizens may be allowed to go to court to demand
educational services.   As mentioned in Chapter Two, legal accountability is based on specific
responsibilities which are formally or legally awarded to authorities (Boven, 2005:8). To that
end, government may enact laws that give authority to statutory bodies that are involved in
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ensuring accountability in education. Some of their roles include school evaluation and
accreditation and registration. Examples of such laws in South Africa are the General and
Further Education and Training Quality Assurance Act, 2001 (for the establishment of
uMalusi) and the South African Council for Educators Act, 2000 (for the establishment of
South African Council for Educators).
Accreditation is an example of strategies used to increase accountability (Brinkerhoff,
2003:24; Timar, 2003:181). School accreditation is a “system of voluntary self-regulation”
(McCormick, 1982:142). Decisions concerning accreditation are based on the degree to
which a school meets threshold standards that have been set as preconditions for all schools.
In the United States accreditation has played a central role in promoting accountability and
quality education (Wolf, 2005:78). Wolf notes that the power and influence of accreditation
arises from its distinctive characteristic:
 It uses a peer review process that is well adapted to the academic culture;
 Unlike other external review approaches, it includes other practitioners and schools;
 It focuses heavily on institutional development and improvement (2005:78).
Evaluation involves a relentless and continuous quest for school quality (McCormick,
1982:142). McCormick  explains that evaluation is a “self-study and visiting team process
that a school undertakes for the purposes of reviewing its present purposes, goals, and
activities, for planning future activities that will enable the school to improve the quality of
its service to its clientele” (1982:142). “To ensure accountability in education, evaluation
policy of the schools has been carried out throughout [South Korea] since 1997” (Jin, 2001).
The evaluation teams are composed of educational administrators, principals, school teachers,
university lecturers, and parental representatives.  In Australia, evaluation in the
accountability processes is linked to registration renewal (accreditation) for private schools.
However, the primary purpose of the requirement of a visiting team and the preparation of a
visiting team school report is to improve the quality of schools and not to gather information
that pertains to making any decision concerning continued accreditation (McCormick,
1982:142). In Australia “a number of states now allow external accreditations to be
undertaken by organisations such as the Council of Internationally Accredited Schools
(CIAS)” (2006). Some studies in the United States have that shown school accreditation is
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used to market schools (Adams and Hill, 2006:228). This is a very effective mechanism of
accountability, especially for independent or private schools.
Over and above the roles of statutory bodies in ensuring accountability among street-level
bureaucrats, legal accountability also regulates the relationships between street-level
bureaucrats and their clients (learners), their peers, their supervisors and the community at
large. It is clear from this discussion that legal accountability is important in trying to ensure
accountability by street-level bureaucrats.
4.7 Professional accountability
As just recounted, street-level bureaucrats are often held accountable by their peers (Hupe
and Hill, 2007:289). This is reflected in work arrangements that allow street-level bureaucrats
a high degree of professional autonomy. This is based on the presumption that street-level
bureaucrats have undergone professional training and continue to undertake staff
development. Performance accountability is evident in that street-level bureaucrats in
education are held accountable by their colleagues in their organisation (internal
accountability) or by professional bodies (external accountability) which have been legally
mandated to monitor the work of teachers (legal accountability). In education, street-level
bureaucrats are given room for discretion but they are bound by professional ethics. In the
context of this study the two main ways of furthering professional accountability are
professional development and the registration of street-level bureaucrats.
In view of the analytic framework of education accountability discussed earlier, professional
development may be seen as a means of increasing professional accountability as well as a
way of responding to external accountability demands. In terms of external accountability,
schools respond in various ways to meet new demands. In their book The New
Accountability; High Schools and High-Stakes Testing, Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin
(2003:195) explain that policy makers mistakenly think that schools were ‘not accountable’
before the new wave of accountability policies. This is because “all schools, consciously or
unconsciously, have well worked out ideas of accountability, and, most importantly, that they
respond to new accountability policies by adjusting their existing ideas of accountability to
external influences introduced by new policies” (Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin 2003:195-196).
The nature and form of internal accountability determine how the schools respond to external
accountability mechanisms. Such mechanisms mobilise the capability of schools in particular
ways. The knowledge, values, skills and commitment of street-level bureaucrats determine
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how their schools will respond to external accountability mechanisms (Carnoy, Elmore and
Siskin 2003:196). Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin argue that it is possible for schools to act in
accordance with basic requirements of accountability mechanisms without any significant
improvement in student learning, a phenomenon which they call “compliance without
capacity” (2003:200). Thus securing internal accountability requires knowledge and expertise
on the part of street-level bureaucrats and a motivation to focus that knowledge on a common
goal (Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin, 2003:200). To achieve this, Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin
(2003:84) point out that most school principals put pressure on street-level bureaucrats “to
improve through school wide professional development sessions”. To this end, this section
will focus on training, pre-service and in-service used by schools and education agencies in
order to meet accountability requirements.
Public organisations seek to improve accountability and control of their street-level
bureaucrats through training and professional development (Simon, 1997:13; 1944:24; Lint,
1988:283). Training constitutes a tacit mechanism of controlling workers and attaining
accountability. According to Simon in his seminal article titled ‘Decision-Making and
Administrative Organisation’, training influences decisions “from the inside out” (Simon,
1944:24). Although training does not force a worker to make any decision, it provides the
premises on which to make a decision. Training prepares a member of an organisation to
reach a satisfactory decision himself, without the need for constant authority and advice
(Simon, 1944:24). In line with this view, Lint, in his study entitled Regulating Autonomy:
police discretion as a problem for training, shows how training can be a significant tool in
restraining discretion and securing accountability in street-level bureaucrats (Lint, 1998:277).
A good example of this is found in Finland’s education system. In contrast with general
trends, Finland consistently performs at the highest level in international tests but its national
inspection system was discontinued in 1991 (2004:78). De Grauwe notes that “decision-
makers felt that the benefits from external inspection and advice services were minimal, in
view of the high level of training and professionalism of teachers” (2004:78). Although its
accountability systems are relatively weak, Finland’s initial selection process for students
applying for the teacher education program is very rigorous. All teachers graduate with a
Master’s degree.
Like Lint (1998), Lipsky also values the importance of training for street-level bureaucrats.
He points out that “the professionalization of street-level bureaucrats is commended by some
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analysts because standardised training in universities, seeking training to get credentials over
occupational entry, is already far advanced in teaching, nursing, social work, and other street-
level occupations” (Lipsky, 1980:201). The most important aspect of dealing with street-level
bureaucrats is the in-take process (Riccucci, 2005:33) in which careful selection is done on
the basis of qualifications. Some researchers contend that professional development will lead
to restricted professionalism (Hardy and Lingard, 2008:66).
Professional development may perhaps not have realised its potential but it is still seen as the
best means for changing classroom instruction, because other methods, such as policies and
programmes that standardize teacher behaviour, have fared no better (Supovitz and Turner,
2000: 964). Supovitz and Turner report that street-level bureaucrats often restructure or
overlook policies that are proposed to manipulate their daily classroom routines (2000: 964).
A focus on professional development has been emphasised due to studies that show that
teachers prove to have a greater impact on student performance than other accountability
mechanisms (Supovitz and Turner, 200: 964). Like Guskey (1986:6), Supovitz and Turner,
(2000:964) say that the reason for focusing on professional development as a way of
improving student attainment is that high class professional  development will generate
superior schooling in classrooms, which will, in turn, result in higher levels of success by
learners. Guskey points out that “the three major outcomes of staff development are change
in the classroom practices of teachers, change in their beliefs and attitudes, and change in the
learning outcomes of students (1986:6). The logic behind such staff development is
illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 A model of the process of teacher change
Source: Guskey (1986:6)
Many scholars agree that professional development is a way in which schools respond to















elements (Supovitz and Turner, 2000:964; Borko, 2004:3). Supovitz and Turner (2000:964)
posit that professional development is effective if it includes four vital components. The first
one of these is that “high quality professional development must immerse participants in
inquiry, questioning, and experimentation and therefore model inquiry forms of teaching”
(2000:294). This view is also echoed by Berne who says that professional development must
“include training, practice, and feedback; opportunities for individual reflection and group
inquiry into practice; and coaching or other follow-up procedures” (1999:175).
The second component of professional development is that it must be both intensive and
sustained (Supovitz and Turner, 2000:964; Kinnucan-Welsch et al, 2006:423; Knap,
2003:121). In agreement with this assertion Berne contends that professional development
must be “conducted often enough and long enough to ensure progressive gains in knowledge,
skill, and confidence” (1999:175). Some studies have shown relationships between
“professional development and contact time and student learning, although the association
appeared to hold more in science than mathematics” (Supovitz and Turner, 2000:964). Again,
time span and contact hours have a substantial positive influence on opportunities for active
learning (Garet et al, 2001:933). Garet et al also add that length of time and contact hours
have a reasonable influence given the emphasis on content knowledge (2001:933). Desimone
et al also observed that the duration of professional development programmes, “including the
total number of contact hours that participants spend in the activity, as well as the span of
time over which the activity takes place; and the degree to which the activity emphasizes the
collective participation of groups of teachers from the same school, department, or grade
level, as opposed to the participation of individual teachers from many schools” produces
desirable effects on the teachers (2002:83). The duration of professional development is
important in two ways. One, “longer activities are more likely to provide an opportunity for
in-depth discussion of content, student conceptions and misconceptions, and pedagogical
strategies” (Garet et al, 2001:921). Second, “activities that extend over time are more likely
to allow teachers to try out new practices in the classroom and obtain feedback on their
teaching” (Garet et al, 2001:922).
Thirdly, Supovitz and Turner (2000:964) and Kinnucan-Welsch et al (2006:423) aver that
staff development of street-level bureaucrats should incorporate their everyday experiences
with students. Berne (1999) echoes the same sentiments. He says that professional
development should focus on critical problems of curriculum and instruction, be based and
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embedded in teacher work and be rooted in the knowledge base for teaching and, most
importantly, be situated in classroom practice (1999:175-176). Desimone et al also point out
that professional development should provide “opportunities for teachers to become actively
engaged in the meaningful analysis of teaching and learning” and should integrate
“experiences that are consistent with teachers’ goals, align with state standards and
assessments, and encourage continuing professional communication among teachers”
(2002:83). Furthermore, Garet et al add that teachers must be actively engaged in meaningful
discussion, planning, and practice of professional development (2001:925).  Empirical studies
have shown that professional development which is undertaken in isolation from teachers’
ongoing classroom duties seldom have much impact on teaching practices or student
achievement (Supovitz and Turner, 2000:964).
Fourthly, professional development must focus on subject-matter knowledge and deepen
teachers’ content skills (Supovitz and Turner, 2000:964; Knap, 2003:122). This is because
some teachers might not have the capacity to meet the accountability requirements. Most
researchers believe that professional development must have a content focus and should aim
at improving and deepening teachers’ content knowledge (Desimone et al 2002:83). There is
a great deal of evidence which suggests that “teaching a subject requires content knowledge
that goes substantially beyond what is typically taught and learned in college and university
classes” (Goldschmidt and Phelps, 2010:433). They call this form of knowledge ‘pedagogical
content’ (2010:433). For example, studies on “mathematics teaching and learning conducted
for the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, calls attention to the importance of
high standards, content focus, and in-depth learning opportunities for teachers” (Garet et al
2001:917). Some scholars argue that professional development should “take a more
authentic, more substantive form in an effort to provide teachers with the knowledge they
need to teach students” (Wilson and Berne, 1999:201). Goldschmidt and Phelps report that
“professional development can affect changes in the knowledge teachers use in elementary
reading instruction, but that knowledge gains generally erode after teachers return to the
classroom and these gains are unlikely to significantly impact the uneven distribution”
(2010:433). In sum, there are numerous studies that show that “programs that focus on
subject matter knowledge and on student learning of particular subject matter are likely to
have larger positive effects on student learning than programs that focus on teaching
behaviours” (Supovitz and Turner, 2000:964).
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There are many studies that record the success of professional development (Desimone et al
2002:99; Supovitz and Turner, 2000:974). However, some authors are a bit pessimistic about
the reported impacts of professional development on the behaviour of teachers (Hill
2009:472). In view of this, it is important to review the academic research on the importance
of these mechanisms in securing accountability and improving educational outcomes.
Ngidi’s (2005) study, which sought the perceptions of teachers who underwent a
professional development programme, found that the capacity of teachers improved. Using a
longitudinal study to examine the effects of professional development on mathematics and
science teachers’ instruction, Desimone et al (2002:81) report that professional development
which focused on specific instructional practices increased teachers’ use of those practices in
the classroom. Furthermore, they found that specific features, such as active learning
opportunities, increase the effect of professional development on a teacher’s instruction.
Nonetheless, while the use of longitudinal methods by Desmone et al (2002) has strengths, it
is affected by complicating factors such as maturation. Thus, the changes in teacher
behaviour may not be entirely attributed to professional development but may result from
experience that the teachers acquire over a period of time.
A longitudinal study by Supovitz and Turner on the effects of professional development in
science on teaching practices and classroom culture shows that results vary according to
focus and duration of such development (2000:974). For example, they discovered that
change in teacher behaviour was related to the duration of a development programme (as
shown in Figure 4.2). Increasing amounts of “professional development were strongly linked
with increasing teacher use of inquiry-based practice and investigative classroom culture”
(Supovitz and Turner, 2000:974). They also note that “teachers with minimal exposure to
professional development had below average inquiry oriented classroom cultures, and it was
only after [plus or minus] 40 h [ours] that teachers’ investigative classroom culture was above
that of the average teacher” (2000:973). Other factors that they investigated were gender,
attitudes towards the curriculum and teaching experience. Concerning teaching experience,
they report that it was “negatively associated with investigative culture, but was not related to
inquiry-based teaching practices” (Supovitz and Turner, 2000:974).
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Figure 4.2 The relationship between hours of professional development and classroom
practice
Source: Supovitz and Turner (2000:974)
In another study, Desmone et al found that there are increased benefits of “professional
development when there is collective participation of teachers from the same school,
department, or grade level” (2002:101). Furthermore, their results also show that professional
development is more effective if teachers are closely engaged in the activities rather than
being passive recipients of information from the facilitators. They conclude that besides
focusing on content, five critical qualities of professional development are useful in
enhancing teaching practice: “three structural features (characteristics of the structure of the
activity) - reform type, duration, and collective participation - and two core features
(characteristics of the substance of the activity) - active learning and coherence” (2002:102).
A different study using a matched-comparison design, which was carried out in elementary
schools in Jerusalem by Angrist and Lavy, also indicated that training in schools led to an
improvement in student test scores (2001:343). In yet another study, which focused on the
duration of behaviour change after a short professional development workshop, Leach and
Conto found that the teaching practices of teachers greatly improved. However, “after initial
increases, there was a downward trend during the post-workshop period” (1999:459). They
noted that benefits from workshops were short-lived.  One of the reasons why professional
development fails is that “it is usually implemented in ways that violate key conditions for
teacher learning” (Newmann, 2000:259). The factors that lead to effective professional
development in changing teacher behaviour are summarised in Figure. 4.3.
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Figure 4.3 Factors that enhance the effectiveness of professional development
Source: Newmann (2000:259)
Some scholars are not very optimistic about the effectiveness of professional development.
Hill points out that there is much scholarship trumpeting “phenomenal improvements in
teacher knowledge and skills” as a result of professional development (2009:471). But there
is also evidence to the contrary.  For example, “teachers apparently have little use for their
learning experiences” and some simply engage in professional development in compliance
with professional requirements (Hill, 2009: 471). Another astounding finding is that “teachers
themselves are lukewarm about their professional development experiences” (Hill,
2009:472). In a study in which teachers were asked about the effectiveness of professional
development experiences in the previous three years, “more than a quarter, on average,
reported that professional development affected their instruction” (Hill, 2009:472). In that

























and a minority reported no effect at all” (2009:472). This revelation raises questions about the
use of professional development to meet accountability requirements.
It is important to point out that the purpose of professional development and training is to
influence the practices of the street-level bureaucrats from the inside out. After receiving
training the street-level bureaucrats still have discretion whether to use or not use what they
learnt. Nonetheless, it is clear that professional development forms one of the important
pillars of professional accountability outlined in the theoretical framework for this study.
Another mechanism of increasing professional accountability is licensing teachers or
registration which is based on acquiring appropriate qualifications. This allows professionally
qualified street-level bureaucrats to be given the room to exercise professional discretion with
minimal supervision. Licensing of novice teachers is becoming a global phenomenon.
Teacher licensing in some countries is based on having appropriate qualifications as well as a
clean criminal record. Timar (2003:180) notes that in the United States teacher licensing
screens out people with criminal records.  The licensing bodies usually control the
“certification of those who can teach in the schools, and attempt to assure that teachers are
socialized in such a way as to reflect the ethos of education” (Levin, 1974:382). In some
cases, licensing is connected to continuous professional development. This process is
codified in laws which can reflect legal accountability. This is also a form of external
accountability. In South Africa, as will be discussed later, there is registration but no
licensing.
Conclusion
Using the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapters, this chapter outlined a
framework for increasing accountability in education. Although the types of accountability
were discussed separately, they are related to one another. In considering performance
accountability in education it was seen that bureaucracies try to measure the performance of
street-level bureaucrats. However, it was highlighted that the measurement of street-level
bureaucrats is not an easy task since their outputs are difficult to quantify.
In terms of hierarchical accountability, it was revealed that educational bureaucracies often
use a mandated curriculum which is developed at the centre or top for all schools to
implement. This is supported by assessments that are also set centrally for all students to
write. It was discussed that hierarchical accountability can undermine the professional
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autonomy of street-level bureaucrats since they are always regulated by guidelines,
procedures and work schedule. Furthermore, hierarchical accountability is closely related to
political as well as legal accountability.
It was explained how the work of street-level bureaucracies and bureaucrats is regulated by
laws and regulations in the form of legal accountability. This includes accreditation processes
and school evaluation. Legal accountability entails a high degree of enforcement since it
leaves no room for discretion.  It was pointed out that officials and elected politicians have to
comply with the laws and regulations to deliver basic education to all. Legal accountability is
also a form of external accountability.
The chapter ended with a discussion of professional accountability which involves street-
level bureaucrats holding each other accountable. It is often enforced by statutory bodies
which have been given legal mandate to do so. Street-level bureaucrats are expected to
observe a code of professional ethics.  One major way of increasing this accountability is
through professional development. The academic scholarship which was reviewed showed
that professional development can be a very effective tool of improving classroom
instruction. Professional accountability is also enforced through licensing and registering new
teachers. In order to be licensed street-level bureaucrats are normally required to have
appropriate qualification and a clean criminal record to enter the profession. The licensing of
street-level bureaucrats is codified in law in some countries.
The next chapter will explore the history of education policy in South Africa in order to put
the study into context. To that end, the chapter will begin with a brief discussion on South
African education policy before 1994. Then it will discuss the evolution of Curriculum 2005,
NCS and Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statements (CAPS).
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE CONTEXT: THE SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION SYSTEM
The demise of apartheid in 1994 in South Africa marked a critical defining moment for
democracy and human rights. This historic moment offered an opportunity to rebuild the
highly fragmented and discriminatory institutions and construct unified national institutions
which are underpinned by equity and transparency. In all these endeavours, the education
sector was central. Considering the role played by education in establishing the foundation of
apartheid, it was important for the new government to effectively restructure the education
bureaucracy in terms of the new dispensation of democracy and in line with international
trends. The mission statement of the Department of Education illustrates explicitly the goals
of education in a new South Africa. It states that: “Our vision [is] of a South Africa in which
all our people have equal access to lifelong education and training opportunities, which will
contribute towards their quality of life and build a peaceful, prosperous and democratic
society” (DoE, 2001:3). This led to the promulgation of several legislative acts and
regulations geared to achieve these goals. The crucial legislation and policies of the early
phase of democratic South Africa include: The South African Constitution (1996) which
requires the education system to be transformed and democratised in accordance with the
values of human dignity, equality, human rights and freedom, non-racism and non-sexism;
The National Education Policy (NEPA) (1996);  The South African Schools Act (SASA)
(1996); Employment of Educators Act (1998); The Further Education and Training Act
(1998);  and the Curriculum 2005 (C2005) (DoE, 2001:4-5).
To understand this and to put the whole discussion into perspective it is important to discuss
the background to these policies and what they sought to address. To that end, this chapter
will discuss, in brief, the state of education policy before 1994. Then it will explore the
evolution of Curriculum 2005, the National Curriculum Statements and Curriculum and
Assessments Policy Statements (CAPS) and the Schooling 2025 policies in South Africa. It
will present the major components of the policies and the way in which accountability was
sought among the street-level bureaucrats. Then, it will discuss tenets of the outcome based
education system (OBE) as a philosophy for educational policy reform. Thereafter, current
issues in the implementation of the NCS in South Africa and the official abandonment of
OBE in 2010 will be discussed.
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5.1 Education policy before 1994
Admittedly, a comprehensive discussion of education policy in South Africa before 1994 is
beyond the scope of this study but a brief analysis will help to illustrate the kind of hope and
expectations that the people had after the demise of apartheid.  Although the policies that
pertain to education in South Africa can be traced back to the creation of the Union of South
Africa in 1910 through The Union of South Africa Act (1909) the discussion in this section
will focus on those policies that were prominent in shaping the more recent educational
landscape of the country. The issues that arose following the creation of the Union of South
Africa culminated in the enactment of the National Education Policy Act  of 1967
(NEPA,1967) (Behr, 1984:20). It is important to note that this policy addressed the issues of
education for whites. This policy provided for various aspects of education that included
attendance, funding, administration, inspection and the training of teachers. For instance, the
policy stipulated that “the training of white persons as teachers for secondary schools may be
provided at a university only” (NEPA, 1967 section 1A). In terms of funding and other
resources, the policy stated that “education (including books and stationery) shall be provided
free of charge in schools maintained, managed and controlled by a department of state”
NEPA, 1967 section 2e). The Act also provided for input in the form of recommendations
and suggestions from officially recognised teachers’ associations and specified the uniform
conditions of service and the salary scales of teachers (Behr, 1984:39). To promote
professionalism among teachers the South African Teachers’ Council for Whites Act, 1976
was enacted. Behr notes that the operation of this policy in 1977 signified the
accomplishment of a long cherished ideal of an organised profession (1984:39).
Alongside the NEPA 1967, the Black Education Act of 1953 was in operation. This Act
addressed issues in Black education. On most of the issues discussed earlier (NEPA, 1967),
the Black Education Act was either silent or did not address them. In terms of funding, the
Black Education Act subsection section 6.1(a) and (b) and subsection 6.2 stipulated that:
6. (1) ... The Minister may ... out of the moneys appropriated or set aside by
parliament for Black education –
(a) subsidize any school established or maintained by a Black authority...
(b) assist the establishment or maintenance of any such a school ...
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6. (2) The Minister may, in his discretion, at any time suspend, reduce or withdraw
any subside or assistance granted to any such school under this section.
In respect of the financing of Black Education, Dr H. F. Verwoerd, the then Minister of
Native Affairs, argued that “it was sound educational policy to create among Blacks a sense
of responsibility by allowing them to bear sufficient financial responsibility to make them
accept that their development is their own concern and in this way to guarantee its
continuity” (Behr, 1984:184). A high teacher-pupil ratio common in Black schools. Teacher
training courses (Primary Teachers’ Certificate and Junior Secondary Teachers’ Certificate)
were offered at the institutions for Black teachers. Fort Hare, the North and Zululand
universities trained secondary school teachers but they could not cope with the demand.
It is believed that the state of schools was one of the major causes of the Soweto riots in
1976. The Cillié Commission found that “besides the objection to Afrikaans, there was
dissatisfaction with the standard of education, the quality of teaching, the school buildings
and equipment” (Behr, 1984:197). The Black Education Act, 1953 was subjected to severe
criticism during the 1976 Black students’ riots. Partly as a result, it was replaced by the
Education and Training Act, 1979. The principles of this Act followed the pattern of NEPA,
1967 but excluded aspects like conditions of service and uniform salaries. Another important
feature of educational policy during this phase was the multiplicity of departments of
education based on race and geography. Added to these problems, in the late 1980s and early
1990s there was considerable global economic adjustment as a consequence of slower
economic growth (Fleisch, 2002:2). This resulted in high levels of unemployment and
declining state expenditure on social services, including education. Fleisch notes that
“between 1990 and 1995 South Africa experienced a surge of militancy among the working
class and the poor, with teacher unionism becoming a major force on the educational
landscape” (2002:2). During this phase most organisations became sophisticated in their
strategies to advance their agendas.
The last policy efforts to modernise the apartheid education system and “to minimise local
and international protest and contestation” were made in 1989 when National Department of
Education (DNE) devised new curriculum polices (Cross et al, 2002:173). To this end, the
Curriculum Model for South Africa (CUMSA) was introduced in 1991. Cross et al note that
the aim of this policy initiative was to “make education more relevant, rationalise the
curriculum, eliminate unnecessary overlapping of subject content and redress other
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shortcomings” of the previous policies (2002:173). This was followed by the Education
Renewal Strategy (ERS). The purpose of this policy was “to renew and restructure the South
African education system in order to improve existing deficiencies, make education more
affordable and create education and training opportunities for an ever-growing population”
(Department of National Education, 1992:5). However, ERS was overshadowed by the
publication of National Education Investigation Policy (NEPI) reports in 1992. This was as a
result of the liberation movements’ request to develop an agenda and position papers on
education (Cross et al, 2002:174). The main idea was to generate policy alternatives for a
future education dispensation in a new and democratic South Africa.  The central themes
which informed these early proposals were non-racism, non-sexism, democracy, equity and
redress (Cross, et al, 2002:174).
After national political negotiations, when the agreement on the Interim Constitution was
struck and the 1994 elections were looming, the African National Congress (ANC) began its
preparation to govern (Fleisch, 2002:12). Cross et al report that:
[T]he ANC’s Head of Education constituted an independent policy-research agency,
the Centre for Education Policy Development (CEPD) in 1993. Drawing on some
NEPI specialists, the CEPD developed the ANC’s ‘Policy Framework’, and
undertook the subsequent ‘Implementation Plans for Education and Training’ (IPET)
project. (2002:174)
Another problem that beset the government in waiting was the need to transform the
bureaucracy and reorganise the old departments while building alliances with progressive
teachers (Fleisch, 2002:20). A means was sought of bringing the bureaucrats on board
through informal networking, consensus building and popular mobilisation. To that end, by
April 1994 the ANC Task Team had opened dialogue with apartheid bureaucrats (Fleisch,
2002:20). Another important feature of this phase was that the policy-making approach was
top-down and was shrouded in secrecy and authoritarianism (Cross et al, 2002:172).
This brief analysis of the educational policy in South Africa before 1994 has shown the
disparities in education resources available to people were based on race. The inequalities
were a result of policies enacted by the apartheid government. This resulted in protests from
some of the sectors of society. Amendments to the educational policies and the promulgation
of new ones prior to 1994 did not have a significant impact on the majority of the people in
South Africa.
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5.2 Educational policy reform in the post-apartheid South Africa
When Sibusiso Bengu assumed the position of the Minister of Education in a new South
Africa in 1994 the education system was complex and had collapsed (Chisholm, 2003:268).
Chisholm notes that the problems included high levels of adult illiteracy, dysfunctional
schools and universities, discredited curricula and illegitimate structures of governance
(2003:268). Since the ANC education manifesto promised to open the doors of learning and
culture to all, the new democratic government undertook four important initiatives (Fleisch,
2002:41). The first one was to close down the racially segregated education departments and
replace them with a single non-racial administration. Secondly, the ANC started to equalise
per capita school funding. Thirdly, the new government promised to open up new
opportunities for adult basic education and training and early childhood education. Lastly, the
new government committed itself to “transforming the bureaucratic and the authoritarian
culture of the former education systems” (Fleisch, 2002:41). The Department of Education
(2001:3) grouped these objectives into three interrelated tasks. These were dismantling
apartheid structures and creating a unified education system; creating a more equitable
system of financing in the context of huge demands on limited financial resources; and
devising a policy framework which gave expression to the values that underpinned the new
state (DoE, 2001:3). This section explores some of the initiatives that were undertaken after
the dismantling of the apartheid education, their implementation and the issues that arose.
However, a comprehensive discussion of these policies will be limited to Curriculum 2005
(C2005), NCS, and now CAPS due to their relevance to this study.
First was the South African Constitution (1996) which required that education be transformed
and democratised in accordance with the values of human dignity, equality, human rights and
freedom, non-racism and non-sexism (DoE, 2001:4). The South African Constitution
guarantees access to a basic education for all. The Constitution explicitly states that everyone
has the right to:
 a basic education, including adult basic education; and
 further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make
progressively available and accessible (South African Constitution, 1996:8).
The vision of education expressed in the Constitution was based on the 1994 education policy
framework of the African National Congress (DoE, 2001:4).
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A more specific important policy in education was the National Education Policy Act
(NEPA) (1996). This policy was established to embody “the principle of co-operative
governance, elaborated in Schedule Three of the Constitution” (DoE, 2001:4). NEPA (1996)
outlined the monitoring responsibilities of the Minister of Education and specified the
relations between national and provincial departments of education.  As a result it established
the Council of Education Ministers (CEM) and Heads of Education Departments Committee
(HEDCOM) as inter-governmental forums to collaborate in building the new system, and
provide for the determination of national policies on, among other matters, curriculum,
assessment, language policy and quality assurance. In terms of monitoring and evaluation,
NEPA (1996) specified that “the Minister shall direct that the standards of education
provision, delivery and performance throughout the Republic be monitored and evaluated by
the Department annually or at other specified intervals, with the object of assessing progress
in complying with the provisions of the Constitution and with national education policy”
[NEPA, 1996 section 8(1)]. Another important objective of NEPA (1996) was to provide for
the publication and implementation of national education policy. Furthermore, the policy
addresses the ratio between teachers and students as well as education for the profession and
accreditation of educators.
To promote access, quality and democratic governance in the schooling system the South
African Schools Act (SASA) (1996) was enacted (DoE, 2001:4).  Its aim is to provide for a
uniform system for the organisation, governance and funding of schools and to amend and
repeal certain laws relating to schools. SASA seeks to ensure that all learners have the right
of access to quality education without discrimination, and makes schooling compulsory for
children aged 7 to 14 years (SASA, 1996). Specifically, the policy states that “every parent
must cause every learner for whom he or she is responsible to attend a school from the first
school day of the year in which such learner reaches the age of seven years until the last
school day of the year in which such learner reaches the age of fifteen years or the ninth
grade” (SASA, 1996). SASA (1996) provides for two types of schools, that is, public schools
and independent schools. The Act also promotes democratic school governance through
school governing bodies and representative councils of learners. In terms of funding, SASA
prioritises redress and targets poverty in providing funding to schools.
In 1998 the Employment of Educators Act was enacted to regulate the professional, moral
and ethical responsibilities and competencies of teachers (DoE, 2001:4). This Act addresses
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the historically divided teaching profession and states that the teaching force shall be
governed by one Act of Parliament. The Act also provides for the formation of one
professional council, that is, the South African Council of Educators (SACE). SACE
established a code of professional ethics for educators which applies to all educators who are
registered or provisionally registered with the Council and advises the Minister on any
relevant aspect (South African Council of Educators ACT No. 31 of 2000).
5.3 The evolution and nature of curriculum 2005
Of all the educational policies formulated and implemented in South Africa since the mid-
1990s, Curriculum 2005 (C2005) has occasioned considerable controversy.  Because of its
centrality in education and its significance for this study, this policy merits detailed and
comprehensive discussion. The name Curriculum 2005 was given to reflect “the year when
its first learners would finish school” (Marneweck, 2010:1). C2005 “envisaged for general
education a move away from a racist, apartheid, rote learning model of learning and teaching
to a liberating, nation-building and learner centred outcomes-based one” (DoE, 2001:5). The
DoE says that the reformulation of the curriculum was “intended to allow greater mobility
between different levels and institutional sites, and the integration of knowledge and skills
through ‘learning pathways’” (2001:5). Furthermore, the C2005’s assessment, qualifications,
competency, and skills-based framework encouraged the development of curriculum models
aligned to the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) in theory and practice. Because of
its holistic nature, C2005 was significant because of the enormity of the practical and
symbolic legacy that it aimed to “address as well as the weight that is attached to what it can
achieve” (Chisholm, 2003:268).
Curriculum 2005 and Outcomes Based Education (OBE) were the culmination of
developments that took place in the country and elsewhere. It was “part of a flow of ideas that
through globalisation processes have gained echo in different contexts and express
converging trends in educational systems throughout the world”, such as the
centralisation/decentralisation debates, debates on the effectiveness of schools and recently
approaches to school improvement (Cross et al, 2002:176). Cross et al note that the OBE
approach in South Africa can viewed as a policy ‘hybrid’ since “there are both local and
global roots to [it] that had different impacts at different times” (2002:176). Spreen also says
that “activists outside the traditional education establishment (with strong international ties)
were instrumental in establishing the new educational agenda in South Africa” (2001:5). The
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labour movement was also involved in this. Regarding Congress of South African Trade
Unions (COSATU) involvement in the OBE, Spreen asserts that:
The COSATU Education Desk began to strive for recognition from the education
community for what workers knew and were able to do. In many ways, these early
concerns are what brought about an interest in OBE. Increased recognition of the
skills workers obtained on the job and in other settings outside of the formal
education system would give them better credentials that would bring more pay and
greater mobility. (2001:130)
However, the actual work of putting together a curriculum framework began in 1995 with the
appointment of the Consultative Forum on Curriculum although much of the work was done
by learning areas committees in 1996 (Fleisch, 2002:122). The final version of the curriculum
was unveiled in 1997 in an official booklet entitled ‘Curriculum 2005: Lifelong for the 21st
Century’. A cause for prolonged debate among all stakeholders in education was its departure
from content-based teaching and learning to an outcomes based education (Fleisch, 2002:122;
Cross et al, 2002:178).  Cross et al noted that this curriculum demanded a “departure from
‘fundamental pedagogics’ (a racially-based prescribed set of learning objectives) to
progressive pedagogy and learner-centred teaching and learning strategies” (2002:179). The
main aims of curriculum 2005 were to:
(i) align school work with workplace, social and political goals;
(ii) emphasise experiential and cooperative learning;
(iii) pursue the value of diversity in the areas of race, gender and culture;
(iv) develop citizens who are imaginative and critical problem-solvers (Cross et al,
2002:178).
To that end, Curriculum 2005 identified eight learning areas which are regarded as a means
of “breaking away from strict boundaries between traditional school subjects and to ensure
integration within and across the different disciplines as well as developing and organising
the core curriculum” (Cross et al, 2002:178). Nevertheless, the traditional subjects were
retained and accommodated within eight learning areas: Arts and Culture; Language,
Literacy and Communication; Economic and Management Sciences; Human and Social
Sciences; Life Orientation; Mathematical Literacy, Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences;
Physical and Natural Sciences; and Technology (DoE, 2002b:18; Cross et al, 2002:178).
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Another key feature of the C2005 was its emphasis on critical and developmental outcomes
which are derived from the Constitution and are contained in the South African
Qualifications Act (1995) (DoE, 2002:10; Cross et al, 2002:178). These outcomes describe
the kind of a citizen the education system aims to create at the end of the period of
instruction. The critical outcomes are to create learners who will be able to:
 Identify and solve problems and make decisions using critical and creative thinking.
 Work effectively with others as members of a team, group, organisation and community.
 Organise and manage themselves and their activities responsibly and effectively.
 Collect, analyse, organise and critically evaluate information.
 Communicate effectively using visual, symbolic and/or language skills in various modes.
 Use science and technology effectively and critically showing responsibility towards the
environment and the health of others.
 Demonstrate an understanding of the world as a set of related systems by recognising
that problem-solving contexts do not exist in isolation. (DoE, 2002b:10; Cross et al,
2002:178)
The developmental outcomes aimed at creating learners are able to:
 Reflect on and explore a variety of strategies to learn more effectively.
 Participate as responsible citizens in the life of local, national, and global
communities.
 Be culturally and aesthetically sensitive across a range of social contexts.
 Explore education and career opportunities.
 Develop entrepreneurial opportunities. (DoE,2002b:10)
There seems to be a divergence of views on what really constitutes OBE. Another issue is the
distinction between OBE and content based education. Chisholm notes that OBE as a
philosophy has been defined and re-defined differently by many people. She concludes that
OBE is a ‘floating signifier’ meaning different things to different people (Chisholm,
2003:271).
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Spady argues that OBE rejects the “notion that students of differing aptitudes or abilities
should be given different curricula and learning opportunities, and thereby leaving some
permanently behind and others permanently ahead” (1994:14). For this to happen, schools
will have to change how they have been operating. These arguments resonated well with a
new democratic government which came to power in 1994 promising equality among
citizens. It was a total departure from apartheid’s educational policies. Mention has already
been made of teachers who relied on teaching methods that did not engage learners in active
learning. Many of them were also preoccupied with the imperative to complete the syllabus
in preparation for examinations (DoE, 2003a:4). These issues gave the new government an
impetus to adopt the new OBE system.
Nonetheless, some scholars do not see OBE as a viable education system. For example,
Jansen (1998) points out that:
At first glance, there appear to be sound reasons for a curriculum policy modelled on
OBE. Outcomes would displace an emphasis on content coverage. Outcomes make
explicit what learners should attend to. Outcomes direct assessment towards
specified goals. Outcomes signal what is worth learning in a content-heavy
curriculum. Outcomes can be a measure of accountability, i.e. a means of evaluating
the quality and impact of teaching in a specific school. (1998:2)
However, he quickly queries the efficacy of the OBE in the delivery of educational services.
Jansen (1998:2) asks: “Do outcomes in fact deliver what they claim? How do outcomes play
out in a resource-poor context? Can outcomes survive their psychological roots in
behaviourism? Do outcomes in different contexts mean the same thing, e.g. are outcomes
specified for education equivalent to those identified for training?” These questions are
critical for the front - line workers who dispense the packaged policy.  For street-level
bureaucrats, issues of resources and the psychological behaviour of both clients and
themselves are very important. It is therefore critical for these issues to be addressed in order
to accomplish the principal aims of OBE and to make the education system accountable to
society. Soon after the initial implementation of C2005 a growing number of scholars,
practitioners and other stakeholders began to criticise it. Some of the issues and the criticisms
made are discussed in the next section.
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5.4 Issues with the implementation of Curriculum 2005
Chisholm points out that when C2005 was launched in 1997 it gave hope to the majority of
citizens as it included commitments to human resource development, learner-centredness,
relevance, integration, differentiation, and learner support, nation-building and non-
discrimination (2003:273). On the surface there appeared to be sound reasons for advocating
a curriculum policy which was modelled on outcomes-based education (Jansen, 1999:146).
To many people OBE was good in the sense that outcomes would displace an emphasis on
content coverage.
Among other issues, Jansen doubted the relevance of OBE in a resource-poor country
(1999:146).  He went on to outline ten ‘principal criticisms of OBE’. In brief, these are: (i)
the language of innovation associated with OBE; (ii) assumptions about the relationship
between curriculum and society; (iii) flawed assumption about what happens inside schools,
how classrooms are organised and the kind of street-level bureaucrats that exist in the school;
(iv) desirability of specifying outcomes in advance in a democratic society that is
undemocratic; (v) the focus on ends as final outcomes is questionable considering that much
of educational and political struggle of the 1980s valued the process of learning and teaching;
(vi) OBE side-steps the issue of values in the curriculum with its focus on instrumentalism;
(vii) the management of OBE increases burdens placed on teachers; (viii) OBE trivialises
curriculum content as it claims to be a leverage away from content coverage; (ix) the
minimum requirements for OBE to succeed cannot be met since there is neither the fiscal
base nor the political will to intervene in the education system at this level of intensity; and
lastly (x) OBE requires a radical revision of the most potent mechanism in schools militating
against curriculum innovation, namely the system of assessment (Jansen, 1999:146-153).
Cross et al discuss the criticism of OBE according to six main dimensions: “(i) its origins and
conceptual basis; (ii) its policy nature; (iii) its knowledge and pedagogical features; (iv)
process issues such as the management of its formulation, adoption and implementation; (v)
design issues; and (vi), its position in the context of schooling” (Cross et al, 2002:180). Some
saw OBE as an imposition of the Western world or as another manifestation of cultural
imperialism (Nekhweva, 1999:491; Cross et al, 2002:180).  Nevertheless, some scholars
argue that it is misleading and too simplistic to perceive “global influences simply as
impositions on local contexts, since this would overlook the agency of local actors as well as
the different forms that adaptation”  [Christie cited in Cross et al, 2002:181).
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The nature of C2005 has been questioned. It has been argued that this policy was driven by
political imperatives more than by policy imperatives. This curriculum initiative was not
meant to be implemented but was just a “part of state policy symbolism and political
expediency to give the impression that change was taking place and the expectations of the
disadvantaged groups were being addressed” (Jansen, 2002: 210).
Furthermore, criticisms were focused on the policy process. The major concern was that the
administration of the “curriculum process from its conceptualisation, formulation, adoption
and implementation was not aligned with curriculum development, teacher development,
selection and supply of learning materials” (Cross et al, 2002:182).
Some critics argued that in C2005 the degree of state intervention in the curriculum process
was too much. Cross et al point out that C2005 represented an example of a bureaucratic-
driven [top-down] process of curriculum reform (2002:182).  They argue that this problem
resulted in the following deficiencies:
1. Too much alignment to socio-economic concerns at the expense of knowledge
and pedagogical concerns.
2. A highly regulated framework.
3. Over-specification of outcomes (seven critical outcomes and 66 specific
outcomes) which de-skills street-level bureaucrats by leaving little space for their
discretion and creativity.
4. Under-specification of content and knowledge basis, which diminishes its value
as a framework and limits the pedagogical authority of the teacher.
5. Limited teacher participation in the conceptualisation and design of the
curriculum; and
6. Less attention to pedagogical concerns. (Cross et al, 2002:182).
In terms of design, the policy has been criticised for focusing too much on outcomes and
neglecting issues of content that were left to individual educators to formulate. The policy
makers did not anticipate the effects of confounding factors such as “poor training of teachers
and lack of resources, as well as the toll that apartheid had inflicted on the education system.
The majority of teachers found it difficult to know what to teach and tended to act as mere
technicians without the necessary conceptual and content tools” (Cross et al, 2002:182). In
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other words, even if educators wanted to comply with the new policy requirements it was
difficult for them because they lacked capacity.
Policy makers often overlook crucial aspects of policy implementation such as capacity and
the competence of implementers or street-level bureaucrats.  Berlach and O’Neill (2008:50)
point out that “when Spady’s principles first surfaced, they appeared to be such common
sense and so compelling that many education authorities wholeheartedly embraced Spady’s
(1988) challenge of “organising for results”. They did this, often doing so naively, believing
that matters such as content, assessment and implementation would, by and large, take care of
themselves as schools interpreted and implemented OBE in their local context (Berlach and
O’Neill 2008:51). These criticisms precipitated pessimism among stakeholders. These
reactions have had a direct impact on the outcomes of the policy. Botha points out that:
Negative reactions and pessimism from the South African communities,
educationists, teachers and the press against certain elements of the model can
already be observed. Such reactions can contribute towards denying the OBE model
a chance, which could result in its early demise. The misunderstandings of the
theoretical bases and tensions among philosophical underpinnings can be viewed as
possible reasons for concern in the South African scenario. (Botha, 2002:363)
These reactions have persisted. Teachers, politicians, academics and labour movements have
queried the effectiveness of the policy to address the problem of the quality of education.
The government insisted that the policy is effective but that the street-level bureaucrats were
not implementing it correctly, although finally it was admitted that the OBE model was
flawed (DBE, 2009c:1). Rogan (2007) is of the view that C2005 might be good but little
emphasis had been placed on implementation. Citing Verspoor (1989: 133), in his analysis of
21 World Bank-supported educational change programmes, he points out that:
Large-scale programmes tend to emphasize adoption and neglect implementation. In
nearly all instances low outcomes resulted from poor implementation of what was
essentially a good idea. In South Africa, this lack of foresight was particularly
unfortunate. The high ideals of C2005 were to be implemented in a system that was
already under considerable stress. (Rogan, 2007:98)
It can be discerned from this quotation that many policy makers put their effort into policy
formulation and adoption phases and ignore the implementation phase but wait for good
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results. They omit to take into consideration the context within which the policy is being
implemented. Unlike in other countries where OBE was implemented, the South African
environment was under considerable stress. It seems that the government made simple
assumptions that when the policy is in place everything would flow naturally. One of the
assumptions underlying this nationally directed educational reform process was that street-
level bureaucrats would be both willing and able to adapt their teaching and assessment
practices accordingly. Yet, there is considerable evidence to suggest that this is not so
(Vandeyar, 2005:461). In reality, many street-level bureaucrats have not been so willing to
adapt due to a number of factors, which may include their capacity to interpret the policy
(Mutereko, 2009:59).
Most of the issues that affect South Africa education policy implementation are akin to other
developing countries. Issues to do with financial resources, human resources, political will,
physical resources, attitudes and beliefs of street-level bureaucrats can all combine to affect
policy implementation. Of all these factors, attitudes and values are very critical (Mutereko,
2009:59). Botha points out that “the attitudes and values of most of the adult South Africans
of this decade were formed in the apartheid era” (2002:363).  This is very significant since
attitudes tend to change slowly. It is important to note that the majority of these street-level
bureaucrats were socialised under apartheid.
Cross et al (2002) summarise the issues that arose from the implementation of C2005:
As in many other developing countries, curriculum reform in South Africa has
resulted in several structural and policy tensions within the system. These tensions
include: the vision vis-à-vis the country’s realities; symbolism vis-à-vis mass
expectations; the curriculum framework vis-à-vis applicability, conditions of
implementation and actual practice in schools; expected outcomes vis-à-vis the
capacity of street-level bureaucrats to translate them into reality; and budget concerns
vis-à-vis commitment to values such as equity, redress and massification, and so on.
(Cross et al, 2002:172)
The issues which are critical for street level-bureaucrats’ accountability are the applicability
of the policy, conditions of implementation and actual practice in schools. It can be inferred
that the actual practice of C2005 in schools might not reflect what was intended, either
because of discretion exercised by the street-level bureaucrats or because of the different
accountability mechanisms employed. Of great importance is the capacity of street-level
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bureaucrats to translate the outcomes into reality. But as explained earlier, the majority of the
teachers were trained to teach black learners who then received inferior education.
Consequently, the implementation of C005 required retraining teachers.
There seems to be a general problem with teacher training. As Botha (2002:368) laments: “in
South Africa there is a lack of responsibility [accountability], dedication and commitment on
the part of many teachers and learners”. Botha observes that “achieving the required
knowledge, skills and habits of mind to promote a prosperous and democratic country with a
quality education system will take some very hard work from a number of key players such
as teachers and learners” (2002:368). The implication of this assertion is twofold.  Firstly, it
can imply that street-level bureaucrat autonomy, discretion by school management and
government accountability mechanisms may hamper policy implementation and may need to
be reduced or controlled. Secondly, although it is beyond the scope of this current study,
Botha mentions the importance of learners’ (clients) commitment in ensuring improved
outputs of the policy.  Botha asserts that “learners will have to take greater responsibility for
their learning” (2002:368). In response to all these kinds of issues, the then Minister of
Education, Professor Kader Asmal, appointed a committee to review C2005.
5.5 The Review Committee on Curriculum 2005 and the Revised National Curriculum
Statement
Amongst other purposes, a policy review can serve as an accountability mechanism (Cross et
al, 2002:183). Depending on who appoints a review committee and the purpose of the
review, its outcomes could be used with reference to all the types of accountability discussed
earlier.  The task of the review committee was “to investigate the structure and design of the
curriculum, the level of understanding of the curriculum, how the curriculum could be
strengthened, and what needs to be done to about implementation envisaged for 2001”
(Chisholm, 2003:277).  Cross et al added that the committee was to investigate the “[s]teps to
be taken in respect of the implementation of the new curriculum in Grades 4 and 8 in 2001”
(2002:183). Broadly, the review committee reaffirmed the social justice, equity and
development goals of the curriculum. In this regard, the committee placed “the values of
society striving for social justice, equity and development through the development of
creative, critical and problem-solving individuals” at the core of the curriculum (Chisholm,
2003:278). Chisholm states that the review committee also discovered that there was
overwhelming support for the principles of OBE as well as for C2005.  After all, the Review
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Committee was “not expected to do away with Curriculum 2005 or to question its approach
(i.e. OBE) and basic assumptions, though these have been an object of contestation” (Cross et
al, 2002:183). According to DoE (2001) and Cross et al (2002) some of the problems and
challenges of the C2005 implementations were the following:
i. Although there was support for the curriculum changes (especially its underlying
principles), the levels of understanding of the policy and its implications were highly
varied;
ii. A skewed curriculum structure and design, for instance, the language was often
complex and confusing (including the use of unnecessary jargon);
iii. Integration, a leading design feature (seen as placing emphasis on progression and not
on conceptual mastery);
iv. Policy overload and limited transfer of learning into classrooms;
v. Lack of alignment between curriculum and assessment policy (too much assessment-
oral, written, individual, group, etc. - ad hoc and fragmented - each of the 66 specific
outcomes has three to four assessment criteria);
vi. Inadequate orientation, training and development of teachers and follow-up support
unavailable;
vii. Too much emphasis on the outcomes without stating what should go into the system
(inputs) for the outcomes to be achieved;
viii. Learning support materials were variable in quality, and often unavailable;
ix. Shortages of personnel and resources to implement and support Curriculum 2005;
x. Inadequate recognition of curriculum as the core business of education departments;
and
xi. Timeframes for implementation were unmanageable and unrealistic – the policy was
released before the system was ready, with timeframes that were too rushed. (Cross et
al, 2002:184; DoE, 2001:27)
In response to the findings, the Review Committee outlined a number of proposals to
strengthen the implementation of C2005 [for a detailed list of the proposals see Cross et al,
2002:185]. These proposals culminated in the drafting of the Revised National Curriculum
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Statement (RNCS). RNCS retained the broad vision of Curriculum 2005, but refined the
policy documents (DoE, 2001:7). “The Revised National Curriculum Statement streamlines
and strengthens Curriculum 2005 and continues to be committed to outcomes-based
education” DoE, 2001:28).
In tandem with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the goals of RNCS are “to
create a new South African identity that encompasses critical consciousness, to transform
South African society, to promote democracy and to magnify learner involvement in
education” (Msila, 2007:151). Furthermore, the RNCS envisaged educators and learners who
were to assume new roles. On the one hand, the RNCS states that street-level bureaucrats at
all levels are regarded as key contributors to the transformation of education in South Africa
and as such that they are expected to be qualified, competent, dedicated as outlined in the
Norms and Standards for Educators of 2000 (Government Gazette No 20844) (DoE,2002b:9).
The DoE states that teachers are seen “as mediators of learning, interpreters and designers of
Learning Programmes and materials, leaders, administrators and managers, scholars,
researchers and lifelong learners, community members, citizens and pastors, assessors and
learning area/phase specialists” (2002:9). On the other hand, the RNCS envisaged a learner
who “will be imbued with the values and act in the interests of a society based on respect for
democracy, equality, human dignity, life and social justice” (DoE, 2002b:8). The DoE states
that:
The curriculum aims to develop the full potential of each learner as a citizen of a
democratic South Africa. It seeks to create a lifelong learner who is confident and
independent, literate, numerate and multi-skilled, compassionate, with a respect for
the environment and the ability to participate in society as a critical and active
citizen. (DoE, 2002b:8)
Assessment remained a cornerstone of RNCS as it aligns the curriculum with Assessment
Policy (Government Gazette No 19640 of 1998). Each Learning Area Statement includes a
detailed section on assessment. In line with outcomes-based principles, “the most suitable
assessment methods that accommodate divergent contextual factors are used” (DoE,
2002b:18). The RNCS stipulates that “assessment should provide indications of learner
achievement in the most effective and efficient manner, and ensure that learners integrate and
apply knowledge and skills (DoE, 2002b:18). Furthermore, assessment should help learners
to make informed judgements about their own performance.
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However, the implementation of NCS was not without problems. Many challenges that
haunted the implementation of C2005 have persisted with the implementation of NCS.  In
response to this, the Minister of Basic Education, Minister Motshekga, appointed a panel of
experts to investigate the nature of these challenges and to develop a set of recommendations
designed to address them (DBE, 2009a:5). After obtaining information over several years
from a range of stakeholders such as teachers, parents, teacher unions, school management
and academics, the Minister of Education realised that there were serious problems and
challenges relating to the implementation of the National Curriculum Statement. Despite the
fact that several minor interventions have been made to attend to some of the challenges of
implementing the NCS, these changes had not had the desired effect. The panel of experts
presented their findings and recommendations in July 2009. Then The Minister of Education,
Angie Motshekga announced that:
I have been aware of the wide-ranging comments on the implementation of the
National Curriculum Statement. While there has been positive support for the new
curriculum, there has also been considerable criticism. This has included criticism of
teacher overload, confusion and stress. Most worryingly, there is consistent evidence
of widespread learner underperformance in both international and local assessments.
(DBE, 2009b:2)
The next section discusses the major findings from the panel of experts who were appointed
to review the implementation of the NCS. It then explores the introduction of Curriculum
Assessment Policy Statement, Schooling 2025 and the Action Plan to 2014.
5.6 The evolution of Curriculum Assessment Policy Statements (CAPS)
The panel found that there was no clear, widely communicated plan for the implementation
and support of the National Curriculum Statement (DBE, 2009b:7). As a consequence, many
stakeholders complained that they had no broad vision in terms of what the curriculum sets
out to achieve, specifically with regard to learners. Together with the poor performance of
learners, this has caused distrust in the education system. The panel was of the view that “a
coherent, clear, simple Five Year Plan to Improve Teaching and Learning across the
schooling system needed to be developed and adhered to; it must be clearly and widely
communicated to the nation” (DBE, 2009b:7). This led to the development of the Action Plan
to 2014. This is a part of a vision which is called Schooling 2025. The Action Plan sets out
the goals that the national education system will be working towards as well as the actions to
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achieve these goals, by 2014 (DBE, 2010a:4).  These are the first steps towards realising the
bigger, more long-term vision of quality education in schools by 2025. “Schooling 2025 is a
long term plan for the basic education sector which will allow for the monitoring of progress
against a set of measurable indicators covering all aspects of basic education, including
amongst others, enrolments and retention of learners, teachers, infrastructure, school funding,
learner well-being and school safety, mass literacy and educational quality” (DBE, 2011a).
Additionally, the panel recommended the use of accountability mechanisms to monitor the
implementation of the plan, such as regular external monitoring to assess whether the plan
has the desired effect on learner and teacher performance.
The panel also discovered that there was “a plethora of policies, guidelines and
interpretations of policies and guidelines at all levels of the education system, from the DoE
down to provincial, district and subject advisor level” (DBE, 2009b:7). The panel
recommended that the NCS documents be streamlined into a set of single, coherent
documents per subject or learning area for each phase from Grade R to Grade 12. This
resulted in the development of a Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement for every
learning area and subject (by phase) for implementation by January 2012. However, this was
postponed until January 2013 to give the book publishers ample time to prepare learning
materials. Currently (2013) the only grades that are implementing CAPS are Grades R - 6 in
primary school and Grades 10 and 11 in high school.
It important to stress that CAPS did not replace NCS. The CAPS replaced the Subject
Statements, Learning Programme and Guidelines and Subject Assessment Guidelines with:
a) Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statements (CAPS) for all approved subjects
listed in this document;
b) National policy pertaining to the programme and promotion requirements of the
National Curriculum Statement Grades R-12; and
c) National Protocol for Assessment Grades R-12.
With respect to the types of accountability discussed in the theoretical framework, CAPS
typifies hierarchical accountability in the sense that it prescribes what needs to be taught and
the time prescribed for teaching elements of curricula.
Another challenge which was identified pertains to the role of subject advisors. The role of
subject advisor differs from province to province and street-level bureaucrats see the role as
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demanding unnecessary administrative tasks and ‘box ticking’ (DBE, 2009b:8). There were
also too few subject advisors nationwide; moreover, many of them did not have sufficient
knowledge and skills to offer street-level bureaucrats the support they require to improve
learner performance (DBE, 2009b:8). This is because they did not receive special training for
their jobs which might have contributed to the confusion and led to a proliferation of
documents and paperwork. The panel recommended that the DBE should “clarify Subject
Advisor roles nationally and specify the exact nature of in-classroom and school support they
should provide to teachers” (DBE, 2009b:8). This issue is in line with criteria of professional
accountability which was discussed in the previous chapters.
The implementation of NCS was also hindered by the nature of teacher training. The panel
found that the “current teacher development policies to support the curriculum were often too
generic and superficial and did not provide the needed support to teachers” (DBE, 2009b:10).
This was compounded by the sense that most tertiary institutions did not cover the National
Curriculum Statement thoroughly enough in curricula for qualifications and as a result many
newly trained street-level bureaucrats were not competent to teach what is required. The
panel recommended that as from September 2010 onwards “the training of teachers to
support curriculum implementation should be subject specific and targeted only where
needed; and all support staff, including school management, subject advisors and district
officers, should also undergo training on the Curriculum and Assessment Policy” (DBE,
2009b:10).
In brief, these are some of the findings and recommendations of the panel of experts
appointed by the Minister of Education, Angelina Motshekga. These findings led her to sign
the ‘Death Certificate’ of OBE in the South African education system. In her address to the
parliament on the 6th of November 2009, the Minister of Education said that:
The question on everyone’s lips is why we do not ... declare the death certificate of
outcomes-based education, OBE? I must say that we have, to all intents and
purposes, done so. So if anybody asks us if we are going to continue with OBE, we
say that there is no longer OBE. We have completely done away with it. (DBE,
2009a:2)
This marked an important turning point with regard to the application of the principles of
outcomes based education in South Africa. The use of textbooks which was de-emphasised in
OBE has since resumed a central role. Work books were distributed by the DBE, starting in
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2011. The assessment of learners from Grade 1- 9 which was carried out internally by schools
has been replaced by Annual National Assessment at Grades 3, 6 and 9. However, these
assessments are marked by schools themselves. As will be discussed, these assessments act as
bureaucratic accountability mechanisms for street-level bureaucrats.
Conclusion
In an attempt to put the entire study into perspective, this chapter explored the South African
education system. It commenced with exploring the different education policies that have
been used to shape the education landscape. Apartheid education policies which sought to
deliver education along racial lines were discussed. The apartheid policies still have a
significant bearing on the current problems which are faced in education. Their impact on the
contemporary South Africa is still evident. The dawn of a democratic South Africa and the
demise of apartheid brought in a new dispensation in the education system of South Africa. It
brought new hopes and aspirations. The new educational policies and curriculum frameworks
in the democratic South Africa include Curriculum 2005 which was underpinned by the OBE
philosophies. It seems that people expected too much from the educational policies that
sought to redress the past injustices.
However, the implementation of such policies was marred by challenges which led to its
review in 1999 and the adoption of the Revised National Curriculum Statement in 2000. The
Revised National Curriculum Statement was still informed by the principles of OBE.
Difficulties in implementation persisted and the Minister of Basic Education appointed
another Review Committee which led to the abandonment of OBE and the phasing in of the
Curriculum Assessment Policy Statements, Action Plan 2014 and Schooling 2025.
Admittedly, the educational policies that have been in operation South Africa may be flawed,
but accountability in the implementation of these policies requires attention. With the
knowledge that street-level bureaucrats may pose challenges for management, all forms of
accountability will now be explored to see how effective they are in holding street-level
bureaucrats accountable to organisation goals. The next chapter will explore the different
types of accountability which were discussed in preceding chapters in the context of South
African educational policy implementation, that is, political, performance, hierarchical, legal
as well as professional accountability.
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CHAPTER SIX
TYPES OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION
Accountability in the South African education system will be presented according to the types
of accountability discussed in the previous chapter. Using a comprehensive review of policy
documents this chapter will commence with a discussion of political accountability in South
African education, which will focus on issues such as how government has been politically
accountable in financing the education system and supporting the less privileged schools and
learners. This will then be followed by discussing the application of performance
accountability to South African education. The third type to be investigated will be
bureaucratic or hierarchical accountability. In terms of hierarchical accountability, use of
examinations as an accountability mechanism will be discussed. The fourth type of
accountability to be considered is legal accountability. Different policies and regulations that
govern the work of street-level bureaucrats will be explicated. The last type is professional
accountability. Here professional bodies and peer review are used as ways of making
accountable street-level bureaucrats who are implementing the NCS. There are many overlaps
and similarities between these types of accountability as will be revealed in the course of the
argument which follows.
6.1 Political accountability
In as far as political accountability is concerned, the South African government, as Brinkerhoff
(2003:7)  says, established institutions, procedures, and mechanisms that seek to ensure that
government delivers on electoral promises, fulfils public trust, aggregates and represents
citizens’ interests, and responds to ongoing and emerging societal needs and concerns. As
explained previously, political accountability is a cornerstone of democracy whereby those
elected are accountable to the citizens. However, in political accountability the performance
and outcomes expected of the elected officials are variable and hard to specify. In the case of
education, this might entail policies relating to the “curriculum taught, the level of spending on
education, or special treatment for a constituent’s children” and the provision of infrastructure
(Education Encyclopaedia, online). In a democracy, elected officials will be inclined to act in a
manner that favours their re-election.
Financing and access
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Most education policies enacted after the demise of apartheid in South Africa were aimed at
fulfilling the promises that were made and gaining the trust of citizens. In the context of high
unemployment, coupled with a widely recognised shortfall in skills, reducing poverty is to a
large extent a matter of giving South Africans a better educational start in life. For that reason,
basic education featured strongly on the 2008 election manifesto of the ruling party (African
National Congress), and it is why access to quality education has been a priority amongst
democratic South Africans for decades, as reflected in, for instance, the 1955 Freedom Charter
(DBE, 2010e:6). In light of this, government’s contribution at national level to public
education remains its single largest investment, as that is seen as key to reducing poverty and
accelerating long-term economic growth. As enshrined in the South African Constitution, the
government strives to make sure that everyone has the right to a basic education, including
adult basic education and further education, which the state, through reasonable measures,
must progressively make available and accessible.
The Department of Basic Education, in terms of the South African Schools Act of 1996, made
attendance in school compulsory for all children aged seven to 15 (or the completion of Grade
9) (South African Schools Act of 1996, section 3.1). In order to achieve this without
disadvantaging learners from poor communities, the same Act allows for learners from poor
families to be exempted from paying school fees. Furthermore, government introduced the No
Fee Schools policy which abolishes school fees in the poorest 40% of schools nationally for
learners from Grade R to Grade 9 and in 2009 this was extended to 60% of learners nationally
(South African Government Information, 2011: available online). Consequently, spending on
education is the largest allocation in the national budget (see Figure 6.1), totalling R165 billion
(19%) in 2010/11.
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Figure 6.1 Public spending on education in South Africa; percentage of government
expenditure.
(Source: Trading economics: available online – accessed 20 June 2012)
Figure 6.1 shows that the amount allocated to education has not been static. Over the years it
has fluctuated depending on other variables. In 1996 education was allocated over 21% of the
national budget (which coincided with the introduction of C2005) with 2002 showing the
highest percentage (over 22%) ever allocated. In 1995 and between 1997 and 1999 education
was allocated below 16% of the budget.
Government’s top priority
Education is a top priority for the current government. This is reflected in the Delivery
Agreement which is a negotiated charter reflecting the commitment of the key partners
involved in the direct delivery process. It stipulates the activities to be undertaken to produce
the mutually agreed-upon outputs (DBE, 2011a:4). In the Delivery Agreement “Improved
quality of basic education” is the first ranked of twelve general priorities which were identified
by government. The Delivery Agreement should be read in conjunction with the Action Plan to
2014: Towards the realisation of Schooling 2025 (published as Government Notice 752 of
2010), referred to as the Action Plan (DBE, 2010a:6).
Political accountability at local level
Another component of political accountability is the need to involve parents in the affairs of
the education of their children. The South African Schools Act No. 84 of 1996 stipulates the
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establishment of school governing bodies (SGBs), comprising parents, educators and non-
educator members of staff (Van Wyk, 2009:132). This is a critical component of political
accountability at local level since it involves parents who are elected to govern the affairs of a
school. Van Wyk (2009:132) argues that parents are placed in a powerful position and are able
to influence the school budget, language policy, discipline and the appointment and promotion
of street-level bureaucrats and administrative staff since they form the majority on SGBs. This
is because the South African Schools Act No. 84 of 1996 states that parents must form the
majority of members on a school governing body. Their number in any school governing body
must be at least half plus one of the total combined number of members with voting rights.
Assistance to less privileged schools and learners
A review of official documents suggests that government, in this case the provincial
Department of Education in KwaZulu – Natal and the uMgungundlovu District, has been
trying to help the less privileged learners. In its performance plan for 2011/2012 it expanded
the National School Nutrition Programme (NSNP) which caters for underprivileged learners
(KZN DoE, 2011:40). It notes that “the School Nutrition Programme targets learners from poor
socioeconomic backgrounds, primarily those in rural, farm schools and schools in informal
settlements, i.e. quintile one, two and three schools1” (NSNP provides learners with nutritious
snacks for every school day. To this end, secondary schools have been provided with catering
equipment and a few schools will receive mobile kitchens for storage and preparation of food
(KZN DoE, 2011:40)).
Furthermore, learners who are in both fee paying and non fee paying schools are said to benefit
from the No Fee2 paying policy. In order to help the deserving learners, the KZN DoE points
out that there are many No Fee paying schools and the No Fee paying policy was expected to
be extended to cover all the schools in quintile three (KZN DoE, 2011:40). This would mean
that all learners attending school in quintiles one to two would not pay fees. Furthermore, the
KZN DoE has re-imbursed fees to learners who have been exempted from them.
With regard to learners who live far from schools, the KZN DoE has made available transport
facilities for them. In its performance plans for 2011/2012, the KZN DoE notes that “up to this
1
The schools in uMgungundlovu District are ranked into five economic classes known as quintiles. These quintiles determine the poverty
level of a school with quintile one being the lowest with the poorest schools, and quintile five being the least poor.
2 The criterion for determining whether a school should be a ‘fee paying’ or ‘no fee paying’ school is determined by the socio-economic
conditions of the geographical area within which the school is found.
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point 2,838 learners are benefiting from the provision of learner transport and plans are afoot to
increase this number to 9,000 in the financial year 2010/11” (KZN DoE, 2011:34).
All these provisions suggest that the government has been and is still doing a great deal in
order to maintain the trust of the citizens who elected them. The money allocated to education
each year has remained significantly high. The government, it seems, has been making
concerted efforts to make sure that everyone has access to education and that support -
financial subsidy, nutrition, transport – in principle is made available to those who need it.
Political accountability in the implementation of NCS is very critical. As a form of external
accountability mechanism citizens are expected to hold elected officials accountable and
require them to deliver the services they promise. As citizens put their faith in government,
street-level bureaucrats come under indirect pressure to perform appropriately since their
failure may mean government failure. The extent to which this form of accountability is
effective in South Africa is difficult to determine.
6.2 Performance accountability
Performance accountability is an external form of accountability which involves the “scrutiny
of the actions of officials and agencies related to the production of outputs, delivery of
services, accomplishment of objectives, and/or achievement of results and impacts”
(Brinkerhoff, 2001:6). In South African education the performance of street-level bureaucrats
is scrutinised in terms of their outputs (for example, the pass rate in Grade 12 (matriculation)
and numeracy skills in various grades) and the objectives of DBE. However, the performance
and outputs of education bureaucracies is not the same for all the different stakeholders in
education. While some stakeholders measure the achievement of schools through pass rates,
others measure it in terms of the quality of such passes or the ability of school leavers to cope
with university education and find placement in jobs. This has given rise to different ways of
measuring performance as well as indicating various means of making street-level bureaucrats
accountable.
Performance measurement
One such method of holding street-level bureaucrats accountable through their performance is
the Annual National Assessments (ANA). The states that “ANA, the Action Plan to 2014,
Schooling 2025 and the Delivery Agreement are key elements of a new approach to make
schooling more accountable” (2011a:10). The main purpose of this is to make sure that neither
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poor nor outstanding performance will go unnoticed. In explaining the importance of
performance accountability the DBE argues that:
It is necessary to know where underperformance occurs and the underlying reasons
for this so that timely and well-targeted interventions can occur. At the same time,
outstanding performance should be acknowledged and replicated through the system.
It is especially important to promote good management and accountability within the
82 district offices in the country and amongst the school principals of approximately
25,900 public schools. (DBE, 2010d: 11)
To be able to achieve performance accountability, the DBE uses Human Resources
Management tools such as the Integrated Quality Management System (IQMS) (Weber,
2005:65). Weber notes that the use of IQMS was agreed on by the Department of
Education and teacher organisations in the Collective Agreement 8 of 2003: Integrated
Quality Management System (2005:64). The IQMS has several devices, which include
Developmental Appraisal (DA), Performance Measurement (PM) and Whole School
Evaluation (WSE) (mentioned here as a component of IQMS).
The purpose of DA is to assess individual educators in a transparent manner with a view to
determining areas of strength and weakness and to draw up programmes for individual
development (Weber, 2005:65).
The DBE uses Performance Measurement (PM) to secure accountability among teachers.
This mechanism mimics the traits of ‘carrot and stick’ device. PM is a rewards and
incentives tool which is used to evaluate individual teachers for purposes of salaries and
promotion, as well as affirmation of appointments. PM has ten Performance Standards.
Some of the Performance Standards for class based educators are:
 Performance Standard 1: Creation of a positive learning environment. The educator is
expected to create a positive learning environment that enables the learners to
participate actively and to achieve success in the learning process.
 Performance Standard 2: Knowledge of curriculum and learning programmes. The
educator is expected to possess appropriate knowledge of curriculum content which is
demonstrated in the creation of meaningful learning experiences.
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 Performance Standard 3: Lesson planning preparation and presentation. The educator
must demonstrate competence in planning, preparation, presentation and management
of learning programmes.
 Performance Standard 4: Learner Assessment/Achievement. The teacher should
demonstrate competence in monitoring and assessing learner progress and achievement.
 Performance Standard 5: Professional development in field of work/career and
participation in professional bodies. The educator must engage in professional
development activities which demonstrate his/her willingness to acquire new
knowledge and additional skill (DBE, 2010d:52-80).
Figure 6.2 Composite score sheet for use in performance measurement for pay
progression and grade progression for level 1 educator
(Source: DBE, 2010b: 80)
Figure 6.2 shows that the performance of street-level bureaucrats is measured for different
aspects of their job. These aspects include creation of a positive learning environment, lesson
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planning and learner assessment. The measures are aggregated, thus arriving at a final score
which indicates the level of overall performance by a street – level bureaucrat.
Purpose of Integrated Quality Management System
Although it cannot be used for punitive and judgmental purposes, IQMS can be used for
incentives. For instance, with reference to the operation of IQMS as a performance
management tool in the South African education system, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) notes that IQMS is:
An incentive scheme which operates where evaluation of a teacher’s performance is
linked to salary progression. The evaluations are categorised as ‘good’, ‘satisfactory’
and ‘unsatisfactory’. Those evaluated as good go up two notches on the salary scale at
three yearly intervals; those with a satisfactory grade go up one notch, while those
regarded as unsatisfactory receive no advancement. (2008:303)
Thus IQMS can be used in the promotion and salary progression of street-level bureaucrats.
However, it has been noted that IQMS has not been as effective as expected because many
street-level bureaucrats are given a score of ‘good’ regardless of their performance (OECD,
2008:303). Because of this, external moderators have been introduced in the South African
system but they have been turned away from some schools by labour unions (DBE, 2013:9).
The DBE (2009:28) outlines the process of “monitoring of educator performance using the
IQMS”. KZN DoE (2011:32) and underscores the importance of performance by stating that
“there will be [for the 2011/2012 performance plan] focussed attention on teacher
accountability through the monitored implementation of the IQMS”.
National Policy on Whole School Evaluation
The National Policy on Whole School Evaluation (WSE) has been designed to ensure that
school evaluation is carried out according to an agreed national model (DoE, 2002:8; DoE,
2001b). The purpose of WSE is to evaluate the overall effectiveness of a school – including the
support provided by the District, school management, infrastructure and learning resources – as
well as the quality of teaching and learning (Education Labour Relation Council (ELRC),
2003:33). The aims of WSE are varied but focus on improving performance accountability and
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helping struggling schools and their individual teachers. The Department of Education (DoE)
(2002:10) says that the aims of WSE are to:
a) Moderate externally, on a sampling basis, the results of self-evaluation carried out by
schools.
b) Evaluate the effectiveness of a school in terms of the national goals, using national
criteria.
c) Increase the level of accountability within the education system. [with increased
emphasis on individual street-level bureaucrats]
d) Strengthen the support given to schools by district professional support services.
e) Provide feedback to all stakeholders as a means of achieving continuous school
improvement.
f) Identify aspects of excellence within the system which will serve as models of good
practice.
g) Identify the key elements of effective schools and improve the general understanding of
what factors create effective schools.
Use of examinations in measuring performance
In many cases, the performance of schools and individual street-level bureaucrats is measured
through the educational achievement of the learners in state mandated examinations. The use
of assessments in South African education can be traced back in the history of education in this
country. The use of examinations as a means of assessment began with the first formal
examination which was conducted in South Africa by the University of the Cape of Good Hope
in 1858 (DBE, 2010d:8). A new feature of assessment is its use as an accountability
mechanism in the implementation of national and mandated curricula. Previously provincial
departments used to set their own assessments. Motivated by the need to establish national
standards across provinces, the national Department of Education took control over the
national examination papers of Grade 12 in 2001 (DBE, 2011b:9). In the Assessment Policy3 in
General and Education Training the DoE notes: “assessment has a direct influence on teaching
and learning, and this power can be harnessed and directed to achieve positive impact” (DoE,
1998: online).
3The Assessment Policy was used to guide assessments before it was incorporated into the CAPS documents in 2012.
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Although examinations serve various purposes for different stakeholders in education, their
effect as an accountability mechanism cannot be overemphasised. The National Senior
Certificate (NSC) examination results in Grade 12 in South Africa have always attracted media
attention since they are a significant means of demonstrating the accountability of the
education system. The current Minister of Basic Education, Angie Motshekga, believes that
NSC examination results sum up schooling over the twelve years and thus serve as a yardstick
of performance of the education system as a whole (DBE, 2011b:7). Managers in the education
sector at all levels always respond to these results in one way or another. The publication of
NSC results exposes under-performers to public scrutiny. At national level provinces are
ranked according to their performance, as illustrated in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3 Ranking of 2013 NSC examination results percentage of schools with 100% in
South Africa according to province
(Adapted from DBE, 2014:42)
At school level the NSC results bring pride to teachers whose learners performed well and
shame to those whose learners under-performed. In KZN a number of teachers whose learners
performed below certain benchmarks in the NSC examination are called to learning workshops
over some weekends. Winter schools have also been introduced for under-performing schools
(DBE, 2011b:34). For independent schools, the publication of results has a direct impact on
their enrolments and by extension has financial implications. As a result such schools have
these means of ensuring performance accountability among their street-level bureaucrats.
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However, the problem of using examinations as a prime performance accountability
mechanism was that the quality of education has not been sufficiently measured before Grade
12. The DBE notes that “a key problem in the past has been that there has been insufficient
measurement of the quality of teaching and learning below Grade 12” (2011a:12). It is against
this background that the DoE introduced the Annual National Assessments (ANA) in 2009.
This prescribes universal and standardised testing in Grades 3, 6 and 9. The DBE has set
targets that are based on performance in relation to international testing programmes. ANAs, in
line with the Action Plan 2014, Schooling 2025 and the Delivery Agreement outcome 1 are
key elements of a new approach to make schooling more accountable (DBE, 2011a:13). While
ANAs are aimed at improving the quality of teaching and learning, their real purpose might be
to ensure accountability. Hence the DBE’s argument is that “if people know there is
monitoring, for instance through regular assessments of educational quality, a sense of
accountability is strengthened” (2011a:7).
It was seen that performance accountability is an external form of accountability which ensures
that street-level bureaucrats in schools are made to account for their performance. However,
measuring their performance is problematic. This has led to the use of surrogate measures such
as the performance of learners in assessments and other elements such as those used in the
IQMS as a means of promoting and testing performance accountability.
6.3 Hierarchical accountability
This section focuses on hierarchical accountability, which is also known as bureaucratic
accountability, in the implementation of NCS in South Africa. Hierarchical accountability is
multifarious. In the implementation of NCS, hierarchical accountability involves the teachers
(street-level bureaucrats) who are accountable to a head of department (HoD) in their school
and school principals, or what is commonly called a school management team. Teachers are
accountable for teaching, planning and assessment of learners. The mechanisms for this
include: conformity to standards and procedures; peer review; as well as tests and examination,
as with performance accountability. In hierarchical accountability the most important feature is
the subordinate/supervisor relationship. Roles are clearly defined for street-level bureaucrats,
indicating to whom they should account in the hierarchy. Figure 6.4 illustrates a simplified
structure of the South African education hierarchy.
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Figure 6.4 Simplified structure of hierarchical accountability in South African
education
Figure 6.4 shows a simplified hierarchy of accountability in South African education. In the
hierarchy of the South African education bureaucracy there are stipulated reporting procedures.
From the street – level bureaucrat (teacher / educator) up to the Minister of Basic Education,
there are levels of the subordinate/supervisor relationship within the education sector. These
can include relationships between teachers and heads of departments; principals and circuit
managers; district education managers, provincial education directors, the director - generals
and political heads (Minister of Basic Education). Both teachers and schools are held
accountable through hierarchical structures for various issues which pertain to their
responsibilities. At school level, teachers are held accountable by the school principals for the
performance of their classes and other issues relating to classes: principals/schools and their
governing bodies are accountable to their cluster, circuit and districts. Districts are accountable




Circuit/District/School Governing Body/Local Community
Principal
School Head of Department/ school management team
Street-level bureaucrats (teachers/educators)
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to provincial leadership. And education authorities in a province are then accountable to the
Minister of Basic Education.
Finally, the performance and implementation of NCS and the functioning of the DBE at
national level is subject to the scrutiny of the Portfolio Committee on Basic Education
(parliamentary committee) in the National Assembly of South Africa’s Parliament.
Information flows upwards from the teachers and principals to senior bureaucrats in the DBE
through monthly, quarterly, and annual reports: quarterly reports are on student performance,
staffing issues, expenditure and any other information which is required. Schools are subject to
DBE’s demands for additional information on an ad hoc basis.
Furthermore, the senior street-level bureaucrats have a duty to evaluate the performance of
their street-level bureaucrats and the schools in their jurisdiction. Consequently, there are
various mechanisms to ensure hierarchical accountability among the street-level bureaucrats.
Some of the tools are similar to those discussed in the previous section on performance
accountability. These include performance evaluation of individual street-level bureaucrats,
WSE and staff development. WSE in this context is a tool which is used by supervisors to
make their subordinates accountable in terms of hierarchical or bureaucratic accountability.
In order to strengthen educational accountability through evaluation, the former Minister of
Education, Grace Pandor, appointed in September 2008 a Ministerial Committee to consider
establishing a National Education Evaluation and Development Unit (NEEDU). The review
team reported that the planned NEEDU could serve a very useful purpose, if sufficiently well
staffed (OECD 2008:319). The OECD asserts that the NEEDU “might also be a useful agency
in dealing with chronically ineffective teachers. Furthermore, it would be a help in ensuring
that teachers are present – and on time – at school, and that the main focus of their work is on
teaching and learning” (OECD 2008:319). Eventually, NEEDU was established and its first
report (The State of Literacy Teaching and Learning in the Foundation Phase) was presented
to the Minister of Education in April 2013 (NEEDU, 2013).
6.4 Legal accountability
In South Africa educators are held accountable through legislative requirements and
administrative regulations. Many legislative acts and regulations have been put in place to
guide the processes of street-level bureaucrats in education. These regulations provide
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directives in terms of how educators are employed and how they should conduct their duties.
Some of the Acts intended to regulate the educators are found in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Some legislation for legal accountability in South African education
ACT/POLICY DOCUMENT FUNCTION
National Education Policy Act,
No. 27 of 1996
Provides for the determination of policy on salaries and conditions of
employment of educators
South African Schools Act No.
84, of  1996
The employment and promotion of teachers
Employment of Educators Act
No. 76 of 1998




South African Council for Educators
Performance of other work by educators
South African Council for
Educators Act, No. 31 of  2000
Defines and promotes the ethical conduct of an educator as one who upholds the
view of human rights embodied in the Constitution
Compulsory registration of educators
General And Further Education
And Training Quality Assurance
Act,  No. 58 of 2001
(Umalusi)
Monitor the suitability and adequacy of standards and qualifications
Ensure that providers adopt quality management systems for learner achievement
Assure the quality of learner assessment at exit points
Promote quality improvement among providers; and monitor and report to the
Minister on the performance of departments (General and Further Education
and Training Quality Assurance Act of 2001).
The first Act is the National Education Policy Act No 27 of 1996 (NEPA), which empowers
the Minister of Education to determine national policy according to the following:
 The ratio between educators and students [this has a direct impact on the work load of
street-level bureaucrats]
 Professional education and accreditation of educators
 Training educators
 The salaries and conditions of employment of educators.
Most of the policies listed in Table 6.1 were determined in terms of the legislative framework
of NEPA in order to regulate the work of street-level bureaucrats (NEPA, 1996).
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The South African Schools Act no. 84, of 1996 provides for the employment and promotion of
teachers. Subject to the Employment of Educators Act, the South African Schools Act
empowers a school governing body to the recommend to the head of department in the DBE
the appointment of teachers at a school.
In fostering legal accountability the Employment of Educators Act No. 76 of 1998 determines
how appointments, promotions, transfers, misconduct and discharge of educators should be
handled. Together with other policies, this policy also guides the evaluation of performance of
work carried out by street-level bureaucrats. For instance, it states that a teacher shall be guilty
of misconduct if he or she is absent from office or duty without leave or a valid reason.
In accordance with NEPA, the South African Council for Educators Act of 2000 was enacted.
This led to the establishment of South African Council for Educators (SACE). This provides a
strong pillar of legal accountability in the sense that it determines who enters the teaching
profession by registering and accrediting them. Besides, SACE also advances the professional
and ethical conduct of teachers. Subject to the Employment of Educators Act No. 76 of 1998,
“a person may not be appointed as an educator unless such person is registered or provisionally
registered with the South African Council for Educators” (DoE, 1998:13). An applicant may
not be registered if he or she does not meet the minimum requirements set by SACE. However,
in exceptional cases SACE may provide provisional registration to people who do not meet the
minimum requirements if:
 the Council has approved that the person be appointed to a teaching post on the grounds
that there are no other suitably qualified teachers available;
 the Council is of the opinion that the person will obtain the required qualification
within a reasonable time; or
 the Council is of the opinion that it is in the interests of learners at an educational
institution (SACE: online).
The General and Further Education and Training Quality Assurance Act, No 58 2001 realised
the establishment, composition and functioning of the General and Further Education and
Training Quality Assurance Council (‘Umalusi’ meaning ‘shepherd’), to provide for quality
assurance in general and further education and training, and to exercise control over norms and
standards of curriculum and assessment. Among other statutory duties, Umalusi monitors the
suitability and adequacy of standards and qualifications; and ensures that providers adopt
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quality management systems for learner achievement and assures the quality of learner
assessment at exit points. The DBE, in the Delivery Agreement for Outcome 1: Improved
Quality of Basic Education, indicates that Umalusi has a crucial role to play in ensuring that
ANA becomes a world class assessment programme (DBE, 2011a: 17).
In order to maintain the quality of qualifications for prospective teachers, the institutions
offering the qualifications must themselves be accredited. As defined in the General and
Further Education and Training Quality Assurance Act, 2001 accreditation means “the
certification of a person, a body or an institution as having the capacity to fulfil a particular
function in the quality assurance system set up by the South African Qualifications Authority
in terms of the South African Qualifications Authority Act, 1995 (Act No. 58 of 1995)”.
Umalusi has been accredited by the South African Qualifications Authority, in terms of section
5(l) (b) (i) of the South African Qualifications Authority Act, 1995 (Act No. 58 of 1995), as the
body responsible for establishing education and training standards or qualifications for general
and further education and training at education institutions.
6.5 Professional accountability
SACE is specifically charged with regulating the teaching profession (Jansen, 2005:5; SACE
ACT, 2000). The majority of the Council members are teachers (18 of the 30 members).
However, the chairperson and five members are appointed by the Minister of Education. The
Council has legislative powers to determine criteria for entry into the profession through the
process of registration of educators (Jansen, 2005:5). Its main functions are “the registration
and professional development of educators and the setting, maintenance and protection of
ethical and professional standards” (OECD, 2008:87).
In South African education, street-level bureaucrats are often held accountable by their peers as
well as by their professional body, SACE. Professional accountability systems in South
African education system are reflected in the nature of the work that affords street-level
bureaucrats a high degree of autonomy which is circumscribed by the decision-making norms
and standards which are prescribed by SACE’s code of ethics. Therefore, professional
accountability in the South African education system has both an internal form (as practised by
peers in schools and their cluster groups), and an external form (as exercised by SACE).
The internal form of professional accountability relationships in the South African education
system derives from internal sources that involve low degrees of control and high degrees of
discretion when the street-level bureaucrat in his or her classroom makes professional
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judgements with little or no close supervision. The relationships in professional accountability
are based on a high opinion of the expertise of teachers who are regarded as professionals.
The professional body, SACE, is critical to the external form of professional accountability in
South Africa as it lays down codes with standards for acceptable practice that are binding for
all street-level bureaucrats. SACE has the authority to register teachers. For a teacher to be
registered he or she he must have a minimum of a three year qualification after matriculating
[M+3 or Relative Education Qualification Value (REQV) 13]. Alternatively, he or she must
have a two-year certificate in teacher education for the pre-primary phase (M+2 or REQV12
(SACE, 2011b: online). However, unlike other professional councils for engineering,
accounting or medicine, SACE “does not regulate and quality assure the development of higher
education qualifications for professional employment” (Parker and Adler, 2005:64). In addition
to accreditation requirements, a teacher’s educational qualifications also have to be submitted
to the DBE for evaluation for employment in education (DBE, 2010d: 19). This has to be
accompanied by a certified copy of a SACE registration certificate (DBE, 2010d: 26). The
assumption is that if a street-level bureaucrat has appropriate professional qualifications then
he or she has the requisite expertise and can exercise discretion as a professional, without the
need for constant supervision.
Over and above the professional qualification requirements, an applicant for registration must
satisfy the ethical standards contained in the Code of Professional Ethics for Educators (SACE,
2011b: online). A part of the Code of Professional Ethics for Educators states that educators
who are registered or provisionally registered with the South African Council for Educators
must:
 acknowledge the noble calling of their profession to educate and train the learners of
our country;
 acknowledge that the attitude, dedication, self-discipline, ideals, training and conduct of
the teaching profession determine the quality of education in this country;
 acknowledge, uphold and promote basic human rights, as embodied in the Constitution
of South Africa;
 commit themselves therefore to do all within their power, in the exercising of their
professional duties, to act in accordance with the ideals of their profession, as expressed
in this Code; and
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 act in a proper and becoming way such that their behaviour does not bring the teaching
profession into disrepute (SACE, online).
In general, SACE’s main focus is on professionalism among educators, on the sensitivity to
unequal power relations that exist between educators, as well as between educators learners
and on a commitment to the ideals of human rights and democracy (Jansen, 2005:5). The DBE
views SACE as important in enforcing professional accountability and calls on teachers to
conform to the SACE Code of Professional Ethics and promise to:
• teach, to advance the education and the development of learners as individuals;
• develop loyalty and respect for the profession;
• be punctual, enthusiastic, well prepared for lessons, and of sober mind and body;
• improve their own knowledge and skills base to be more effective;
• provide regular information to parents on their children’s progress;
• eliminate unprofessional behaviour such as teacher-pupil relationships, drunkenness,
drug use, assault, sexual harassment and others (DBE, 2010e:39-40)
It is clear that SACE has been given an important role in promoting professional accountability
in South African education. Its role as an accreditation agency is critical for professional
accountability.
One of the activities SACE has been involved in is the Ethical and Legal Training (ELT)
Project. This project provides “training and development workshops for educators to make
them aware of both the ethical and legal issues that are significant for the implementation of
the SACE Code of Professional Ethics in schools, and various educational institutions and
centres” (SACE, online). It also has training material that can be used by schools to familiarise
educators with the legal and ethical obligations of the profession. SACE also initiated the
Ethics and Values in Education (EVE) Project. This project produced the SACE Handbook on
the Code of Professional Ethics which can sharpen teachers’ understanding of ethical issues
and can enhance their ability to act ethically by provoking debate, thinking and discussion
about ethical issues in education.
With the aim of improving professionalism in the implementation of NCS in 2011, the
Department of Basic Education and the Department of Higher Education and Training (DBE &
DoHET) marked an important milestone in South Africa with regards to the professional
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development of educators when they published the Integrated Strategic Planning Framework
for Teacher Education and Development in South Africa, 2011–2025. This came after the
realisation that the accountability mechanisms on their own will not yield quality education in
an environment where the teachers’ subject matter knowledge and pedagogical knowledge of
curriculum content are poor. The main aim of the framework is to “improve the quality of
teacher education and development in order to improve the quality of teachers and teaching”
(DBE & DoHET, 2011:4).
The Integrated Strategic Planning Framework for Teacher Education and Development in
South Africa, 2011–2025 is a 42 page document which offers a comprehensive plan on how to
improve the quality of teaching and learning. It explains the processes of identifying and
addressing the development needs of individual teachers. The plan involves self-evaluation by
educators at all levels and identifies the interventions necessary. The interventions include
discovering and addressing the immediate to medium-term systemic needs for teacher
development. (DBE & DoHET, 2011: 9-10). A system for identifying and addressing the
development needs of teachers is shown in Figure 6.5.
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Figure 6.5 A system for identifying and addressing teachers’ development needs in South Africa
(Source: DBE & DoHET, 2011:8)
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With reference to improving formal qualifications, the DBE & DoHET will offer a practice-
based Advanced Certificate in School Leadership and Management (ACE SL&M), which is
designed specifically for the South African context for selected principals, deputy principals
and heads of department in schools. A Bachelor of Education (BEd) (Honours) and Master’s
degrees, which are designed to enhance the subject advisors’ knowledge of teaching and
learning in their specialist area, as well as their ability to provide support to practising teachers
and leadership to other advisors in the system, are also indicated. It is envisaged that
competent teachers and subject advisors will be used to induct new teachers, to catalyse the
development of professional learning communities at the school and local cluster levels in their
specialisations (DBE & DoHET, 2011:10-11). Unqualified graduate teachers will be identified
and supported so that they can complete the Post Graduate Certificate in Education (PGCE)
part-time over two years (in the future, this will become an Advanced Diploma in Teaching),
while unqualified teachers will be identified and supported to complete BEd degree
programmes (either full-time or part-time) (DBE & DoHET, 2011:10-11).
Professional accountability is a critical mechanism of ensuring accountability without the need
for constant close monitoring and supervision. SACE is an important statutory body which is
involved in promoting professionalism among street-level bureaucrats through registration and
enacting professional codes of conduct for teachers. The DBE and DoHET places an emphasis
on professionalism and on the importance of staff development as a way establishing some
control over teachers.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the accountability systems used in education in terms of the analytic
framework developed in the previous chapters. Political accountability in education is largely
associated with government itself. It was shown that education has been allocated a significant
proportion of South Africa’s national budget. Out of the twelve priorities identified by
government, education is at the top. Performance accountability has taken the form of
performance evaluation as a mechanism of ensuring conformity in the implementation of NCS.
Examinations and mandated curricula are instruments of hierarchical accountability.  A
comprehensive review of different legislation in South Africa has revealed that legal
accountability is another means of controlling street-level bureaucrats. Finally, professional
accountability could be seen as a softer but effective means of controlling the work of street-
level bureaucrats in South Africa’s education system.
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After presenting in the next chapter a profile of the uMgungundlovu District and outlining the
research methods used, the chapters thereafter will investigate political, performance,
hierarchical and professional accountability in relation to street – level bureaucrats in the
District. Legal accountability was omitted from the case study because its salient features are




UMGUNGUNDLOVU DISTRICT: PROFILE AND RESEARCH METHODS
The purpose of this study is to explore the accountability mechanisms employed by
government and education management to secure and improve accountability among street-
level bureaucrats who are involved in the implementation of the National Curriculum
Statements. The government in general, and national and provincial departments of education
in particular, and other statutory bodies, as well as the schools themselves, employ a variety of
accountability mechanisms to this end. The research now turns to detailed investigation of
these accountability mechanisms in uMgungundlovu District. But before doing so, the specific
context and research methods need to be outlined.
7.1 Study site
uMgungundlovu District is found in Kwazulu-Natal province (KZN) in the eastern part of
South Africa (see Figure 7.1). It includes the provincial capital city of KZN, Pietermaritzburg,
which is the second largest city in the province and the fifth largest in South Africa.
uMgungundlovu District has 547 schools. About 179 (both public and independent schools)
of these are secondary schools which are also known as high schools. There are approximately
7458 teachers (for both primary and high schools) and 225 081 learners in 502 public schools
and 1108 teachers and 14 679 learners in 45 independent schools (KZN DoE, 2011:2).
uMgungundlovu District has a total of 239 760 learners (8.44% of the provincial total), 8 566
teachers (9.12% of the province) and 547 primary and secondary schools (8.85% of the
provincial total) (KZN DoE, 2011:3). The average teacher / learner ratio in the district is 1:29
which is slightly below the provincial average of 1:29.7. uMgungundlovu District has the
highest number of public schools (84) with less than 100 learners.
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Figure 7.1 Map of uMgungundlovu District in context





The pass rate in the National Senior Certificate in uMgungundlovu District has improved
slowly since 2009. In 2009 the pass rate was 66.68%, followed by 75.86% in 2010 and then
72.27% in 2011. The District was ranked third in the province in terms of the pass rate in 2011.
The District has a few schools which are among the best performers in the country, but there
are many that continue to have poor pass rates. The average performance of schools in
uMgungundlovu District in 2011 was 71%, with the lowest performing schools obtaining a
pass rate of 11.8% among their learners, while the best achieved 100%.
7.2 Population, sampling, data collection methods and analysis
This study used data from multiple sources, that is, from documents, interviews, questionnaires
and observation as well as secondary sources. The official documents used in this study include
those from government, DBE, Umalusi and SACE.
The total population for this study was all the practising high school teachers and school
principals in uMgungundlovu Education District. According to the EMIS 2010 there were
approximately 3240 high school teachers in the District. For feasibility purposes, the
researcher chose a sample of 100 teachers which was based on non-probability purposive
sampling which is also known as ‘judgment sampling’ (Abrahams, 2011:538). Although the
purposive sample was deemed perfect for this study, “it does not pretend to represent the
wider population” (Cohen, Manion and Morison, 2005:104). This limitation hinders the
generalisation of the findings to the whole population. A total of 15 schools were
conveniently selected. Three were from former Mode C schools, 3 from independent schools
and 9 from public townships schools. Although this was not accurately proportion the
numbers were determined by the need to be so. After a pilot test, a questionnaire was
distributed to teachers in order to obtain information and gain their perceptions of various
accountability mechanisms (see the questionnaire in Appendix
Face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted with the six principals of the schools
where the teachers who participated in the questionnaire were located. The interviews lasted
forty-five minutes to one hour. The interviews served two main purposes. Firstly, the
interviews sought to understand the mechanisms of accountability associated with the
implementation of the NCS. Secondly, the interviews also elicited the views of school
principals on the effectiveness of the mechanisms employed by the government in securing
132
accountability among street-level bureaucrats (see Appendix Two). The researcher took notes,
and recorded the interviews when permission was granted.
In order to augment the other methods, observation and was also used in the course of
attending several cluster workshops and seminars which had been organised by the KZN DoE
and uMalusi between March 2011 and December 2012. Detailed notes of issues pertaining to
accountability were taken.
The main form of data analysis was content analysis. Data recorded and coded from
interviews will be transcribed before analysis. Thematic content analysis was used to analyse
responses to the open ended comments in the interview schedule. The analysis of this
transcribed data was based on pattern matching logic, which ‘compares an empirically-based
pattern with a predicted one’ (Yin, 2003:116). The ‘predicted pattern’ comprised findings
from the previous studies, together with the theoretical framework (Bergen and While,
2005:4). Put another way, findings from other studies at times were used to compare results.
The responses from the closed questions in the interview schedule for the educators were
analysed quantitatively, using SPSS Windows. Frequency tables and bar graphs were used to
present summary statistics. The Chi-Square tests were used to test the effect of accountability
mechanisms and the level of accountability. Cross tabulation were used to explore
relationships in the data.
To ensure construct validity the researcher used multiple sources of evidence (triangulation)
during the data collection stage. The researcher gave some participants draft reports for
verification.  The study used pattern and explanation building during the data analysis stage
to ensure internal validity. External validity was enhanced through the use of theories
outlined in the theoretical framework (Bickman and Rog, 1998: xiii)
7.3 uMgungundlovu education district in context
This section presents information on the educators, followed by a description of the schools in
which they teach.
7.3.1 Biographical data of the educators in uMgungundlovu District.
Data for a total 3 250 high school educators (ordinary public and independent schools) in 2010
was collected on uMgungundlovu District by the researcher from the Education Management
Information System (EMIS). These educators are located in 21 wards. Figure 7.2 shows the
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racial composition of the educators in uMgungundlovu District. About 60.4% (1930) of the
educators are female.
Figure 7.2 Racial composition of high school teachers in uMgungundlovu District
(Source: based on uMgungundlovu EMIS 2010)
The majority (74%) of teachers in uMgungundlovu District are African while Coloured and
Indian educators are 9% each. The White teachers constitute 8% of the teachers in the District.
Although Africans are present in all the wards, the same cannot be said about the other races. A
majority of Indian educators (51%) are found in the ward of Cumberwood while Africans
constitute 19.4%.  Cumberwood, Msunduzi South, Midlands East and Midlands North wards
have 89.3% of all the white teachers. These wards are predominantly areas that were reserved
for Whites under apartheid.
The average age of all the street-level bureaucrats is 40.9 years with a standard deviation of 10
years. The lower age quartile is 33 while the topmost quartile is 48 years. The oldest educator
was 71 years old (EMIS 2010).
In terms of teaching experience the average was 14.5 years with a standard deviation of 9.9
years. Figure 7.3 shows teaching experience according to race.
134
Figure 7.3 uMgungundlovu District: high school educators’ teaching experience
according to race
(Source: based on EMIS 2010)
This data seem to suggest that the average teaching experience of the African teachers is
around 14 years less than any other race. However, there are a few outliers who have more than
40 years of teaching experience. Whites, on the other hand, seem to have the highest average
number of years (20) of teaching experience.
Most of the street-level bureaucrats (83.4%) are employed by the provincial Department of
Education. The school governing boards (SGBs) as a whole employ 14.2%, while 0.7 % of the
educators were voluntary. The majority of the street-level bureaucrats (80.5%) are employed
on a permanent basis, 16.4% full – time on a temporary basis and 1.5% are part-time. There
was information missing on 1.7% of teachers. The majority of street-level bureaucrats (92.4%)
who are employed by the SGBs are in the independent schools. Over and above the teachers
who are employed by government, the public school governing bodies may employ additional
teachers whom they pay themselves from school fees levied. This is common for relatively
wealth schools. Also, independent schools pay their teachers from their own resources.
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Furthermore, the schools in which these educators teach are generally identified in terms of
public township schools, public former Model C schools and independent schools. Township
schools which are found in residential areas outside the Central Business District were a
product of racial segregation. They are often under-resourced in terms of infrastructure and
human resources. They mostly cater for learners from low income families. Some of them are
No Fee schools, where as explained before, learners do not pay fees in order to attend them.
Other schools in township charge relatively low fees. The teachers’ salaries are paid by the
KZN DoE.
The former Model C schools are previously schools for white learners which are often found in
the suburbs (Bloch, 2009:141). They often cater for learners from middle income families and
charge fees accordingly. They are also known as Section 21 schools.4 They have better
facilities and physical infrastructure compared to township schools. Bloch notes that these
schools are “well - organised, focused and able to draw on experienced teachers” (2009:141).
Their teachers’ salaries are paid by KZN DoE. They also employ their own teachers over and
above those paid by the government whose salaries are paid by a school’s governing body.
Independent schools are not reliant on government in order to run their school business
although they do receive state subsidy. Some of them have been established for profit while
others are faith based. Some of these schools are well resourced as compared to the public
township schools. However, others have few resources.
Characteristics of teachers
In terms of human resources, most secondary schools depend on the teachers allocated by the
Post Provisioning Norm (PPN) [this determines the maximum number of educators a public
school can have] which is based on the teacher/learner ratio (1:30). All such teachers are
employed by the KZN DoE. EMIS data for 2010 indicates that all the schools in quintile five
employ more teachers than those provided for by PPN, who are hired by the SGBs. Most
schools in quintiles three to five had more teachers than those determined by PPN.
There is some racial disparity between educators in uMgungundlovu District in terms of their
level of education. Figure 7.4 indicates this. In Figure 7.4 zero represents no qualification; one
– Certificate; two – Diploma; three – Bachelor’s Degree; and four – graduate qualification.
4 These are schools that are permitted to raise funds and manage their own finances.
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Figure 7.4 uMgungundlovu District: qualifications of teachers according to race.
(Source: based on EMIS 2010)
Most of the African teachers are at level one. Their White counterparts are at higher levels.
Most Indian and Coloured teachers are at level two in terms of qualifications. This shows that
most African teachers are the least qualified of all the teachers. The qualification level of street
– level bureaucrats is important in determining potential for professional discretion that can be
exercised by street-level bureaucrats in implementing NCS.
About 63.1% of all educators use Information and Computer Technology (ICT). Table 7.1
which is based on EMIS data in 2010 shows ICT usage by race in uMgungundlovu District.
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Table 7.1 ICT usage by educators in uMgungundlovu District
N = 3193 ICT usage
TotalYes No
Race African 1328 1018 2346
56.6% 43.4% 100.0%
65.9% 86.5% 73.5%
White 222 48 270
82.2% 17.8% 100.0%
11.0% 4.1% 8.5%
Indian 240 50 290
82.8% 17.2% 100.0%
11.9% 4.2% 9.1%
Coloured 226 61 287
78.7% 21.3% 100.0%
11.2% 5.2% 9.0%
Total 2016 1177 3193
63.1% 36.9% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
(Source: based on EMIS 2010)
Table 7.1 shows that 65.9% of African teachers use ICT, compared to 78.75 of the Coloureds,
82.2% of Indians and 82.2 % of the Whites. But the disparity is even wider in absolute terms in
the schools, since Africans constitute 73.5% of all the teachers in the District.
7.3.2 Information about the schools in uMgungundlovu District
Data for all 178 (147 public and 31 independent) high schools in uMgungundlovu District in
2010 were collected by the researcher. These included 34 combined schools5 which enrol
learners from Grade R to Grade 12. About 80.9% of the schools are secondary only while
19.1% are combined. Most (64.7%) of the combined schools are public. The rural areas have
44.1% of the combined schools while the remaining schools are in the urban areas. The
majority of schools in both urban (79.3%) and rural (83.1%) areas serve high school learners
only. Only 38.7% of the independent schools are for both primary and secondary learners. The
majority (82%) of the schools are public schools while the remainder 17.4% are independent.
Table 7.2 shows the distribution of secondary schools in uMgungundlovu District according to
type, and whether they are located in an urban or a rural area.
5 Combined schools which cater for both primary and secondary school learners.
138
















(Source: based on EMIS 2010)
A substantial majority (90.3%) of independent schools is found in the urban areas while 9.7%
is in the rural areas. A very small proportion (3.4%) of the rural schools is independent while
96.6% are public schools.   In urban areas independent schools constitute 31.5% while 68.5%
are public. Table 7.2 shows that the number of secondary schools in the rural areas and urban
area is equal, that is 89 in each area.
As mentioned earlier, schools are ranked into five economic classes known as quintiles. These
quintiles determine the poverty level of a school with quintile one being the poorest and
quintile five being the least poor. The socio – economic status of a community where a school
is located is used to determine its quintile. Figure 7.5 shows the distribution of schools in
uMgungundlovu District according to quintiles. Data for 31 schools were missing.
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Figure 7.5 uMgungundlovu District: distribution of schools according to quintile
(Source: based on EMIS 2010)
Of the 147 schools, 5.6% were in quintile one while 11.2% of the schools were in quintile five.
The majority (46%) of the schools were in quintile three. Almost all (90%) of the schools in
quintile one are in the rural areas. About 32% of the schools are in quintile five and all of them
are in the urban areas.
The majority of the schools (72.8%) are beneficiaries of the National School Nutrition
Programme (NSNP). 2010 EMIS data indicate that most of the schools receiving nutrition
programmes are those in the lower quintiles. Because of such poverty the provincial
Department of Education plans to declare most of these schools as No fee schools, which is
meant to enable even poor children to attend school.
Facilities for learning in the schools
The learning facilities in the schools are not uniformly distributed. For instance, only 57% of
all the schools have at least one media centre. One school has five media centres and five
schools have two media centres each. About 65.7 % of all the schools with a media centre are
in the urban areas and most (79.4%) of the schools with media centres are public.
A large proportion (44.4%) of schools does not have computer rooms. Rural schools which
constitute 50% of all the high schools in uMgungundlovu comprise 36.4% of schools with
computer rooms. About 7.3% of schools have at least two computer rooms while one school
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has more than five computer rooms. Independent schools which constitute 17.4% of all the
high schools make up 19.2% of all the schools with computer rooms.
Laboratories are also nonexistent in about 47.8% of the secondary schools in uMgungundlovu
District. Rural schools make up 31.2% of the schools with laboratories. There are a few
schools (2.4%) with at least 10 laboratories each while one school has 19. Although
independent schools constitute 17.4% of all the secondary schools, they have 20.4% of the
laboratories. Quintile five schools which make up 20% of the high schools have 25.7% of all
the laboratories.
The data seem to indicate that most schools (81.5%) have staff rooms while 7.9% of the
schools have more than one staff room. Most (57.1%) of the schools without staff rooms are in
quintile two and most (57.9%) are in rural areas.
This brief portrait of uMgungundlovu District indicates that the legacy of apartheid is still very
evident which is characterised by racial inequality, especially in rural areas.
Profile of learners
According to EMIS 2010, uMgungundlovu District had about 97 000 learners in Grades 8 – 12
in all schools. Of these, about 20 000 were in Grade 8, 20 000 in Grade 9, 22 900 in Grade 10,
19 900 in Grade 11, and 14 000 in Grade 12. About 51% of all these learners are in schools
that are classified as rural. 92.6% are in public schools and 7.4% in independent schools.
Conclusion
uMgungundlovu District is heterogeneous in that it has some of the best performing schools as
well as some of the worst performing ones. Its secondary schools are in both urban and rural
areas. There are many ways of looking at these schools.  They could be classified as urban or
rural. They can also be classified into township schools, public Model C schools and
independent schools. Townships schools often have fewer resources and facilities than Model
C schools. A majority of such schools are in lower quintiles which reflect their low socio –
economic status.   Model C schools are found mainly in the suburbs. As beneficiaries of the
education system under apartheid, they remain well resourced in terms of learning facilities
and physical infrastructure. As Section 21 schools, they are also allowed to raise and manage
their funds. Independent schools, on the other hand, are privately owned and depend on fees
they levy on learners as their main source of revenue. They cater for a wide range of learners
from different socio – economic backgrounds.
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Teachers from former Model C schools tend to be more experienced and better qualified than
those from other types of schools. A majority of these are White teachers. Most teachers in
township schools are African. Many are less qualified than their White, Coloured and Indian
counterparts. Most teachers in uMgungundlovu District are African; most are located in
schools in rural areas.
Fifteen years or so since the universal right to education and basic equality were enshrined in
the South African Constitution and enacted in subsequent legislation, the legacy of educational
apartheid is still experienced by learners, teachers and schools in uMgungundlovu District. The




UMGUNGUNDLOVU DISTRICT: POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN
IMPLEMENTING EDUCATIONAL POLICY
The following four chapters investigate the accountability mechanisms pertaining to street –
level bureaucrats in education in uMgungundlovu District. This chapter will focus on political
accountability in implementing the NCS which is based on the data collected from the
questionnaires and interviews. It will investigate the respondents’ perceptions of political
accountability in financing education, in supporting the less privileged schools and learners, in
policy formulation and in implementation. The responses from teachers and principals will be
coded in order to preserve their anonymity. Thus Tr2 indicates teacher 2, Prl4 is principal 4
and so on.
8.1 Political accountability: financing education
The street-level bureaucrats were asked to rate the effectiveness of government in financing
education. Financing education is a broad term. It includes financing all aspects of education.
Some respondents expressed satisfaction in terms of the money allocated for education but
bemoaned how it has been used. The following are some of the respondents’ views on the
effectiveness of the government in financing education.
We hear there is a lot of money for education but it’s not coming. Not in terms of finance,
there is a great need to increase financial support (Tr43).
No. There is little money coming. In my school we don’t have computer rooms. Our
learners pass matric without the knowledge of using a computer. I wonder how they cope
in tertiary institutions (Tr31).
Some schools still do not have the necessary infrastructure like toilets and classrooms.
Only No Fee schools get the government attention, they focus mostly on what they term
‘under-performing’ schools. There is no help for parents who can’t afford school fees. In
No Fee paying schools text books always arrive late so quality learning is delayed
(Tr71).
It is apparent that some respondents acknowledge that the government is allocating large sums
of money to education but they are not receiving it. For instance, Tr43 points out that
substantial money is given to education each year but there is very little to show for this in the
schools. Tr31 and Tr71 do not believe that the government is doing enough in terms of
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supplying the schools with necessary facilities and equipment needed for teaching and
learning.
Educators in all types of schools, former Model C schools, public schools in townships, urban
and rural schools, complained about the resources they receive in order to run their schools. As
a result, most respondents said that the government was not effective in financing education.
Figure 8.1 shows the perceptions of educators on the effectiveness of government to finance
education.
Figure 8.1 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of teachers of government’s
effectiveness in financing education
Figure 8.1 shows that a very small proportion of respondents in uMgungundlovu District
(15%) think that the government is effective in financing education. Only 5% of the
respondents said the government was very effective in financing this. On the other hand 25%
of the respondents indicated that the government was ‘not effective at all’ while 27% said that
it was ‘not effective’. Further analysis indicates that the perceptions of respondents may be
based on the type of school where they taught, which is shown in Table 8.1.
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Table 8.1 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of teachers of government’s effectiveness














3 4 8 10 0 0 25
% in Type of school
12.00% 16.00% 32.00% 40.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
% in Financing




15 16 9 4 3 1 48
% in Type of school
31.30% 33.30% 18.80% 8.30% 6.30% 2.10% 100.00%
% in Financing




7 7 10 1 2 0 27
% in Type of school
25.90% 25.90% 37.00% 3.70% 7.40% 0.00% 100.00%
% in Financing
education 28.00% 25.90% 37.00% 6.70% 40.00% 0.00% 27.00%
Total N
25 27 27 15 5 1 100
% in Type of school
25.00% 27.00% 27.00% 15.00% 5.00% 1.00% 100.00%
% in Financing
education 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 8.1 indicates that 40% of respondents in independent schools in uMgungundlovu District
said that the government was ‘effective’ in financing education although they obtain most of
their revenue from fees paid by the learners. Respondents from independent schools constitute
66.7% of those who said the government was effective. Perhaps this is due to the fact that they
are not as reliant on substantial support from government.
A majority in the former Model C schools expressed dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of
the government in financing education. They also constitute the highest percentage (60%) of
those who indicated that government was ‘not effective at all’ and 59.3% of those who
suggested the government was ‘not effective’.  The views of former Model C schools
respondents were also echoed by those in ordinary public schools in townships.
About 25.9% of the respondents from public schools in the townships said that government
was ‘not effective at all’ while another 25.9% said that the government was ‘not effective’ in
financing education.
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Expenditure by Department of Education in KwaZulu - Natal
Data on financial support at district level could not be found. The purpose of showing how
government is allocating financial resources on education is to suggest how the government
attempts to be politically responsive to the needs of the citizens.
The KZN Department of Education’s expenditure on different sectors of education is shown in
Figure 8.2. Public ordinary school education received the biggest share (85%) of the amount
allocated for education. Early Childhood Development, Special Functions, Adult Basic
Education and Training (ABET) and independent schools received a small portion (5%) of the
budget.
Figure 8.2 KwaZulu – Natal: financial allocation for different education sectors
2011/2012
Source: Adapted from KZN DoE, 2011:47
Figure 8.3 reveals how the money allocated to public ordinary school education is divided into
different sectors. Most of the money was allocated to public primary schools (55.7%) with
39.33% for public secondary schools. It can be assumed that the differences in allocation to
primary and secondary schools are a result of the distribution of learners and by extension the
number of schools at each level. The National Nutrition Programme received 3.32% of all the
finances allocated to the public ordinary school education.
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Figure 8.3 Allocation by KZN DoE to different sectors of public ordinary school
education in   2011/12
Source: Adapted from KZN DoE, 2011:47
The KZN provincial government is attempting to fulfil its mandate as well as trying to gain the
trust of the citizens through financing education. It is allocating large sums of money to
education. Although appreciating the money allocated to education, the street – level
bureaucrats who are implementing the NCS feel that the government is not effective enough in
financing education.
8.2 Political accountability: supporting less privileged schools
The government has introduced a range of policies that are meant to support the less privileged
schools. Figure 8.4 shows the respondents’ perception of the level of political accountability of
government in supporting these.
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Figure 8.4 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of educators of government’s
effectiveness in supporting the less privileged schools
Figure 8.4 shows that 32 % of the respondents believed that the government had not been
effective in supporting the less privileged schools, whereas 24% indicated that it had been ‘not
effective at all’. A small proportion (12%) of the respondents said that the government was
‘effective’ while a tiny fraction (3%) said the government was ‘very effective’. Some 28%
could not say whether the government had been effective or not.
Further analysis of the perceptions of respondents of government’ support for less privileged
schools revealed that their responses differ according to the type of school. Table 8.2 shows the
respondents’ perceptions according to the type of school in which they taught.
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Table 8.2 uMgungundlovu District: government’s support for less privileged schools,
according to respondent’s type of school
Type of school









Independent 2 9 7 7 0 0 25
8.0% 36.0% 28.0% 28.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
8.3% 28.1% 25.0% 58.3% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0%
Public: former
model C
15 15 10 4 3 1 48
31.3% 31.3% 20.8% 8.3% 6.3% 2.1% 100.0%
62.5% 46.9% 35.7% 33.3% 100.0% 100.0% 48.0%
Public: township 7 8 11 1 0 0 27
25.9% 29.6% 40.7% 3.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
29.2% 25.0% 39.3% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 27.0%
24 32 28 12 3 1 100
24.0% 32.0% 28.0% 12.0% 3.0% 1.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 8.2 indicates that while 28% of teachers in independent schools said that government had
been ‘effective’ in addressing the needs of the less privileged schools, they were in the
majority (58.3%) of all educators who took such a view. The largest proportion (36%) of the
respondents in independent schools said the government had not been ‘effective’ while 8% said
it had ‘not been effective at all’.
The majority of respondents in former Model C schools did not believe that the government
was doing enough in supporting the less privileged schools. About 31.3% said it was ‘not
effective at all’ while another 31.3% said it was ‘not effective’. The respondents from former
Model C formed the majority (62.5%) of those who thought that the government was ‘not
effective at all’ in supporting the less privileged schools. All the respondents (6.3%) who said
the government had been ‘very effective’ were from former model C schools.
A small majority (40.7%) of those in ordinary public schools in townships noted that
government’s effectiveness was ‘neutral’ [average]. However, many [a total of 55.5%] of them
did not think the government was effective in supporting less privileged schools. 25.9% of the
respondents from the public township schools indicated that the government had ‘not been
effective at all’. They make up 29.2% of those who said the government was not effective at
all.
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Further analysis shows that there was no relationship between the type of school and the
respondents’ perception of government’s support for the less privileged schools. An
insignificant chi-square test (p = 0.053) showed that the association is a result of chance as
shown in Table 8.4.
Table 8.3 Chi-square test
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 18.139 10 .053
8.3 Political accountability: supporting less privileged learners
The respondents were asked to rate the government in terms of supporting less privileged
learners. This question was more complex than the previous one about ‘less privileged
schools’, because in some cases, less privileged learners in the fee paying schools may find it
difficult to pay the fees, to have decent meals or to have transport to and from school.
Table 8.4 uMgungundlovu District: respondents’ perceptions of government’s
effectiveness in supporting the less privileged learners, according to type of school
Type of school
Supporting less privileged learners
Total
Not effective
at all Not effective Neutral Effective Very effective No opinion
Independent 3 6 7 9 0 0 25
12.0% 24.0% 28.0% 36.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
14.3% 17.1% 26.9% 69.2% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0%
Public: former
model C
14 16 10 3 3 2 48
29.2% 33.3% 20.8% 6.3% 6.3% 4.2% 100.0%
66.7% 45.7% 38.5% 23.1% 100.0% 100.0% 48.0%
Public: township 4 13 9 1 0 0 27
14.8% 48.1% 33.3% 3.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
19.0% 37.1% 34.6% 7.7% 0.0% 0.0% 27.0%
Total
21 35 26 13 3 2 100
21.0% 35.0% 26.0% 13.0% 3.0% 2.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 8.4 shows that 21% of all the respondents believed that the government is ‘not effective
at all’ in supporting the less privileged learners while 35% said that the government was ‘not
effective’. A total of 16% [13% and 3%] was satisfied with the support given to less privileged
learners. Further analysis shows that 29.2% of all former Model C school respondents said that
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the government was ‘not effective at all’ in supporting less privileged learners. At the same
time, the respondents from former Model C schools constituted 66.7% of all those who said the
government was ‘not effective at all’ in supporting the less privileged learners.
The majority (48.1%) of respondents in the ordinary public schools in townships thought that
the government was ‘not effective’ in supporting less privileged learners. They also constituted
37.1% of those who believed that the government was ‘not effective’ and 19% of those who
said the government was ‘not effective at all’ in supporting less privileged learners.
36% of respondents from independent schools indicated that the government was ‘effective’ in
supporting the less privileged learners. Furthermore, the majority (69.2%) of all the
respondents who noted that the government was ‘effective’ in supporting the less privileged
learners were from independent schools.
The information given in Table 8.4 is also supported by data collected from the interviews.
Some teachers commented as follows:
No. The government is not effective. Poverty stricken learners are still suffering! (Tr32).
Government is not doing enough for the less privileged. The poor will remain poor (Tr28).
There is no help for parents who can’t afford school fees. In No Fee paying schools textbooks
always arrive late so quality learning is delayed (Tr71).
I don’t think they are supporting the less privileged learners. The government is giving more
money to basic education - where is that money going? I don’t know. They are cutting down on
subsidies; they are cutting down all over (Prl1).
On paper it’s happening. In practice it is not happening, because there are a lot of poor people
who are denied access to schools because they can’t pay the fees. It’s a good theoretical thing
but there are a lot of people who are unable to pay fees. Even in No Fee paying schools very
often the quality of education is very poor. Although these schools do not charge fees, they
start charging for other things (Prl1).
There are some schools which are fee paying schools but because of the structures of the
government people can join the school and then basically ask for full reduction of the fees and
they qualify for it. I feel that nobody should qualify for it. If they choose to come to this school,
which is a fee paying school, they should pay something but the government doesn’t have that
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philosophy. The government does not subsidise non fee paying learners. This leaves the school
in financial problems (Prl3).
The differences in perception in terms of all type of schools is statistically significant as
confirmed by a chi-square test (p = 0.005). This shows that the variation cannot be attributed to
a chance occurrence. Table 8.5 shows that the relationship between the type of school where a
respondent taught and the perception of government’s political accountability in supporting the
less privileged learners is statistically significant.





Pearson Chi-Square 25.373 10 .005
It is apparent that the government is helping the less privileged learners and schools. A
substantial number of schools has been classified as No Fee. However, the quality of education
in these schools may not be good, as principal 1 said. Furthermore, as principal 1 pointed out,
even though the No Fee schools do not levy fees, they charge learners for other things. As a
result the less privileged learner may remain deprived.
In terms of supporting the less privileged learners, the government introduced a nutrition
programme, as was reported earlier. Table 8.6 which is based on data from EMIS 2010 shows
that the majority (60.1%) of the high schools in uMgungundlovu District are served by the
nutrition programme.















Source: Based on EMIS 2010
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Schools that are classified as rural are the major beneficiaries of the nutrition programme.
They constitute 77.6% of all the schools on the nutrition programme. The majority (93.3%) of
rural schools have a nutrition programme. Schools that are classified as urban constitute a
mere 22.4% of all the schools that are benefiting from the nutrition programme. Furthermore,
91.5% of the schools that have not received the nutrition programme are classified as urban. It
can be argued that, by serving 61.1% of secondary schools in UMgungundlovu District, the
government has tried to accommodate the less privileged learners.
Another area in which the government is assisting the less privileged learners is transport.
Because of the geographical distribution of high schools in uMgungundlovu District, not all
learners have a high school nearby. In that regard, there are plans to assist such learners. In its
performance plans 2011/2012, the KZN DoE “has been providing learner transport to certain
areas where children experience difficulties in getting to nearby schools” in the province which
include uMgungundlovu District (KZN DoE, 2011:34). However, the actual number of
learners benefiting from the learner transport programme for uMgungundlovu could not be
ascertained.
The government has exercised political accountability by supporting the less privileged
learners and schools, as well as by introducing a nutrition programme for those in need as well
as planning to introduce transport. Such measures are evident in uMgungundlovu District, but
the overall sense from teachers and principals is that such efforts to date have not been
adequate. The next section investigates the perception of respondents in uMgungundlovu
District of government’s effectiveness in formulating educational policy.
8.4 Political accountability: policy formulation
In order to gain and maintain the trust of citizens governments formulate policies that are
aimed at delivering services such as education. Respondents were asked to give their views on
the effectiveness of the government in formulating relevant educational policies for South
Africa. The results are presented in Figure 8.5.
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Figure 8.5 uMgungundlovu District: respondents’ perceptions of the effectiveness of
government in formulating educational policies
About 28% of respondents said that the government was ‘not effective’ and another percentage
14% indicated that the government was ‘not effective at all’ in formulating educational
policies. About 34.7% were neutral. 19% of the respondents noted that the government was
‘effective’ while 2% believed that the government was very effective in formulating
educational policies. As indicated earlier, some respondents pointed out that such policies were
‘good on paper’ which may also be taken to mean that the policies are well formulated. Some
teachers had the following to say about educational policy in South Africa.
I think government is trying. They are definitely spending a lot of money on education but the
education system they are using is not right for our context (Prl5).
No. The policies are not good.  With the advent of OBE and its rigidity as a system ... teachers
felt disempowered and often lost confidence in themselves. The administration was onerous
and time consuming leaving less time for more important activities like lesson preparation.
(Tr36)
No, some policies are not working in SA. (Tr22).
The government is forever changing goal posts, we are never consulted (Tr24).
It is not enough. The government must stop changing the curriculum now and then (Tr17).
I think the department needs to make up their minds and stick to it. Changes cause stress and
confusion to teachers (Tr16).
154
Yes, the government is doing well but they must stop giving new policies every day. They
should make sure that all schools have learning materials and facilities (Tr54).
The issues raised by respondents included policy stability, policy effectiveness and policy
relevance. Most of these respondents were dissatisfied with the educational policies
themselves, especially the pace of change. Table 8.7 shows the perceptions of respondents
based on their race.
Table 8.7 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of respondents of government’s









3 16 21 14 1 0 55
5.50% 29.10% 38.20% 25.50% 1.80% 0.00% 100.00%
21.40% 59.30% 61.80% 73.70% 50.00% 0.00% 56.10%
White
6 6 5 2 0 1 20
30.00% 30.00% 25.00% 10.00% 0.00% 5.00% 100.00%
42.90% 22.20% 14.70% 10.50% 0.00% 50.00% 20.40%
Indian
5 4 6 2 1 1 19
26.30% 21.10% 31.60% 10.50% 5.30% 5.30% 100.00%
35.70% 14.80% 17.60% 10.50% 50.00% 50.00% 19.40%
Coloured
0 1 2 1 0 0 4
0.00% 25.00% 50.00% 25.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
0.00% 3.70% 5.90% 5.30% 0.00% 0.00% 4.10%
14 27 34 19 2 2 98
14.30% 27.60% 34.70% 19.40% 2.00% 2.00% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 8.7 indicates that a large percentage (42.9%) of those who said the government was ‘not
effective at all’ in formulating educational policies were White respondents.  On the other
hand, 73.7% of those who indicated that the government was ‘effective’ were African
respondents. About 26.3% of the Indian respondents believed that the government was ‘not
effective at all’ in formulating educational policies while 50% of the coloured respondents
thought that the effectiveness of government in formulating educational policy was neutral
[average].  The responses given here seem to suggest that the racial background of street-level
bureaucrats is related to their perception of government’s effectiveness in educational policy
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formulation but a chi-square test (p =0.279) shows that the association is not statistically
significant.
8.5 Political accountability: implementing educational policies
How effective has government been in implementing policies on education, as opposed to
formulating them? The results appear in Figure 8.6.
Figure 8.6 uMgungundlovu District: the perceptions of respondents of government
effectiveness in implementing educational policies
The results indicate that the government has not been very effective in implementing
educational policies. A small percentage (15%) of the respondents asserted that the government
has ‘not [been] effective at all’ in implementing educational policies. 26% of the respondents
said the government is just ‘not effective’ while 27% said the government has been neutral in
the area of educational policy. Only a small percentage (7%) of respondents thought that the
government was very effective in implementing the policy, but 23% indicated that it had been
effective.
One teacher said that: on paper it works but lacks implementation at cluster and school level
(Tr18).
With regard to implementation, other teachers asserted that:
The government is trying, however, more needs to be done in terms of implementing education
policies (Tr54).
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The government is not effective at all because there many things which are insufficient in our
school but government does nothing (Tr38).
No. Too much under SADTU [South African Democratic Teachers’ Union] and
implementation is hampered by cadre deployment (Tr34).
Policies are all in place but there is a no implementation thereof. There is not enough
accountability in some schools and in the Department of Education. Some schools do not have
telephones and it is difficult to communicate. There is a shortage of qualified teachers in many
schools (Tr71).
A largely negative response arose from the interviews on matters of policy implementation.
Yet the findings from the questionnaire were mixed, with 4% overall expressing some
dissatisfaction, while 27% had a neutral view, and 30% thought that government had been
effective to some degree. In order to analyse this further, the perceptions of the respondents
was calculated according to their educational qualification.
Table 8.8 uMgungundlovu District: respondents’ perception of government’s
effectiveness in policy implementation according to educational qualification
Respondent’s level of qualification
Implementing the education policies
Total
Not effective





N 0 0 3 0 0 0 3
% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.0%
Teacher Certificate
N 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
% 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 4.3% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0%
Diploma
N 4 9 4 5 2 0 24
% 26.7% 34.6% 14.8% 21.7% 28.6% 0.0% 24.0%
Bachelor  Degree
N 11 8 10 9 4 2 44
% 73.3% 30.8% 37.0% 39.1% 57.1% 100.0% 44.0%
Honours’ Degree
N 0 7 8 8 1 0 24
% 0.0% 26.9% 29.6% 34.8% 14.3% 0.0% 24.0%
Masters’ Degree
N 0 2 1 0 0 0 3
% 0.0% 7.7% 3.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.0%
Total
N 15 26 27 23 7 2 100
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 8.8 shows that 73.3% of those who said the government was ‘not effective at all’ in
implementing educational policies hold a Bachelor’s degree as their highest qualification.
Respondents with a Master’s degree constituted 7.7% of those who said the government was
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not effective. Those who hold a teacher certificate comprised 4.3% of those who said that
government was effective in implementing educational policy. It seems as though the degree of
satisfaction with government’s performance in policy implementation depended on the level of
qualification of respondents. The higher the qualification the respondent has, the lower the
level of contentment. However, a chi-square test (p = 0.269) seems to suggest that this is a
chance occurrence.
Conclusion
The chapter has offered a comprehensive presentation and analysis of the views of street - level
bureaucrats’ on government’s political accountability in implementing the educational policies
in uMgungundlovu District by examining government’s financing of education, how
government supports less privileged learners and schools, as well as the formulation and
implementation of policies in education.
On financing education, the government has allocated a large portion of the national budget to
education but the respondents in uMgungundlovu District expressed dissatisfaction with the
resources they have received in the schools. The sentiments were generally similar across
different types of schools.
The exercise of political accountability by government in terms of supporting the less
privileged learners in schools in uMgungundlovu District was evident. The government
classified some schools as No Fee schools and introduced nutrition programmes in most of the
schools in the lower quintiles. There are also plans to introduce transport programmes for all
learners who reside in areas that are far from schools. However, the respondents in
uMgungundlovu District indicated that the government was still not doing enough to support
the less privileged schools and learners.
In exercising political accountability, the government formulated educational policies to be
implemented in all districts. Some respondents in uMgungundlovu District indicated that the
policies were good and that the government had been effective in designing them. But other
respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which the policies are made and the
pace at which they are changed.  There were differences in the views of respondents from
different racial and educational backgrounds on the effectiveness of government in formulating
educational policies. However, these differences were not statistically significant.
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Very few respondents in uMgungundlovu District affirmed the effectiveness of government in
implementing educational policies. Most respondents, especially those who were interviewed,
said that the policies themselves were inadequate, nor had government been effective in
implementing them.




UMGUNGUNDLOVU DISTRICT: PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY IN
IMPLEMENTING THE NCS
The second objective of the study is to survey the external accountability mechanisms used by
the government through the Department of Basic Education (DBE) to secure accountability
among the street-level bureaucrats (teachers) and to improve performance in the
implementation of NCS policy. It was found that the Department uses a number of strategies to
make schools and educators accountable. Performance accountability in uMgungundlovu
District involves scrutinising the actions of street-level bureaucrats who are implementing the
NCS in relation to the outputs and accomplishment of objectives.
This chapter will investigate performance evaluation as a principal method of ensuring
performance accountability. The main tool used in measuring and evaluating the performance
of street-level bureaucrats in uMgungundlovu District, namely, IQMS, will be discussed with
respect to various items that are listed on the composite score sheet for performance evaluation.
Performance Agreements (PA) must be signed by educators at the beginning of the year and be
reviewed quarterly until evaluation is completed. Quarterly reports must be kept in an
individual’s file and be made available whenever they are required. The chapter will end with a
discussion on the perceived effects of performance evaluation in ensuring performance
accountability by teachers in implementing the NCS.
9.1 uMgungundlovu District: the perceived importance of different aspects of the
performance evaluation score sheet
The respondents were asked to rate the different items listed on the composite score sheet of
performance evaluation in terms of their significance when evaluating the performance of a
street-level bureaucrat in implementing NCS. These items are: learner assessment and
achievement; teacher attendance and punctuality; planning, administration and lesson delivery;
co-curricular activities; human relations and contribution to school development; creation of a
positive learning environment; and knowledge of curriculum content; and professional
development. The respondents were asked to rank the importance of each item. The ratings
were 1 (not important at all), 2 (slightly important), 3 (somewhat important), 4 (important) and
5 (very important).  The next sub-section will focus on all these items, discussing each item in
turn.
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9.1.1 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of learner achievement for
performance evaluation
One of the most important aspects of performance evaluation is learner achievement in
assessments. Figure 9.1 shows the perceptions of respondents in relation to this.
Figure 9.1 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of learner achievement in
assessments
Figure 9.1 shows that about 23% of respondents indicated that performance evaluation based
on learner achievement in assessments is ‘important’. The majority (55%) indicated that this
means of assessment is ‘very important’ in performance evaluation. A very small group (4%)
said performance evaluation is ‘not important at all’ and a fairly large proportion (15%) said
learner achievement in assessment is ‘somewhat’ important.  The information in Table 9.1
indicates that most of the respondents affirm that learner achievement in assessments is a
significant component of performance evaluation. Table 9.1 analyses the respondents’
perceptions according to the type of school in which they taught.
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Table 9.1 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of learner achievement in










Independent 1 1 5 7 11 25
4.0% 4.0% 20.0% 28.0% 44.0% 100.0%
25.0% 33.3% 33.3% 30.4% 20.0% 25.0%
Public former Model C
School
2 2 7 9 28 48
4.2% 4.2% 14.6% 18.8% 58.3% 100.0%
50.0% 66.7% 46.7% 39.1% 50.9% 48.0%
Public township 1 0 3 7 16 27
3.7% 0.0% 11.1% 25.9% 59.3% 100.0%
25.0% 0.0% 20.0% 30.4% 29.1% 27.0%
Total 4 3 15 23 55 100
4.0% 3.0% 15.0% 23.0% 55.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 9.1 indicates that 44% of respondents in independent schools said that learner
achievement in assessments is very important for performance evaluation; 28% rated this as
‘important’ and 20% believed this to be ‘somewhat important’. A very small minority (4%)
thought that this consideration is either ‘slightly important’ or ‘not important at all’.  Note,
though, that those who rated assessment as ‘very important’ constituted 20% of the total of
number of teachers in all types of schools.
The majority (58.3%) of respondents in public former Model C schools said that learner
achievement is ‘very important’ in performance evaluation; they were also the majority
(50.9%) of all respondents who took such a standpoint. About 18.8% of the respondents in
former Model C schools indicated that learner achievement in assessment is ‘important’ in
performance evaluation and they constituted 39.1% of all respondents who held such a view. A
small proportion (14.6%) in former Model C schools believed that learner achievement in
assessments is ‘somewhat important’ in performance evaluation. They were a large proportion
(46.7%) of all the respondents who took that position. In the ‘not important at all’ and ‘slightly
important’ categories there was 4.2% in each.
The highest proportion (59.3%) of those who believed that learner achievement in assessment
is ‘very important’ in performance evaluation was from the respondents in public township
schools, although they comprise a small proportion (29.1%) of all the respondents who took
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such a view. Furthermore, 25.9% of all the respondents in public township schools believed
that learner achievement in assessments is ‘important’. Another 11% of such respondents rated
this as ‘somewhat important’ in performance evaluation, which was 20% of all respondents
who made the same judgement. Only one respondent (3.7%) in a public township school
believed that learner achievement for performance evaluation is ‘not important at all’.
The information in Table 9.2 seems to suggest that there is little variation in the perceptions of
respondents according to type of school. This is confirmed by a chi-square test which shows
that the variations are not statistically significant (p = 0.914) as shown in Table 9.2. It is
therefore clear that the type of school had no influence on the perception of street-level
bureaucrats on the importance of learner assessment in performance evaluation.
Table 9.2 Chi-square test
Value
Degree of
freedom Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
3.300a 8 .914
9.1.2 uMgungundlovu District: Attendance of teachers and punctuality
Teacher attendance and punctuality are the second item of performance evaluation of street-
level bureaucrats implementing NCS in uMgungundlovu District. Figure 9.2 shows the
perceptions of respondents on the importance of this.
163
Figure 9.2 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of teacher attendance and
punctuality as a means of performance evaluation
Figure 9.2 shows that the majority (51%) of all the respondents believed that teacher
attendance and punctuality are ‘very important’ while 23% of the respondents said they are
‘important’. It suggests that 74% of the respondents affirmed that the punctuality and
attendance of teachers are crucial in performance evaluation of street-level bureaucrats. About
16% of the respondents said that teacher attendance and punctuality are ‘somewhat important’,
while 7% and 3% of the respondents believed that teacher attendance and punctuality are
‘slightly important’ and ‘not important at all’ respectively. Generally, one can say that most
respondents acknowledged the importance of teacher punctuality and attendance in
performance evaluation.
Further analysis shows that the perceptions of respondents from different schools are not the
same as Table 9.3 reveals.
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Table 9.3 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of teacher attendance and











Independent 0 3 3 5 14 25
0.0% 12.0% 12.0% 20.0% 56.0% 100.0%
0.0% 42.9% 18.8% 21.7% 27.5% 25.0%
Public former model C 3 4 7 12 22 48
6.3% 8.3% 14.6% 25.0% 45.8% 100.0%
100.0% 57.1% 43.8% 52.2% 43.1% 48.0%
Public township 0 0 6 6 15 27
0.0% 0.0% 22.2% 22.2% 55.6% 100.0%
0.0% 0.0% 37.5% 26.1% 29.4% 27.0%
Total 3 7 16 23 51 100
3.0% 7.0% 16.0% 23.0% 51.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 9.3 shows that the majority (56%) of respondents in independent schools believed that
teacher attendance and punctuality are ‘very important’ in performance evaluation. They
constituted a small proportion (27.5%) of all respondents who believed as much. 20% of all the
respondents in independent schools believed that teacher attendance and punctuality are
‘important’ in performance evaluation, 21.7% of all the respondents who made the same rating.
18% of those suggested that teacher attendance and punctuality are ‘somewhat important’ in
performance evaluation, 12% of the total who indicated as such. Although only 12% of
respondents in independent schools indicated that teacher attendance and punctuality are
‘slightly important’, they were a large percentage (42.9%) of all the respondents who took such
a view.
A significant proportion (45.8%) of all the respondents in former Model C schools who
believed that teacher attendance and punctuality for performance evaluation are ‘very
important’, were a large proportion (43.1%) of those who held such an opinion. The biggest
proportion (52.2%) rated teacher attendance and punctuality as ‘important’ but they were a
small fraction (25%) of all the respondents from such schools. About 14.6% of all the
respondents from former Model C schools indicated that teacher punctuality and attendance are
‘somewhat important’ in performance evaluation, a small percentage (8.3%) of all respondents
who thought so. Although only 6.3% of all the respondents in former Model C schools said
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that teacher attendance and punctuality is ‘not important at all’ in performance evaluation, they
constituted 100% of all respondents who believed as much.
A substantial majority (55.6%) of respondents in public schools in townships indicated that
teacher attendance and punctuality are ‘very important’ in performance evaluation but they
constituted a small fraction (29.4%) of all respondents who indicated this.  22.2% of all the
respondents in public schools in townships believed that teacher attendance and punctuality are
‘important’ in performance evaluation, 26.1% of all respondents who took such a position. It
can be inferred that all the respondents from public schools in townships affirmed that teacher
punctuality and attendance are significant factors in performance evaluation.
Table 9.3 seems to suggest that the perceptions of street-level bureaucrats are associated with
the type of school in which they teach. However, statistical analysis dispels this view, given the
results of chi-square test (p = 0.454). This means that any such association is based on chance.
Table 9.4 Chi-square test
Value Degree of freedom
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 7.790 8 .454
9.1.3 The importance of planning administration and lesson delivery in performance
evaluation
The third item of performance evaluation of educators in uMgungundlovu district is planning,
administration and lesson delivery. Figure 9.3 shows the perceptions of respondents in relation
to this.
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Figure 9.3 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of planning, administration
and lesson delivery for performance evaluation
A substantial majority (56%) of all the respondents believed that planning, administration and
lesson delivery are ‘very important’ in performance evaluation, about 22% of all the
respondents rated this as ‘important’ and 18% as ‘somewhat important’. Only 3% of all the
respondents rated this item as ‘slightly important’ while 1% believed it is ‘not important at all’.
Generally, Figure 9.3 shows that most respondents confirmed the significance of planning,
administration and lesson delivery in the performance evaluation of street-level bureaucrats’
work.
In order to see any association between such perceptions of respondents and the type of school
in which they teach the two variables were cross tabulated. Table 9.5 shows the results.
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Table 9.5 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of planning, administration as







important Important Very important Total
Independent 1 1 3 7 13 25
4.0% 4.0% 12.0% 28.0% 52.0% 100.0%
100.0% 33.3% 16.7% 31.8% 23.2% 25.0%
Public former
Model C
0 1 9 10 28 48
0.0% 2.1% 18.8% 20.8% 58.3% 100.0%
0.0% 33.3% 50.0% 45.5% 50.0% 48.0%
Public township 0 1 6 5 15 27
0.0% 3.7% 22.2% 18.5% 55.6% 100.0%
0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 22.7% 26.8% 27.0%
Total 1 3 18 22 56 100
1.0% 3.0% 18.0% 22.0% 56.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 9.5 shows that the majority (52%) of respondents in independent schools said that
planning, administration and lesson delivery are ‘very important’ in performance evaluation
and they constituted a small percentage (23.2%) of all the respondents who took such a
position. 31.8% from independent schools indicated that this item is ‘important’ in
performance evaluation, 28% of all respondents from such schools, 12% rated this as
‘somewhat important’ in performance evaluation; 4% indicated that it is either ‘slightly
important’ or ‘not all important’.
About 58.3% of all the respondents in public former Model C schools (50% of all such
respondents) indicated that planning, administration and lesson delivery are ‘very important’ in
performance evaluation. 20.8% believed that this item is ‘important’, (45.5% of all respondents
who took such a view), 18.8% regarded it as ‘somewhat important’ (50% of the entire sample),
whereas only 2.1% (only one teacher) viewed this as ‘slightly important’.
Table 9.5 shows that the majority (55.6%) of respondents from public schools in townships
constituted a small proportion (26.8%) of all the respondents who indicated that planning,
administration and lesson delivery are ‘very important’ for performance evaluation. 18.5% of
respondents in public schools in townships rated this as ‘important’ (22.7% of the sample) and
22% viewed the item as ‘slightly important’ (33% of all such respondents).
No one thought that planning, administration and lesson delivery are not important for
performance evaluation. The responses seem to be fairly similar across all types of schools.
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This is confirmed by a chi-square test (p = 0.784). It is generally apparent that planning,
administration and lesson delivery were regarded as crucial elements of performance
evaluation of street-level bureaucrats implementing NCS in uMgungundlovu District.
9.1.4 The importance of co-curricular activities in performance evaluation
Involvement in co-curricular activities is considered to be an important part of a teacher’s job
description. To this end, it is also listed on the composite score sheet of performance evaluation
in uMgungundlovu District. What are the perceptions of street-level bureaucrats of the
importance of co-curricular activities in performance evaluation? Figure 9.4 presents the
responses.
Figure 9.4 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the importance of co-curricular
activities in the performance evaluation
Figure 9.4 shows that a small majority (35%) of respondents said that co-curricular activities
are ‘very important’ in performance evaluation, 26% said they are ‘important’, while 25% said
they are ‘somewhat important’. A small proportion (11%) indicated that they are ‘slightly
important’. Only 3% of all the respondents thought that co-curricular activities are ‘not
important at all’.  As compared to other items of the composite score sheet discussed earlier, it
seems as though less value is attached to co-curricular activities for purposes of performance
evaluation as shown by the relatively small proportion (35%) of respondents who thought that
contributing to co-curricular activities are ‘very important’ for evaluating their performance.
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The findings seemed to suggest that there was an association between perceptions of
respondents on the importance of curricular activities and the type of schools in which they
taught. See Table 9.6.
Table 9.6 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of co-curricular activities as











Independent 1 5 8 6 5 25
4.0% 20.0% 32.0% 24.0% 20.0% 100.0%
33.3% 45.5% 32.0% 23.1% 14.3% 25.0%
Public former Model C 1 4 7 13 23 48
2.1% 8.3% 14.6% 27.1% 47.9% 100.0%
33.3% 36.4% 28.0% 50.0% 65.7% 48.0%
Public township 1 2 10 7 7 27
3.7% 7.4% 37.0% 25.9% 25.9% 100.0%
33.3% 18.2% 40.0% 26.9% 20.0% 27.0%
Total 3 11 25 26 35 100
3.0% 11.0% 25.0% 26.0% 35.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 9.6 shows that 20% of respondents from independent schools (14.3% of all such
respondents), indicated that co-curricular activities are ‘very important’ in performance
evaluation, 24% that they are ‘important’ (23.1% of all such respondents), and 32% that they
are ‘somewhat important’ (45.5% of all such respondents). Only 4% (33.3% of all respondents)
of respondents from independent schools thought that co-curricular activities are ‘not important
at all’ in their performance evaluation.
The highest proportion (47.9%) of respondents who indicated that co-curricular activities were
‘very important’ in performance evaluation was in the former Model C public schools and they
also constituted 65.7% of all respondents who took such a viewpoint. 27.1% in these schools
rated this item as ‘important’ (50% of the sample who did so), whereas a small fraction (8.3%)
thought that co-curricular activities are ‘slightly important’ for performance evaluation (18.2%
of all respondents who had the same view).
The proportion of respondents from former public schools in townships who felt that co-
curricular activities were ‘very important’ for performance evaluation was 25.9%, which was
the lowest of all types of schools. Another 25.9% indicated that this criterion is ‘important’ for
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performance evaluation and 37% that it is ‘somewhat important’ (40% of all the respondents
who held such a view).
The information in Table 9.6 seems to suggest that there is an association between the
perceptions of teachers about the importance of co-curricular activities in performance
evaluation and the type of schools in which they are located. Respondents from former Model
C schools seemed to place greater value on co-curricular activities than respondents from
public township schools.  However, a chi-square test showed that this was not statistically
significant (p = 0.177).
9.1.5 The importance of human relations and contribution to school development in
performance evaluation
Street-level bureaucrats in uMgungundlovu District are expected to maintain good human
relations and contribute to the development of the schools in which they teach. This is a fifth
item on the composite score sheet of performance evaluation. Respondents were asked to rank
the importance of this item for their performance evaluation. The findings are presented in
Figure 9.5.
Figure 9.5 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of human relations and
contributing to school as a means of performance evaluation
Figure 9.5 shows that a small majority (40%) of all the respondents said that human relations
and contributing to the development of their school is ‘very important’ in assessing their
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performance while 27% said it is ‘important’. About 22% suggested that this item is
‘somewhat important’, 8% that it is ‘slightly important’ while 2% believed it is ‘not important
at all’. The perceptions were then analysed according to the type of school where a teacher was
based. The results appear in Table 9.7.
Table 9.7 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of human relations and













1 5 8 6 5 25
4.0% 20.0% 32.0% 24.0% 20.0% 100.0%
33.3% 45.5% 32.0% 23.1% 14.3% 25.0%
Public former model
C
1 4 7 13 23 48
2.1% 8.3% 14.6% 27.1% 47.9% 100.0%
33.3% 36.4% 28.0% 50.0% 65.7% 48.0%
Public township
1 2 10 7 7 27
3.7% 7.4% 37.0% 25.9% 25.9% 100.0%
33.3% 18.2% 40.0% 26.9% 20.0% 27.0%
Total
3 11 25 26 35 100
3.0% 11.0% 25.0% 26.0% 35.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 9.7 shows that 20% of all the respondents from independent schools said that human
relations and contributing to school development were ‘very important’ in performance
evaluation (a small proportion (20%) of all respondents who took such a view), 24% indicated
that this is ‘important’ (23.1% of all such respondents) and 20% that this is ‘slightly important’
(45.5% of all such respondents).
Table 9.7 shows that respondents from former Model C schools seem to give more value to
human relations and to contributing to school development than any other type of school, with
47.9% of their respondents constituting 65.7% of all the respondents who suggested that this is
‘very important’. Furthermore, 27.1% of their respondents were 50% of all respondents who
felt that this criterion is ‘important’. About 14.6% indicated that it is ‘somewhat important’
(28% of who took such a view). Only one teacher dismissed the importance of this item
altogether.
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Table 9.7 shows that 25.9% of respondents in public township schools constituted 20% of all
respondents who believed that human relations and contributing to school development were
‘very important’ in their performance evaluation. A further 25.9% rated this item as
‘important’ (26.9% overall), and 37% as ‘somewhat important’ (40% of all such respondents).
Three teachers took a lesser view of the significance of such criteria for their performance
evaluation.
It is clear that teachers in all types of school attach at least some importance to human relations
and to contributing to school development as a means of performance evaluation. Although
respondents from former Model C schools seem to attach more value to this than any type of
school, a chi-square showed that the association was not statistically significant (p = 0.177).
9.1.6 The importance creation of a positive learning environment for performance
evaluation
Street-level bureaucrats are not only expected to make learning happen in their classes, but
they were also expected to create a positive learning environment in them. They were given
scores on the composite score sheet for performance evaluation according to how they do so.
Figure 9.6 shows the perception of respondents of this item for their performance evaluation.
Figure 9.6 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of creating of a positive
learning environment as a means of performance evaluation
173
Figure 9.6 shows that a small majority (47%) of the respondents said that creation of a positive
learning environment is ‘very important’ in the performance evaluation of street-level
bureaucrats while 25% indicated that it is ‘important’. 20% that it is ‘somewhat important’ and
6% that it is ‘slightly important’. It can be inferred that 72% of the respondents highlighted the
importance of the creation of a positive learning environment in performance evaluation. Did
these views depend on the types of schools concerned? Table 9.8 presents these findings.
Table 9.8 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of creating a positive learning










important No opinion Total
Independent
0 4 7 6 8 0 25
0.0% 16.0% 28.0% 24.0% 32.0% 0.0% 100.0%
0.0% 66.7% 35.0% 24.0% 17.0% 0.0% 25.0%
Public former
model C
1 1 8 13 24 1 48
2.1% 2.1% 16.7% 27.1% 50.0% 2.1% 100.0%
100.0% 16.7% 40.0% 52.0% 51.1% 100.0% 48.0%
Public township
0 1 5 6 15 0 27
0.0% 3.7% 18.5% 22.2% 55.6% 0.0% 100.0%
0.0% 16.7% 25.0% 24.0% 31.9% 0.0% 27.0%
Total
1 6 20 25 47 1 100
1.0% 6.0% 20.0% 25.0% 47.0% 1.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 9.8 shows that 32% of the respondents in independent schools (17% of all such
respondents) indicated that the creation of a positive learning environment is ‘very important’
in evaluating the performance of street-level bureaucrats who are implementing NCS. 24%
believed that this is ‘important’ (24% as well of all such responses). Thus 56% rated this item
as at least important. 28% of respondents from independent schools formed 35% of all the
respondents who thought that the creation of a positive learning environment is ‘somewhat
important’ in performance evaluation. Only 16% believed it is ‘slightly important’, which was
66.7% of all respondents who had such a view.
The majority (50%) of respondents from former Model C schools also formed the majority
(51%) of all respondents who believed that creating a positive learning environment is ‘very
important’ in the performance evaluation of street-level bureaucrats. A small percentage
(21.7%) of respondents from these schools constituted a majority (52%) of all respondents who
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thought that this factor is ‘important’. This means that a total of 77.1% of respondents from
former Model C schools identified the importance of creating a positive learning environment.
16.7% of respondents in former model C schools noted that this is ‘somewhat important’ with
only one teacher suggesting that it is ‘slightly important’ and another that it is unimportant.
Table 9.8 shows that the majority (55.6%) of respondents in public schools in townships
indicated that the creation of a positive learning environment is ‘very important’ for
performance evaluation while 22.2% suggested that it is ‘important’. Thus 77.8% rated the
importance of this item. 18.5% of respondents from public schools in townships (25% of all
such respondents) felt that the creation of a positive learning environment is ‘somewhat
important’.
The creation of a learning environment was found to be important in all types of schools with
47% of the total indicating that it is ‘very important’ and 25% that it is ‘important’. Table 9.6
shows that there is no big variation in perceptions between types of school, although schools in
the townships had the highest proportion of respondents in the ‘very important’ category.
9.1.7 The perceived importance of knowledge of curriculum content in performance
evaluation
On the composite score sheet for the performance evaluation of street-level bureaucrats
knowledge of the curriculum content is listed as a further (sixth) item where street-level
bureaucrats can score points. Knowledge of curriculum content describes the street-level
bureaucrat’s knowledge and mastery of the subject(s) he or she teaches. Figure 9.7 shows the
perceptions of respondents of the importance of knowledge of curriculum content for their
performance evaluation.
175
Figure 9.7 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of knowledge of curriculum
content  for performance evaluation
Figure 9.7 shows that the majority (56%) of respondents indicated that knowledge of
curriculum content is a ‘very important’ component of performance evaluation. About 20%
and 18% of the respondents said it is ‘important’ and ‘somewhat important’ respectively. A
very small proportion of respondents rated this lower with 3% saying it is ‘not important at all’
and 2% that it is ‘slightly important’.
The type of schools where respondents taught seemed to have an influence on their perceptions
about the importance of knowledge of curriculum content for performance evaluation. Table
9.9 portrays these results.
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Table 9.9 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of knowledge of curriculum
content in performance evaluation, according to type of school







Important Very important No opinion Total
Independent
1 2 6 3 13 0 25
4.0% 8.0% 24.0% 12.0% 52.0% 0.0% 100.0%
33.3% 100.0% 33.3% 15.0% 23.2% 0.0% 25.0%
Public former
model C
1 0 8 10 28 1 48
2.1% 0.0% 16.7% 20.8% 58.3% 2.1% 100.0%
33.3% 0.0% 44.4% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 48.0%
Public township
1 0 4 7 15 0 27
3.7% 0.0% 14.8% 25.9% 55.6% 0.0% 100.0%
33.3% 0.0% 22.2% 35.0% 26.8% 0.0% 27.0%
Total
3 2 18 20 56 1 100
3.0% 2.0% 18.0% 20.0% 56.0% 1.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 9.9 reveals that 52% of respondents from the independent schools (23% of all such
respondents) indicated that knowledge of curriculum content is ‘very important’ in their
performance. 12% thought that it is ‘important’ (15% of all respondents who took such a
standpoint).  This means that 67%% of respondents from independent schools identified the
significant importance of knowledge of curriculum content in performance evaluation. Only
12% thought that this is ‘somewhat important’ while 24% believed that it was ‘slightly
important’.
58.3% of all respondents from former Model C schools constituted the biggest proportion
(50%) of respondents who felt that knowledge of curriculum content is ‘very important’ in
performance evaluation. 20.8% thought that this is ‘important’. Only one respondent (2.1%)
believed this item is ‘not important at all’ for performance evaluation.
Table 9.9 shows that 55.6% of the respondents from public schools in townships constituted
26.8% of all respondents who said knowledge of curriculum content is ‘very important’ in their
performance evaluation. 25.9% in these schools (35% of all such respondents) rated this as
‘important’, 14.8% as ‘somewhat important’, while 3.7% indicated that it is ‘not important at
all’.
A chi-square test showed that there was no significant difference between respondents from
different type of schools (p = 0.490). However, this test revealed that there was an association
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between respondents’ perception of the importance of knowledge of curriculum content
relation to their highest educational qualification (p = 0.009) (see Table 9.10).
Table 9.10 Chi-square test
Value degree of freedom Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 44.874 25 .009
9.1.8 The perceived importance of professional development in performance evaluation
The number and type of exercises in professional development that a street-level bureaucrat
attends in a year are the final item for performance evaluation. Respondents were asked to rank
the importance of this for their performance evaluation. This is indicated in Figure 9.8.
Figure 9.8 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of professional development
for performance evaluation.
A small majority (45%) of respondents said that they considered professional development to
be a ‘very important’ component of performance evaluation, 27% indicated that it is
‘important’, while 22% thought that it is ‘somewhat important’, and 4% that it is ‘slightly
important’. only 2% felt that it is ‘not important at all’.
An analysis of the responses according to type of school where teachers were located revealed
no significant differences. See Table 9.11.
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Table 9.11 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the importance professional








Important Very important Total
Independent
1 2 6 7 9 25
4.0% 8.0% 24.0% 28.0% 36.0% 100.0%
50.0% 50.0% 27.3% 25.9% 20.0% 25.0%
Public former Model
C
0 2 9 12 25 48
0.0% 4.2% 18.8% 25.0% 52.1% 100.0%
0.0% 50.0% 40.9% 44.4% 55.6% 48.0%
Public township
1 0 7 8 11 27
3.7% 0.0% 25.9% 29.6% 40.7% 100.0%
50.0% 0.0% 31.8% 29.6% 24.4% 27.0%
Total
2 4 22 27 45 100
2.0% 4.0% 22.0% 27.0% 45.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
36% of the respondents from independent schools (20% of all such respondents) rated
professional development as ‘very important’ for their performance evaluation. 28% (25.9% of
all such respondents) regarded this factor as ‘important’. Thus 64% of the respondents in
independent schools suggested the significant importance of professional development in their
performance evaluation of educators. Only 8% of the respondents from independent schools
indicated that professional development is ‘slightly important’ while 4% that it is ‘not
important at all’.
Former Model C schools had the highest proportion (52.1%) of respondents who believed that
professional development is ‘very important’ which also constituted the majority (55.6%) of all
respondents who took such a viewpoint. 25% of respondents in these schools (44.4% of all
such respondents) regarded professional development as ‘important’ in performance
evaluation, 18.8% that it is ‘somewhat important’ and 4.2% that it is ‘slightly important’. In
sum 77.1% of these teachers indicated that professional development is at least an important
consideration in their performance evaluation.
Table 9.11 shows that 40.7% of respondents from public schools in townships (24.4% of all
such respondents) suggested that professional development is ‘very important’ for performance
evaluation, and 29.6% that it is ‘important’ (29.6% of respondents who took such a view). This
brought to 70.3% the total proportion of respondents who identified the importance of
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professional development for performance evaluation. 25.9% of these respondents rated
professional development as ‘slightly important’ for performance evaluation.
The information in Table 9.11 shows that there is no association between the perceptions of
respondents of the importance of professional development and the type of school where they
teach. This is confirmed by a chi-square test (p = 0.67) which shows that any such association
is insignificant.
This section has outlined the perceptions of respondents of the importance of different items on
the composite score sheet which is used to evaluate the performance of street-level bureaucrats
implementing the NCS in uMgungundlovu District. An attempt was made to compare the
perceptions of respondents according to different types of schools. Generally, no statistically
significant variation emerged. The next section will focus on the purposes of performance
evaluation as perceived by street-level bureaucrats.
9.2 uMgungundlovu District: Purpose of performance evaluation
What is the purpose of performance evaluation? Some educators in uMgungundlovu District
argue that its main purpose is to evaluate best teaching practice while others see it as a way of
learning. Some view performance evaluation as a means of rewarding high performers and
punishing the street – level bureaucrats who do not perform to expected standards. This section
will investigate the perceptions of educators relating to the purpose of performance evaluation.
9.2.1 Evaluation as the main purpose of performance evaluation
Many street – level bureaucrats in schools believe that the main purpose of performance
evaluation is to evaluate their work. Figure 9.9 shows their opinions.
180
Figure 9.9 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of performance evaluation as a purpose
of evaluation
Most (54%) of the respondents suggested that the main purpose of performance evaluation is to
evaluate their performance ‘all the time’.  19% thought this is so ‘sometimes’ while 23% rated
this as ‘almost never’. Only a small fraction (4%) said that the purpose of performance
evaluation is ‘never’ to evaluate their work. In order to analyse this further, the perceptions of
respondents were calculated according to the types of schools in which they taught.
Table 9.12 uMgungundlovu District: perception of performance evaluation as a means







time All the time
Independent
2 8 4 11 25
8.0% 32.0% 16.0% 44.0% 100.0%
50.0% 34.8% 21.1% 20.4% 25.0%
Public former Model C
2 12 9 25 48
4.2% 25.0% 18.8% 52.1% 100.0%
50.0% 52.2% 47.4% 46.3% 48.0%
Public township
0 3 6 18 27
0.0% 11.1% 22.2% 66.7% 100.0%
0.0% 13.0% 31.6% 33.3% 27.0%
Total
4 23 19 54 100
4.0% 23.0% 19.0% 54.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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Table 9.12 shows that 44% of all the respondents from independent schools indicated that the
purpose of performance evaluation is to evaluate their performance ‘all the time’. However,
they comprise a small proportion (20.4%) of all the respondents who took such a view. 16% in
independent schools believed that evaluation ‘almost all the time’ measures their performance
and 32% indicated that this is sometimes the case. Only 8% of respondents from independent
schools suggested that that the main purpose of performance evaluation is ‘almost never’ to
evaluate (the majority (50%) of all respondents).
A majority (52.1%) of respondents from former Model C schools thought that performance
evaluation is aimed at evaluating street – level bureaucrats (46.3% of all such respondents),
25% that this is so ‘sometimes’ (52.2% of all such respondents) and 4.2% that it is ‘almost
never’.
A large proportion (66.7%) of respondents from township schools said that the purpose of
performance evaluation is to evaluate their work ‘all the time’ (33.3% of all such respondents).
A further 22.2% thought that this is the case ‘almost all the time’ (31.6% of all such
responses), and 11.1% that this is so ‘sometimes’ (13% of who held such a view).
In some cases, after an evaluation, lessons are learnt and methods are improved. The next
section investigates learning as the main purpose of performance evaluation.
9.2.2 Learning as the main purpose of performance evaluation
In order to make a comprehensive analysis, the perceptions of respondents were calculated
according to the types of schools in which they teach, as shown in Table 9.13.
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Table 9.13 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of learning as the purpose of
performance evaluation, according to type of school
Type of school
To learn
TotalNever Almost never Sometimes
Almost all the
time All the time
Independent
3 3 5 8 6 25
12.0% 12.0% 20.0% 32.0% 24.0% 100.0%
100.0% 75.0% 18.5% 38.1% 13.3% 25.0%
Public former
Model C
0 1 13 6 28 48
0.0% 2.1% 27.1% 12.5% 58.3% 100.0%
0.0% 25.0% 48.1% 28.6% 62.2% 48.0%
Public township
0 0 9 7 11 27
0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 25.9% 40.7% 100.0%
0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 24.4% 27.0%
Total (overall
results)
3 4 27 21 45 100
3.0% 4.0% 27.0% 21.0% 45.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
It is apparent that that a small majority (45%) of all the respondents affirmed that the main
purpose of performance evaluation ‘all the time’ is to learn, that this is so ‘almost all the time’
for 21.%, and ‘sometimes’ for 27%. 4% thought that learning is ‘almost never’ the purpose of
performance evaluation and 3% that it ‘never’ is.
Independent schools had the smallest proportion (13.3%) of all the respondents who said the
purpose of performance evaluation ‘all the time’ is to learn. 12% of respondents from these
schools formed a substantial majority (75%) of those who said it is ‘almost never’ the case that
the main purpose of performance evaluation is to learn. The 12% of respondents from
independent schools formed 100% of all who indicated that the purpose of performance
evaluation is ‘never’ to learn.
A majority (58.3%) of respondents from former Model C schools were a substantial majority
of all respondents (62.2%) who believed that the purpose of performance evaluation ‘all the
time’ is to learn. About 12.5% of respondents from former Model C schools said that ‘almost
all the time’ the purpose of performance evaluation is to learn (28.6% of all the respondents
who took such a view), and 27.1% that it is so ‘sometimes’. Only 2.1% of respondents from
former Model C schools thought that learning is ‘almost never’ the purpose of performance
evaluation, although this constituted 25% of all such respondents.
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A small majority (40.7%) of all the respondents from public township schools said that the
purpose of performance evaluation ‘all the time’ is to learn, but they constituted a small
fraction (24.4%) of all the respondents who took such a view. For 25.9% learning as the
purpose of performance evaluation is the purpose ‘almost all the time’ and ‘sometimes’ for
33.3%. There was no one from these schools who indicated that the purpose of performance
evaluation is ‘almost never’ or ‘never’ to learn.
The findings suggest that there is a close association between the respondents’ perceptions of
learning as the main purpose of performance evaluation and the type of school in which they
teach. It seems as though most respondents from independent schools did not see improving
their teaching as the main purpose of performance evaluation. This association is confirmed by
a chi – square test (p = 0.003) which shows that this is not a chance variation.
Table 9.14 Chi-Square Tests
Value df Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 23.235a 8 .003
9.2.3 Rewarding high performers as main purpose of performance evaluation
Table 9.15 illustrates the opinions of teachers on rewarding high performers as the main
purpose of performance evaluation.
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Table 9.15 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of rewarding high performers as the
purpose of performance evaluation, according to type of school
Type of school
To reward high performers
TotalNever Almost never Sometimes
Almost all
the time All the time
Independent
9 8 3 1 4 25
36.0% 32.0% 12.0% 4.0% 16.0% 100.0%
47.4% 53.3% 12.5% 11.1% 12.1% 25.0%
Public former
Model C
7 5 14 4 18 48
14.6% 10.4% 29.2% 8.3% 37.5% 100.0%
36.8% 33.3% 58.3% 44.4% 54.5% 48.0%
Public township
3 2 7 4 11 27
11.1% 7.4% 25.9% 14.8% 40.7% 100.0%
15.8% 13.3% 29.2% 44.4% 33.3% 27.0%
Total
19 15 24 9 33 100
19.0% 15.0% 24.0% 9.0% 33.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 9.15 shows that a small majority (33%) of respondents indicated that the main purpose
of performance evaluation in uMgungundlovu District ‘all the time’ is in order to reward high
performers, this is so ‘sometimes’ for 24% and that for a significantly high proportion 19%
performance evaluation is ‘never’ used to reward high performers. In order to gain a deeper
understanding, the perceptions of the respondents were calculated according to the types of
schools in which they teach.
A small majority (36%) of respondents from independent schools who said that performance
evaluation is ‘never’ used in order to reward high performers also constituted the largest
percentage (47.4%) of all the respondents who indicated as much.  Another fairly large
proportion (32%) from independent schools comprised 53.3% of all the respondents who
suggested that performance evaluation is ‘almost never’ used to reward high performers. Only
16% of the respondents from independent schools said that ‘all the time’ performance
evaluation is used to reward high performers. On the other hand, 12% in these schools believed
that performance evaluation is a means of rewarding achievers ‘sometimes’, 4% ‘almost all the
time’ and 16% ‘all the time’.
Unlike in independent schools, a small majority (37.5%) of respondents from former Model C
schools who said that performance evaluation is used ‘all the time’ to reward high performers
also constituted the majority (54.5%) of all such respondents. Furthermore, 8.3% from former
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Model C schools (44.4% of all such respondents) thought that ‘almost all the time’
performance evaluation is used to reward high performers 29.2%, ‘sometimes’, but 10.4%
‘almost never’ and 14.6% ‘never’.
A large proportion (40.7%) of respondents from township public schools indicated that
performance evaluation is used ‘all the time ‘to reward high performers, while another 14.8%
said that this is so ‘almost all the time’ (44.4% of all such respondents) and 29.2% that this
happens ‘sometimes’. For 7.4% performance evaluation ‘almost never’ serves this purpose,
and ‘never’ for 11.1%.
The findings reveal that perceptions of the purpose of performance evaluation are dependent on
the type of schools in which teaching happens. Most respondents from independent schools did
not affirm the use of performance evaluation in rewarding street – level bureaucrats who
perform well. A chi – square test (p = 0.018) confirms this.
Table 9.16 Chi-Square Tests
Value df Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 18.489 8 .018
9.2.4 Punishing low performers as main purpose of performance evaluation
Table 9.17 portrays the perceptions of punishing teachers who do not perform in terms of
expected outcomes.
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Table 9.17 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of punishing low performers as the
purpose of performance evaluation, according to type of school





the time All the time No opinion
Independent
11 7 5 1 1 0 25
44.0% 28.0% 20.0% 4.0% 4.0% 0.0% 100.0%
23.9% 38.9% 26.3% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% 25.3%
Public former
Model C
24 8 9 3 3 1 48
50.0% 16.7% 18.8% 6.3% 6.3% 2.1% 100.0%
52.2% 44.4% 47.4% 60.0% 30.0% 100.0% 48.5%
Public township
11 3 5 1 6 0 26
42.3% 11.5% 19.2% 3.8% 23.1% 0.0% 100.0%
23.9% 16.7% 26.3% 20.0% 60.0% 0.0% 26.3%
Total (overall
results)
46 18 19 5 10 1 99
46.5% 18.2% 19.2% 5.1% 10.1% 1.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 9.17 shows that a small majority (46.5%) of all respondents said that performance
evaluation are ‘never’ used to punish low performers. Another 18.2% said that it is ‘almost
never’ used to punish low performers. Only 10.1% of all the respondents said that performance
evaluation is used ‘all the time’ to punish street – level bureaucrats who do not perform well.
The perceptions of respondents were calculated according to the type of schools in which they
teach in order to gain an insight into the distribution of their responses. This is presented in
Table 9.17.
Independent schools formed 23. 9% all respondents who indicated that performance evaluation
is ‘never’ used to punish low performers, 38.9% said ‘almost never’, 26,3% ‘sometimes’,
20% ‘almost all the time’ and 10% ‘all the time’ In general, most independent school
respondents did not regard performance evaluation as a means used to punish low performers.
The majority (50%) of respondents from former Model C schools who indicated that
performance evaluation is ‘never’ used to punish low performers were also in the majority
(52.2%) of all respondents who held such a position. Furthermore, 16.7% of all the former
Model C respondents who believed that performance evaluation is ‘almost never’ used to
punish low performers made a significant fraction (44.4%) of all respondents who assumed
such a view.  Although a small percentage (6.3%) of respondents from these schools thought
that performance evaluation is used ‘almost all the time’ to punish low performers, it formed
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the majority of all respondents who took such a point of view. The findings suggest that most
of the street – level bureaucrats in the former Model C schools did not view performance
evaluation as a mechanism of punishing low performers.
42.3% of respondents from townships public schools said that performance evaluation is
‘never’ used to punish low performers although they constituted a small percentage (23.9%) of
all respondents who held such a view. 11.5% of the respondents from such schools noted that
performance evaluation is ‘almost never’ used to punish low performers. 19.2% indicated that
performance evaluation is ‘sometimes’ used for this purpose, 3.8% that this is so  ‘almost all
the time’ and 23.1% that this is so ‘all the time’ (a majority (60%) of all the respondents who
assumed such a position). Generally most respondents from public township schools in
uMgungundlovu District did not see performance evaluation as a way of punishing low
performers.
There is a general consensus among teachers from all types of schools that the purpose of
performance evaluation is not to punish street –level bureaucrats who do not meet the required
standards of performance. Furthermore, most respondents tended agree there are no financial
benefits attached to performance evaluation. As result most street – level bureaucrats view
performance evaluation as a routine exercise.
As a mechanism of ensuring performance accountability, performance evaluation is feared by
some street – level bureaucrats in uMgungundlovu District because they do not understand its
main purpose. It is viewed as a way of evaluating learning processes and methods but such
evaluation has also been seen in relation to rewarding high performers and punishing low ones.
Teachers’ perceptions of performance evaluation may result in both desired and unintended
effects. The next section investigates some of these effects.
9.3 uMgungundlovu District: Perceived effects of performance evaluation
Respondents were asked whether performance evaluation improved their performance; caused
false behaviour by teachers; led to falsification of information; caused teachers to focus on
measured output; added more clerical work (administration); or improved accountability. This
section will focus on these effects on street – level bureaucrats. In order to gain a deeper
understanding of the perceived effects of performance evaluation the perceptions of the
respondents were calculated according to the type of school in which they were located.
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9.3.1 Performance evaluation improves performance of the teachers
Has performance evaluation helped to improve the actual performance of teachers? Views on
this are portrayed in Table 9.18.
Table 9.18 uMgungundlovu District: performance evaluation improves performance,





disagree Disagree Uncertain Agree Strongly agree
Independent
2 1 2 14 6 25
8.0% 4.0% 8.0% 56.0% 24.0% 100.0%
50.0% 16.7% 18.2% 30.4% 18.2% 25.0%
Public former
Model C
2 4 7 19 16 48
4.2% 8.3% 14.6% 39.6% 33.3% 100.0%
50.0% 66.7% 63.6% 41.3% 48.5% 48.0%
Public township
0 1 2 13 11 27
0.0% 3.7% 7.4% 48.1% 40.7% 100.0%
0.0% 16.7% 18.2% 28.3% 33.3% 27.0%
Total
4 6 11 46 33 100
4.0% 6.0% 11.0% 46.0% 33.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
In general, a small majority (46%) of respondents ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation
improved their performance while 33% ‘strongly agreed’ that it did so. A significantly small
percentage (6%) ‘disagreed’ while 4% ‘strongly disagreed’ that performance evaluation was
effective in improving their performance. This would suggest that performance evaluation as
an effective mechanism of performance accountability is viewed positively by respondents (a
total of 79%).
Independent schools had the highest proportion (56%) of their respondents who ‘agreed’ that
performance evaluation was effective in improving their performance. About 24% of
respondents from independent schools who ‘strongly agreed’ that performance evaluation
improved their performance formed 18.2% of all such respondents. Although a very small
percentage (8%) of respondents ‘strongly disagreed’ that performance evaluation improved
their performance, they were 50% of all respondents who took a similar view. The responses
from independent schools were largely positive.
The responses from former Model C schools were also generally positive with a small majority
(39.6% of respondents) who ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation improved their performance
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and 33.3% who ‘strongly agreed’. However, respondents from these schools were the most
(63.6%) of all respondents who were ‘uncertain’ about the effects of performance evaluation.
Furthermore, their respondents constituted 50% of all respondents who ‘strongly disagreed’
and 66.7% of all respondents who ‘disagreed’.
About 33.3% of all respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ that performance evaluation improved
their performance were from public township schools. Respondents from these schools also
formed 28.3% of all respondents who ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation improved their
performance. About 7.4% of their respondents formed 18.2% of all respondents who were
‘uncertain’ about the effects of performance evaluation. Only 3.7% of respondents from public
township schools ‘disagreed’ that performance evaluation improved their performance.
The responses from all types of schools were largely positive which suggests that performance
evaluation as a mechanism of performance accountability was effective in improving the
performance of street – level bureaucrats.
9.3.2 Performance evaluation caused false behaviour by teachers
Teachers were asked if performance evaluation caused them to perform better when they were
being observed for performance evaluation than when they not. Their responses are shown in
Table 9.19.
Table 9.19 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of performance evaluation causing false











2 7 7 7 2 0 25
8.0% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 8.0% 0.0% 100.0%
16.7% 28.0% 29.2% 23.3% 28.6% 0.0% 25.0%
Public former Model C
4 10 9 18 5 2 48
8.3% 20.8% 18.8% 37.5% 10.4% 4.2% 100.0%
33.3% 40.0% 37.5% 60.0% 71.4% 100.0% 48.0%
Public township
6 8 8 5 0 0 27
22.2% 29.6% 29.6% 18.5% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
50.0% 32.0% 33.3% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 27.0%
Total
12 25 24 30 7 2 100
12.0% 25.0% 24.0% 30.0% 7.0% 2.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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A very small majority (30%) of all respondents ‘agreed’ that teachers may behave differently
when they were being observed. However, a small but significant percentage (25%) of all
respondents ‘disagreed’, while 12% ‘strongly disagreed’, that educators may teach better when
they are being observed than when they are not. A very small proportion (7%) of all the
respondents ‘strongly agreed’ that performance evaluation may lead to false behaviour in the
classroom. The total number of respondents of those who affirmed false behaviour and those
who denied it is almost the same (30% vs. 25%), while 24% were uncertain.
The proportion of respondents from independent schools who ‘disagreed’, were ‘uncertain’ and
those who ‘agreed’ about performance evaluation causing false behaviour was similar (28%).
A small percentage (8%) from these schools who ‘strongly disagreed’ formed 16.7% of all
respondents who took such a view. Their opinion as to whether or not performance evaluation
led to false behaviour by teachers was inconclusive.
A small majority (37.5%) of respondents from former Model C schools in uMgungundlovu
District were the majority (60%) of all respondents who ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation
causes false behaviour. Furthermore, 10.4% of respondents from these schools comprised
71.4% of all those who ‘strongly agreed’ that teachers would teach differently when they are
being observed. A small percentage (8.3%) from former Model C schools was 33.3% of all
respondents who ‘strongly disagreed’ that performance evaluation leads to ‘window dressing’.
The findings are also inconclusive.
About 22.2% of respondents from township public schools made up the majority (50%) of all
respondents who ‘strongly disagreed’ that performance evaluation leads to false behaviour. A
large proportion (29.6%) of respondents from these schools formed 32% of those who
‘disagreed’. A significantly large fraction (29.6%) of respondents was ‘uncertain’ while 18.5%
‘agreed’ that performance evaluation leads to false behaviour. A largely negative response
came from public township schools which suggests that many of these respondents did not
think that performance evaluation leads to behaviour modification when they are being
observed.
Responses from the interviews largely indicated that performance evaluation may lead to false
behaviour, as is shown in the following comments.
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Because it is done once [per term], it is not a true reflection. If it is done continuously it can
empower teachers for better performance (Tr23).
It is not a true reflection of everyday activities (Tr62).
It not a true reflection of everyday activities as evaluation occurs on limited occasions (Tr59).
The other thing is that when IQMS happens the teacher can put on a show for one lesson when
observation is done and then for the rest of the year (Prl2).
I do think that evaluation can lead to "window dressing",  one often feels - you told me you
were coming so now I must give my best and more / not what is normal (Tr66).
These responses as well as observation by the researcher seem to suggest that performance
evaluation as a mechanism of performance accountability may lead to behaviour modification
by teachers in uMgungundlovu District. In some cases, behaviour modification may be
accompanied by falsification of information. This is the focus of the next section.
9.3.3 Performance evaluation caused falsification of information
Respondents were asked if performance evaluation may cause teachers to falsify information
about their job. Their responses are displayed in Table 9.20.
Table 9.20 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of performance evaluation causing
falsification of information by teachers, according to type of school
Type of school
Leads to falsification of information
Total
Strongly




4 7 8 4 2 25
16.0% 28.0% 32.0% 16.0% 8.0% 100.0%
23.5% 28.0% 28.6% 18.2% 28.6% 25.3%
Public former Model C
8 10 11 13 5 47
17.0% 21.3% 23.4% 27.7% 10.6% 100.0%
47.1% 40.0% 39.3% 59.1% 71.4% 47.5%
Public township
5 8 9 5 0 27
18.5% 29.6% 33.3% 18.5% 0.0% 100.0%
29.4% 32.0% 32.1% 22.7% 0.0% 27.3%
Total
17 25 28 22 7 99
17.2% 25.3% 28.3% 22.2% 7.1% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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A small majority (28.3%) could neither agree nor disagree with the assertion that teachers may
falsify information due to performance evaluation. A fairly significant proportion (22.2%) of
all respondents ‘agreed’ while 7.1% ‘strongly agreed’ that falsification of information may be
caused by performance evaluation. About 17.2% ‘strongly disagreed’ while 25% ‘disagreed’
that performance evaluation may cause teachers to falsify information.
A further analysis of the perceptions of respondents according to their schools showed that
28.6% of all respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ and 18.2% of all respondents who ‘agreed’
were from independent schools. A small majority (32%) of respondents from independent
schools was ‘uncertain’. However, a significantly large percentage (28%) of all respondents
who ‘disagreed’ was from independent schools.  About 16% of respondents from independent
schools who ‘strongly disagreed’ formed 23.5% of all the respondents who took such a view.
Respondents from former Model C schools constituted 71.4% of all respondents who ‘strongly
agreed’ and 59.1% of all respondents who ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation may lead to
the falsification of information by teachers. About 17% of respondents from former model C
schools ‘strongly disagreed’, while 23.4% ‘disagreed’, that teachers may falsify information
due to performance evaluation. This shows that some of the unintended consequences of
performance evaluation are falsification of information. This may suggest that teacher’s
performance evaluation as an accountability mechanism on its own is not enough to hold
street-level bureaucrats accountable.
A small majority (33.3%) of all respondents from public schools in township were ‘uncertain’
as to whether performance evaluation may cause teachers to falsify information about their
work. About 18.5% of respondents from these schools constituted 29.4% of all respondents
who ‘strongly disagreed’ that performance evaluation may lead to such falsification. Only
18.5% of respondents from township public schools ‘agreed’ that teachers may falsify
information due to performance evaluation.
One teacher said that it is difficult to falsify information due to the constant supervision of
heads of departments.
Because we have constant checking up and moderation by our HoDs, we cannot falsify
information, but we can always strive to develop and grow for the good of our school, learners
and ourselves (Tr76).
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The findings suggest that the use of performance evaluation as a mechanism of performance
accountability may lead to falsification of information but effective and constant supervision
by heads of departments might help to reduce this. The next section will investigate the
assertion that teachers may focus on the measured output which might be used as a coping
mechanism to deal with performance evaluation.
9.3.4 Performance evaluation causes teachers to focus on measured outputs
Respondents were asked if performance evaluation caused them to focus on the tasks that are
and measured. Their responses are shown in Table 9.21.
Table 9.21 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of performance evaluation causing
teachers to focus on measured outputs, according to type of school
Type of school
Teacher focuses on measured output
Total
Strongly




1 4 9 8 3 0 25
4.0% 16.0% 36.0% 32.0% 12.0% 0.0% 100.0%
16.7% 28.6% 29.0% 24.2% 20.0% 0.0% 25.0%
Public former
Model C
5 6 14 15 7 1 48
10.4% 12.5% 29.2% 31.3% 14.6% 2.1% 100.0%
83.3% 42.9% 45.2% 45.5% 46.7% 100.0% 48.0%
Public township
0 4 8 10 5 0 27
0.0% 14.8% 29.6% 37.0% 18.5% 0.0% 100.0%
0.0% 28.6% 25.8% 30.3% 33.3% 0.0% 27.0%
Total
6 14 31 33 15 1 100
6.0% 14.0% 31.0% 33.0% 15.0% 1.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
A small majority of all the respondents (33%) ‘agreed’ while 15% ‘strongly agreed’ that
performance evaluation may lead teachers to focus on measured outputs. About 31% percent
were ‘uncertain’, 14% ‘disagreed’ and 6% ‘strongly disagreed’ that teachers would focus on
measured outputs due to performance evaluation. Table 9.21 seems to suggest that most (48%)
of the respondents affirmed that performance evaluation may lead to the neglect of tasks that
are not measured in performance evaluation.
Further analysis shows that 24.2% of all respondents who ‘agreed’ and 20% of all those who
‘strongly agreed’ were from independent schools. A small majority (36%) of respondents from
these schools formed 29% of all respondents who were ‘uncertain’. About 16% of all
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respondents from independent schools constituted 28.6% of all respondents who ‘disagreed’
that performance evaluation may cause teachers to focus on measured outputs.
A small majority (46.7%) of all respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ that performance evaluation
may cause teachers to focus on measured outputs came from 14.6% of respondents from
former Model C schools. About 31.3% of respondents from these schools ‘agreed’, while
29.2% was ‘uncertain’. Only 10.4% of respondents from Former Model C schools were in the
majority (83.3%) of all the respondents who ‘strongly disagreed’ that performance evaluation
may cause teachers to focus on measured outputs.  However, the findings suggest that most
(45%) of respondents from former model C schools acknowledged that performance evaluation
may lead to the neglect of tasks that are not measured in the performance evaluation.
A majority (37%) of respondents from township schools ‘agreed’ while 18.5% ‘strongly
agreed’ that performance evaluation may lead teachers to focus on the measured output.
However, 29.6% of respondents from these schools were ‘uncertain’ while 14.8% ‘disagreed’.
However, most respondents from these schools acknowledged that performance evaluation as a
mechanism of performance accountability may cause teachers to focus on the measured
outputs.
The views of teachers from different types of schools did not vary significantly. However,
there were more respondents from township schools who believed that teachers may focus on
the measured outputs due to performance evaluation.
9.3.5 Performance evaluation causes more clerical work for teachers
Findings from observation showed that teachers often complained about the additional clerical
work due to performance evaluation. Respondents were asked about this. Their responses are
shown in Table 9.22, which is based on the type of school in which a teacher is situated.
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Table 9.22 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of performance evaluation causing
more clerical work, according to type of school
Type of school
Adds more clerical work
Total
Strongly




2 2 5 4 12 25
8.0% 8.0% 20.0% 16.0% 48.0% 100.0%
40.0% 15.4% 23.8% 16.7% 32.4% 25.0%
Public former Model C
2 7 4 14 21 48
4.2% 14.6% 8.3% 29.2% 43.8% 100.0%
40.0% 53.8% 19.0% 58.3% 56.8% 48.0%
Public township
1 4 12 6 4 27
3.7% 14.8% 44.4% 22.2% 14.8% 100.0%
20.0% 30.8% 57.1% 25.0% 10.8% 27.0%
Total
5 13 21 24 37 100
5.0% 13.0% 21.0% 24.0% 37.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
A small majority (37%) of all respondents ‘strongly agreed’ while 24% ‘agreed’ that
performance evaluation has led to more clerical work for educators.  About 21% said
‘sometimes’ this was so. A very small proportion (13%) disagreed while only 5% ‘strongly
disagreed’. Generally, the biggest proportion of all respondents acknowledged that
performance evaluation has caused more clerical work.
Further analysis based on the types of schools where the respondents are showed that a
majority (48%) from independent schools ‘strongly agreed’ while 16% ‘agreed’ that
performance evaluation did add clerical work to their teaching load. Only 8% of respondents
from these schools ‘disagreed’, while a small majority (40%) of the sample who ‘strongly
disagreed’ were from these schools. It can be inferred that most (64%) of all respondents from
independent schools confirmed that performance evaluation as a mechanism of performance
accountability has added more clerical work to the load of teachers.
A majority (56.8%) of all respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ that performance evaluation
caused more clerical work for teachers were from former Model C schools. Respondents from
these schools also constituted a majority (58.3%) of all those ‘agreed’ that performance
evaluation increased clerical work.  Although only 14.6% of respondents from former Model C
schools ‘disagreed’, they were in the majority of all respondents who took such a view. Only
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4% percent of all respondents from these schools ‘strongly disagreed’ that performance
evaluation added more clerical work. Taken as a whole, most of the respondents from former
Model C schools acknowledged that performance evaluation has caused more clerical work.
A majority (44.4%) of respondents from township schools were integral to the majority
(57.1%) of all respondents who said ‘sometimes’ performance evaluation added more clerical
work to educators. About 22.2% of respondents from these schools ‘agreed’ while 14.8%
‘strongly agreed’.  A small percentage (3.7%) of respondents from township schools formed
20% of all those who ‘strongly disagreed’.
In the main, the perceptions of respondents from township schools in uMgungundlovu District
were different from perceptions of teachers in other types of schools. Although the latter
acknowledged that performance evaluation has caused more clerical work, most of the
respondents from township schools said it ‘sometimes’ does. This was confirmed by a chi –
square test (p = 0.02) which shows that this variation was not a result of chance.
9.3.6 Performance evaluation improves performance accountability among teachers
Respondents were asked if performance evaluation improved their performance accountability.
Their responses are shown in Table 9.23.
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Table 9.23 uMgungundlovu District: performance evaluation improves performance
accountability, according to type of school
Type of school
Performance evaluation improves performance accountability
Total
Strongly




2 0 7 7 9 25
8.0% 0.0% 28.0% 28.0% 36.0% 100.0%
33.3% 0.0% 30.4% 17.9% 34.6% 25.0%
Public former Model C
4 4 9 24 7 48
8.3% 8.3% 18.8% 50.0% 14.6% 100.0%
66.7% 66.7% 39.1% 61.5% 26.9% 48.0%
Public township
0 2 7 8 10 27
0.0% 7.4% 25.9% 29.6% 37.0% 100.0%
0.0% 33.3% 30.4% 20.5% 38.5% 27.0%
Total
6 6 23 39 26 100
6.0% 6.0% 23.0% 39.0% 26.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 9.22 shows that a small majority of all respondents ‘agreed’, while 26% ‘strongly
agreed’, that performance evaluation improved their performance accountability. About 23%
of all respondents said that ‘sometimes’ performance evaluation improved their performance
accountability. Only 6% ‘strongly disagreed’ while another 6% ‘disagreed’. The findings
suggest that a large proportion of all respondents acknowledged that performance evaluation
improved their performance accountability.
Analysing the perceptions of respondents according to the types of schools in which they teach
revealed that respondents from independent schools who constituted 25% of all respondents
formed 34.6% of all respondents who ‘strongly agreed’, and 17.9% of those who ‘agreed’.
About 28% of respondents from independent schools thought that ‘sometimes’ performance
evaluation improved their performance evaluation while 8% ‘strongly disagreed’. In the main,
most respondents from these schools confirmed that performance evaluation improved the
performance accountability of teachers.
A majority (61.5%) of all respondents who ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation improved
performance accountability were from former Model C schools. About 14.6% of respondents
from these schools formed 26.9% of all respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ that performance
evaluation improved their performance accountability.  About 8.3% of respondents of former
Model C schools ‘strongly disagreed’ while another 8.3% ‘disagreed’. It is apparent that most
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of the respondents from these schools affirmed the effectiveness of performance evaluation in
improving performance accountability in uMgungundlovu District.
A small majority (37%) of respondents from township public schools ‘strongly agreed’ while
29.6% ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation improved performance accountability among
teachers. About 25.9% of the respondents said that ‘sometimes’ performance evaluation
improved accountability. A small fraction (7.4%) of respondents from these schools formed
33.3% of all respondents who ‘disagreed’. For the most part, respondents from these schools
confirmed that performance evaluation improved performance accountability.
The perceptions of respondents from all types of school discussed here are fairly uniform. Most
of the respondents in uMgungundlovu District acknowledged that performance evaluation
improved performance accountability among teachers. However, one commented that:
Committed and dedicated teachers are accountable all the time. You do not need an instrument
to ensure accountability (Tr53).
Conclusion
This chapter explored the performance accountability of teachers in uMgungundlovu District.
The first section of the chapter investigated the perceived importance of different aspects of the
performance evaluation score sheet that are used when rating the performance of a street –
level bureaucrats for purposes of performance accountability. The items were: learner
achievement in assessments; attendance of teachers and punctuality; planning, administration
and lesson delivery; involvement in co – curricular activities; human relations and contribution
to school development; and content knowledge. Their significance was reported.
The second section concentrated on the main purpose of performance evaluation in relation to
teachers as street – level bureaucrats. There were different views about the main purpose of
performance evaluation. Some of the main purposes explored in this chapter were: evaluation;
learning; rewarding high performers; and punishing low performers. Many respondents did not
believe that the purpose of performance evaluation was to draw lesson from the evaluation.
They viewed the evaluation as ways of limiting their autonomous spaces and reduce their
professional discretion. This may imply that teachers do not look forward to improved practice
after observing what works and what does not work through performance evaluation. Most
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respondents acknowledged the impact of these factors but viewed performance evaluation as a
means of punishing the low performers.
The last section of the chapter surveyed the effects of performance evaluation as a mechanism
of performance accountability among teachers as street – level bureaucrats in uMgungundlovu
District. The main effects that were discussed are: improvement in the performance of
teachers; false behaviour; falsification of information; focusing on measured outputs; increased
clerical load; and improved performance accountability among teachers. Respondents from all
types of schools acknowledged most of these effects although a significant proportion did not
affirm the falsification of information by teachers.
It was apparent that education authorities in uMgungundlovu District are exercising
performance accountability, which is an external form of accountability to secure compliance
among teachers as street – level bureaucrats. The findings suggest that the measures to secure
compliance were seen as being quite effective, although this assessment will be explored more




UMGUNGUNDLOVU DISTRICT: HIERARCHICAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN
IMPLEMENTING THE NCS
In uMgungundlovu District hierarchical accountability, which is also known as bureaucratic or
organisational accountability, is manifested in the roles of supervisors and street – level
bureaucrats. There are rules and operating procedures for tasks which are the responsibility of
educators. Their performance is closely monitored by education authorities at various levels.
As explained in earlier chapters, hierarchical accountability involves teachers who are
responsible for teaching, planning and assessment of learners. The main mechanisms for this in
uMgungundlovu District include conformity to standards that are set at provincial or national
level as well as assessment of learners.
Firstly, the chapter will begin by exploring the perceptions of teachers of the purpose of
assessments. Then it will investigate the perceived effects of using assessments and
examination as a mechanism of hierarchical accountability. Thirdly, the chapter will explore
the role played by the school management teams (SMT). Different accountability tools used
by members of SMT will be considered. Finally, the chapter will end with a discussion on the
role played by subject clusters and subject advisors. Here moderation of school based
assessments at cluster level will be explored.
10.1 uMgungundlovu District: The use of assessments as a mechanism of hierarchical
accountability
As discussed in earlier chapters, the DBE has used assessments as a means to secure
accountability among street – level bureaucrats. Most of the assessments are done in the exit
bands: Grades 3, 6, 9 and 12. Assessments in schools are divided into two, school - based
assessments and common tests. The DBE spells out the number and type of assessments for
each subject and grade. For instance, in Geography learners are expected to carry out eight
tasks in an academic year. Out of the eight tasks, three are examinations (mid-year, trials and
end of year examination), two are tests, and the other three are any tasks that could include
drawing and labelling sketch maps, research and analysing information from sources. For most
schools, the mid-year and trial examinations are common examinations while they set and
administer the other tasks. The first seven tasks are known as school-based assessments
(because they are usually set and marked at school level). In terms of weighting, they comprise
25% of the final mark.
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The DBE introduced Annual National Assessments (ANA) which were piloted in 2010. These
assessments test Grades 1 – 6 and Grade 9 in numeracy and literacy, which are administered
and marked by teachers. The scores are sent to the provincial and national education
departments. These assessments are said to serve two purposes; assessment for learning and
assessment of learning (NEEDU, 2013:52). It is argued that when teachers administer and
mark such assessments they will be in a better position to ascertain the weaknesses of their
learners and therefore seek to improve their performance. Thus assessment of learning leads to
assessment for learning. In so doing, schools are also made accountable for their results. How
have these purposes of assessment been interpreted by teachers as street – level bureaucrats?
10.1.1 uMgungundlovu District: assessment of learners as a mechanism of hierarchical
accountability for teachers.
Do educators in uMgungundlovu District view learner assessments as a mechanism of
bureaucratic accountability? Their responses are displayed in Table 10.1.
Table 10.1 uMgungundlovu District: respondents’ perception of assessment as a
hierarchical accountability mechanism for educators, according to type of school
Type of school
To make educators accountable
TotalNever Almost never Sometimes Almost always
Independent
2 11 8 4 25
8.0% 44.0% 32.0% 16.0% 100.0%
15.4% 42.3% 21.1% 19.0% 25.5%
Public former Model C
10 9 19 8 46
21.7% 19.6% 41.3% 17.4% 100.0%
76.9% 34.6% 50.0% 38.1% 46.9%
Public township
1 6 11 9 27
3.7% 22.2% 40.7% 33.3% 100.0%
7.7% 23.1% 28.9% 42.9% 27.6%
Total
13 26 38 21 98
13.3% 26.5% 38.8% 21.4% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
About 21.4% of all the respondents indicated that ‘almost always’ the purpose of assessments
is to make street – level bureaucrats accountable while a slightly larger percentage (38.8%)
indicated that this is ‘sometimes’. 26.5% of all the respondents believed that learner
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assessments are ‘almost never’ used as an accountability mechanism while to 13.3% of the
respondents it was an outright  ‘never’.
Further analysis revealed that while 16% of those from independent schools believed that
assessments are ‘almost always’ used as an hierarchical accountability mechanism, 22%
thought that it is so ‘sometimes’, while 44% indicated that this is ‘almost never’ the case, and
8% that this is ‘never’ so. The stronger negative reaction proved to be characteristic of the
independent schools.
A majority (76.9%) of all respondents who indicated that assessments are ‘never’ used as a
hierarchical accountability mechanism were from former Model C schools. Furthermore,
41.3% of these respondents were also in the majority (50%) of all those who indicated that
‘sometimes’ education authorities use assessments as a mechanism of accountability. Only
17.4% of respondents from these schools suggested that assessments are used ‘almost always’
for accountability purposes.
A small majority (40.7%) of respondents from township public schools said that ‘sometimes’
assessments are a mechanism of hierarchical accountability. Furthermore, 33.3% of
respondents from these schools were the majority of all those who indicated that learner
assessments are ‘almost always’ used as an accountability mechanism for educators. Only
3.7% of respondents who were surveyed in township public schools believed that assessments
are ‘never’ used for accountability purposes and they were also in the minority of all those who
took such a view. Respondents from township public schools mainly affirmed that assessments
were used as an accountability mechanism in uMgungundlovu District in the implementation
of NCS.
On the whole, although responses from the types of schools differed, they all confirmed that
assessments are used as a mechanism of hierarchical accountability by education authorities.
10.1.2 uMgungundlovu District: using assessments to make schools accountable
Schools, as street – level bureaucracies which implement NCS in uMgungundlovu District, are
sometimes themselves subject to accountability mechanisms. This stems from their position in
the hierarchy of the DBE. Table 10.2 illustrates the perceptions of respondents of how
assessments are used to make schools accountable.
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Table 10.2 uMgungundlovu District: perception of assessment as a bureaucratic
accountability mechanism for schools, according to type of school
Types of schools
To make schools accountable
TotalNever Almost never Sometimes Almost always
Independent
2 8 7 8 25
8.0% 32.0% 28.0% 32.0% 100.0%
33.3% 50.0% 18.4% 20.5% 25.3%
Public former Model C
4 7 19 17 47
8.5% 14.9% 40.4% 36.2% 100.0%
66.7% 43.8% 50.0% 43.6% 47.5%
Public township
0 1 12 14 27
0.0% 3.7% 44.4% 51.9% 100.0%
0.0% 6.3% 31.6% 35.9% 27.3%
Total
6 16 38 39 99
6.1% 16.2% 38.4% 39.4% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
The largest proportion (39.4%) of respondents indicated that assessments are ‘almost always’
meant to make schools accountable. Another proportion (38.4%) simply believed that
‘sometimes’ assessments are used for this purpose. Those who said that assessments are
‘never’ used to make schools accountable were in the minority (6.1%) while another 16.2%
said they are ‘almost never’ used for this.
Analysing the responses according to type of school revealed that a majority (50%) of all
respondents who said that assessments were ‘almost never’ used to make schools accountable
were from independent schools.  Respondents from these schools also constituted 33.3% of all
those who indicated that assessments were ‘never’ used to make schools accountable.
However, about 32% of respondents from these schools pointed out that assessments are
‘almost always’ used for school accountability intentions. Generally most respondents from
independent schools seemed to suggest that assessments in uMgungundlovu District are aimed
at making schools accountable in implementing NCS.
A majority of respondents from former Model C schools (40.4%) indicated that ‘sometimes’
assessments are used to make schools accountable while 36.2% said they are used ‘almost
always’ for such a purpose. Although only 6.1% of all the respondents thought that
assessments are ‘never’ used to make schools accountable, respondents from former Model C
schools were in the majority (66.7%) of all those who took such a view. Most respondents
204
from these schools affirmed the use of assessments as an hierarchical accountability
mechanism which is directed at schools.
Turning to township public schools, a majority (51.9%) of respondents indicated that ‘almost
always’ the purpose of assessments is to make schools accountable while 44.4% believed that
they are ‘sometimes’ used for this. There were very few (3.7%) respondents from these schools
who indicated that assessments are ‘almost never’ used as hierarchical accountability
mechanisms in the implementation of NCS. Generally, the majority of respondents confirmed
that in uMgungundlovu District assessments are used to render schools accountable.
One principal commented that:
The Annual National Assessments are used to measure the performance of the school. The
schools are judged on the results of these national assessments. But it is hard to measure all
the outcomes of education thorough assessments. So [this] is an unfair accountability method
(Prl2).
It is apparent that most of the respondents, regardless of the type of schools where they taught,
believed that assessments are used as hierarchical accountability devices for schools. However,
teachers from township public schools felt the strongest about this.
10.1.3 uMgungundlovu District: using assessments to make learners accountable for
their education
In trying to elicit the perspective of street – level bureaucrats on the purposes of assessment,
respondents were asked to give their opinion on assessments as an accountability mechanism
for learners. Their responses are displayed in Table 10.3.
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Table 10.3 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of assessment as a bureaucratic
accountability mechanism for learners, according to type of school
Type of school To make learners accountable for their education Total
Never Almost never Sometimes Almost always
Independent
1 9 7 8 25
4.0% 36.0% 28.0% 32.0% 100.0%
25.0% 50.0% 30.4% 14.8% 25.3%
Public former Model C
2 3 9 33 47
4.3% 6.4% 19.1% 70.2% 100.0%
50.0% 16.7% 39.1% 61.1% 47.5%
Public township
1 6 7 13 27
3.7% 22.2% 25.9% 48.1% 100.0%
25.0% 33.3% 30.4% 24.1% 27.3%
Total
4 18 23 54 99
4.0% 18.2% 23.2% 54.5% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
A majority (54.5%) of all respondents suggested that assessments ‘almost always’ aimed at
making learners accountable for their learning while 23.2% believed that sometimes they are
used for such a purpose. 18.2% said they are ‘almost never’ used to make learners accountable
for their learning while only 4% felt that this is ‘never’ so.
About 32% of respondents from independent schools constituted 14.8% of all the respondents
who said that ‘almost always’ assessments are used to make learners accountable for their
learning. 28% of the respondents from these schools indicated that ‘sometimes’ assessments
are aimed at making learners accountable for their education. The respondents from
independent schools, who constituted 25.3% of all the respondents, were in the majority (50%)
of all those who suggested that assessments are ‘almost never’ used to make learners
accountable for their education. Only 4% of the respondents from these school pointed out that
assessments are never used to make learners accountable.
With regard to Model C schools, a majority (70.2%) of their respondents indicated that
assessments are ‘almost always’ aimed at making learners accountable for their education.
They also comprised the majority (61.1%) of all respondents who took such a view. About
19.1% of respondents from these schools indicated that ‘sometimes’ assessments are used for
such purposes while 6.4% thought that this is ‘almost never’. Although a mere 4.3% of
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respondents from these schools said that assessments ‘never’ make learners accountable for
their learning, they were in the majority (50%) of those who took such a position.
In township public schools 48.1% of their respondents confirmed that ‘almost always’
assessments are used as an accountability mechanism for learners while 25.9% said they are
‘sometimes’ used for such purposes. Only 3.7% of their respondents rejected this assertion
while 22.2% said it was ‘almost never’ so. In general, the respondents from these schools
agreed that assessments are used as an accountability mechanism for learners.
Most respondents from all types of schools acknowledged that assessments are an instrument
used to make learners accountable. As one educator commented:
The purpose of education and assessment is not assessing the teachers; it is to distribute the
limited resources. If there were no assessments and tests how were we going to determine who
gets the scholarships, who goes to which university, who pursues which degree and who does
which job? In a way, learners need to be accountable if they don’t want to be deprived of what
they want and desire. One of my matric [Grade 12] learners is crying now because she was not
taken into medical school because she does not have enough ‘As’. Isn’t that depriving? (Tr14).
Respondents from former Model C schools seem to have the biggest proportion of those who
regarded assessment as an hierarchical accountability mechanism which made learners
accountable. This was confirmed by a chi – square test; the results (p = 0.03) suggest that this
was not a chance variation.
In conclusion, it is apparent that assessments are multipurpose instruments of bureaucratic
accountability.  Whether they are used to make schools, teachers or learners accountable, it
generally agreed that they remain a crucial hierarchical accountability mechanism in the
implementation of NCS in uMgungundlovu District. The next section will consider the effects
of using assessments as accountability mechanisms.
10.2 uMgungundlovu District: The effects of using assessments as hierarchical
accountability mechanisms
As discussed earlier, the use of any accountability mechanism may produce both intended and
unintended consequences. This is true for the use of assessments as an hierarchical
accountability mechanism. This section will focus on some of these consequences that pertain
to the work of street – level bureaucrats in implementing NCS in uMgungundlovu District. To
that end, assessment will be discussed in relation to: encouraging accountability among
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teachers; improving instruction and classroom practices; manipulating test records and results;
emphasising subject areas that are covered in examination; encouraging a ‘finish the syllabus
syndrome’; and promoting an emphasis on past examination questions.
10.2.1 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of assessments in
encouraging accountability among teachers
As noted earlier, it is apparent that many respondents acknowledged the use of assessments as
an hierarchical accountability mechanism. In order to investigate the effectiveness of this
mechanism, the perceptions of street – level bureaucrats were cross tabulated with the types of
schools in which they taught. The results are illustrated in Table 10.4.
Table 10.4 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effect of assessments in
encouraging accountability in schools, according to type of school
Type of school
Encourages accountability in teachers
Total
Strongly




1 0 4 14 4 0 23
4.3% 0.0% 17.4% 60.9% 17.4% 0.0% 100.0%
100.0% 0.0% 28.6% 27.5% 19.0% 0.0% 24.2%
Public former Model C
0 3 6 24 12 1 46
0.0% 6.5% 13.0% 52.2% 26.1% 2.2% 100.0%
0.0% 42.9% 42.9% 47.1% 57.1% 100.0% 48.4%
Public township
0 4 4 13 5 0 26
0.0% 15.4% 15.4% 50.0% 19.2% 0.0% 100.0%
0.0% 57.1% 28.6% 25.5% 23.8% 0.0% 27.4%
Total
1 7 14 51 21 1 95
1.1% 7.4% 14.7% 53.7% 22.1% 1.1% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
From the data it is clear that the majority (53.7%) of all respondents ‘agreed’ that assessments
were effective in making street – level bureaucrats accountable while 22.1% ‘strongly agreed’.
A very small proportion (7.4%) of all respondents ‘disagreed’ and another 1.1% ‘strongly
disagreed’. It is clear that most respondents in the study confirmed the effectiveness of
assessments as an hierarchical accountability mechanism.
Analysing the data according to type of school showed that although a majority (60.9%) of
respondents from independent schools ‘agreed’, they comprised 27.5% of all respondents who
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‘agreed’ that assessments were effective in making teachers accountable. 17.4% of all
respondents from these schools ‘strongly agreed’ with this assertion. Only 4.3% of respondents
from independent schools who ‘strongly disagreed’ comprised 100% of all the respondents
who took such a view.
The respondents from former Model C were the highest proportion (57.1%) of all those who
‘strongly agreed’ that assessments were an effective tool of bureaucratic accountability. A
majority (52.2%) of respondents from these schools ‘agreed’. The 6.5% of respondents from
former Model C schools who ‘disagreed’ constituted the largest percentage (42.9%) of all
those who took a similar position.  In general, respondents from these schools responded
positively to the assertion that assessments are effective in making teachers accountable.
The largest proportion (57.1%) of all those who ‘disagreed’ that assessments were effective in
making teachers accountable was 15.4% of respondents from township public schools.
However, a majority (50%) of such respondents ‘agreed’ while another 19.2% ‘strongly
agreed’ with the assertion. On the whole, respondents from township public schools confirmed
the effectiveness of assessments in making street – level bureaucrats accountable.
Respondents from all types of schools affirmed the role which is played by assessments in
making educators accountable. The variations between them were not statistically significant.
10.2.2 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of assessments in
improving instruction and classroom practices
It would be expected that the improvement in bureaucratic accountability which was reported
earlier would be accompanied by improvements in classroom instruction and practice.
Respondents were asked if this is so. Their perceptions are shown in Table 10.5.
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Table 10.5 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effect of assessments in improving
classroom instruction in schools, according to type of school
Type of school
Improves instruction and classroom practice
Total
Strongly




1 1 6 10 5 0 23
4.3% 4.3% 26.1% 43.5% 21.7% 0.0% 100.0%
100.0% 16.7% 25.0% 28.6% 18.5% 0.0% 24.5%
Public former Model C
0 3 9 17 15 1 45
0.0% 6.7% 20.0% 37.8% 33.3% 2.2% 100.0%
0.0% 50.0% 37.5% 48.6% 55.6% 100.0% 47.9%
Public township
0 2 9 8 7 0 26
0.0% 7.7% 34.6% 30.8% 26.9% 0.0% 100.0%
0.0% 33.3% 37.5% 22.9% 25.9% 0.0% 27.7%
Total
1 6 24 35 27 1 94
1.1% 6.4% 25.5% 37.2% 28.7% 1.1% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
The results obtained showed that a small majority (37.2%) of all the respondents ‘agreed’ that
assessments lead to an improvement in classroom instruction and practice whilst 28.7%
‘strongly agreed’. Put together, this means that most of the respondents responded positively.
Only 6.4% of the respondents did not agree while 6.4% ‘strongly disagreed’ that assessments
result in improved classroom instruction.
Further analysis revealed that although 43.5% of respondents from independent schools
‘agreed’ that assessments lead to improvement in classroom instruction, this comprised 28.6%
of all respondents who took such a viewpoint. About 21.7% of all the respondents in these
schools ‘strongly agreed’ with the assertion. The 4.3% of all the respondents from independent
schools who ‘strongly disagreed’ comprised 100% of all those who took such a position.  In
short, most respondents from independent schools were largely positive about the effects of
assessment in the improvement of classroom instruction.
Turning to former Model C schools, about 33.3% of respondents from these schools were a
majority (55.6%) of those who ‘strongly agreed’ that assessments had a positive effect on
classroom instruction and practice. About 37.8% of respondents from such schools comprised
48.6% of all the respondents who ‘agreed’, whereas a small percentage (6.7%) of the
respondents ‘disagreed’ (50% of all the respondents who held such a view).   Again, it is
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apparent that most respondents from former Model C schools acknowledged the positive effect
of assessments on classroom instruction and practice.
A small majority (30.8%) of all the respondents from township public schools ‘agreed’ that
assessments lead to the improvement of classroom instruction and practice, 26.9% ‘strongly
agreed’ while 7.7% (33.3% of all such respondents) ‘disagreed’.
Generally, respondents from township public schools had a higher proportion of those who
disagreed that assessments had a positive effect on the classroom instruction and practice,
although in general respondents in various types of schools responded positively. This
observation may suggest the ineffectiveness of assessments as an accountability mechanism
among the township educators.
10.2.3 uMgungundlovu District: assessments cause teachers to manipulate test scores
The perceptions of street – level bureaucrats were sought regarding the negative effects of
assessments as an hierarchical accountability mechanism. Table 10.6 shows the outcome.
Table 10.6 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effect of assessments in causing
teachers to manipulate test scores, according to type of school
Type of school
Leads to manipulation of test records and result
Total
Strongly




2 5 8 8 0 0 23
8.7% 21.7% 34.8% 34.8% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
22.2% 22.7% 26.7% 30.8% 0.0% 0.0% 24.5%
Public former Model C
4 10 12 13 5 1 45
8.9% 22.2% 26.7% 28.9% 11.1% 2.2% 100.0%
44.4% 45.5% 40.0% 50.0% 83.3% 100.0% 47.9%
Public township
3 7 10 5 1 0 26
11.5% 26.9% 38.5% 19.2% 3.8% 0.0% 100.0%
33.3% 31.8% 33.3% 19.2% 16.7% 0.0% 27.7%
Total
9 22 30 26 6 1 94
9.6% 23.4% 31.9% 27.7% 6.4% 1.1% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
The biggest percentage (31.7%) of those surveyed was ‘uncertain’ when asked if the use of
assessments as an accountability device causes teachers to manipulate test scores. A small but
significant proportion (27.7%) of all the respondents ‘agreed’ that the use of assessments as an
hierarchical accountability device causes street – level bureaucrats to manipulate test scores
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while 6.5% strongly ‘agreed’.  Only 9.6% of all the respondents ‘strongly disagreed’, while
23.4% ‘disagreed’. The data show that the proportion of the respondents who did and did not
support the assertion that the use of assessments as accountability may cause teachers to
manipulate test scores is almost equal.
Further analysis shows that about 34.8% of respondents from independent schools ‘agreed’ that
the use of assessments may cause teachers to manipulate test scores while another 34.8% was
‘uncertain’. 8.7% of respondents from these schools comprised 22.2% of all the respondents
who ‘strongly disagreed’ with the assertion. Another 21.7% of respondents from independent
schools ‘disagreed’. Although a bigger proportion of respondents ‘agreed’, the proportion
which was ‘uncertain’ was significant.
As far as former Model C schools are concerned, 11.1% of respondents from these schools
comprised 83.3% of those who ‘strongly agreed’ with the assertion that the use of assessments
may cause street – level bureaucrats to manipulate test scores. Furthermore, 28.9% of
respondents from these schools were in the majority (50.3%) of those who ‘agreed’. However,
26.7% of the respondents from these schools were ‘uncertain’ while 22.2% ‘disagreed’.
Although only 8.9% of the respondents from former Model C schools ‘strongly disagreed’,
they were 44.4% of all the respondents who took such a view.
Although 27.7% of all the respondents were from township public schools, they constituted
only 16% of all those who ‘strongly agreed’ that the use of assessments may cause teachers to
manipulate test scores. About 19.2% of all respondents from these schools also amounted to
19.2% of all those who ‘agreed’ with the assertion. The majority (38.5%) were ‘uncertain’, the
highest percentage of those who took such a view. Again, although 11.5% of their respondents
‘strongly disagreed’ with the assertion that the use of assessments as a hierarchical
accountability device may cause teachers to manipulate test scores, it was the biggest
proportion compared to other types of schools.
In all types of schools there was a large proportion of respondents who were ‘uncertain’ about
the effect of the use of assessments as a bureaucratic accountability mechanism.  The reason
for this is not clear, but it may have something to do with the cautiousness of respondents and
the sensitivity of the subject. As one respondent commented:
Under some circumstances I think it can be fair to ‘adjust marks’ (manipulation - sounds
dishonest) but I see no problem with that (Tr19).
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However, it is apparent that most respondents acknowledged that the use of assessments for
purposes of accountability may have caused them to manipulate test scores.
10.2.4 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of assessments in causing teachers to focus
on areas covered in examination
It has been argued the use of assessments as a bureaucratic accountability device may lead
teachers to focus on areas that are often covered in an examination, that is, to ‘teach to the test’.
Respondents were asked the degree to which they agreed with this assertion. Their responses
are shown in Table 10.7.
Table 10.7 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effect of assessments in causing
teachers to focus on examined areas, according to type of school
Type of school
Teacher put emphasis on subject areas that are covered in exams
Total
Strongly




0 2 5 11 5 0 23
0.0% 8.7% 21.7% 47.8% 21.7% 0.0% 100.0%
0.0% 22.2% 20.8% 27.5% 29.4% 0.0% 24.2%
Public former Model C
3 3 10 19 10 1 46
6.5% 6.5% 21.7% 41.3% 21.7% 2.2% 100.0%
75.0% 33.3% 41.7% 47.5% 58.8% 100.0% 48.4%
Public township
1 4 9 10 2 0 26
3.8% 15.4% 34.6% 38.5% 7.7% 0.0% 100.0%
25.0% 44.4% 37.5% 25.0% 11.8% 0.0% 27.4%
Total
4 9 24 40 17 1 95
4.2% 9.5% 25.3% 42.1% 17.9% 1.1% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Preliminary analysis showed that only 17.9% of all the respondents indicated that they
‘strongly agreed’ while 42.1% ‘agreed’. A small but significant percentage was ‘uncertain’.
Very few of the respondents did not confirm the effect of assessments in causing teachers to
focus on content that they believe would be covered in examinations. About 9.5% ‘disagreed’,
while 4.2% ‘strongly disagreed’, that the use of assessments as hierarchical accountability
devices caused teachers to focus on areas that are likely to be examined at the expense of those
that they believe would not be covered. Generally, most respondents acknowledged the effect
of assessments in directing the attention of street – level bureaucrats to subject matter that they
believe will be examined.
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Further analysis of the data showed that although respondents from independent schools
comprised 24% of all the respondents, they made up 29.4% of all the respondents who
‘strongly agreed’ that the use of assessments as an accountability mechanism may divert
teachers’ attention to those areas that they believe are ‘important’ for examiners. A majority
(47.8%) of respondents from these schools ‘agreed’ while 21.7% was ‘uncertain’, while only
8.7% of respondents (22.2% of all such respondents) ‘disagreed’ with the assertion.
On the other hand, the respondents from former Model C schools were in the majority (58.8%)
of all those who ‘strongly agreed’ that the use of assessments as a bureaucratic accountability
mechanism causes educators to teach according to what is likely to be examined. 4.1% of
respondents from these schools ‘agreed’, 21.7% was ‘uncertain’ while 6.5% ‘disagreed’.
Although a small proportion of respondents from former Model C schools ‘strongly disagreed’
(6.5%), they were in the majority (75%) of all those who took such a view. By and large, most
respondents from these schools confirmed this particular effect of using assessments as a
bureaucratic accountability mechanism.
What stood out most from the respondents from township public schools is that although they
comprised 27.4% of all the respondents, they were in the majority (44.4%) of all those who
‘disagreed’ that the use of assessments may prompt teachers to teach in anticipation of what is
often examined. A small majority (38.5%) of respondents from these schools ‘agreed’ while
7.7% ‘strongly disagreed’. A significant proportion (34.6%) of respondents from these schools
was ‘uncertain’. Overall, this question elicited mixed reaction.
The phenomenon under review here, that the effect of assessment leads to educators teaching
accordingly, arose in the interviews as well. One educator commented that:
It [using assessments as accountability mechanisms] stifles creativity and spontaneity.
Learners can’t learn at their own pace.  We teach to assess. General skills and knowledge
can’t be taught. There is not enough time to fulfil all the other roles of an educator (Tr39).
Furthermore, observation by the researcher also confirms this impression. A good example is
in Geography, where learners are expected to go on some field trips to reinforce concepts
learned in class and to write research projects, but most teachers tend to ignore these aspects
since they do not feature in the National Senior Certificate examinations. To some teachers
these activities are viewed as a waste of valuable ‘learning’ time.
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This syndrome is often connected to the need to finish the syllabus in time without paying
attention to learners’ needs. This is explored in the next section.
10.2.5 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of using assessments as an accountability
mechanism causes a ‘finish the syllabus syndrome’
Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agree that the use of assessments
as an hierarchical accountability mechanism entrenched in them the need to finish, above
anything else, teaching the syllabus on time. The responses are shown in Table 10.8.
Table 10.8 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effect of assessments in causing
finish syllabus syndrome’, according to type of school
Type of school
Promotes ‘finish the syllabus syndrome’
Total
Strongly
disagree Disagree Uncertain Agree
Strongly
agree
Independent 0 1 6 10 6 23
0.0% 4.3% 26.1% 43.5% 26.1% 100.0%
0.0% 7.1% 24.0% 32.3% 27.3% 24.2%
Public former Model C 3 9 9 11 14 46
6.5% 19.6% 19.6% 23.9% 30.4% 100.0%
100.0% 64.3% 36.0% 35.5% 63.6% 48.4%
Public township 0 4 10 10 2 26
0.0% 15.4% 38.5% 38.5% 7.7% 100.0%
0.0% 28.6% 40.0% 32.3% 9.1% 27.4%
Total 3 14 25 31 22 95
3.2% 14.7% 26.3% 32.6% 23.2% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
A general overview of the data shows that a significant proportion (23.2%) of respondents
‘strongly agreed’ while 32.6% ‘agreed’ that the use of assessments as a bureaucratic
accountability mechanism forces them to focus on finishing the syllabus on time for
examinations.  Another significant percentage (26.3%) was ‘uncertain’ while 14.7%
‘disagreed’.
Analysing these perceptions of respondents according to type of school indicates that a small
majority (43.5%) of respondents from independent schools ‘agreed’ that the use of assessments
as a bureaucratic accountability device forces them to focus on finishing the syllabus in time.
About 26.1% of respondents from independent schools comprised 27.3% of those who
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‘strongly agreed’. A significant proportion (24%) of all those who were ‘uncertain’ were from
independent schools. It is apparent that most of the respondents from independent schools
attested that the use of assessments can force teachers to focus mainly on finishing the syllabus
in time.
Further analysis revealed that a majority (63.6%) of all the respondents who ‘strongly agreed’
that use of assessments as an accountability mechanism for street – level bureaucrats causes
them to focus on finishing the syllabus in time were 30.4% of those from former Model C
schools.  About 23.9% of respondents from these schools ‘agreed’ while 19.6% ‘disagreed’. A
majority (64.3) of all the respondents who ‘disagreed’ with the assertion are also from former
Model C schools. It is clear that most respondents from former Model C schools indicated that
assessments may cause teachers to focus on finishing the syllabus more than anything else.
Turning to township public schools, although respondents from these schools comprised 27.4%
of all the schools they were in the majority (40%) of all those who were ‘uncertain’. About
38.5% of their respondents ‘agreed’ while 7.7% ‘strongly agreed’. Only 15.4% of their
respondents ‘disagreed’ with the assertion that the use of assessments may cause teachers to
pay most attention to finishing the syllabus rather than making sure that learners understand the
material. It is apparent that many respondents from these schools did not feel the effect of
assessments to cause teachers to focus more on finishing the syllabus than on other aspects.
Although most respondents from all the schools acknowledged that an effect of using
assessments as an hierarchical accountability mechanisms compels teachers to organise their
work schedules to finish the syllabus on time, fewer in township public schools took such a
view. The general syndrome, though, seems to be very evident. As one educator commented:
The need to finish the syllabus for the exam leads to ‘pushed’ and rushed lessons to make time
for revision (Tr69).
To conclude, the use of assessment as a bureaucratic accountability mechanism can be
applauded for improving accountability among street – level bureaucrats, as well as enhancing
classroom practice and instruction. This is reflected in the data that has been presented here.
However, it should be noted that respondents did highlight that assessments might have also
led to educators manipulating test scores, as well as narrowing the lessons to what teachers
thought examiners would include in the final examinations. Furthermore, such use of
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assessments as an accountability mechanism was seen by many as responsible in forcing
educators to teach at a pace in order to finish the syllabus in time. But assessment by itself may
not be the only bureaucratic accountability which has helped to secure accountability. The next
section will consider other bureaucratic accountability mechanisms.
10.3 uMgungundlovu District: other bureaucratic accountability mechanisms used to
ensure accountability among teachers
This section will investigate the role played by school management teams (SMTs), as well as
by subject advisors and cluster co-ordinators, in uMgungundlovu District in the
implementation of NCS.
10.3.1 uMgungundlovu District: The role of School Management Teams (SMTs)
This section will look at how different schools are enforcing various accountability
mechanisms as they seek to control educators. Observation showed that in a school the SMTs
are responsible for making sure that the national policies are implemented properly in the
classrooms on a day to day basis. The SMTs include the school HoDs, subject heads, deputy
principals, as well as the school principal. District officials have much faith in the internal
accountability mechanisms implemented by SMTs. Although subject advisors are not part of a
school’s internal accountability structures they will be included in this section because often
the management of a particular subject goes beyond school boundaries to the subject advisors.
In terms of policy requirements of a particular subject some teachers communicate directly
with the subject advisors.  Also, cluster coordinators will be discussed here for the same
reason. Table 6.17 shows perceptions of the role of SMTs by respondents based on the type of
school where each teaches.
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20 12 10 7 24
83.30% 50.00% 41.70% 29.20%
Public former Model C
39 21 25 15 47
83.00% 44.70% 53.20% 31.90%
Public location
21 10 9 7 27
77.80% 37.00% 33.30% 25.90%
Total 80 43 44 29 98
This information indicates that in all types of schools the SMT members who supervise most of
the respondents are HoDs. This does not mean that those who were supervised by the HoDs
were not supervised by the principals, cluster co-ordinators or subject advisors. What it shows
is that teachers were supervised most closely by their HoDs.  Observations made by the
researcher revealed that some, but not all, teachers will attend cluster meetings in order to meet
the cluster co-ordinators and subject advisors. This was the case where where more than one
teacher taught a subject at a school. In many cases only one teacher, usually the HoD or subject
head, would attend cluster meetings, which results in fewer numbers of teachers being
supervised directly by a subject advisor. Another reason why fewer teachers might be advised
by subject advisors and cluster co-ordinators is if the respondents taught Grades 8 and 9 [and at
times Grade 10 and 11, and other subjects such as Religion Studies] whose subjects are not
moderated at cluster level.
83.3% of the respondents from the independent schools were supervised by the HoDs while
principals supervised 50%. Only 29.2% of these respondents were also supervised by subject
advisors. The trend was generally the same for respondents from former Model C Schools
where 83% of the respondents were supervised by HoDs while 31.9% were supervised by
subject advisors.
When respondents were asked to say how HoDs supervise their work, they gave the following
brief statements:
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HoDs check the records, and advise on the interpretation of the policy. They conduct
workshops and class visits every term. They also ensure consistency, accountability and
success in tasks done (Tr13).
They do constant checking of records, student books etc. They encourage an educator to excel
in his/her work during classroom visits (Tr43).
The HOD or principal will intervene if need be or asked. ‘Timetabling’ is done by the
principal. Who teaches who is decided by the management. The problem is no subject expert
is guiding us. If we keep a low profile we are left to do pretty much as we please (Tr60).
They are administrative driven – there is more ‘admin’ work and less time to interact with the
learners. They are too prescriptive and emphasise much on policy requirements. They want
100% accuracy. At times they check who is late to lessons or who is absent through check in-
check out registers. The principal can’t see everything (Tr27).
I find HoDs in this school to be very supportive and this has motivated me in terms of my
passion and enthusiasm for teaching (Tr33).
We check the prep [lesson plans] coming in to see if they are following what they should be
doing in class visits. HoDs should be coming in checking books where we look at learners’
results. We also to try and see what’s going on - it’s very difficult to see what happens in the
classroom because when we go into classroom we see that everything is perfect. But what
happens when we are not around is difficult to measure. That’s why at one stage we had a very
detailed performance evaluation thing. On paper people would say everything is happening but
you know in reality that it doesn’t happen all the time but according to your ... you can’t
actually prove that there is something wrong because everything on paper was ok. That is why
we are trying to change, to walk around the class to see what’s going on, talk to children, we
look at their work, and we look at their work when it comes for moderation (Pr1).
Most respondents said that HoDs are key supervisors in their daily work, although teachers can
go a long time without seeing higher level supervisors. HoDs are involved in inspecting
learners’ books, checking class records and lesson plans. They moderate the tasks before they
are given to learners as well as moderate assessments. In some cases respondents said that
HoDs organise a meeting for a subject on a monthly basis. It was also the HoDs who were
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involved in checking learner performance. It was interesting to notice that some respondents
referred to their HoDs as mentors and supporters.
It is clear that school - based HoDs carry a great responsibility in relation to the
implementation process at classroom level (street-level). The researcher, who is also a school -
based HoD, observed that this role is very critical. A HoD is expected to have all the policy
documents for all the subjects in his or her department and to have an in-depth knowledge of
each document to ensure effective implementation. As mentioned by respondents, HoDS play a
crucial role in giving new teachers induction and mentoring them. At the same time they are
expected to play an oversight role, organising internal staff development with teachers in their
department, conducting class visits and inspecting learners’ books. They are the first line of
management to see that teachers are being accountable.
Observation by the researcher revealed that HoDs tend to be more thorough than any other
management level above them. If teachers are doing their work according to policy
requirements it is the HoD who has to give an account to either the school principal or the
subject advisor. It can be assumed that HoDs tend to be thorough in their supervision because
of this. In most cases, HoDs tend to be supportive of the teachers since they always work
together, unlike the principal and the subject advisors. However, the management of teachers is
not left to HoDs alone. Deputy principals and principals are also involved in ensuring
accountability at school level.
Supervising educators is not an easy task. Pr1 has pointed out that it is difficult to monitor what
goes on in a class even for principals and HoDs. Walking around now and then and even
talking to children about what is happening in class are some of the strategies employed by
principals. Principals noted that teachers are professionals: as such principals could not go to
teachers’ classes daily since they assume that educators know what they should do.
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4 18 49 19 8 1
4.00% 18.20% 49.50% 19.20% 8.10% 1.00%
Student book inspection
3 11 46 29 9 1
3.00% 11.10% 46.50% 29.30% 9.10% 1.00%
Staff clock in registers
(attendance)
6 12 42 24 13 2
6.10% 12.10% 42.40% 24.20% 13.10% 2.00%
Teacher records (plans and
progress)
1 10 35 33 20 0
1.00% 10.10% 35.40% 33.30% 20.20% 0.00%
Lesson observation
Table 10.11 shows that a small majority of all respondents (49.5%) indicated that lesson
observation by members of SMT was ‘effective’ in enforcing accountability among teachers
while another 19.2% suggested that it was ‘very effective’ and only 8.1% that was ‘extremely
effective’ as a mechanism of bureaucratic accountability. A small fraction of respondents did
not affirm the effectiveness of this mechanism, with 18.2% indicating that it was ‘not
effective’, while 4% believed that it was ‘not effective at all’.  Generally most of the
respondents acknowledged that lesson observation is an effective tool of hierarchical
accountability.
Inspecting of learners’ books
With regards to inspecting learners’ books as a bureaucratic accountability tool, a total of
46.5% confirmed that it is an ‘effective’ tool, while 29.3% indicated that it was ‘very effective’
and another 9.1% believed that it was ‘extremely effective’.  Observation by the researcher, as
a SMT member, confirmed that learners’ books, in many respects, epitomise what happens in a
classroom. It is often a clear record of what happens in class as it reflects a teachers’ work.
However, checking Creative Arts (formerly Arts and Culture) using this method is not very
effective since some of their activities such as drama and songs are not recorded. To that end,




Schools often have attendance registers for all staff members, including teachers. This register
shows the time of arrival and departure from school. Some schools are too big for anyone
simply to see who is present and who is absent. A register is a bureaucratic means of
measuring compliance, of recording whether teachers are present when they should be. 42.4%
of all the respondents indicated that this is an ‘effective’ mechanism of bureaucratic
accountability while 24.2% suggested that it was ‘very effective’ and another 13.1% expressed
that it was ‘extremely effective’. Only 12% of the respondents indicated that it was ‘not
effective’ while 6.1% said it was ‘not effective at all’. In general, most respondents
acknowledged that a school register was an effective tool of bureaucratic accountability.
Teacher records (plans and progress)
A small majority (35.4%) of all the respondents indicated that inspection of teacher records
was an ‘effective’ mechanism of ensuring bureaucratic accountability, while 33.3% suggested
that it was ‘very effective’ and another 20.2% that it was ‘extremely effective’. However,
10.1% of the respondents indicated that the inspection of the records of teachers was ‘not
effective’ and another 1% suggested it was ‘not effective at all’. Most respondents thought that
the inspection of teacher’ records was an important means of ensuring bureaucratic
accountability.
What can be gleaned from this section is the crucial role played by SMTs in ensuring
bureaucratic accountability. HoDs were seen to be the key members of SMT since they are the
front line managers in educational policy implementation. In order to make them effective,
they were given a manual (KZN DoE, undated). The next section will focus on the role of
cluster co-ordinators and subject advisors in ensuring hierarchical accountability.
10.3.2 uMgungundlovu District: the role of clusters and subject advisors
Schools in uMgungundlovu District are grouped into clusters. These clusters are not organised
according to schools but are based on subjects. Thus different subjects taught at a school
belong to different clusters. Subject advisors work closely with the clusters through an elected
cluster co-ordinator.  Cluster and subject advisors are regarded as key components of
bureaucratic accountability. The accountability role played by clusters and subject advisors is
external to the schools. These advisors work as moderators, overseeing the work of their peers
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from different schools. This is neither a top-down nor a bottom-up accountability system since
the educators here are all at the same level with the exception of the subject advisor.
At the beginning of each year subject teachers and their subject advisors meet in what are
termed orientation workshops in uMgungundlovu District, which is a requirement according to
Annexure 3 of the Guidelines on the Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities of Education
Districts (DBE, 2011b:41). They are grouped into clusters. Each cluster chooses a co-ordinator
to be a link between the cluster and a subject advisor. A cluster co-ordinator is not chosen on
the basis of knowledge, experience or competence. Subject advisors monitor the assessments
of their subjects in each cluster.  The researcher observed that in these clusters meetings
nothing much happens except for token moderation and signing school based assessment
forms. The subject advisor’s role is not well specified. This was confirmed by many
respondents who said that the purpose of a subject advisor is to co-ordinate orientation
workshops at the beginning of the year and to sign the NSC school-based continuous
assessment mark sheets at the end of a year. Respondents commented as follows.
The cluster co-ordinator checks that all assignments are correctly done every term before the
subject advisor can check them. They explain clearly what needs to be done. However, they
sometimes don’t know what they want (Tr92).
Sometimes you are supervised by somebody who does not know the subject (Tr4).
Cluster co-ordinator and moderation - a waste of time, but my subject advisors and I work very
closely together to give support and material to schools in the district (Tr24).
My subject advisor knows less than I do, I mean my subject ... [subject is named]. He is there
because they could not find an advisor for that subject; he is a ... [subject named] person. I
don’t think they are doing anything to make schools and teachers accountable. I think they
tried to introduce policies of going to visit what they call under - performing schools. But their
definition of under - performing school is not right. I would say any school that is performing
below 90% pass rate should be considered to be an under - performing school and they must
be visited, monitored, encouraged and trained to some extent (Tr15).
The comments made by these respondents confirm what the researcher observed in some
cluster meetings. Many times teachers complain about the inability of subject advisors to help
them. In most cases, the few subject advisors try to visit what they call under - performing
schools. Schools that are doing well are often left alone. In one workshop attended by the
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researcher, the subject advisor invited a resource person to help teachers in some special topics
in a subject [subject is known to the researcher] that he was not well versed with. Respondents
indicated that even during workshops subject advisors are dependent on teachers from former
Model C School to help teachers from the under - performing schools. Observation by the
researcher revealed that subject are doing far less than they are expected of in the Annexure 3
of the Guidelines on the Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities of Education Districts (DBE,
2011b). It can be assumed that ensuring accountability when the supervisor does not know
much could be a challenge. Some cluster co-ordinators on the other hand do not offer any
better alternative.
However, it should be noted that subject advisors play an important role in ensuring
bureaucratic accountability, as noted by Tr24. In some cases they disseminate information to
schools and teachers about change to policies pertaining to specific subjects.
To conclude, it is clear that the bureaucratic accountability role played by clusters and subject
advisors is important, but the respondents in this study were not convinced that it is so.
Respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the competence of some subject advisors who are
expected to be key drivers of accountability.
Conclusion
Hierarchical accountability in uMgungundlovu District was seen to be enforced by various
means. The first mechanism discussed in this chapter was assessment of learners through
examinations. Respondents expressed that assessments may be viewed as an accountability
mechanism not only for educators but also for schools and for the learners. The use of
assessment as an hierarchical accountability mechanism has been effective in making street –
level bureaucrats accountable and in improving classroom instruction and practice.
However, it was reported that the use of assessments as a bureaucratic accountability device in
uMgungundlovu District has influenced educators to manipulate test scores as well as to tailor
their teaching to the likely requirements of final examinations. Furthermore, many respondents
acknowledged the need to teach in such a manner so as to ensure that the syllabus is completed
prior to examinations.
The role played by SMTs in ensuring bureaucratic accountability was highlighted. Members of
SMTs are involved in daily issues of policy implementation as front line managers. They visit
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classrooms; inspect books; inspect teachers’ records; as well as keep attendance registers for
teachers. These were viewed as critical components of bureaucratic accountability.
The last section explored the role played by clusters and subject advisors. Although clusters
and subject advisors are expected to function as key components of bureaucratic
accountability, most respondents did not think they were operating properly. Some respondents
lamented subject advisors’ lack of subject knowledge. This concern about professionalism is




UMGUNGUNDLOVU DISTRICT: PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN
IMPLEMENTING THE NCS
The accountability mechanisms which have been discussed so far have not been seen to be
ideal since teachers as street – level bureaucrats will always have resources to cope with the
increased demands of their work and exercise discretion. In some cases, teachers may fail to
comply with the accountability demands out of incompetence, as pointed out by respondents in
the preceding chapter. Education authorities expect teachers to exercise professional
accountability which is guided by professional ethics. Professional accountability is based on
the assumption that teachers are professionals and they should act as such. Therefore, teachers
are held accountable by their peers and professional bodies such as SACE. However, in some
cases teachers are unable to exercise their professional duties due to lack of capacity.
It is against this backdrop that this chapter will examine how professional accountability is
exercised in uMgungundlovu District. It will commence by exploring the perceptions of
educators of SACE as a professional body. The last section of the chapter will investigate
professional development as a way of addressing street – level bureaucrats’ professional
capacity challenges.  The final stage of analysis will consider the effectiveness of professional
development in promoting professional accountability among educators.
11.1 uMgungundlovu District: the role played by SACE in promoting professionalism
The mandate of SACE is to promote the teaching profession by using different strategies, as
was described in Chapter Five. These include registration, inculcating the Code of Ethics and
managing professional development. To what extent is SACE fulfilling this mandate in
uMgungundlovu District?
Registration
Out of all the teachers in the 179 high schools in uMgungundlovu District, only 63.4% were
registered with SACE. In the study sample the percentage of registered teachers was slightly
higher (87%). Considering the requirements for registration that were mentioned earlier
(professionally qualified teachers), it was found that 29% of all the respondents could not
qualify for registration because they do not have the requisite qualification. However, some of
these teachers could be provisionally registered, especially those who were studying towards a
professional teaching qualification. In order to investigate the effectiveness of SACE in making
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sure that only registered professionally qualified educators are teaching in uMgungundlovu
District, the registered and unregistered teachers were tabulated according to the type of school
that they were teaching in. Table 11.1 reveals the results.





N 17 8 25
% 68.0% 32.0% 100.0%
% 19.5% 61.5% 25.0%
Public former Model C
N 45 3 48
% 93.8% 6.3% 100.0%
% 51.7% 23.1% 48.0%
Public township
N 25 2 27
% 92.6% 7.4% 100.0%
% 28.7% 15.4% 27.0%
Total
N 87 13 100
% 87.0% 13.0% 100.0%
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
The data indicate that 68% of respondents from independent schools were registered with
SACE (19% of such respondents) while 32% of their unregistered number were the majority
(61.5%) of such respondents. The biggest proportion (93.8%) of respondents who were
registered were from former Model C schools and were the majority (51.7%) of such
respondents. Only 7.4% of respondents from public township schools were not registered
with SACE; the 92.6% who were registered respondents comprised 28.7% of such
respondents.
On the whole, most respondents who were not registered were from independent schools. In
order to determine the association between registration of teachers by SACE and the type of
schools in which respondents taught a chi – square test was used.  The results (p = 0.005)
show that the association was statistically significant.
Inculcating the Code of Ethics
SACE is expected to promote teaching as a profession and to inculcate professional ethics
through the Code of Ethics. In this regard, teachers are expected to be intrinsically driven
rather than responding only to external accountability requirements in their jobs. To what
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extent do teachers do their work through the influence of professional ethics? Table 11.2
portrays what influences their work.








N 1 10 34 55 0 100
% 1.0% 10.0% 34.0% 55.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Do my work as a moral
obligation
N 4 6 37 53 0 100
% 4.0% 6.0% 37.0% 53.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Respect the views of my
peers
N 0 7 39 54 0 100
% 0.0% 7.0% 39.0% 54.0% 0.0% 100.0%
SACE influences the way I
work
N
32 21 28 19 0 100
% 32.0% 21.0% 28.0% 19.0% 0.0% 100.0%
The data indicate that a majority (55%) of respondents are influenced ‘almost always’ by
professional ethics in their daily tasks, and to 34% this is so ‘sometimes’, while for 10% it is
‘almost never’ so and ‘never’ the case for 1%.  Moral obligation influences 53% of the
respondents in their work ‘almost always’, 37% ‘sometimes’, 6% ‘almost never’ and to 4% it is
‘never’ the case. In terms of holding peers accountable, a majority (54%) of respondents
reported that they respect the views of their peers while 39% reported they do so ‘sometimes’
and 7% ‘almost never’. 32% of the respondents indicated that they are ‘never’ influenced by
SACE in their work and to 21% it was ‘almost never’, 28% ‘sometimes’ and 19% it was
‘almost always’ the case.  SACE received a largely negative reaction from respondents. It is
apparent that respondents identified the factors listed as crucial in their daily work with the
exception of the influence of SACE which received a negative response.
How are these responses influenced by the type of schools where respondents are located? The
next section investigates this further.
11.1.1 uMgungundlovu District: whether professional ethics influences the work of
teachers
Further analysis was carried out to investigate perceptions of respondents of the effect of
professional ethics according to the type of school in which they were located. Table 11.3
displays the results.
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Table 11.3 uMgungundlovu District: perception of respondents of the influence of
professional ethics in their daily work, according to type of school
Type of school
Professional ethics influences my work




N 0 2 11 12 25
% 0.0% 8.0% 44.0% 48.0% 100.0%
% 0.0% 20.0% 32.4% 21.8% 25.0%
Public former Model C
N 0 2 13 33 48
% 0.0% 4.2% 27.1% 68.8% 100.0%
% 0.0% 20.0% 38.2% 60.0% 48.0%
Public township
N 1 6 10 10 27
% 3.7% 22.2% 37.0% 37.0% 100.0%
% 100.0% 60.0% 29.4% 18.2% 27.0%
Total
N 1 10 34 55 100
% 1.0% 10.0% 34.0% 55.0% 100.0%
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 11.3 indicates that 48% of respondents in independent schools said that professional
ethics ‘almost always’ influenced their daily work; 44% rated this as ‘sometimes’ and 8%
(20% of all such respondents) believed this to be ‘almost never’. A very small minority
thought that professional ethical considerations ‘almost never’ influenced their work. Note,
though, that those who rated the influence of professional ethics as ‘almost always’ constituted
21.8% of teachers in all types of schools.
Turning to former Model C schools, 68.8% of respondents (60% of all such respondents)
indicated that professional ethics influenced their work ‘almost always’ while 27.1%
suggested that it was so ‘sometimes’ (38.2% of all such respondents). A minority (4.2%) from
these schools rated the influence of professional ethics in their daily work as ‘almost never’
(20% of all such respondents). Most respondents from these schools identified professional
ethics as crucial in their work.
As far as public township schools are concerned, only 37% of respondents rated the influence
of professional ethics in their daily work as either ‘almost always’ or ‘sometimes’.
Furthermore, they were also in the minority who rated this factor as such. On the other hand,
22.2% of their respondents were the majority (60%) of all respondents who indicated that
professional ethics ‘almost never’ influenced their work. Only one respondent from these
229
schools indicated that it was never the case. A largely negative response concerning the
influence of professional ethics came from these schools.
On the whole, although most respondents from all types of schools identified professional
ethics as crucial in their daily work, that was not the case with public township schools. They
had the biggest percentage of respondents who did not identify this as important. A chi –
square test result (p = 0.03) indicated that this was statically significant. Although the cause of
such apparent disparities with regard to professional ethics among teachers is not well
established, its effects may be reflected in other aspect of their jobs such as commitment to
work and professionalism in general.
11.1.2 uMgungundlovu District: the influence of moral obligation on the daily work of
teachers
In order to investigate the perceptions of respondents of the effect of moral obligation in their
daily work according to the type of school in which they were located the two variables were
cross-tabulated. Table 11.3 portrays the results.
Table 11.4 uMgungundlovu District: perception of respondents of the influence of moral
obligation in their daily work, according to type of school
Type of school
Do my work as moral obligation
TotalNever Almost never Sometimes Almost always
Independent
1 1 9 14 25
4.0% 4.0% 36.0% 56.0% 100.0%
25.0% 16.7% 24.3% 26.4% 25.0%
Public former Model C
3 4 12 29 48
6.3% 8.3% 25.0% 60.4% 100.0%
75.0% 66.7% 32.4% 54.7% 48.0%
Public township
0 1 16 10 27
0.0% 3.7% 59.3% 37.0% 100.0%
0.0% 16.7% 43.2% 18.9% 27.0%
Total
4 6 37 53 100
4.0% 6.0% 37.0% 53.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Most (56%) of respondents in independent schools indicated that they viewed their work as a
moral obligation ‘almost always’ and 36% that this is ‘sometimes’ so. Only 4% rated moral
obligation as either ‘almost never’ or ‘never’ a factor. Note, though, that 25% of all
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respondents who rated moral obligation as ‘never’ and 16.7% who said ‘almost never’ were
from independent schools.
A majority (60.4%) of respondents in former Model C schools (54.7% of all such respondents)
indicated that moral obligation influences their work ‘almost always’ and 25% that it was so
‘sometimes’.  8.3% of respondents from these schools comprised 66.7% of all respondents who
indicated that moral obligation ‘almost never’ influenced their daily work. The 75% who
suggested that moral obligation ‘never’ influenced the way they work were from 6.3% of
respondents from former Model C schools.
Turning to public township schools, a majority (59.3%) indicated that moral obligation only
influences their work ‘sometimes’ (43.2% of all who held such a view) and 37% that this is so
‘almost always’ (a minority (18.9%) of all who took such a viewpoint). Only 3.7% (one
respondent) indicated that moral obligation ‘almost never’ influenced his or her daily work.
Most respondents identified the crucial influence of moral obligation in their daily work
although there were slight insignificant variations between respondents from different type of
schools.
11.1.3 uMgungundlovu District: the influences of peers on the work of teachers
In order to explore how respondents in different types of schools perceive the role of peers on
their work the two variables were calculated and the results are displayed in Table 11.5.
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Table 11.5 uMgungundlovu District: perception of respondents of the influence of peers
in their daily work, according to type of school
Type of school
Respect the views of my peers
TotalAlmost never Sometimes Almost always
Independent
2 10 13 25
8.0% 40.0% 52.0% 100.0%
28.6% 25.6% 24.1% 25.0%
Public former Model C
3 16 29 48
6.3% 33.3% 60.4% 100.0%
42.9% 41.0% 53.7% 48.0%
Public township
2 13 12 27
7.4% 48.1% 44.4% 100.0%
28.6% 33.3% 22.2% 27.0%
Total
7 39 54 100
7.0% 39.0% 54.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
The majority (52%) of respondents from independent schools (24.1% of all such respondents)
indicated that ‘almost always’ they respected the views of their peers concerning their work
and 40% suggested that it was so ‘sometimes’. Only 8% said this was ‘almost never’ the case
although they were 28.6% of all the respondents who took such a view. It is apparent that
most of the respondents from these schools identified the influence of peers as crucial in their
work.
With regard to former Model C schools, 60.4% of their respondents were the majority (53.7)
of all respondents who indicated that that they respected the influence of their peers on their
work. Furthermore, 33.3% of respondents from these schools were also the majority (41%) of
all respondents who rated their influence of peers as ‘sometimes’ while only 6.3% said it was
‘almost never’ so. Generally, most responses from these schools were largely positive.
Turning to public township schools, the majority (48.1%) indicated that ‘sometimes’ peers
influenced their work (33.3% of all who took such a view). Another relatively large
proportion (44.4%) suggested that it was so ‘almost always’.  Only 7.4% felt that peers
‘almost never’ influenced their work. Most respondents were generally positive about the
influence of their peers in their work.
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In general, respondents from different types of schools identified the importance of the role
played by their peers in their work. This may be taken to mean that teachers tend to hold each
other accountable in the form of professional accountability. Having considered this, what is
the role of SACE as a professional organisation in promoting these values among teachers in
uMgungundlovu District? The next section explores this further.
11.1.4 uMgungundlovu District: the role of SACE in promoting the teaching profession
Bearing in mind the mandate given to SACE - to promote the teaching profession -
respondents were asked whether it was living up to this. The results are presented in Table 11.6
according to the type of school in which the respondents were located.
Table 11.6 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of respondents of the promotion of the
teaching profession by SACE, according to type of school
Type of school
SACE promotes the teaching profession
TotalNever Almost never Sometimes Almost always
Independent
9 8 5 3 25
36.0% 32.0% 20.0% 12.0% 100.0%
28.1% 38.1% 17.9% 15.8% 25.0%
Public former Model C
19 6 14 9 48
39.6% 12.5% 29.2% 18.8% 100.0%
59.4% 28.6% 50.0% 47.4% 48.0%
Public township
4 7 9 7 27
14.8% 25.9% 33.3% 25.9% 100.0%
12.5% 33.3% 32.1% 36.8% 27.0%
Total
32 21 28 19 100
32.0% 21.0% 28.0% 19.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
A small majority (36%) of respondents from independent schools felt that SACE ‘never’
promoted the teaching profession (28.1% of all such respondents) and 32% indicated that this
was ‘almost never’ (38.1% of all respondents who took such a view). Only 20% said
‘sometimes’ SACE promoted the teaching profession and another small percentage (12%) said
‘almost always’ SACE was doing so (15.8% of all such respondents). Most of the respondents
from the independent schools expressed dissatisfaction with the activities of SACE.
A majority (59.4) of all the respondents who said SACE was ‘never’ involved in the promotion
of the teaching promotion were from former Model C schools (39.6% of respondents from
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such schools). Only 12.5% from these schools indicated that it was ‘almost never’ the case and
29.2% that it was ‘sometimes’ so (50% of all such respondents). 47.4% of those who indicated
that ‘almost always’ SACE was involved in promotion of the teaching profession was from
former Model C schools. A largely negative response about the role of SACE came from
respondents in these schools.
Although respondents from township public schools were 27% of all the respondents, they
comprised 36.8% of the respondents who indicated that SACE was ‘almost always’ working to
promote the teaching profession. 33.3% indicated that this was so ‘sometimes’, 25.9% that it
was ‘almost never’ so and 14.8% that it was ‘never’ the case. Again, responses from these
schools were also largely negative.
In order to present a detailed perspective of respondents about SACE, some of their comments
are noted here.
When it comes to professional ethics it depends on individuals involved - some say why bother,
they actually pull each other down. I think SACE holds educators accountable in terms of
making sure that they get qualified. They also send out guidelines on how teachers should
conduct themselves. But in the same breath, I can also say that they are not very useful, In fact,
I don’t even know if we should call SACE a professional body. All they are doing is making
sure that educators get qualified.  They make sure that they do not register them until they are
qualified or they have proof that they are studying towards an educational qualification.
However, there are many unregistered teachers in both government and private schools (Pr1).
SACE is meaningless, it’s useless. It’s just there to take your R10 [per month]. There are some
SACE registered teachers who don’t go to school on Fridays and Mondays and when they do
so they are drunk. So SACE registration is meaningless.  You can have a degree and still don’t
teach and but you be paid. You never see a SACE official visiting a school (Tr27).
At the moment the only prominent activities of SACE is misconduct – if a teacher is having
affairs with learners then that case is reported and investigated. If he is found guilty that
teacher is struck off the register. Other than that I haven’t seen anything done by SACE. I
haven’t seen SACE supporting educators in any way. I haven’t seen any workshop organised
by SACE. I haven’t seen any developmental programme organised by SACE. I only hear of
SACE when there is misconduct. Every teacher subscribes to SACE (Pr5).
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All the respondents confirmed that they pay a monthly subscription towards SACE. This has
led some respondents to believe that the role of SACE was to collect money. Many
respondents indicated that they had never seen a SACE official visiting their schools. However,
some respondents confirmed that they knew SACE became involved in cases of misconduct
and the deregistration of teachers for this. Some respondents suggested that registration does
not make educators accountable since there are many registered teachers who were unable to
deliver lessons and some who do not go to work on some days.
What can be gleaned from this section is that professional accountability is an internal
accountability mechanism (in terms of schools and the individual teachers themselves).
Professional ethics, moral obligation and peer accountability form the basis of professional
accountability in schools. On the other hand, professional accountability may take an external
form (in terms of the involvement of the professional body, SACE, in ensuring accountability
among teachers. However, the discussion has shown that SACE was not effective in
performing this role in uMgungundlovu District.
The discussion has indicated that most teachers do their work not as a response to various
accountability devices which are administered to them but through personal motivation such as
moral obligation and professional ethics. What would happen if a street – level bureaucrat
would like to comply with all accountability directives but lacks the professional competence
to be effective in executing tasks?  The next section investigates this issue further.
11.2 uMgungundlovu District: Professional development as a means of enhancing
professional accountability
In order to respond to external accountability demands the DBE has been using professional
development and training as a way of making teachers accountable.  Professional development
may take the form of pre-service training and in-service training. To what extent can
professional development be related to professional accountability? This question was raised in
interviews and the findings are presented here.
Professional development and accountability are different sides of the same coin - this is why
Umalusi and other departments are insisting that teachers should not end with an academic
degree but there is a need to have a professional qualification and continuous development. I
think it still important that teachers do professional development and keep up to date. I mean
teachers who did their training 25 to 30 years ago and have not been prepared to keep up to
date with what is going on. So they should make it compulsory thing to keep your registration
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with it. To a certain extent it’s good but I think what they are doing is going overboard because
they are expecting too much with the SACE point system.  Someone can be excellent in doing
courses but delivery is different (Pr1).
I think the government is strengthening itself in teacher development because there are sub-
directorates dealing with teacher development and there are posts being advertised [in
uMgungundlovu District].  So in about one or two years we are going to see a sub-directorate
on teacher development (Prl2).
If the department was doing proper training and the development of teachers – I mean if I get
trained to function properly I can be held accountable to function properly. But if I am not
trained properly and come along you ask me why I am not doing this like it should be done. I
just tell you that I don’t know how to.  If the department was doing proper training not what
they are doing now, then they come back to the teachers and say, ‘look we trained you in these
things but your learners have done badly’. It can’t be all learners; there must be a teacher role
there. In another way, I don’t think the department should hold the teachers entirely
responsible. It is the department that has not done its job properly in terms of professional
development and training (Pr3).
Accountability and training are linked. Training of educators should most definitely involve the
adoption or internalisation of ethical standards, responsibility and accountability (Prl4).
With learning comes accountability because you know something then you do it, but if you
don’t know it, then you don’t do it (Prl5).
Professional development is linked to accountability. If you say an unqualified person can be a
teacher you are lowering the standards of a teacher. But if you make them highly qualified
both theoretically and practically the quality of education is determined by the quality of a
teacher (Prl6).
It was quite clear from these interviews that professional development was seen as linked to
professional accountability. All the respondents acknowledged the crucial role of staff
development in professional accountability. Prl1 highlighted the importance of continuous staff
development well after teachers have attained their professional qualifications. This data also
revealed that the DBE is instituting a sub-directorate for teacher development. The data has
also shown the belief that educated and qualified teachers are likely to perform effectively
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because of the acquired professional competence. The next section will consider the role of
professional development in uMgungundlovu District.
11.2.1 uMgungundlovu District: attendance at professional development workshops
In order to investigate the value of professional development as means of enhancing
professional accountability in uMgungundlovu District, respondents were asked if they had
attended workshops on some key aspects of their jobs. The results presented in Table 11.7 are
listed according to the aspects of the workshops that were attended by most respondents.
Table 11.7 uMgungundlovu District: workshops attended by respondents in 2011
Yes No
Subject knowledge 72.0% 28.0%
Curriculum knowledge 72.0% 28.0%
Assessment and keeping records 64.9% 35.1%
Knowledge of children and learning 58.0% 42.0%
Class management 55.2% 44.8%
Leadership 55.1% 44.9%
Classroom methodology 52.1% 47.9%
It is apparent that the most attended professional development workshops were those which
covered subject knowledge and curriculum knowledge, with 72% each, followed by
assessment and keeping records (64.9%). The workshops that were attended by the least
number of respondents were: knowledge of children and learning (58%), class management
(55.2%) leadership (55.1%) and classroom methodology (52.1%). It was not clear why many
did not attend workshops on class management, leadership and classroom methodology. Do
teachers, though, implement what they learn from such professional development workshops?
11.2.2 uMgungundlovu District: use in the classroom of knowledge learned from
professional development
Formal professional development workshops
Observation showed that at times teachers did not attend the formal professional development
workshops out of the desire to learn but rather as a duty. Because of this, some teachers did not
apply what they learnt from such workshops. Teachers were asked about this with specific
reference to formal workshops and the results are presented in Table 11.8.
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Table 11.8 uMgungundlovu District: use of knowledge acquired from formal professional
development workshops by teachers, according to type of school
Type of school
Formal (workshops and training)
TotalNever Almost never Sometimes Almost always
Independent
2 8 8 6 24
8.3% 33.3% 33.3% 25.0% 100.0%
33.3% 24.2% 25.0% 21.4% 24.2%
Public former Model C
2 19 14 13 48
4.2% 39.6% 29.2% 27.1% 100.0%
33.3% 57.6% 43.8% 46.4% 48.5%
Public township
2 6 10 9 27
7.4% 22.2% 37.0% 33.3% 100.0%
33.3% 18.2% 31.3% 32.1% 27.3%
Total
6 33 32 28 99
6.1% 33.3% 32.3% 28.3% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
A small majority (33.3%) of all the respondents indicated that they ‘almost never’ used what
they learned from formal professional development workshops, and 32.3% that they did so
‘sometimes’. 28.3% rated this as ‘almost always’ the case while a small proportion (6.1%)
thought that they ‘never’ used knowledge acquired from formal professional development
workshops. Although the number of negative response was considerable, most teachers
indicated that they did apply in the classroom what they learn from workshops.
Further analysis indicated that 25% of respondents from independent schools indicated that
they ‘almost always’ used knowledge learnt from the professional development workshops,
33% suggested that they did so ‘ sometimes’ while another 33.3% felt this was ‘almost never’.
8.3% of respondents from these schools were 33.3% of all respondents who indicated that they
‘never’ use what they learn from the workshops.
Turning to respondents from former Model C schools, 27.1% felt that they used what they
learn from workshops ‘almost always’ (46.4% of all such respondents), 29.2% rated this as
‘sometimes’ 39.6% said they ‘almost never’ did so (57.6% of all respondents who held such a
view).  Only 4.2% said they ‘never’ use what they learn from formal professional development
workshops. The response from former Model C schools was largely negative. This is despite
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the fact that some of the workshops are facilitated by teachers from such schools [noted during
observation].
With regard to respondents from public township schools, 33.3% indicated that they used what
they learn from formal professional development workshops ‘almost always’ and a small
majority (37%) that they did so ‘sometimes’ while to 22.2% it was ‘almost never’ the case.
7.4% believed that they ‘never’ use anything they learn from formal professional development
workshops. In general, the response from these schools was positive.
It is apparent that most respondents apply what they learn from formal professional
development workshops. However, the proportion of teachers who did not use what they learnt
from formal professional development workshops was significantly high, bearing in mind the
value and resources spent on them. How different is this from informal learning and training
that happens in schools between teachers, their peers, mentors and HoDs?
Informal training in schools
It has been argued that teachers tend to use the knowledge they acquire informally in schools
where they teach. Respondents were asked about this and the results are displayed in Table.
11.9.
Table 11.9 uMgungundlovu District: use of knowledge acquired informally by teachers,
according to type of school
Type of school






Independent 3 6 8 7 24
12.5% 25.0% 33.3% 29.2% 100.0%
27.3% 20.7% 25.8% 25.9% 24.5%
Public former Model C 5 11 16 15 47
10.6% 23.4% 34.0% 31.9% 100.0%
45.5% 37.9% 51.6% 55.6% 48.0%
Public township 3 12 7 5 27
11.1% 44.4% 25.9% 18.5% 100.0%
27.3% 41.4% 22.6% 18.5% 27.6%
Total 11 29 31 27 98
11.2% 29.6% 31.6% 27.6% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
27.6% of respondents indicated that they used what they learnt informally in schools in which
they were located ‘almost always’, 31.6% that they use this ‘sometimes’ and 29.6% that it was
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‘almost never’ the case. To 11.2% of the respondents, it was an outright ‘never’ the case. Most
respondents identified the importance of what they learn from their peers and HoDs in informal
ways.
Further analysis revealed that 25.9% of all respondents who said they used what they
informally learnt from colleagues ‘almost always’ were from independent schools. 33.3% of
respondents from these schools indicated that that they did so ‘sometimes’ and 25% said it was
‘almost never’ the case (20.7% of all such respondents). 12.5% said it was ‘never’ the case
(27.3% of all respondents who held such a view). However, the response from these schools
was largely positive.
In the former Model C schools, 31.9% of the respondents were in the majority (55.6%) of all
those who indicated that they used what they learn from informal meetings in schools ‘almost
always’. 34% thought that they did so ‘sometimes’ (51.6% of all the respondents who took
such a view) and 23.4% said it was ‘almost never’ the case, while 10.5% rated this as ‘never’
so (45.5% of all such respondents). It was apparent that these respondents identified informal
learning and training as a crucial factor in professional accountability.
What was evident from respondents in the public schools in townships was that a small
majority (44.4%) indicated that they ‘almost never’ used what they learnt from informal
interactions in the school (they were also 44.4% of all respondents who took such a
standpoint). 11.1% believed that they ‘never’ did so, while 25.9% indicated that it was
‘sometimes’ the case and 18.5% rated this factor as ‘almost always’. A largely negative
response emerged from respondents from these schools.
Although responses from public schools in townships seemed to deviate from the trend in other
types of schools generally, most respondents pointed out that they used information from
informal training in schools. Altogether, respondents from all types of schools showed that
they use information gained from both formal and informal means of professional
development.
Although a large proportion of respondents reported that they used what they learnt from
professional development workshops, it was difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of such
workshops. The next section explores this further.
240
11.3 uMgungundlovu District: perceived effectiveness of professional development
workshops
The respondents were asked about the effectiveness of different professional development
workshops in enhancing professional accountability among teachers.  Professional
development workshops were classified according to the areas, knowledge or skills they
intended to develop among teachers. As a result, the section will consider the perceived
effectiveness of professional development aimed at: subject knowledge; curriculum
knowledge; assessment and recording; knowledge of children and learning; class management;
leadership; and classroom methodology according to the type of schools the respondents were
located.
11.3.1 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional
development that focused on subject content knowledge
Respondents were asked about the effectiveness of professional development workshops that
aimed at enhancing their knowledge of subject content in enhancing professional
accountability. Only 78% of the sample [those who attended such workshops] responded to
this question. The results are displayed in Table 11.10.
Table 11.10 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional













0 1 3 7 3 1 15
0.0% 6.7% 20.0% 46.7% 20.0% 6.7% 100.0%
0.0% 16.7% 10.3% 28.0% 25.0% 20.0% 19.2%
Public former Model C
1 3 16 10 7 4 41
2.4% 7.3% 39.0% 24.4% 17.1% 9.8% 100.0%
100.0% 50.0% 55.2% 40.0% 58.3% 80.0% 52.6%
Public township
0 2 10 8 2 0 22
0.0% 9.1% 45.5% 36.4% 9.1% 0.0% 100.0%
0.0% 33.3% 34.5% 32.0% 16.7% 0.0% 28.2%
Total
1 6 29 25 12 5 78
1.3% 7.7% 37.2% 32.1% 15.4% 6.4% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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Findings showed that a small majority (37.2%) of all respondents indicated that professional
development aimed at subject content knowledge was ‘effective’ in promoting professional
accountability, 32.1% that it was ‘very effective’ and 15.4% that it was ‘extremely effective’.
A small proportion (7.7%) rated this as ‘slightly effective’ and 1.3% (one respondent) believed
that it was ‘not effective at all’. Generally, this factor received a positive response from all
respondents.
Further investigation revealed that 46.7% of respondents from independent schools suggested
that professional development aimed at subject content knowledge was ‘very effective’ (28%
of all respondent who took such a view), 20% that it was ‘extremely effective’ (25% of all such
respondents) and 20% that it was effective (10.3% of all those who held such a position).  Only
6.7% rated this as ‘slightly effective’. On the whole, respondents from these schools gave a
positive response to this question.
A small majority (39%) of those who were surveyed in the former Model C schools rated the
professional development workshops based on subject knowledge as simply ‘effective’ (55.2%
of such respondents), 24.4% as ‘very effective’ and 17.1% as ‘extremely effective’ (58.3% of
all respondents who held such a view). 7.3% believed that it was ‘slightly effective’ and 2.4%
that it was ‘not effective at all’ (100% of all such respondents). Most respondents from these
schools identified professional development that focused on subject content knowledge as
beneficial in enhancing professional accountability.
Turning to the public township schools, a small majority (45.5%) of respondents indicated that
professional development aimed at subject content knowledge was ‘effective’, 36.4% rated this
as ‘very effective’ and 9.1% as ‘extremely effective’ (16.7% of all such respondents). Only
9.1% from these schools felt that it was ‘slightly effective’. Like respondents from other types
of schools, respondents from these schools also identified subject content knowledge as crucial
in enhancing professional accountability.
It is apparent that regardless of the type of school in which the respondents were situated, they
all indentified professional development that was subject based as effective in enhancing
professional accountability. However, those from independent schools rated the effectiveness
more highly than those from other types of schools.
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11.3.2 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional
development that focused on curriculum knowledge
Those surveyed were asked about the effectiveness of professional development workshops
that were aimed at enhancing their curriculum knowledge in promoting professional
accountability. 79% of the sample responded to this question and the results are portrayed in
Table 11.11 according to the types of schools they were located.
Table 11.11 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional













0 2 3 9 2 0 16
0.0% 12.5% 18.8% 56.3% 12.5% 0.0% 100.0%
0.0% 25.0% 10.0% 40.9% 15.4% 0.0% 20.3%
Public former Model C
3 3 17 7 8 3 41
7.3% 7.3% 41.5% 17.1% 19.5% 7.3% 100.0%
100.0% 37.5% 56.7% 31.8% 61.5% 100.0% 51.9%
Public township
0 3 10 6 3 0 22
0.0% 13.6% 45.5% 27.3% 13.6% 0.0% 100.0%
0.0% 37.5% 33.3% 27.3% 23.1% 0.0% 27.8%
Total
3 8 30 22 13 3 79
3.8% 10.1% 38.0% 27.8% 16.5% 3.8% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Preliminary analysis showed that 16.5% of those who responded indicated that professional
development workshops that were based on curriculum knowledge were ‘extremely effective’
in enhancing professional accountability among teachers, 27.8% rated this as ‘very effective’
and 38% felt that it was ‘effective’. A small percentage (10.1%) believed that it was slightly
‘effective’ and 3.8% suggested that it was ‘not effective at all’. Generally, most respondents
identified this as a crucial component of professional accountability.
Further analysis revealed that 20% of all who responded to this question were from
independent schools. A majority (56.3%) from these schools indicated that professional
development for curriculum knowledge was ‘very effective’ in enhancing professional
accountability (40.9% of all such respondents).  Another 12.5% rated this as ‘extremely
effective’ and 18.8% believed it was simply ‘effective’.  A small minority (12.5%) felt that it
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was ‘slightly effective’ (25% of all who held such a view). It is clear that this question received
a positive response from respondents in independent schools.
Turning to respondents in the former Model C schools, 19.5% indicated that professional
development for curriculum knowledge was ‘extremely effective’ in promoting professional
accountability (61.5% of all such respondents). 17.1% rated this as ‘very effective’ and 41.3%
as simply ‘effective’. A very small minority (7.3%) rated this as either ‘slightly effective’ or
‘not effective at all’. Although respondents from these schools comprised 100% of those who
said ‘not effective all’, most of them were positive about the effectiveness of professional
development for curriculum knowledge.
With regards to respondents in the public township schools, a small majority (45.5%) rated the
effectiveness of professional development for curriculum knowledge as ‘effective’ (33.3% of
all such respondents), 27.3% as ‘very effective’ and 13.6% as ‘extremely effective’. A very
small proportion (13.6%) felt that it was ‘slightly effective’ (37.5% of all respondents who held
such a view). Again, a largely positive response came from the respondents in the public
township schools.
Overall, it is clear that most respondents, regardless of the schools in which they were
teaching, identified professional development for curriculum knowledge as a key aspect of
professional accountability.
11.3.3 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional
development that focused on assessment and keeping records
Respondents were asked about the effectiveness of professional development workshops that
were aimed at enhancing their knowledge of assessments and keeping records. 74% of the
sample responded to this question. The results portrayed in Table 11.12 are according to the
type of school where the respondents were located.
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Table 11.12 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional














0 1 3 9 3 0 16
0.0% 6.3% 18.8% 56.3% 18.8% 0.0% 100.0%
0.0% 20.0% 15.0% 36.0% 21.4% 0.0% 21.6%
Public former Model C
2 3 6 11 9 8 39
5.1% 7.7% 15.4% 28.2% 23.1% 20.5% 100.0%
100.0% 60.0% 30.0% 44.0% 64.3% 100.0% 52.7%
Public township
0 1 11 5 2 0 19
0.0% 5.3% 57.9% 26.3% 10.5% 0.0% 100.0%
0.0% 20.0% 55.0% 20.0% 14.3% 0.0% 25.7%
Total
2 5 20 25 14 8 74
2.7% 6.8% 27.0% 33.8% 18.9% 10.8% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
A small majority (33.8%) of those surveyed indicated that professional development for
assessment and keeping records was ‘very effective’, 18.9% rated this as ‘extremely effective’
and 27% as ‘effective’ in enhancing professional accountability among teachers. A minority
(2.7%) felt that it was ‘not effective at all’ and 6.8% that it was ‘slightly effective’.  A
significant proportion (10.8%) who had ‘no opinion’ on this question emanated from those
who had not attended such professional development workshops. Generally, most respondents
were positive about the effectiveness of such professional development workshops.
Analysis done according to the type of school in which the respondents were located indicated
that a majority (56.3%) of respondents from independent schools felt that professional
development for assessment and record keeping was ‘very effective’ and 18.8% that it was
either ‘extremely effective’ or simply ‘effective’ in enhancing professional accountability. A
small percentage (6.3%) of those surveyed indicated that it was ‘slightly effective’ (20% of all
respondents who held such a view). On the whole, respondents from these schools were
positive about the effectiveness of such professional development.
Further analysis revealed that a very small majority (28.2%) of respondents from former Model
C schools rated the effectiveness of professional development on assessment and recording as
‘very effective’ (44.% of all such respondents), 23.1% as ‘extremely effective’ (64.3%) of all
respondents who took such a standpoint) and 15.4% as ‘effective’. A small proportion (7.7%)
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felt that such professional development was ‘slightly effective’ and 5.1% that it was ‘not
effective all’. However, it is clear that the majority identified professional development on
assessment and keeping records as an important key to enhancing professional accountability.
Turning to the respondents in public township schools, a majority (57.9%) indicated that
professional development on assessment and record keeping was simply ‘effective’, (55% of
all respondents who took such a view), 26.3% that it was ‘very effective’ (20% of all such
respondents) and 10.5% that it was ‘extremely effective’ in promoting professional
accountability. Only 5.3% felt that such professional development was ‘slightly effective’. On
the whole, respondents from these schools were positive about the effectiveness of such
professional development.
It is clear that a largely positive response came from the respondents from all types of schools,
although those in former Model C schools tended to have more respondents with negative
perceptions about professional development for assessment and record keeping as a means of
enhancing professional accountability.
11.3.4 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional
development that focused on knowledge of children and learning
77% of the sample responded to the question about the effectiveness of professional
development workshops in enhancing knowledge of children and learning in promoting
professional accountability among teachers. The results portrayed in Table 11.13 according to
the type of school in which the educators were located.
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Table 11.13 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional
development on knowledge of children and learning, according to type of school
Type of school












0 3 4 9 0 1 17
0.0% 17.6% 23.5% 52.9% 0.0% 5.9% 100.0%
0.0% 20.0% 17.4% 37.5% 0.0% 16.7% 22.1%
Public former Model C
2 8 12 10 4 5 41
4.9% 19.5% 29.3% 24.4% 9.8% 12.2% 100.0%
100.0% 53.3% 52.2% 41.7% 57.1% 83.3% 53.2%
Public township
0 4 7 5 3 0 19
0.0% 21.1% 36.8% 26.3% 15.8% 0.0% 100.0%
0.0% 26.7% 30.4% 20.8% 42.9% 0.0% 24.7%
Total
2 15 23 24 7 6 77
2.6% 19.5% 29.9% 31.2% 9.1% 7.8% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Results from preliminary analysis revealed that a small majority (31.2%) of those surveyed
were of the opinion that professional development on knowledge of children and learning was
‘very effective’ in enhancing professional accountability. 29.9% indicated that it was
‘effective’, 9.1% that it was ‘extremely effective’ and 7.8% had ‘no opinion’.  A small but
significant percentage (19.5%) felt that such professional development was ‘slightly effective’
and 2.6% that it was ‘not effective at all’. However, it was clear that most identified
professional development as important for professional accountability.
Additional analysis revealed that a majority (52.9%) of respondents from the independent
schools felt that professional development on knowledge of children and learning was ‘very
effective’ (37.5% of such respondents) and 23.5% that it was ‘effective’ (17.4% of all
respondents who took such a position). Another 17.6% from these schools suggested that it
was ‘slightly effective’ (20% of all such respondents). A largely positive response came from
these respondents.
Turning to respondents in the former Model C schools, 29.3% indicated that professional
development on knowledge of children and learning was ‘effective’ (52.2% of all such
respondents), 24.4% that it was ‘very effective’ (41.7% of all those who took a similar
position)  and 9.8% that it was ‘extremely effective’ (57.1% of all such respondents). 19.5%
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indicated that such professional development was ‘slightly effective’ and 4.9% that it was ‘not
effective all’. A large proportion (83.3%) of all those who had ‘no opinion’ on this question
were from former Model C schools which suggests that these schools had the highest number
of all those who had not attended such professional development workshops.
With regard to respondents from public township schools, a small majority (36.8%) indicated
that professional development on knowledge of children and learning was ‘effective’ in
enhancing professional accountability among teachers (30.4% of all those who took such a
position). 26.3% suggested that it was ‘very effective’ (20.8% of all such respondents) and
15.85% that it was ‘extremely effective’ (42.9% of all those who took such a view). A small
but significant proportion (21%) felt that such professional development was ‘slightly
effective’.  It is, however, clear that most respondents from these schools identified such
professional development as effective in promoting professional accountability among
teachers.
What is apparent from these findings is that most educators from all types of schools identified
professional development on knowledge of children and learning as a critical component of
professional accountability. Note, though, that a small but significant proportion of respondents
from former Model C schools did not have an opinion because they might not have attended
such professional development workshops.
11.3.5 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional
development that focused on classroom management
Respondents were asked to give their opinion about the effectiveness of professional
development workshops on class management as means of promoting professional
accountability among teachers. The results which are based on 71% of the sample are
portrayed in Table 11.14 according to the type of school in which respondents were located.
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Table 11.14 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional














0 3 3 6 3 0 15
0.0% 20.0% 20.0% 40.0% 20.0% 0.0% 100.0%
0.0% 50.0% 13.0% 33.3% 21.4% 0.0% 21.1%
Public former Model C
3 2 13 7 8 6 39
7.7% 5.1% 33.3% 17.9% 20.5% 15.4% 100.0%
75.0% 33.3% 56.5% 38.9% 57.1% 100.0% 54.9%
Public township
1 1 7 5 3 0 17
5.9% 5.9% 41.2% 29.4% 17.6% 0.0% 100.0%
25.0% 16.7% 30.4% 27.8% 21.4% 0.0% 23.9%
Total
4 6 23 18 14 6 71
5.6% 8.5% 32.4% 25.4% 19.7% 8.5% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Preliminary analysis revealed that a very small majority (32.4%) of the respondents felt that the
professional development that focused on classroom management was ‘effective’, 25.4% that it
was ‘very effective’ and 19.7% that it was extremely effective’. 8.5% had either ‘no opinion’
or suggested that it was ‘slightly effective’ and 5.6% believed that it was ‘not effective at all’.
Generally, most respondents identified such professional development as important for
professional accountability.
Further examination showed that 20% of the respondents from independent schools rated
professional development that focused on classroom management as ‘extremely effective’
(21% of all such respondents), 40% as ‘very effective’ (33.3% of all the respondents who took
such a view) and 20% as simply ‘effective’ (13% of all such respondents). 20% of the
respondents from these schools who felt that such professional development was ‘slightly
effective’ were the majority of all respondents who held such a view. Responses from these
schools were essentially positive.
What stood out most for responses from former Model C schools is that they had the largest
proportion (15%) of all respondents who had ‘no opinion’ (100% all the respondents who took
such a view). This may suggest that these schools had the largest proportion of teachers who
had not attended such workshops. 20% indicated that such professional development was
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‘extremely effective’ (57.1% of all such respondents), 17.9% that it was ‘very effective’
(38.9% of all those who took a similar view) and 33.3% that it was ‘effective’. A small
percentage (5.1%) rated such professional development as ‘slightly effective’ and 7.7% as ‘not
effective at all’ (75% of all those who held the same view). It is, however, apparent that most
respondents from these schools rated such professional development as crucial for the
promotion of professional accountability.
Turning to the respondents from the public township schools, a small majority (41.2%) rated
professional development that focused on classroom management as ‘effective’ in enhancing
professional accountability. 29.4% rated such professional development as ‘very effective’
(27.8% of all such respondents) and 17.6% as ‘extremely effective’ (21.4% of all those who
took such a view). A minority (5.9%) rated this kind of professional development as either
‘slightly effective’ or ‘not effective at all’. Again, it is clear that respondents from these
schools identified such professional development as crucial for professional accountability.
Most respondents indicated that professional development that focused on classroom
management was a key to the promotion of professional accountability. However, it was also
clear that a significant proportion (29%) of all the respondents had not attended such
professional development workshops.
11.3.6 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional
development that focused on leadership skills
About 69% of the all the respondents attended leadership professional development
workshops. They were asked to give their opinion about the effectiveness of such professional
development as a means of promoting professional accountability among teachers. The results
are portrayed in Table 11.15 according to the type of school in which they were located.
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Table 11.15 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional














0 1 3 5 2 2 13
0.0% 7.7% 23.1% 38.5% 15.4% 15.4% 100.0%
0.0% 20.0% 16.7% 22.7% 16.7% 20.0% 18.8%
Public former Model C
1 3 6 10 8 8 36
2.8% 8.3% 16.7% 27.8% 22.2% 22.2% 100.0%
50.0% 60.0% 33.3% 45.5% 66.7% 80.0% 52.2%
Public township
1 1 9 7 2 0 20
5.0% 5.0% 45.0% 35.0% 10.0% 0.0% 100.0%
50.0% 20.0% 50.0% 31.8% 16.7% 0.0% 29.0%
Total
2 5 18 22 12 10 69
2.9% 7.2% 26.1% 31.9% 17.4% 14.5% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
The findings revealed that a small majority (31.9%) indicated that professional development
that focused on leadership was ‘very effective’ in promoting professional accountability among
educators, 17.4% that it was ‘extremely effective’ and 26.1% that it was simply ‘effective’. A
very small proportion (7.2%) rated the effectiveness of such professional development as
‘slightly effective’ and 2.9% (two respondents) as ‘not effective at all’. It is apparent that most
respondents felt that such professional development was important for enhancing professional
accountability.
An analysis of the findings according to the type of school revealed that a small majority
(38.5%) of the respondents from the independent schools rated the effectiveness of
professional development that focused on leadership as ‘very effective’ (22.7% of all such
respondents), 15.4% as ‘extremely effective’ (16.7% of all the respondents who held such a
view), 23.1% as ‘effective’ and another ’15.4% had ‘no opinion’. A very small percentage
(7.7%) felt that such professional development was ‘slightly effective’. Overall, most
respondents from these schools identified professional development that focused on leadership
as critical for the promotion of professional accountability.
With regard to respondents from former Model C schools, 22.2% had no opinion (80% of all
such respondents), another 22.2% suggested that the effectiveness of such professional
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development was ‘extremely effective’, (66.7% of all those who held a similar view), 27.8%
that it was ‘very effective’ (45.5% of all the respondents who took such a view) and 16.7% that
it was ‘effective’.  A small percentage (8.3%) rated this kind of professional development as
‘slightly effective’ and 2.8% as ‘not effective at all’ (50% of all such respondents). It is evident
that most respondents from these types of schools felt that such professional development was
important in enhancing professional accountability among teachers.
As for the respondents from public township schools, a small majority (45%) indicated that
professional development that focused on leadership skills was ‘effective’ (50% of all such
respondents), 35% that it was ‘very effective’ (31.8% of all the respondents who took such a
position) and 10% that it was ‘extremely effective’ (16.7% of those who took a similar view).
Only 5% rated the effectiveness of such professional development as either ‘slightly effective’
or ‘not effective at all’. This clearly shows that most of the respondents from these schools
recognised the importance of professional development that focused on leadership as crucial
for professional accountability.
Professional development workshops that focus on leadership skills was seen as important for
the promotion of professional accountability among educators. However, the findings have
shown that 39% of all the respondents had not attended any such workshops. This could be
attributed to the fact that such professional development was often given to educators who
were in leadership positions.
General perceptions about professional development workshops
Respondents gave general comments about professional development workshops which were
not specific to those considered in the preceding sections. Some of their comments are listed
here.
Professional development workshops are very important. However, it is up to the educator to
familiarise herself with curriculum content and assessment strategies and not to wait for
workshops (Tr60).
A recent workshop in Hilton was very effective in promoting new ways to understand poetry for
example (Tr39).
Professional development workshops with subject advisors are done once a year.  They are
very useful and practical (Tr89).
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Education department puts workshops on once a year. Some education workshops are terrible.
I learn more from the Thutong [website] and Western Cape Website. District Workshops are
terrible. Provincial ones are better (Tr16).
NCS and OBE workshops were not effective and unclearly presented. No professional
development workshop can adequately prepare you for all classroom variables. It is always a
short amount of time with a lot of work (Tr69).
Somehow they should be done over a long period rather than the plus or minus three days
(weekends) (Tr73).
Some are good; others are means of giving money to the facilitators who tell us what we know
better. They do book reading (Tr91).
They do good work on subject content knowledge. The professional development workshop I
attended was very effective and I learnt a great deal (Tr23).
The workshops were educative and helpful and made teaching and learning much easier and
successful (Tr3).
What can be gleaned from these comments is that professional development workshops were
identified as very important in professional accountability processes. Furthermore, these
respondents raised a number of issues. First, such professional development workshops were
too short in terms of duration. To that end respondents proposed that teachers had to exercise
their initiative to learn rather than to wait for such workshops. Another issue raised by
respondents was the frequency of such professional development workshops which they said
often took place once a year. This was further compounded by poor organisation. The last issue
was the incompetence of professional development workshop facilitators. Respondents pointed
out that such facilitators simply read from the workshop manuals without any further
interpretation or explanation of what they read.
Conclusion
Professional accountability can be viewed as a softer way of holding street – level bureaucrats
accountable to the objectives of an organisation. This chapter has shown that SACE, as a
professional organisation, was playing a critical role in enforcing such a form of accountability
in uMgungundlovu District. Through the use of the Code of Ethics, SACE promotes
professionalism among the educators. In order to make sure that teaching was carried out by
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professionals, educators who were not registered as professionally qualified teachers were not
permitted to teach in the schools. Furthermore, findings have shown that educators who
breached the Code of Ethics were deregistered by SACE. However, the registration of teachers
had not been effective as evidenced by a significant proportion of educators in uMgungundlovu
District who were not registered. Although many educators indicated that SACE did not play a
significant role in their daily work, they confirmed that professional ethics influenced far more
the way in which they approached their work. Furthermore, they pointed out that they regarded
their work as a moral obligation. Like other professions, teachers in uMgungundlovu District
emphasised the importance of peer accountability among colleagues.
Professional accountability emanates from professionalism among the educators. In order to
promote such professionalism, teachers were often targets of professional development
programmes. Respondents pointed out that this was very important in order to make sure that
educators had the competence needed to comply with accountability demands. Most
respondents revealed that such professional development workshops were very important in
promoting professional accountability. However, a significant number of respondents noted
that they rarely use or apply what they learn from such workshops. A majority of respondents
who apply what they learn from work such professional development workshops highlighted
the effectiveness of such professional development. Most of them indicated that professional
development workshops that were aimed at: subject content knowledge; curriculum
knowledge; assessment and recording; knowledge of children and learning; classroom
management; and leadership skills were very crucial in promoting professional accountability
among educators.
The importance of professional development in professional accountability stems from the
ability of training and education to influence the decisions of street – level bureaucrats from the
inside out. To put it another way, professional development can influence the decision -
making processes of educators. This issue will be considered further in the next chapter which
will focus on a final, overall analysis.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
FINAL ANALYSIS OF THE STUDY
One of the underlying premises of this study is that if the educational outcomes are to
improve, there is a need for public managers to find ways of controlling street-level
bureaucrats' (in this case, teachers') discretion and enhancing accountability.  This study
confirms that teachers have a vital role to play in the implementation of the National
Curriculum Statements, and their use of discretion impacts on whether the NCSs stated goals
and objectives can be met.  The primary research question guiding this study was by what
means teachers could be held more accountable in the implementation of NCS policy? This
chapter reflects on the findings of this study in this respect.
It is apparent that different stakeholders play various roles to ensure accountability in the
education bureaucracy in uMgungundlovu District. The documents, surveys and interviews
have shown that different accountability mechanisms are employed in order to hold street -
bureaucrats accountable to the educational goals. The purpose of this chapter is to conduct a
final analysis of the thesis through the lens of the theoretical framework presented in the earlier
chapters of the study. To that end, this chapter will discuss the findings in the context of the
research objectives as well as in terms of the theoretical framework. The chapter will begin by
focusing on the theory of street – level bureaucracy in the light of the findings of this study.
The second part will explore the five accountability mechanisms which are: political
accountability; performance accountability; hierarchical accountability; legal accountability;
and professional accountability in order to draw conclusions about the research questions.
Finally, the chapter will end with some implications of the study.
12.1 uMgungundlovu District’s street – level bureaucrats in perspective
The nature of the work of educators in uMgungundlovu District epitomises the professional
attributes of street – level bureaucrats as characterised by Lipsky. This section will consider the
salient issues of street – level bureaucrats outlined in the theoretical framework following the
findings of this study. These are: discretion; differences between street – level bureaucrats and
managers; and resources for resistance. The section will end with a note on the role of
management in holding street – level bureaucrats accountable to the DBE.
Discretion
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As mentioned earlier, teachers exercise considerable discretion in their classes as they
implement the NCS. Findings showed that teachers can focus on certain aspects of their jobs
and ignore others in order to cope with the pressures of performance evaluation. Furthermore,
teachers in uMgungundlovu District exercised considerable discretion with regards to the
choice of subject content to teach in order to prepare their learners for examinations. In the
process they used such discretion to ignore certain topics and activities which they believed
would not help the learners in preparation for their examinations.
It is clear from the research undertaken that teachers exercised a considerable amount of
discretion in decisions they made when implementing NCS. Most of the decisions they made
were beyond the scrutiny of HoDs and school principals. As Lipsky (1080:14) points out:
“street – level bureaucrats are professionals, the assertion that they exercise considerable
discretion is fairly obvious”. This is so because as professionals, teachers are expected to make
discretionary decisions about their work and clients. Lipsky also notes that the discretion of
street – level bureaucrats stems from the fact that they work in situations that are too
complicated to be reduced to programmatic schedules (1980:15). This resonates with what
respondents said about how it was difficult to follow the work schedules as outlined in the
work plans since other variables, like the need to finish the syllabus and the speed at which
individual learners understood concepts, also needed to be considered. In such cases, educators
had to exercise their professional discretion.
Differences between street – level bureaucrats and managers
What could be gleaned from the findings is that the way in which the SMTs and the teachers
perceived their roles was different. The general perspective of the school principals and HoDs
was on the effectiveness and productivity of the educators in terms of pass rates per subject and
compliance with the rules of the schools. On the other hand, teachers were interested in making
their job easier in such things as clerical or administrative work and focusing on only what they
believed was critical for examinations or important for performance evaluation. With regard to
this matter, Lipsky argues: “at the very least, workers have an interest in minimising the danger
and discomfort of the job and maximising income and personal gratification” (1980:19). This
was revealed in the findings where teachers had to create shortcuts and simplify their tasks as a
way of coping with the pressure of work. As a result, street - level bureaucrats process work
that is consistent with their own preferences and tasks that are backed up by sanctions (Lipsky,
1980:19).  Because of this, most respondents pointed out that they tend to focus on aspects of
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their job that may expose them to the scrutiny of the management which is often result
oriented.
Another difference between management and street – level bureaucrats stems from the desire
of the latter to maintain and expand their professional autonomy. Findings revealed that
although teachers regard the classroom as their domain, the SMTs in uMgungundlovu District
devised several mechanisms to limit such discretion (see later sections). In some cases most
respondents felt that some of these devices were unfair or illegitimate. However, Lipsky points
out that although professionals like teachers have “some claim of professional status, they also
have bureaucratic status that requires compliance with superiors’ directives” (1980:19). On the
whole, the main differences between the two were reflected in the desires of the teachers to
maximise their satisfaction and lessen their workload while management, through the SMTs,
sought to secure compliance among teachers and maximising productivity. What do street –
level bureaucrats have to do in order to advance their desires?
Resources for resistance
Results indicated that in some cases educators did not comply with policy requirements to
some degree in the implementation of NCS in uMgungundlovu District. A number of cases of
such noncompliance became apparent, which included teachers focusing on areas that they
believed would be covered in the examinations, and on those areas that were considered
important for performance evaluation and thus teaching to the test. Lipsky notes that “workers
can punish supervisors who do not behave properly toward them, by doing only minimal work”
(1980:24).  This kind of behaviour is sometimes supported or protected by membership of
teacher unions. For instance, external evaluators of IQMS were turned away from some
schools by teachers who belong to powerful teacher unions. With regards to this, Lipsky notes
that “public service workers currently enjoy the benefits of collective resources that strengthen
their position” (1980:23).
Another resource for resistance available to the educators in uMgungundlovu District is their
level of expertise. It was seen that a majority of all the teachers in this District are qualified,
meaning that they are considered to be professionals. Because of this, Lipsky suggests that,
“managers are highly dependent upon subordinates without being able to intervene extensively
in the way work is performed” (1980:24). This is in line with what principals said about their
teachers, that they had faith in them.
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This section has reviewed the nature of educators as street – level bureaucrats in accordance
with the theoretical framework. Most importantly, what has emerged is that educators in this
study have relative autonomy from bureaucratic control. It may seem that managers have no
means of holding street – level bureaucrats accountable to the objectives of the DBE in
uMgungundlovu District. Lipsky (1980:24) points out that street – level bureaucrats are
constrained “by rules, regulations, and directives from above, or by norms and practices of
their occupational group”, such as those presented in this thesis. The previous chapters have
demonstrated that various accountability mechanisms are being implemented to secure such
accountability among the educators in the District.  The next sections will return to consider
these mechanisms which are: political accountability; performance accountability; hierarchical
accountability; legal accountability; and professional accountability.
12.2 uMgungundlovu District: political accountability
As presented in the theoretical framework, political accountability entails building trust among
citizens and the elected officials in government. Its main avenues are regular elections which
are decisive in determining the continuation of a government in power (Brinkerhoff, 2001:9).
The elected officials are expected to deliver on their promises, otherwise they could be voted
out of power. Political accountability gives managers the discretion to respond to key issues
from their clients, as well as to elected officials and the general public (Huisman and Currie,
2004:531).
This thesis has shown that the performance and outcomes of elected officials are not easy to
specify in education. The outcomes of elected officials may consist of educational policies,
levels of spending on education, and special treatment for a category of children. The
perception of street – level bureaucrats on this variable may influence their response to
different accountability mechanisms. To that end the study undertook an extensive review of
government documents to elicit what the government has been doing in exercising political
accountability. This was followed by an exploration of respondents’ perceptions of the level of
government’s political accountability regarding issues like: financing education; supporting
less privileged schools; supporting less privileged learners; policy formulation; and
implementing educational policies. These issues were considered to be critical for street – level
bureaucrats’ accountability in the sense that when they are satisfied they are more likely to be
motivated in their work. The next section will review findings from the documents and then
from the surveys.
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Documentary review: political accountability
Documentary evidence indicates that the government of South Africa has exercised political
accountability in various ways. Most education policies enacted after the demise of apartheid
have sought to fulfil political accountability. The issue of education has featured on different
election manifestos of the ruling party (African National Congress). Furthermore, the thesis has
noted that quality of education has been a priority amongst democratic South Africans for
decades, as reflected the 1955 Freedom Charter (DBE, 2010e:6). In exercising political
accountability, the South African government strives to make sure that everyone has the right
to a basic education in accordance with the South African Constitution. To that end, the study
has shown that spending on public education has become South Africa’s largest item in
national budgets.
Furthermore, the South African government has made education its top priority. In the
Delivery Agreement which could be read in conjunction with the Action Plan to 2014:
Towards the Realisation of Schooling 2025, which was discussed in earlier chapters, the desire
to achieve improved quality education is ranked first out of twelve other priorities of
government. In addition to this, the government has policies to help less privileged learners in
form of nutrition programmes, a No Fee policy for certain schools, as well as transport
programmes in order to make sure that all learners have access to basic education.
What does this mean in terms of the political accountability framework? In exercising political
accountability, the South African government has “established the institutions, procedures, and
mechanisms that seek to ensure that government delivers on electoral promises, fulfils the
public trust, aggregates and represents citizens’ interests, and responds to ongoing and
emerging societal needs and concerns” (Brinkerhoff, 2003:7). But how do the respondents
perceive such actions in terms of effectiveness and adequacy?
Surveys: political accountability
The thesis has demonstrated that government exercises political accountability in education in
various ways. First, Table 12.1 shows the summary of the issues that political accountability in
education often focuses on, and then Table 12.2 portrays the perceptions of respondents of
government’s effectiveness in exercising political accountability in such areas. As mentioned
earlier, the government’s political accountability is often measured in terms of the items listed
in Table 12.1, but Bovens (2005:7) points out that this might be contestable since it is often
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based on media coverage, blaming, coalition building, and political opportunity to get into
power or stay in power.
Table 12.1 uMgungundlovu District: summary of political accountability focus
Accountability type Focus of accountability
Political accountability
 Financing education
 Supporting less privileged schools
 Supporting less privileged learners
 Policy formulation
 Implementing educational policies
Table 12.2 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of respondents of government’s










25% 27% 27% 15% 5% 1%
Supporting less privileged learners
21% 35% 26% 13% 3% 2%
Supporting less privileged schools
24% 32% 28% 12% 3% 1%
Enacting education policies
14% 28% 35% 19% 2% 2%
Implementing the education policies
15% 26% 27% 23% 7% 2%
With regard to financing education, the thesis has shown that a majority of respondents were
largely negative about the effectiveness of government. 25% and 27% suggested that it was
‘not effective all’ and ‘not effective’ respectively. This meant that 52% of the respondents were
not satisfied with the funding given to education. This may be difficult to understand since
documentary evidence suggested that the government was giving the largest portion of its
budget to education and had placed it at the top of its priority list. The answer to this paradox
may lie in the distribution of such funding in the DBE’s different sectors such as those
discussed in the thesis. These include: administration; public special education; further
education and training; early childhood education; independent schools; and spending on
public ordinary schools which is further divided into: public primary schools; public secondary
schools; professional services; human resources development; school sports and culture; a
nutrition programme; and HIV/AIDS.  Considering such distribution, it might be difficult to
6 Table 12.2 is a summary based on the data presented in Chapter Eight.
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assume that each sector was getting adequate funding. Respondents from some schools
pointed out that the government was actually cutting funding.
However, after analysing the responses according to the type of school in which respondents
were located, it was determined that a majority (40%) of respondents from independent schools
were in the majority (66%) of those who felt that the government was effective in financing
education. Perhaps this could be because these schools charge fees and are less dependent on
government support.
In accordance with the South African Constitution, the government is expected to exercise
political accountability by making sure that every learner has access to basic education. To that
end, it has a responsibility to support the less privileged learners. Documentary evidence
suggested that the government has a number of strategies to help such learners. For instance,
learners who lived far away from schools were provided with transport. Learners whose
parents could prove that they were unable to pay fees were also exempted from paying school
fees. As was explained, learners who attended schools in quintiles one to three were given
nutritional snacks every school day. However, a majority of respondents were generally
negative about the government support for the less privileged learners. Some respondents
pointed out that although some learners were charged school fees, they are also charged for
other things such as sports and excursions which they cannot afford.
According to the research carried out, schools in public townships had the largest proportion of
respondents who were negative about government’s support for such learners. Because of the
effects of apartheid, these areas tend to have more learners who are less privileged than any
other types of schools. Since these respondents are exposed to such learners more than any
other respondents, they may have a better understanding of the needs of such learners. Again,
by contrast, independent schools had the highest proportion of respondents who felt that the
government was ‘effective’ in supporting the less privileged.
The study has shown that schools in uMgungundlovu District are not at the same level in terms
of resources. Some schools are more privileged than others. For instance, there are some
schools with more than three laboratories while others do not have even one. To that end, a
largely negative response came from all the respondents about the government support for the
less privileged schools, as presented in Table 12.2. Lack of support for such schools raises
serious questions about the government’s political accountability to education since it can lead
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to what is commonly called the ‘silent exclusion’ of learners in such schools. This is a situation
whereby learners attend schools which are not properly equipped to teach effectively.
The theoretical framework has shown that another way of measuring government political
accountability is through policy formulation. A significant proportion of respondents were
largely negative about the government’s effectiveness in this area.  14% suggested that it was
‘not effective at all’ and 28% that it was ‘not effective’. A positive or negative perception of
street – level bureaucrats about policy formulation is critical for policy implementation. A
negative perception might engender a negative attitude in teachers who are implementing the
policy.
Turning to government’s effectiveness in implementing education policy, a large proportion of
respondents were negative. Although most respondents said the educational policies were good
on paper they pointed out that government was ineffective in implementing them. When the
data were analysed according to the level of education of respondents, it was seen that those
with higher qualifications were in the majority of those who expressed dissatisfaction in policy
implementation. Some respondents blamed cadre deployment as one hindrance in policy
implementation while others blamed strong teacher unions for blocking implementation and
yet others blamed the dearth of qualified educators. Whatever the reasons, documentary
evidence seemed to corroborate these perceptions of respondents since it has become apparent
that educational policy implementation has been the main challenge facing education in South
Africa, as suggested by the number of review committees established by successive ministers
of education. However, a small but significant proportion (30%) of respondents was positive
about the implementation of education policy; most of these respondents were among the least
qualified.
In sum, this thesis has revealed that in exercising political accountability, the South African
government introduced transport and nutrition programmes for less privileged learners. This is
consistent with what Jaafar and Anderson (2007:220) say about political accountability, that it
“allows the government to demonstrate, at least symbolically, that it is being attentive and
responsive to all constituent interests in education”. This is further corroborated by Radin and
Romzek’s assertion: “political accountability manifests itself in educational institutions’
responsiveness to expectations that emerge from external stakeholders such as legislative
bodies and parents and the society at large” (1998:77). In line with this, Fenstermacher
(1979:333) says that political accountability guarantees “that all students, without respect to
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race, income, or social class, will acquire the minimum school skills necessary to take full
advantage of the choices that accrue upon successful completion of public schooling”.
This thesis has revealed that in order to gain the trust of the citizens, the South African
government is exercising political accountability in financing education, supporting less
privileged schools, supporting less privileged learners, in policy formulation and in
implementing educational policies. With a few exceptions, most respondents are not satisfied
with government’s effectiveness in all these areas. When governments fail to exercise their
political accountability, Smithson argues, political accountability allows “citizens in a
democracy to hold those responsible for making curriculum policy decisions, democratically
accountable for their policies - to the extent that should citizens disapprove of policies and
policy-makers, they could rid themselves of both, and the electoral system is the traditional
means of accomplishing this” (1987:7). Although the mechanisms of checking political
accountability are political processes and regular elections, this thesis has not shown why these
have not been effective. Many respondents indicated that political accountability does not work
in South Africa because the government was not evaluated on the basis of service delivery but
on the basis of bringing apartheid to an end. Some of them said that freedom was more
important than services. This implied that removing the government is equivalent to bringing
apartheid back. This is hardly distinguishable from Brinkerhoff’s (2001:9) view that political
accountability does not work well in “developing and transitioning countries”. As stated
earlier, the manner in which street – level bureaucrats perceive the commitment of leaders of
their organisations and political leaders at large to the goals of education may affect their
reaction to the accountability mechanisms they employ. The next sections consider the
different accountability mechanisms of ensuring compliance by street – level bureaucrats,
starting with performance accountability.
12.3 uMgungundlovu District: performance accountability
In order to bring about compliance among street – level bureaucrats Lipsky argues for the
“development of performance measures” (1980:165). This falls under performance
accountability mechanisms. This thesis has shown that performance evaluation is a critical
component of accountability in uMgungundlovu District. Table 12.3 displays a summary of
performance accountability issues which have been explored in this thesis.
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Table 12.3 uMgungundlovu District: summary of performance accountability issues
Aspects of performance
evaluation
 learner achievement for performance evaluation
 attendance of teachers and punctuality
 planning administration and lesson delivery in performance evaluation
 co-curricular activities
 human relations and contribution to school development
 creation of a positive learning environment






 rewarding high performers
 punishing low performers
Perceived effects of
performance evaluation
 evaluation improved performance of the teachers
 evaluation caused false behaviour by teachers
 caused falsification of information
 caused teachers  to focus on measured outputs
 caused more clerical work for teachers
 improved  performance accountability among teachers
12.3.1 Aspects of performance evaluation
Lipsky notes that bureaucracies and their managers need to know what they want their workers
to do and to be able to rank their preferences and know how to measure the output (1980:161).
It is against this background that this thesis revealed that it is critical to identify crucial aspects
of the job of street – level bureaucrats in order to measure their performance. Table 12.3
displays key aspects (key result areas) of uMgungundlovu District educators who are subject to
performance evaluation. Table 12.4 displays a summary of perception of respondents of the
importance of these aspects in the order of the value that was attached to each item.
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Table 12.4 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of respondents of the importance of











Planning and administration and
lesson delivery
1% 3% 18% 22% 56% 0% 100%
Knowledge of curriculum and
programmes
3% 2% 18% 20% 56% 1% 100%
Learner assessment/ achievement 4% 3% 15% 23% 55% 0% 100%
Teacher attendance/ punctuality 3% 7% 16% 23% 51% 0% 100%
Creation of a positive learning
environment
1% 6% 20% 25% 47% 1% 100%
Professional development 2% 4% 22% 27% 45% 0% 100%
Human relations and contribution
to school development
2% 8% 22% 27% 40% 1% 100%
Co-curricular activities 3% 11% 25% 26% 35% 0% 100%
The thesis has revealed that performance evaluation, planning, administration and lesson
delivery are considered to be ‘very important’ by 56% of all respondents surveyed and by 22%
to be ‘important’.  This perception was generally uniform across different types of schools.
This suggests that planning, administration and lesson delivery were critical for educators as
for well as members of SMTs.  The next most important item was knowledge of curriculum
and programmes which was also considered to be ‘very important’ by 56% of the respondents
and ‘important’ by 20%. However, in practice, this item may be difficult to measure. Methods
of evaluating the knowledge of a teacher are not easy to find and become well accepted.
Learner assessment was ranked third in Table 12.4 with 55% who felt that this measure of
performance was ‘very important’ and by 23% that it was ‘important’. In fourth position was
the punctuality and attendance of teachers which was viewed as ‘very important’ by 51% and
‘important’ by 23%. This shows that the SMTs valued teachers’ attendance at school on time
as the prime consideration before they could evaluate other items. In fifth position was the
creation of a positive learning environment which was judged to be ‘very important’ by 47%
and ‘important’ by 25%. Since a learning environment is not confined to the classroom, this
item may be difficult to evaluate. A few observations of lessons by SMTs cannot evaluate this
comprehensively. Concerning this, Lipsky notes that “teaching is done in the classrooms that
principals and supervisors do not normally enter; if they do, they provide a notice so that the
teaching, like performance may be changed by the presence of audience” (Lipsky, 1980:169).
The sixth position was professional development which was considered to be ‘very important’
by 45% and important by 27%. Again the measurement of this item was based on the number
7 Table 12.4 is summary based on the data from Chapter Nine.
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of professional development workshops attended by a teacher as opposed to what was learnt
(content) and how much the teacher understood. To put it another way, it was purely based on
attendance. Seventh position was the ‘human relations and contribution to school development’
which was considered ‘very important’ by 40% and ‘important’ by 22%, and the last position
in the ranking was co-curricular activities which was considered ‘very important’ by 35%,
many of whom were from former Model C schools, and  ‘important’ by 25%.
It can be concluded that although there are several measures of performance evaluation in
uMgungundlovu District, the most critical ones in the eyes of respondents are: planning and
administration and lesson delivery; knowledge of curriculum and programmes; and learner
assessment/ achievement. Furthermore, it may seem that some of the items are difficult to
measure in an objective manner. Even those that can be (such as professional development)
may not reveal behavioural change by educators. This may raise serious questions as to the
purpose of performance evaluation. The next subsection explores this issue further.
12.3 2 Purpose of performance evaluation
Those who administer performance evaluation often have a purpose that may not be explicit.
This thesis has revealed that there are several purposes for performance evaluation other than
to ensure compliance among teachers. Some of them are listed Table 12.5 according to the
order of importance.
Table 12.5 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of respondents of the importance of







time No opinion Total
To evaluate 0% 4% 23% 19% 54% 0% 100%
To improve efficiency 1% 3% 20% 22% 54% 0% 100%
To learn 3% 4% 27% 21% 45% 0% 100%
To reward high performers 19% 15% 24% 9% 33% 0% 100%
To punish low performers 46% 18% 19% 5% 10% 1% 100%
A review of literature earlier in this thesis revealed that often the purpose of performance
measures is to evaluate (Behn, 2003:588). Bureaucracies want to know how well their workers
are performing, although they rarely state this. Behn asserts: “evaluation is the usual reason for
measuring performance” (2003:588). This study received mixed responses concerning this
8 Table 12.5 is a summary based on the data from Chapter Nine.
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assertion from respondents, although a majority (54%) felt that it was so ‘all the time’ and 19%
that it was so ‘almost all the time’.  Such a perception is likely to influence other purposes of
performance evaluation. As shown in Table 12.5, evaluation is perceived to be the main
purpose of performance evaluation.
The second most important purpose of performance evaluation according to the respondents
surveyed is to improve efficiency. In line with this view, Behn points out that in order “to
ratchet up performance, public managers need to understand how they can influence the
behaviour of the people inside their organisations who produce their outputs and how they can
influence the conduct of citizens who convert these outputs into outcomes” (2003:597). 54%
of those who were surveyed indicated that performance evaluation in uMgungundlovu District
was aimed at improving efficiency ‘all the time’ and 22% felt that it was so ‘almost all the
time’. It can be suggested that such a perception of performance evaluation is positive.
Educators are more likely to take part in such evaluation if they have such a positive attitude.
Third on the list of purpose of performance evaluation was learning. 45% indicated that ‘all the
time’ the purpose of performance evaluation was learning and 21% felt it was so ‘almost all the
time’. As reported by Behn (2003:596), public managers need to use performance evaluation to
answer these questions: what is my organisation doing well? What is my organisation not
doing well? What does my organisation need to do differently to improve what it is not doing
well? Answers to these questions would result in learning. The proportion of respondents who
indicated that performance evaluation is aimed at learning was generally high. Again, this is a
positive attitude which ensured the support of educators for such performance evaluation.
This study sought to find out if performance evaluations were used to reward high performers.
The findings from this study were inconclusive. 33% indicated that performance evaluation
was used for such a purpose ‘all the time’, 9% that it was so ‘almost all the time’ and 24% that
it was so ‘sometimes’. A significant proportion (19%) felt that performance evaluation was
‘never’ used for such a purpose and 15% that it was ‘almost never the case’. These results were
not expected since a review of documents revealed that performance evaluation was attached to
potential annual increases in salary. However, probably the reason for this is that most
respondents reported that all teachers are entitled to such an increase whether they perform
well or not.  The thesis has also shown that this was so because there was a tendency among
SMTs to award every educator with a ‘good’ performance in the IQMS. Rewarding high
performers was related to the last item on the list of purposes of performance evaluation.
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Hardly any respondents (10%) indicated that performance evaluation was used to punish low
performers: most of these respondents were from independent schools. On the other hand, a
majority of respondents rejected the assertion that performance evaluations were meant to
punish low performers. 46% indicated that it was ‘never’ used for such purposes and 18% that
it was ‘almost never’ the case.
This thesis has revealed that IQMS had seemingly conflicting goals between performance
evaluation (which focused on measuring performance) and development appraisal (for staff
development – focusing on areas of weaknesses). It may be obvious that street-level
bureaucrats might try to hide any information that they believed might reveal their weaknesses,
especially if such weaknesses attracted negative sanctions. Consequently, any information that
could be used to help the teachers in terms of professional development was hidden. The
findings have revealed that in some cases it had become common for supervisors to classify all
performance as ‘good’. To that end, external moderators were appointed but they were turned
away from some schools by teachers belonging to ‘powerful’ teacher unions.
What can be gleaned from this is that, generally, the perceptions of respondents of the purpose
of performance evaluation were positive. Most respondents regarded performance evaluation
as a way of either to evaluate, to improve efficiency, or to learn. This means that the use of
performance evaluation as an accountability mechanism is likely to be effective since
educators view it in a good light. The fact that respondents did not view performance
evaluation as a way of rewarding or punishing them would limit the chances of falsification of
information in order to avoid punishment or gain rewards. If performance evaluation were
designed to achieve what has been outlined here, to what extent is this successful? What are the
other effects of performance evaluation on educators? The next subsection focuses on these
issues.
12.3.3 Perceived effects of performance evaluation
The thesis has revealed that performance evaluation was used as an accountability mechanism
in uMgungundlovu District. However, this has produced both intended and unintended
consequences. Table 12.6 portrays a summary of the effects of performance evaluation starting
with those that most respondents strongly agreed with.
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Adds more clerical work (admin) 5.0% 13.0% 21.0% 24.0% 37.0% 0.0%
Improves my performance 4.0% 6.0% 11.0% 46.0% 33.0% 0.0%
Performance evaluation improves
accountability
6.0% 6.0% 23.0% 39.0% 26.0% 0.0%
Teacher focuses on measured output 6.0% 14.0% 31.0% 33.0% 15.0% 1.0%
Causes teacher burnout 12.0% 25.0% 34.0% 17.0% 12.0% 0.0%
Leads to falsification of information 17.2% 25.3% 28.3% 22.2% 7.1% 0.0%
Of all the effects investigated, most respondents felt that performance evaluation created more
administrative or clerical work for educators (37% ‘strongly agreed’ and 24% ‘agreed’). Very
few (13%) respondents disagreed and 5% ‘strongly disagreed’. Most educators complained that
the process of performance evaluation involved a lot of paperwork which they felt was taking a
lot of their teaching and preparation time. This was one unintended effect of performance
evaluation.
Second on the list was improvement in teachers’ performance, which received a largely
positive response.  A majority of respondents indicated that performance evaluation led to the
improvement of their performance (33% ‘strongly agreed’ and 46% agreed’). This is in tandem
with Lipsky’s (1980:166) assertion: “by virtue of simply putting attention on some tasks over
others street-level bureaucrats can improve their performance on most quantitative measures
managers introduce”. Because educators knew that their performance was going to be
measured at the end of a learning term this induced them to work diligently in the areas
concerned and consequently resulted in improvements. However, some respondents
complained about how their performance was measured, which was often through learners’
achievement in assessments. Related to this was the third item on the list: improvement in
accountability. 26% ‘strongly agreed’ and 39% ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation improved
their accountability to the goals of the DBE. This epitomises what Brinkerhoff (2001:10) says,
that performance accountability ensures that workers in organisations should demonstrate and
account for performance in the light of agreed-upon targets.
9 Table 12.6 is a summary based on the data from Chapter Nine.
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The last three items on the list identified largely negative effects of performance evaluation
which are: increased focus on measured outputs; causing teacher burnout; and falsification of
information by education. This thesis has shown that performance evaluation led educators to
focus on activities that were measured. Lipsky points out that “street-level bureaucrats will
concentrate on the activities measured” (1980:166). The findings revealed that 33% ‘agreed’
and 15% ‘strongly agreed’ that performance evaluation caused educators to concentrate on the
measured outputs. This implies that organisations that are able to identify the right outcomes to
be measured would cause an improvement of the outcomes that are measured. In the end,
educators used their discretion to focus on the measured outcomes at the expense of those that
were given little attention.
Apparently, this thesis could not find any link between teacher burnout and performance
evaluation. Only 12% ‘strongly agreed’ and 17% ‘agreed’ that teacher burnout was caused by
performance evaluation. This was low compared to 25% who ‘disagreed’ and 12% who
‘strongly disagreed’. Lastly, the study could not fully prove that performance evaluation led to
falsification of information by street-level bureaucrats. The findings, however, show that a
small but significant proportion 22.2% ‘agreed’ and 7.1% ‘strongly agreed’ that falsification of
information could take place if supplying the correct information would result in punitive
actions or caused incentives to be withheld or withdrawn.  Concerning this issue, Lipsky
(1980:167) asserts that “fraud and deception can also intrude into performance measurement”.
However most respondents in this study disagreed (25.3%) and strongly disagreed’ (17.2%)
with such a view.
This section discussed how the effects of performance evaluation were both positive and
negative. As a mechanism of performance accountability, performance evaluation was reported
to be effective in improving the performance and accountability of teachers. However,
performance evaluation was also blamed for increasing the workload of teachers, causing them
to focus on measured outputs, and perhaps resulting at times in teacher burn out and
falsification of information by educators.   These problems do not outweigh the benefits of
performance evaluation, as they are what Lipsky (198:50) calls “difficulties that skilled
management experts can overcome”. To that end, this thesis revealed that a number of
mechanisms were employed to ensure compliance by educators. One such mechanism is
hierarchical accountability which will be explored in the next section.
270
12.4 uMgungundlovu District: hierarchical accountability
The three main areas of hierarchical accountability explored in this thesis are summarised in
Table 12.7.
Table 12.7 uMgungundlovu District: summary of hierarchical accountability mechanism
12.4.1 Assessments as a mechanism of hierarchical accountability
This thesis has shown that the DBE has been using assessments as an accountability
mechanism, including Annual National Assessments, (NEEDU, 2013:12). This mechanism
targeted the different stakeholders of education, as summarised in Table 12.8.
Table 12.8 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of respondents of the purpose of
assessments.10




4.0% 18.2% 23.2% 54.5% 0.0%
To assess the performance of the school
6.1% 16.2% 38.4% 39.4% 0.0%
To evaluate teacher performance
13.3% 26.5% 38.8% 21.4% 0.0%
Most respondents felt that assessments were aimed at learners. 54% indicated that ‘almost
always’ assessments were meant to make learners accountable and 23% said it was so
10 Table 12.8 is based on the data from Chapter Ten.
Assessments as a mechanism of
hierarchical accountability
 assessment of learners as a mechanism of hierarchical
accountability for teachers
 using assessments to make schools accountable
 using assessments to make learners accountable for their
education
The effects of using assessments as
hierarchical accountability mechanisms
 the effectiveness of assessments in encouraging
accountability among teachers
 the effectiveness of assessments in improving instruction
and classroom practices
 assessments cause teachers to manipulate test scores
 assessments causing teachers to focus on areas covered in
examination
 using assessments as an accountability mechanism
causes  a ‘finish the syllabus syndrome’
Other bureaucratic accountability
mechanisms used to ensure accountability
among teachers
 The role of School Management Teams (SMTs)
 The role of clusters and subject advisors
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‘sometimes’. 39% indicated that almost always assessments were meant to make schools
accountable and 38.4% felt that this was the case ‘sometimes’. Compared to the first two
assertions mentioned here, fewer respondents (21%) felt that assessments were meant to make
teachers accountable and 38.8% felt that this was so ‘sometimes’. In essence, this implies that
most respondents did not see assessments as a way of making them accountable. They saw
assessments, instead, as a way of helping learners to see their strengths and weaknesses. Also,
most of the respondents felt that assessments were meant to check the performance of schools.
The DoE noted that the “purpose of  assessment is not only to guide teaching and learning, but
also to provide summary statements of learners’ achievements, for purposes of reporting and
accountability” (DoE, 2001:25).
In order to implement fair and uniform assessments, the thesis has shown that the DBE had to
introduce a mandatory curriculum for all the schools. This is not unique to South Africa. Linn
notes that assessment and accountability have played prominent roles in many of the
educational reform efforts in the United States (2000:4). Another scholar, Angelo (1999:30)
asserts: “assessment should be used for student learning and secondarily to determine
accountability for the quality of learning produced”. The use of assessment is growing in many
countries. For instance, some scholars note that “accountability for students’ performance,
coupled with standards and assessment, directed at students, teachers, or schools is growing not
only in the United States, but the world over” (Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin, 2003:129). The
reason for this is based on the presumption that “educational accountability should focus
schools’ attention less on compliance with rules and more on increasing learning for students”
(1996:65). Thus, Linn (2001:4) suggests that “a fundamental premise of high-stakes
accountability systems is that instruction and student learning will be improved by holding
teachers and or learners accountable for results”.
The findings of this study suggest that the respondents perceived the evaluation of teachers to
be one of the purposes of assessment while some thought they served to evaluate the
performance of schools and others believed that assessment served to help the learners. The
evaluation of teachers through assessment was based on the conjecture that if schools and
teachers became aware of their performance through assessment they would change their
behaviour in order to improve their teaching. The same applies for assessment as a means of
helping the learners. It can be assumed that assessments will help the teachers to know the
areas in which their learners are performing well or poorly. This is usually termed diagnostic
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analysis where teachers analyse the results of assessments by perusing each answer script to
discover where learners performed badly and to propose remedial measures. This is consistent
with Linn’s (2003:2) argument that “tests and assessments are designed to provide information
about student achievement which will be helpful to teachers, schools and parents, although it is
seldom specified in what way”. However, this is only applicable to internal assessments and
not to the final NSC examinations which are not marked at school level. Schools, on the other
hand, place a high premium on NSC examination results, especially considering that the results
are published in the media for all to see. However, the issue of using assessments as an
accountability mechanism leads to serious questions. To what extent is the use of assessment
producing the desired outcomes? What are the undesired consequences of using assessments as
a hierarchical accountability mechanism?
12.4.2 The perceived effects of using assessments as an hierarchical accountability
mechanism
The perceptions of respondents of the purpose of assessments which were discussed in the
preceding paragraphs are vital for the use of such an accountability mechanism. This may have
a bearing on the effects of assessment on teachers’ behaviour. To that end, the thesis revealed
that assessments seem to have had various effects on the behaviour of teachers in
uMgungundlovu District. A summary of such effects is displayed in Table 12.9.
Table 12.9 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of respondents of the effects of
performance evaluation.11
Strongly





Encourage accountability among teachers
1.1% 7.4% 14.7% 53.7% 22.1% 1.1%
Improve instruction and classroom practices
1.1% 6.4% 25.5% 37.2% 28.7% 1.1%
Leads to manipulation of test records and result
9.6% 23.4% 31.9% 27.7% 6.4% 1.1%
Teacher put emphasis on subject areas that are
covered in exams 4.2% 9.5% 25.3% 42.1% 17.9% 1.1%
Promotes ‘finish syllabus syndrome’
3.2% 14.7% 26.3% 32.6% 23.2% 0.0%
Promotes emphasis on past exams
2.1% 18.8% 28.1% 31.3% 19.8% 0.0%
11 Table 12.9 is a summary based on the data from Chapter Ten.
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This thesis has revealed that assessments were effective mechanisms of hierarchical
accountability in uMgungundlovu District as the majority of respondents reported that such
assessments led to accountability among educators (53.7% ‘agreed’ and 22.1% ‘strongly
agreed’) and improved instruction and classroom practice (37.2% ‘agreed’ and 28.7% ‘strongly
agreed’). Furthermore, the thesis revealed that the use of assessments as an hierarchical
accountability mechanism was positive in improving classroom instruction and practices.
37.2% ‘agreed’ and 28.7% ‘strongly agreed’ that the use of assessments as an accountability
mechanism led to such improvement. The argument for the use of assessments is based on
shifting the focus of educational accountability from compliance with rules to paying more
attention to student learning which is assessed through examinations. By extension, it is
believed that this would lead to improvements in accountability and in classroom instruction
and practices. In concurrence with this these findings, Linn, (2001:4) acknowledges that “a
fundamental premise of high-stakes [examination] accountability systems is that instruction
and student learning will be improved by holding teachers and or learners accountable for
results”. The findings of this thesis lend support to this argument as the majority of respondents
reported that assessments encouraged accountability in schools and improved instruction and
classroom practice.
However, this thesis has also revealed that the use of assessments as an accountability
mechanism has led to unintended consequences, such as the manipulation of test records and
results (27.7% ‘agreed’ and 6.4% strongly agreed’); the ‘finish syllabus syndrome’ (32.6%
‘agreed’ and 23.2% ‘strongly agreed’); and an emphasis on subject areas that are covered in
examinations (42.1% ‘agreed’ and 17.9% ‘strongly agreed’); and an emphasis on past
examination papers (31.3% ‘agreed’ and 23.2% ‘strongly agreed’). These findings are hardly
distinguishable from Lipsky’s (1980:166) assertion that “if teachers are assessed or even
remotely evaluated on the proportion of their charges who pass end-of year examinations, more
will pass as teachers ‘teach to the test’”. This happens when teachers put the emphasis more on
past examination papers rather than focusing on the curriculum. With regards to the
manipulation of test records and examination marks, Lipsky calls this the intrusion of fraud and
deception into the processes of hierarchical accountability (1980:167).
The emphasis on subject areas that are covered in assessments as reported in this thesis confirm
previous research by Shepard (1991:232) who noted that teachers focused only on skills
covered by tests in subjects like Mathematics and reading and language mechanics. Shepard
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commented that long projects and reading real books was replaced with “word recognition;
recognition of errors in spelling, language usage, and punctuation; and arithmetic operations”
(1991:232).
Although there was overwhelming evidence in this thesis to support that teachers use their
discretion and professional autonomy in class to rush their teaching in order to finish the
syllabus and spend more time revising past examination papers, there was scarcely any such
evidence reported in the scholarly literature.
To sum up, the use of assessments as an hierarchical accountability mechanism was seen to
have had both positive and negative effects. The improvement of classroom instruction and
accountability are important educational virtues that cannot be ignored. On the other hand, the
downside of using assessments as an accountability mechanism is too substantial to ignore. An
important question is: what can be done to harness the positive aspects of using assessments as
accountability mechanisms while minimising its negative areas? The next part of this section
explores this question.
12.4.3 Other bureaucratic accountability mechanisms used to ensure accountability
among teachers
The role of School Management Teams (SMTs)
Evidence from this study shows that SMTs, led by the school principals, are the most effective
means of ensuring accountability in the implementation of NCS. The uMgungundlovu District
has faith in the effectiveness of SMTs.  To ensure that they do their job properly and
effectively, the KZN DBE prepared a manual for them. The use of manuals in bureaucracies is
considered to be very critical by Simon (1997:213), who points out that the “function of
manuals is to communicate those organisation practices which are intended to have permanent
application”. In the absence of manuals, policies will remain in the minds of organisation
members who make them. Manuals serve to determine whether members of an organisation
have a common understanding of their organisation’s structure and policies (Simon, 1997:213).
This is especially the case of the range of schools managed by SMTs where educators have
different values, educational qualifications and experience. The use of manuals ensures
uniformity, although it may be blamed for limiting the discretion of individual school
principals.  Lipsky (1980:162) explains that manuals reduce street-level bureaucrats’ discretion
and constrains their alternatives whenever regulations are introduced to cover contingencies.
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The members of SMTs often visit classrooms and observe lessons, scrutinise teachers’ records,
and inspect learners’ books and exercise other managerial oversight at school level. These
tasks are usually done by HoDs. Visiting classrooms and witnessing lessons are said to be very
common for the purposes of IQMS. Concerning lesson observation, this study has shown that
most of the respondents (49.5%) indicated that this was ‘effective’; 19.2% that it was ‘very
effective’; and 8.1% that it was ‘extremely effective’. However, it must be noted that some
respondents felt that, for purposes of accountability, educators could stage manage a lesson in
order to please anyone observing it. In order to gain a balanced view, Pr1 indicated that at
times they talk to learners about what is going on in their classes. Observing lessons is used in
many countries as an internal accountability mechanism. Tailor (2007:569) notes that in the
United States “increased monitoring of teachers’ plans and books and increased lesson
observation has had a significant impact on discretion”.
In a comparative study of policy and practice in Finland and England, Webb et al (1998:551)
comment that lesson observation were also used effectively by teachers and HoD where this
would be followed by a discussions of the strengths and areas for improvement. However,
some teachers seem to dislike class visits since these are perceived to undermine their
professional discretion.  Teachers, as street-level bureaucrats, view themselves as masters of
their classes. Even in uMgungundlovu District, teachers “often view such visits with suspicion
and dislike them since they are associated with reducing their discretion” (Mutereko, 2009:21).
In another case study in the Netherlands, class visits which focused on aspects of instructional
behaviour were carried out by the school management at least three times a year (Hendriks,
Doolaard and Bosker, 2001:515). The main purpose of observing lessons in all the different
context mentioned here was to exercise accountability, although its overt use is to enhance
learning.
Turning to the inspection of students’ books by SMTs, this thesis revealed that most
respondents felt that this was an effective tool since it was considered to be a true record of
what takes places in a classroom in the absence of supervisors. A total of 84.7% acknowledged
this.
Attendance registers for teachers were acknowledged as an effective means of bureaucratic
accountability by many respondents (79.7%). This finding was unexpected in another sense
considering that all schools in uMgungundlovu District use such registers for monitoring
attendance, but there are often complaints about teacher absenteeism. The reason for this
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rather contradictory result is still not clear, but perhaps it could be explained by the improper
and ineffective use of such registers by SMTs.
This study showed that a total of 88.9% of those surveyed felt that the inspection of teacher
records was an effective tool of bureaucratic accountability. However, those who took an
exception to this pointed out that it was likely that a teacher could prepare excellent records to
please the SMTs but still fail to deliver effective lessons in class.
It is clear that the SMT is the most effective and critical level of hierarchical accountability in
uMgungundlovu District. These management teams oversee the daily activities of educational
policy implementation at school level. They work with subject advisors in ensuring compliance
with educational policy.
The role of subject advisors and clusters
This study has indicated that subject advisors were expected to play a very critical role in the
implementation of NCS. Although there were respondents who identified the effectiveness of
subject advisors, a significant proportion of respondents did not agree. This was also confirmed
by the subject advisors themselves who said that there were too few of them to cover all the
schools. Another area of concern was the content knowledge of the subject advisors which was
said to be inadequate. A study carried out by Dilotsothle, Smit and Vreken (2001) in North
West Province (South Africa) had indicated some of these issues. For instance, they discovered
that the majority of the subject advisors had not received a job description on appointment,
their roles had not been clearly spelt out, they had not undergone any training or induction and
that they were inexperienced as subject advisors (Dilotsothle, Smit and Vreken 2001:308).
They also found that:
• There is no legislation governing the functioning of subject advisors.
• There is a shortage of experienced subject advisors as a result of the small supply of
experienced science teachers.
• There is no formal evaluation of subject advisors by seniors or teachers. This is due
to the Labour Relations Act.
• There is evidence that subject advisors are involved in management at the expense
of other roles. (Dilotsothle, Smit and Vreken 2001:308)
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Since Dilotsothle, Smit and Vreken’s study, there have been improvements in guiding and
directing subject advisors’ work. For instance, Annexure 3 of the Guidelines on the
Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities of Education Districts (DBE, 2011b) provides a
detailed and unambiguous description of a subject advisor’s roles and responsibilities.
Notwithstanding this, this study has revealed that subject advisors in uMgungundlovu District
were doing far less than they was expected of them, as reflected in the findings presented in
Chapter Ten. At times teachers did not understand whether subject advisors were playing a
supportive role or the role of an inspectorate. As a result, the effectiveness of subject advisors
in enforcing accountability among teachers is difficult to determine.
On the positive side, subject advisors in uMgungundlovu District play a critical role in working
with subject clusters, HoD and cluster co-ordinators. They play an important role in
moderating school based assessment (SBA) for Grades 10, 11 and 12. Their role in the lower
grades is almost nonexistent (at least in uMgungundlovu District). Again, their work with
clusters could be an important accountability mechanism if it were used properly. However, as
reported in earlier chapters, sometimes the moderation by clusters was just a formality.
Taken together, it is clear that hierarchical accountability is exercised in uMgungundlovu
District where SMTs, subject advisors and cluster co-ordinators are playing pivotal roles in
implementing NCS. The exercise of hierarchical accountability and other forms of
accountability in education are informed by legal accountability. This is the topic of the next
section.
12.5 uMgungundlovu District: legal accountability
A review of government documents revealed that legal accountability is a critical element of
increasing accountability in educational bureaucracies and of street-level bureaucrats. This
thesis has shown that the work of teachers in uMgungundlovu District is regulated by
legislation. This includes: (1) the National Education Policy Act, No. 27 of 1996 which
provides for the determination of policy on salaries and conditions of employment of
educators; (2) South African Schools Act No. 84, of 1996 which outlines the conditions for the
employment and promotion of educators; (3) Employment of Educators Act No. 76 of 1998
which, among other things, addresses the appointment, promotion and transfer, and
performance of other work by educators; (5) South African Council for Educators Act, No. 31
of  2000 which provides for the compulsory registration of educators, which also defines and
promotes the ethical conduct of an educator as one who upholds the view of human rights
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embodied in the Constitution of South Africa; and General and Further Education And
Training Quality Assurance Act, No. 58 of 2001 (Umalusi) which ensures that educational
institutions adopt quality management systems for the achievement of learners and assure the
quality of learner assessment at exit points.
In some cases, legal accountability also regulates the relationships of teachers and their clients
(learners), their peers, their supervisors and the community at large. Legal accountability is
important in ensuring accountability by street-level bureaucrats. The South African
government is also bound by legislation to provide quality education for all. For instance, the
KwaZulu-Natal Joint Liaison Committee (a committee of independent schools) took the KZN
DoE to court over unpaid subsidies (The Witness 23 November 2012). The independent
schools won the case. Other cases of legal accountability include the mandatory registration of
teachers with SACE. However, evidence from this study revealed that although registration
with SACE was a legal requirement, a significant number of teachers was not registered.
The types of accountability presented so far are largely external. Another form of
accountability which this study explored is professional accountability which is the subject of
the next section.
12.6 uMgungundlovu District: professional accountability
The study has revealed that professional accountability in which street-level bureaucrats often
hold each other accountable constitutes a soft form of accountability processes in
uMgungundlovu District. The need for professional accountability is highlighted by Harley et
al (2000:298) who point out that there has been “increasing managerialism, bureaucratic
accountability regimes as opposed to professional accountability regimes”. In uMgungundlovu
District professional accountability was reflected in the work arrangements that allowed
educators a high degree of professional autonomy. SACE was mandated with promoting
professionalism among educators. In order to achieve this, SACE has a legal responsibility to
register and deregister all teachers. Furthermore, SACE is required to carry out professional
development with educators. This study considered these three main areas: the role played by
SACE in promoting professionalism among teachers; the use of professional development to
promote professional accountability; and the effectiveness of professional development
workshops in promoting professional accountability. These areas are summarised in Table
12.10.
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Table 12.10 uMgungundlovu District: summary of issues of professional accountability
that were investigated
Role played by SACE in promoting
professionalism
 professional ethics influences the work of teachers
 moral obligation influences the work of teachers
 the influences of peers on the work of teachers
 the role of SACE in promoting the teaching profession
Professional development as a means of
enhancing professional accountability
 attendance to professional development workshop
 classroom use of knowledge learned from professional
development
Perceived effectiveness of professional
development workshops
 effectiveness of professional development that focused on subject
content knowledge
 effectiveness of professional development that focused on
curriculum knowledge
 effectiveness of professional development that focused on
assessment and recording
 effectiveness of professional development that focused on
knowledge of children and learning
 effectiveness of professional development that focused on
classroom management
 effectiveness of professional development that focused on
leadership skills
12.6.1 uMgungundlovu District: role played by SACE in promoting professionalism
It has been reported that SACE has a legal mandate to “enhance the status of the teaching
profession through appropriate registration, management of professional development and
inculcation of a Code of Ethics for all educators” (SACE, online). This study revealed that
only 87% of all the educators were registered with SACE, leaving 13% unregistered.
Independent schools had the highest number of unregistered educators. Besides a monthly
subscriptions paid to SACE, educators were not aware of any activities which had been
organised or undertaken by SACE in the District. However, the OECD (2008:298) reports that
SACE has contributed significantly to the teaching profession and has the potential to achieve
more. Such potential is shown by the results of this study, especially considering the number of
respondents who are not aware of SACE’s other roles. One area that was regarded as being key
in promoting professional accountability was staff development and training.
12.6.2 Staff development and training
This thesis has shown that the DBE has been using training and staff development as a tacit
way of securing accountability among street-level bureaucrats in uMgungundlovu District. All
respondents reported that they had attended various workshops and seminars relating to staff
development. According to Simon, “the behaviour of a rational person can be controlled if the
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value and factual premises upon which he bases his decisions are specified for him”
(1997:308). To that end, Simon argues that “influence is exercised through control over the
premises of decision-making” (1997:308). This may also be revealed in the minimum
qualification for entry into teaching (Lipsky, 1980:201).
Staff development and training were used in uMgungundlovu District to equip educators with
the requisite skills, knowledge and competence to meet external accountability demands. This
is a clear sign that training is an important component of accountability, as noted by Simon
(1944:24; 1997:13) who avers that training influences decisions “from the inside out”. Simon
further asserts: “training prepares the organisation member to reach satisfactory decisions
himself, without the need for constant authority or advice” (1944:24). Put another way, training
is an alternative to the use of authority as a means of controlling street-level bureaucrats.
Another reason put forward by Riccucci (2005:87) is that “by setting up workshops with
managers and staff to discuss the consequences of various behaviours, professional stuff are
able to see the broader picture of the actual services delivered by their organisation”.
Simon (1997:13) says: “when persons with particular educational qualifications are recruited
for certain jobs, the organisation is depending upon this pre-training as principle means of
assuring correct decisions in their work”. When it comes to in-service training, street-level
bureaucrats may be given this (such as that carried out in uMgungundlovu District) during
school holidays or weekends to enable teachers to perform their task with less supervision. In
essence, training provides the street-level bureaucrats with a “frame of reference for thinking”
(Simon, 1997:13). This is hardly distinguishable from the minimum qualifications demanded
by SACE for a teacher to register as a professionally qualified educator, as discussed earlier.
Riccucci (2005:51) also emphases the importance of training for street – level bureaucrats,
especially whenever there is a policy change. In line with this, this study has revealed that most
respondents had attended the new CAPS orientation workshops. Some of the professional
development areas that the DBE focused on are: knowledge of children and learning; subject
knowledge; curriculum knowledge; curriculum interpretation;  knowledge of teacher’s role;
subject application; assessment and recording; leadership; classroom methodology and
classroom management. But how effective are these staff development workshops?
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12.6.3 The effectiveness of training and professional development
The interesting finding in this study was that, generally, most respondents said that the
workshops and training were very effective in making them more capable teachers in the
different professional development areas listed earlier (see Chapter 11.3). This was not
surprising since such findings have been recorded elsewhere. For example, a study of in-
service training in Jerusalem’s secular elementary schools revealed that children’s achievement
in reading and mathematics improved significantly (Angrist and Lavy, 2001:365). This is also
in line with Ngidi’s findings on an evaluation of Post Graduate Certificate in Education in
South Africa (NPDE) in which 70% of the respondents reported a considerable improvement in
the effectiveness of their development, which, moreover, was not related to the school or level
of qualification of recipients (Ngidi, 2005:37).
Generally, there was a small proportion of respondents in this thesis who reported that staff
development was not effective all (see Chapter 11.3). Those who were negative about the
effectiveness of workshops also complained about the competence of workshop facilitators
and/or the timing of such workshops. These findings are consistent with Ngidi’s (2005)
findings which also reported that about 30% of the respondents did not find the in-service
training effective. Even in Jerusalem’s religious schools, the in-service training was reported to
be ineffective, albeit for other reasons that were not related to religion and the main one being
the duration of training (Angrist and Lavy, 2001:365). Angrist and Lavy concluded that “that
teacher training may provide a less costly means of increasing test scores than reducing class
size or adding school hours” (2001:365).
To sum up, professional accountability in uMgungundlovu District was both internal and
external. Based on their professional training, teachers were expected to make independent
judgements about learning in their classes. The SMTs accorded them professional autonomy.
Externally, SACE was seen a professional body that was meant to ensure professional
accountability through registering teachers and inculcating professional ethics among the
educators. However, most respondents noted that SACE was not effective in carrying out its
mandate. This suggests that professional accountability like any other type of accountability
could not work in isolation from the others.
What this study concluded is that holding street – level bureaucrats accountable to the goals of
the DBE was not an easy task. It required various actors and different mechanisms of
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accountability in a combined effort. The commitment made at national level by politicians
may have a direct impact on how street – level bureaucrats react to the type of accountability to
which they are subjected. Performance accountability where the performance of educators was
measured was to some extent effective in holding educators accountable. Hierarchical
accountability which was administered by the SMTs at school level was seen a crucial
component of accountability. This was supported by different legislative requirement
(hierarchical accountability). It was seen that these forms of accountability were viewed as key
drivers of compliance. However, it was also seen at times that educators did not have the
requisite skills to comply. To address this challenge, professional accountability played a key
role in influencing educators’ decisions without resorting to the use of authority through
professional development. How do all these conclusions which emerge from the findings
answer the research questions and objectives posed at the outset of the study? The next section
addresses this question.
12.7 Conclusions about the research objectives
The whole enquiry sought to gain an understanding of how the DBE in uMgungundlovu
District secures accountability among the educators who are implementing the NCS. To
accomplish this, the thesis explored the perceptions of street – level bureaucrats of different
accountability mechanisms to which they are subjected.   The key objectives and conclusions
reached are presented here according to the various forms of accountability that were
indentified in the theoretical framework.
12.7.1 Political accountability
To explore the perceptions of teachers and principals of the government’s responsiveness to
the educational needs of South Africa.
With regards to this objective, the following conclusions are drawn from the findings:
a) In terms of financing education, the evidence from this study suggests that most
respondents were satisfied with the amount of money allocated to education in the
national budget but they lament that such funding was not reaching the schools.
b) Most respondents felt that the South African government had not been adequately
exercising political accountability in supporting less privileged schools. This was
despite the fact that the South African government had policies in place to support
such schools.
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c) Respondents were not satisfied with the exercise of political accountability in
supporting the less privileged learners, although the South African government had
such policies for a nutrition programme, transport programmes and a No Fee policy
for the benefit of such learners.
d) With regards to formulating educational policies, the findings from this study indicate
that respondents were not satisfied. However, it was recognised that after the demise
of apartheid the South African government formulated progressive policies which had
no racial bias.
e) Evidence from this study indicates that the South African government had been not
effective in implementing education policy. This view was also supported by the
evidence of numerous commissions established by successive ministers of education
to investigate the implementation of educational policy.
12.7.2 Performance accountability
To survey the implementation of performance evaluation used by the Department of Basic
Education (DBE) to secure accountability and improve the performance of the street-level
bureaucrats (teachers) in the implementation of NCS policy in uMgungundlovu District.
Concerning performance accountability, the conclusions are as follows:
a) Most respondents felt that the main purpose of performance evaluation was to
evaluate, improve efficiency and to learn best professional practices that could be
used in the classroom.
b) Improvement in the performance of educators was an upshot of performance
evaluation implemented through IQMS.
c) Compliance with the policies, rules and regulation of the DBE was an outcome of
performance evaluation.
d) The unintended consequences of performance evaluation were an increased
administrative work load for teachers and a narrowed focus on measured outputs.
e) Whilst this study did not confirm that performance evaluation caused teacher burnout
and caused teachers to falsify information about their work, it did partially
substantiate that such cases did occur.
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12.7.3 Hierarchical accountability
To explore the bureaucratic processes used by the DBE in order to improve the compliance
with policies and accountability of the street-level bureaucrats (teachers) who are
implementing NCS.
a) Using the evidence from this research it can be concluded that assessment of learners’
work through examination forms a major component of hierarchical accountability.
The main purposes of such assessment were to help the learners and to evaluate the
performance of the teachers.
b) In general, the use of assessments as hierarchical measures of accountability led to
improved accountability and enhanced classroom instruction as teachers attempted to
improve the pass rates of their learners.
c) The findings from this study indicate that: manipulation of test records; a narrowed
emphasis of teaching subject matter that was covered in examinations; an emphasis on
past examination papers; and rushed teaching in order to finish the syllabus are a
consequence of the use of assessments as a hierarchical accountability mechanism.
d) The study concludes that the SMTs played a critical role in ensuring that teachers in
schools adhered to policies, rules and regulations of the DBE.
e) The indications are that subject advisors were expected to play a pivotal role in the
implementation of NCS but they had not been equal to the task. The reasons for this
included a lack of capacity and that there were too many schools to be covered by a
single subject advisor.
12.7.4 Legal accountability
To explore the legal framework which governs the work of the street-level bureaucrats
(teachers) and ensure accountability and compliance with policies and rules in the
implementing the NCS.
a) The Constitution of South Africa makes basic education a right of all citizens.
Through it, the South African government is held responsible for the provision of
basic education.
b) Documentary evidence revealed that there is a range of legislation which governes the
work of educators in South Africa. For instance, there is a legal requirement for
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teachers to be registered with SACE. Other legislation provided for conditions of
employment, termination of service, appointments, promotion and transfers of teachers
and some relate to the quality assurance of learner assessment at exit points.
12.7.5 Professional accountability
To investigate how professional accountability improves accountability of the street-level
bureaucrats (teachers) and ensures their compliance with policies, rules and regulations in
implementing NCS in uMgungundlovu District.
a) Taken together, the findings of this thesis indicate that SACE was the main
professional body that was mandated with promoting professionalism among teachers
(by extension, this task involves promoting professional accountability).
b) In order to achieve this, SACE was legally required to register all professionally
qualified teachers. Unregistered teachers are not permitted to teach in South African
schools. However, this study revealed that such a requirement was too ambitious to
attain since almost all the schools surveyed had a proportion of their educators who
were unregistered.
c) The findings from this study indicate that one way of influencing the educators
without the use of authority was to improve their professionalism through training and
staff development. This method was reported to be very effective by respondents.
12.8 Implications of this study
This study has identified an analytic tool which assists our understanding of the role of street
– level bureaucrats in implementing policies, not only in education but with regard to all
public policies in which workers exercise some degree of professional discretion and
autonomy. The study further explored methods of limiting such discretion and holding street
– level bureaucrats accountable to organisational goals. The evidence collated in this thesis
adds to our understanding of the role of management, law and professional bodies in holding
street – level bureaucrats accountable.
It is apparent that The Principle of Scientific Management propounded by Frederick Taylor in
1912 is still relevant both as a theoretical tool for analysing organisational performance as
well as a practical means of managing workers’ performance in public organisations. The
evidence accumulated in this thesis implies that performance evaluation is an effective and
useful tool in managing the behaviour of workers. However, a further implication is that
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management should know important aspects of the job (key results areas) that they intend to
measure since street – level bureaucrats have a tendency to focus their attention and energies
on such tasks that are measured.
Several noteworthy implications for our understanding of bureaucratic accountability devices
used in implementing educational policy flow from this research. First, the use of
assessments was seen as pivotal in making teachers accountable for the learning of students.
Although these assessments are rarely aimed at measuring the performance of educators,
often teachers indirectly view their performance in terms of the proportion of their learners
who pass such assessments. The data from this study suggest that the use of assessments as
bureaucratic accountability devices could be exploited in order to secure accountability
among educators, but necessary efforts must be taken to mitigate the unwanted consequences
such as falsification of test records and teaching to the test which are likely upshots of using
such mechanisms.
This thesis has demonstrated that school management teams are critical key drivers of
accountability in educational policy implementation since they oversee the actual
implemention of such policy. Empowering these front – line managers with the proper skills
and knowledge would enhance their effectiveness. Furthermore, preparing detailed manuals
might help the SMTs to do their daily work. The study further indicates that the
implementation of NCS in uMgungundlovu District has the pontential to benefit from
adequate, effective, competent and well-informed subject advisors. This may require
furthering the training of the current subject advisors and employing more in order to reduce
the number of schools and teachers who are assisted by a single subject advisor.
With regards to legal accountability, the fact that not all teachers in uMgungundlovu District
are registered with SACE implies that either the law is not being observed, or that it is not
feasible to do so. For instance, for some schools it is difficult to find professional qualified
teachers who can teach cultural subjects like Music, Art and Dance, or others like Computers
Studies and Physical Education. This suggests that perhaps the law should make provisions
for such cases.
The findings of this study might have important implications for strengthening professional
accountability as a means of securing compliance among educators without resorting to the
exercise of authority. The evidence indicates that if educators undergo development this
could foster an intrinsic motivation for them to realise a moral and professional obligation to
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accomplish their tasks because they would then have the competence to do so. Further
implications relate to the role of SACE as a professional body: it has the potential to be more
visible and accessible to educators over and above the collection of monthly subscriptions.
Taken together, these findings suggest that no mechanism is perfect to hold accountable street
– level bureaucrats who are working in environments that allow them a high degree of
autonomy and discretion. The mechanisms of accountability which have been discussed in
this thesis are not mutually exclusive. Instead, it was demonstrated that they complement one
another.
This study has gone some way towards enhancing our understanding of the nature of street –
level bureaucrats in schools in the South African context and revealing how they are managed
in the course of policy implementation. However, the findings of this study represent an
initial step towards a complete understanding of managing policy implementation in such
street – level bureaucracies. Our knowledge could be enhanced by enlarging the sample of
the study as well as by covering a larger geographical area. Another possibility would be to
focus on one type of accountability mechanism and then undertake a comprehensive analysis
of how it is being used in implementing a specific public policy. This could be carried out as
a cross-national study embracing all the provinces in South Africa. More broadly, research is
also needed to determine how respondents perceive various types of accountability according
to areas of location location, educational qualifications, as well as their position in their
educational organisation. In short, an extended application of Lipsky’s formulation of street –
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APPENDIX ONE: LETTER OF CONSENT
Letter of Consent
Analyzing Accountability in Street-Level Bureaucracy: Managing the Implementation of National
Curriculum Statements in the Umugungundlovu District.
My name is Sybert Mutereko. I am a PhD student under the direction of Professor Ralph Lawrence (e-
mail: lawrencer@ukzn.ac.za) in the School of Sociology & Social Studies at the University of
KwaZulu-Natal in Pietermaritzburg. I am conducting a research study which focuses on
accountability mechanisms used in the implementation of National Curriculum Statements in the
Umugungundlovu District.
The main purpose of my study is to find out how the Department of Basic Education and schools seek
to secure and improve accountability in the implementation of National Curriculum Statements
uMgungundlovu District. Furthermore, the study seeks to understand how the school principals and
educators perceive the different accountability mechanisms the government and the secondary schools
employ to hold them accountable.
I appreciate your cooperation in this interview. No one in your school or the Department of Basic
Education will know how you have answered. You do not have to give your name or any person’s
name in your answers. Your responses will remain confidential. There are no right or wrong answers
to the questions in this interview. This study only seeks honest and thoughtful judgements about
accountability mechanisms used by government as well as your schools. Your opinion, perceptions
and judgements are very valuable to this study.  I hope you will find this very interesting.
Your participation in this study is voluntary. If you choose not to participate or to withdraw from the
study at any time, there will be no penalty. The results of the research study may be published, but
your name will not be used. All information you provide will be considered confidential and grouped
with responses from other participants.  Further, you will not be identified by name in my thesis or in
any report or publication resulting from this study. During the course of interviews a tape recorder
may be used but before that, your permission will be sought. Should you not agree to this, the
researcher will write down answers to the questions? If you agree to the use of tape recorder, the
researcher will insure that all information recorded is kept safely and deleted immediately after the
use. The data collected through this study will be kept in a safe place for five years (according to the
UKZN Research Ethics) in School of Sociology And Social Studies.
The research is expected to be completed in November 2011, and the research results will be shared
with the Department of Education, academics and policy makers thereafter.
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I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance
through the Office of Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee at UKZN.
However, the final decision about participation is yours. Should you have comments or
concerns resulting from your participation in this study, please contact Professor Ralph
Lawrence (e-mail: lawrencer@ukzn.ac.za) or myself at 208522821@ukzn.ac.za





APPENDIX TWO: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR PRINCIPALS
1. Type of school…………………………………………………………………
2. How does the Department of Basic Education ensures that:
(a) The schools are accountable to the goals of the department?
(b) The educators are accountable to the goals of the department?




4. How often do you use the following do you use the following accountability






5. What are the effects (intended and unintended) of these accountability mechanisms on
the teachers?
(a) Performance evaluation




6. What are the effects (intended and unintended effects) of the accountability
mechanisms in Question 5 (a), (b) and (c) on schools:
(a) Schools
(b) Teachers
7. Which organisations are involved in the implementation of the National Curriculum
Statement (NCS)?
8. What roles do the organisations like Umalusi, SACE and others play in the
implementation of  NCS and in ensuring accountability among:
(a) Schools?
(b) Teachers?
9. How effective are these organisations in securing accountability among teachers?
10. What role do subject advisors play in securing accountability among your teachers?
Thank you for your participation.
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APPENDIX THREE: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TEACHERS




4. Gender   male …….      female ……….
5. Race
6. SACE registration   YES…..     NO…….















9. Teaching experience in years.
<6 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 >25
1 2 3 4 5 6
Section B: Performance Evaluation/appraisal
1. Are there any performance evaluations your school? Yes…… No……













































Learner Performance…………… 1 2 3 4 5 6
Attendance……………………… 1 2 3 4 5 6
Punctuality……………………….
.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Languages (Fundamental) 1
Arts and Culture 2
Human and Social Studies and Languages 3
Physical, Mathematical, Computer, Life and Agricultural Sciences 4
Business, Commerce, Management and Service Studies 5
Manufacturing, Engineering and Technology 6
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Planning and administration…… 1 2 3 4 5 6
Co-curricular
activities……………
1 2 3 4 5 6
Lesson
delivery…………………...
1 2 3 4 5 6
























































To evaluate …………………….. 1 2 3 4 5 6
To motivate……………………... 1 2 3 4 5 6
To promote……………………... 1 2 3 4 5 6
To celebrate……………………. 1 2 3 4 5 6
To learn…………………………. 1 2 3 4 5 6
To improve efficiency...………... 1 2 3 4 5 6
To reward high performers…….. 1 2 3 4 5 6
To punish low performers………. 1 2 3 4 5 6






















To reward high performers
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………….
To punish low performers
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………




































Improved teacher performance…. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Improved learner performance…. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Teacher Burnout………………... 1 2 3 4 5 6
Window dressing………………. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Inhibits innovation………………… 1 2 3 4 5 6
Falsification……………………... 1 2 3 4 5 6
Focus on measured output 1 2 3 4 5 6
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Creaming……………………… 1 2 3 4 5 6
Private goal definition………….. 1 2 3 4 5 6
8. Do you agree that the use of performance evaluation systems improves your accountability?
Circle the appropriate number.
Agree fully Agree Uncertain Do not agree Do not agree at
all
5 4 3 2 1
9. Comment on the effects of performance evaluation mentioned in question 6. And any other






Section B: training and professional development
1. In the past two years have you ever received training on the items listed below? If your
answer is yes please indicate the training was formal (workshops or classroom training) or
informal (training by principal, HOD or peers).
If yes
Yes No Formal Informal Both
Knowledge of children and
learning………………………......
1 2 1 2 3
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Subject knowledge……………… 1 2 1 2 3
Curriculum knowledge………….. 1 2 1 2 3
Curriculum interpretation……….. 1 2 1 2 3
Knowledge of teacher’s role…….. 1 2 1 2 3
Subject application……………… 1 2 1 2 3
Assessment and recording………. 1 2 1 2 3
Leadership………………………. 1 2 1 2 3
Classroom methodology………… 1 2 1 2 3
Class management………………. 1 2 1 2 3
Other (name)…………………….. 1 2 1 2 3
2. If you have received, how effective were these training and professional programs in



































Knowledge of children and
learning………………………......
1 2 3 4 5 6
Subject knowledge……………… 1 2 3 4 5 6
Curriculum knowledge………….. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Curriculum interpretation……….. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Knowledge of teacher’s role…….. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Subject application……………… 1 2 3 4 5 6
Assessment and recording………. 1 2 3 4 5 6
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Leadership………………………. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Classroom methodology………… 1 2 3 4 5 6
Class management………………. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Other (name)…………………….. 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. How often do you apply what you learnt from formal training as well as informal training in
day to day duties?
Almost never Sometimes Often Almost
always
Formal (workshops and classroom
training)………
1 2 3 4
Informal (on the job training by
principal)………..
1 2 3 4





Section C: Student Assessment as accountability mechanism
1. How many formal assessments do give learners in the subject that you teach per year? ............






































4. Learner assessments are used as an accountability mechanism? Circle the appropriate number.
Almost never Sometimes Often Almost
always
To evaluate teacher performance........... 1 2 3 4
To assess the performance of the school. 1 2 3 4
To help the learners ……………………. 1 2 3 4
5. Who should be accountable for learners’ success in assessments? Circle the appropriate
number.
Almost never Sometimes Often Almost
always
Teachers……………………………….. 1 2 3 4
The school……………………………… 1 2 3 4
The parents…………………………… 1 2 3 4
The learners……………………………. 1 2 3 4
6. Who should be accountable for learners’ failure in assessments? Circle the appropriate
number.
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Almost never Sometimes Often Almost
always
Teachers……………………………….. 1 2 3 4
The school……………………………… 1 2 3 4
The parents…………………………… 1 2 3 4
The learners……………………………. 1 2 3 4
7. How does the use of student assessments as an accountability mechanism for the teachers



































Academic improvement in all subject
categories……………………………….......
1 2 3 4 5 6
Encouraged accountability in schools……... 1 2 3 4 5 6
Improved instruction and classroom
practices…………………………………….
1 2 3 4 5 6
Enhanced preparatory curriculum for higher
education and vocational training…………
1 2 3 4 5 6
Manipulated test records and result………...
1 2 3 4 5 6
Dispossession of students who fail to meet
the desired performance levels……………..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Teacher emphasis on subject areas that are
covered in exams…………………………
1 2 3 4 5 6
Set a false idea of the aims and purposes of
education……………………………………
1 2 3 4 5 6
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Promotes ‘finish syllabus syndrome’……… 1 2 3 4 5 6
Promotes emphasis on past exams………… 1 2 3 4 5 6





Section D: Supervision and Inspection
1. Who supervises the work that you do?
HOD Principal Subject adviser
1 2 3































































Lesson observation........................................ 1 2 3 4 5 6
Student book inspection............................... 1 2 3 4 5 6
Clock in registers (attendance)...................... 1 2 3 4 5 6
Teacher records (plans inspection)................ 1 2 3 4 5 6
Thank you for your participation.
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APPENDIX FOUR: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS
